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Re-examination of this work has revived the y 
impression it made on me in 1962. As a history
ref. work this thesis is valuable, mainly 
because of Kealy*s extraordinary diligence. It 
includes a large amount of material quoted from 
contemporary official memoranda, including some 
that would not be normally available to research 
workers, and some (inter-district memos espec.) 
that probably no longer exist . Most of the 
documents and their authors are identified 
-which I believe was the main reason for Hasluck 
- ’s demand that the thesis was to be kept under
^raPS’Healy has a tendency to ignore any facts 
that do not support his generally accurate 
contention that the post-Pacific War Aust. Admin 
of PNG was unimaginative and heavily paternalistl 
One example : it is basic to his argument 
that tsi developing native local government the 
Aust. Govt, and the PNG Admin . both discouraged 
political development and the display of 
initiative by local council leaders. This is 
partly correct. But Healy*s own references show 
that he must have seen some quite startling 
contrary evidence. Thus at pp. 654-655 in his 
thesis he quotes from Fienberg*s paper of 5.11.57 
written for C.R.Lambert, then Sec. for Terr.Dept. 
Healy omits mentioning that this paper, inter 
alia, advocated a common roll franchise for PNG 
as soon as it could be arranged.The Reifcber Council situation Healy descr- 
-ibes at pp. 675-676 hardly bears out his 
repeated contention that Council initiatives 
were stifled by kiaps. *
U l * * * , -J^ rf< 4: o* - U j mf* ■ f  - •7 * •
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PREFACE
This thesis attempts to cover a great area of ground previously mapped only in outline. It takes the ideals and 
preconceptions underlying native administration and relates 
them to actual practice at the district and village level; only in this way oan the shaping and re-shaping of policy 
be defined and understood* For these purposes, much of the 
source material is unusually poor; large segments of the pre­war Territory records, notably Divisional correspondence, 
were lost during the war. Our knowledge of relevant culture 
change is also slender* Even in Africa, it is only in recent years that anthropologists have devoted concentrated effort to the political problems of segmentary societies; in Papua 
they have generally sought sooieties unsmirched by colonial 
acculturation* For all these reasons, lacunae and 'thin' areas in the thesis will be obvious. Conscious of this, and of the fact that much of what I have adumbrated may serve as a 
starting point for later and deeper studies, I have used as many examples in substantiation as space allows*
For access to published material, and to the pre-war 
unpublished material my thanks are due to the staffs of the library of the Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University; of the Mitchell Library, Sydney; amJ of 
the National Library, Canberra* I also thank the librarian of A.S*O.P.A. for making reports from the School available to me in Canberra* I owe a heavy debt to Mr. J.H* Gibbney 
of the National Archives, Canberra, for patient guidance through Papuan official records whioh he was still classifying*
For enabling me to collect post-war material I thank The 
Australian National University, which made possible an extensive 
field-trip (see map) through Papua-New Guinea and the British Solomon Islands in 1960* Many officials of the two 
Administrations responded generously to my endless questions 
and requests. In particular I thank Mr* H.T. Plant, Executive Officer (Local Government) in the Papua-New Guinea Administration, and Mr. T* Russell, acting Secretary for 
Protectorate Affairs in the B.S.I.P* Administration*
Every effort has been made to use the information 
gathered on this field-trip accurately and fairly* I have 
enough personal experience of colonial problems to be aware of their complexity. Where a critical spirit is evident, this 
in no way impugns the dedication or ability of offioials*
The fact is that colonial administration is a peculiarly taxing and delicate endeavour, in which even the most able
i
11
and beat intentioned of men can hope for only limited success. Any colonial study with pretensions to objectivity 
must reflect this and, with a just sense of contemporary 
realities, must point to past deficiencies. Otherwise 
historical perspective means nothing.
For help while the thesis was being planned and written 
I owe special thanks to Dr. F.J. West and Prof. J.W.Davidson of the Department of Pacific History, the Australian 
National University, for what must have seemed tedious and 
often unprofitable advioe and enoouragement, freely given to someone who, in 1959, knew nothing of Melanesia.
Some material is relegated to appendices which, without 
limitations on space, might possibly have been included in the thesis proper. However, although this is germane and is 
often referred to, it represents additional evidence or is 
peripheral to the main theme. Because of access undertakings 
it is all unpublishable, but may prove useful to future scholars when they come to analyse the history of Papua more 
intensively.
Allowing for the acknowledged quotation or re-inter­pretation of researoh published by others, the thesis is the 
writer’s original work.
A.M. Healy
14th March, 1962.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The term ’Native Administration’s ie used 
in the rather restricted sense in which it has 
been defined by Lord Hailey, having particular 
reference here to the ways in which native« 
have participated in ’procedures of local 
administration*
The jurisdiction of the Western Pacific High 
Commission was found Inadequate everywhere) 
Ch.I(a-b) this inadequacy was particularly marked in New 
Guinea before and under the protectorate, 
because of the laok of chiefs.
Under Sir William MacGregor* s administ­
ration of the colony the search for chiefs who 
could be made responsible for co-operation 
with government continued for a time; initially 
MacGregor sought to adapt methods anfl in­
stitutions from Fiji. The delegation of res­
ponsibility to Government Chiefs proved tedious 
Ch. 1(c) and unsuccessful. Local control through
appointed village constables was accepted as 
a substitute, MacGregor was so involved with 
pacification - to some extent involuntarily - 
that a simple police system was found expedient. 
With a small European staff of poor quality, 
it seemed to offer relatively easy and un­
complicated control.
In the period 1898-1908 central control of 
pacification techniques deteriorated, and the 
Ch.1(d) trend to direct police rule accelerated; a co­
rollary was the total eolipse of the Govern­
ment Chiefs.
1) Hailey, Native Administration in the British Afrioan Terri­
tories. ÏV, pp. i"» 1#
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Ch. II
Ch.IV
Ch. V
Sir Hubert Murray had as his firet task the
close regulation of pacification. In addition,
pressures for settler development forced the
rapid extension of the frontier. These
faotors, in relation to insufficient funds
and staff, inhibited the evolution of new
methods of native administration. Indeed, the
hurried appointment of village constables came
to be looked on in hope (or desperation) as
the talisman of law and order*After 1918, when systems of native tax and
of native plantations were introduced, the 
deficiencies of the simple village constable 
system became progressively more patent* This 
led to experiments with non-statutory village 
councillors and assessors* A few enlightened 
officers, and the missions, conscious of social 
stresses for which native administration did 
not provide, even initiated approaches to 
native councils and oourts* Murray’s adminis­
trative preconceptions, essentially assimil- 
ationist, precluded any real or substantial 
delegation to natives*
Murray's death and the war brought a period 
of re-thinking* Increasing centralization of 
control in Australia opened the way for a new 
group not steeped in *the Murray tradition1 to 
exert influence* methods similar to the British 
Native Authority system were mooted. En­
trenched opposition and the traditional con­
ceptions eventually proved too strong, however, 
Native local government, as implemented, thus 
constituted only a segment of the more com­
prehensive system of native administration
A
Voriginally projected; in particular, the element 
of devolution was rejeoted* In part thie derived, 
conceptually, from the paradoxical reserve shown 
the few traditional authorities by MacGregor and 
Murray* Moreover, actual delegation of powers 
and functions to councils was slight; they became 
Administration instrumentalities, while a policy 
of centralizing without a centralizing of policy 
strangled local initiative.
Until 1956, when local government extension 
became accepted policy, councils were established 
in response to local pressures. Opposition within 
and outside the Administration, together with the 
primary emphasis on executive training (the two 
being inter-related) implied that counoils were 
established only in carefully surveyed areas* The 
legacy of the long-standing village official 
system meant that initially many tiny ’parishes* 
(traditional political units) within a projected 
area had to be persuaded to confederate, and that 
there were almost no natives capable of assuming 
executive responsibility* Ideally councils were 
set up only where adequate cohesion and economic 
potential existed; but this principle often gave 
way in the face of political and other factors# 
Centralization and the non-traditional approach 
of the Administration to native local government 
tended to emasculate local authority which 
Chs. VII-IX councils or councillors sought to assume* Thl* 
was particularly noticeable in the legislative 
sphere. Political tension developed in certain 
areas*
Ch. VI s
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Ch. VIII
Even in the executive sphere, the lack of an 
integrated approach by central government frus­
trated co-operation by councils in developmental 
responsibilities, although they had notable 
achievements in the erecting of buildings, the 
sinking of wells, etc. Forms of co-operation 
were slowly and painfully worked out with the 
central Education and Health Departments. 
by 7^  Broadly, however, the disorganization and delay 
to which many councils were subjected, together 
with the discouragement by central government of 
Chs. IX-X political expression through local government, 
t j t f a t  • N o n c*J*‘ 9 often eroded interest, inhibited the assumption
r- & A - /Al> 6’ -cr z > £ c * o of local responsibility and thereby perpetuated
¿(An)^ ¿¡pliance on central government. Paternal welfare 
'ZZ.ooGr**^ ZS* ~ — ' was accepted by government as a substitute for
^  (rationalei as a preparation for) administrative
7 fr£ devolution. (The analogy with former Belgian
r-rue. i f *  7
-¡H & i /Kr^policy is striking). This emphasis, inter alia.
(/VVM Tt,cpi P  ? ~7L 1 r........ .. ry'a-c/o'r' also frustrated approaches to other forms of
Ch# H  local government.®
2) For a more complete outline of various aspects of my argu­ment, see my articles listed in the Bibliography, III, b,
(i) and (ii), especially Native Looal Government in New 
Guinea: Its Functions and Problems. J.A.A.. XIII# 5. 1961, pp.165-^4. ^his was written in I960 - a few of the views expressed there are slightly modified in the thesis),
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THE FOUMDATIOfiS OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
I. Pre-Protectorate Administration.
(i) She Inadequate Extension of British Jurisdiction
An understanding of the events leading to the annexation
of British New Guinea is essential for an appreciation of
later administration.1 During the 1870s Britain attempted
to control relations between British subjects and Pacific
natives more closely. One step towards this was the
annexation of Fiji in 1874. According to Ward, this was part
of the policy of ’minimum intervention*;2 according to Morrell,
there was no such policy, for British statesmen did not think
t
continuously about Pacific problems.
At all events, the British government had to devise
remedies for wrongful acts by British subjects, and for
outrages perpetrated by natives.
Above all else, it was necessary that British law 
should follow British subjects into the unannexed 
islands where native rulers still retained theirA 
sovereignty.
In New Guinea and the Solomons this problem was aggravated 
by the lack of centralised political structures and therefore
1) J.D. Legge, Australia and New Guinea to the Establishment 
of the Britisk Protectorate, tiist. Studies Aust.. IV>
p. 54.
2) J.M. Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific. 1786-1893. 
p. 41-9. —  — ....— ..........
3) W.P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Island, p.vii.
4) Ward, op.cit., p.262.
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of native rulers* In the late 1870s and early 1880s this 
problem came into prominence as labour traders penetrated
c
more deeply into western Melanesia, Moreover, attention
focussed on the area as wild commercial hopes were aroused
and as the Australian colonies recognized the strategic
£
importance of the area,
The major step taken by the British government was the 
promulgation of the Pacific Islanders Protection Act, 1875, 
which provided for a High Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners 
exercising jurisdiction (Sect. 6) over British subjects in 
the unannexed islands,7 The first Order in Council (1877) 
applied this, specifically, for our purposes, to New Guinea 
east of 143°, New Britain, New Ireland, and the Louisiade 
Archipelago, This Act laid the basis for the diffusion of 
British justice from Fiji; but for its machinery it relied
o
still on the Royal Navy (’commodore justice*), A further
Order in Council (1879) broadened control over British
subjects, and was designed to secure friendly relations with
9native authorities; but the whole system was defective in 
the undefined relations between the Deputy Commissioners and 
the Navy; the latter in 1881 was given primacy in judging
5) W.T. Wawn, The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour 
Trade, pp,2?&-&df noted as a major facior from the Eriilsh 
viewpoint in M.G. Jacobs, The Colonial Office and New 
Guinea, 1874-84. Hist. Stuff. Aust. V» 18, 19&2, pp.156-18.
6) J,D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy, pp.7-30* Ward, op, 
cit,, Ch. XXVYtl, passim.
7) Ward, op.cit,, p,265,
8) Morrell, op.cit., pp,184-6.
9) Ward, op.cit., pp.274-5.
3native 'Acts of War' and thereby in determining punitive 
retaliation.1^
The resulting jurisdiction was in practice fortuitous, 
depending on the play of personalities and on the practica­
bility of visiting offending native groups. Its inadequacies 
can be illustrated from the experiences of H.H. Romilly, 
appointed Deputy Commissioner to New Guinea and the Solomons in 
1881. For two months Romilly had available to him H.M.S.
Beagle. for what Sir Arthur Gordon called 'an ambulatory 
mission of inspection of British Beachcombers'.11 His principal 
object, in the New Britain area, was to investigate reported 
murders of Europeans. He made a distinction between provoked 
attacks by natives (for example, the Kleinschmidt case, no 
action taken) and unprovoked attacks (for example, the murder 
of an English trader on the north coast, where a naval party 
was put ashore 'to try to capture the actual murderer and to 
give a lesson to the natives').1^
Romilly was apparently prepared for the Navy to continue 
to exercise punitive jurisdiction; but he also had some con­
ception of the need to sheet home individual responsibility
10) Ibid., pp.275-7. The position seems to have been anomalous, 
for if fully applied the 1875 Act would have destroyed the 
informal, often arbitrary, jurisdiction of naval officers- 
see Western Pacific Royal Commission Report (Cad. 3905, 
1884), para. 46. Of course Deputy Commissioners had to 
rely on the Navy for sanctions.
11) H.H. Romilly, Lettersfrom the Western Pacific and Mashona- 
land. 1878-91« pp.148-9.
12) Ibid., pp. 160-, 149 respectively*
4amongst natives, and not only to punish those who trans­
gressed but to establish friendly relations in order to fore­
stall transgression. During his seoond tour in 1883 his role
was more clearly that of preventing clashes between whites
13and natives. He made no attempt to intervene in native
fauding, and on one occasion witnessed a battle begun by a
fchieff he had befriended, and the subsequent eating of the
14bodies.
(ii) The Search for a Solution
The lack of Jurisdiction over natives was the major fault
in the powers of the High Commission; but there were divergences
of opinion on rectifying this. Sir Arthur Gordon felt that
the powers of the High Commissioner could be amplified and
simplified; and, although he did not rule out measures that
16
might be *more effective*, he was appalled at the thought
that the natives might be entrusted to the 'unfit* government 
17of Queensland«
13) Ibid», p.177. Here he was separated from the Navy, 
possibly with salutary results. He travelled on a labour 
vessel, and was dependent on the hospitality of a German 
trader for accommodation.
14) H.H« Romilly, The Western Pacific and New Guinea, Ch. Ill; 
Letters, pp«18S-6; ¿.¿U Fort, Chance or Design, pp,44-6, 
Homilly took six armed Solomon Islanders as 'boat's crew' — 
a common practice among the traders, and the origin of
the ’water police* under the Protectorate«
15) Western Pacific Royal Commission Recommendations, Queensland 
Leg. Council Journals*, 1884, I, pp,272-3, paras. 10,12, 
15,184.
16) Ibid., para.205,
17) Gordon to Gladstone, 20.4.1883,quoted P. Knaplund, Sir 
Arthur Gordon on the New Guinea Question. 1883, Hist. Stud. 
4ust. " m .  277 lov. i§5"l7T;3307 ------- ------------------
Attitudes in the Australian colonies were complex. ’Lax 
measures’ to punish natives were criticized! but the 1881 
Inter-Colonial Conference had no real answer, beyond trans­
ferring the High Commissioner’s powers to a Federal Court 
(obviously dependent on federation) or outright British 
annexation*1®
In 1883-4 the Queensland Government was in a peculiarly
difficult position, for recruiters for the sugar plantations
burst into the Louisiades, the d’Entrecasteaux, and the ad-
19
joining mainland. The government was continually amending
the Pacific Island Labourers’ Act, but its shipboard Agents
20were often inefficient. Romilly warned certain natives about
P i
reoruiting; but no one warned thoss in Milne Bay. The 
notorious cruise of the Hopeful to this area (1884) forced a 
Queensland Royal Commission whioh revealed a wide range of
pp
recruiting trioks and abuses. The Western Pacific High 
Commission was well aware that the repercussions of recruiting 
provoked many of the retaliatory attacks by natives; though
18) Inter-Colonial Conference, Queensland Leg. Council Journals 
1881, II, p.843. As an Interim measure it called for in­
creased powers for the H.C., but oould not say how such 
powers were to be exercised*
19) Morrell, op.cit., p.400. They were legally restricted to 
the Louisiades*
20) Romilly believed that if all the provisions had been en­
forced, the cost of labour would have been prohibitive - 
From my Verandah in New Guinea. p.212.
21) Romilly, op.cit. (Letters). p.184* letter dated 12.10.1883.
22) Report of the Royal Commission into the Polynesian Labour 
Trade, Queensland V. & P., 1885, II, pp.797-988.
5
6Queensland representatlYes had long denied recruiting abuses,
Bomilly noted, after returning natives recruited by the
Hopeful to their homes, that fthese same returned islanders
24are now the most hostile natives to whites in New Guinea*,
although at the time of their return in 1885 they had been
assured that ’for the future, they would be protected against
25such outrages*. Their experiences left an unfortunate
legacy of distrust amongst those natives who had had most
intense outside contact.
It is unnecessary further to elaborate the dilemma in
which the British Government was placed. It gradually became
clear that only the establishment of an adequate form of
administration within New Guinea itself would prevent abuses
and native-white clashes) only annexation would satisfy the
27Australian colonies, and particularly Queensland. At the 
same time the British Government was very chary of Queensland’s
23) Queensland Agent-General• s interview with Lord Derby, 
7.3.1883; Agent-General to C.O., 17.4.1883 - Queensland 
V. & P., 1883, I, pp.773-8.
24) H.H. Eomilly, From, My Yerandah_ln_Me wjGuliaa. V-22Zt ef. 
pp. 192-3.
25) See Eomilly*s account of the cruise of the Victoria. 
Pergusson Island, 1.7.1885; Queensland V. & 188S, II, 
p.1072.
26) Romilly, The Western Pacific and New Guinea, pp.189-90.
27) Correspondence respecting Annexation of New Guinea, 1883: 
Queensland P.P. No.22, 1883. Also see R.B. Joyce, The 
Administration of British New Guinea. 1888-1902. p.IS*
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7interests in a future Protectorate, possibly with some reason*
(iii) The Importance of the Missionaries
One of the most important factors in the situation, 
however, was the attitude of the L.M.S. missionaries, the 
real pioneers in Papua. According to Romilly, it was a letter 
by Dr. Lawes to The Times which first awoke British opinion to 
the illegality of much labour recruiting carried out under
pQ
Queensland Government surveillance* Chalmers in 1883 had
stated that Queensland control would mean the sacrifice of
30the natives; Lawes had sought no annexation - he wanted 
the natives *left alone* - but as this was impossible he felt
31it *far better to have an English Government than any other*.
28) At the time of the 1883 ’annexation’ the Bundaberg Mail« 
the organ of the sugar interests, was reported to have 
saidi *That settles the Kanaka labour question for ever* - 
quoted Brisbane Courier. 17.5.1898* Large elements of 
public opinion in Queensland continued to feel themselvee 
cheated by the *pro-native* administration of MacGregor*
Note also the instructions Issued to H.M. Chester when 
returning illegally recruited labourers to their homes in 
1885: *As the Government are anxious that the most friendly 
relations between the natives of New Guinea and Europeans 
should be maintained, I have to request that you will *** 
make it clearly known that while every effort will be made 
to punish irregularities on the part of ike whites, 
reprisals by the natives will be followed by ample punish­
ment. * (Pnder-Col'* Sec** Brisbane* to Chester, 6*6* 1865s~ 
P 7  & P* 1885, II, p.1055). My italics.
29) Romilly in Queensland V* & P* 1885, II, p«1069*
Generally, see D.C. Gordon, The Australian Frontier in 
New Guinea* pp. 150-73.
30) C* Lennox, James Chalmers of New Guinea* p. 126; J. Chalmers 
Pioneering in New Guinea, p.ill.
31) Letter of 8.5.1885, quoted R* Lovett, James Chalmers* His 
Autobiography and Letters, p*260-1.
Morrell remarks that"the affair of the Hopeful in parti­
cular* .*. indicated the need for a protectorate, but 
hardly augured well for its success** Op.cit*, p.402. 
Romilly was anxious about Queensland control - From My
Verandah in New Guinea, pp.212-3.
8The London Missionary Society had in fact, established
a form of local control at the Tillage level before the
Protectorate was proclaimed, and it saw this threatened on
all sides: by the extension of the labour trade, by
•commodore justice’, and by the intrusion of Government
officials which a Protectorate promised#
The mission on the mainland was begun at Manumanu, west
of Port Moresby, in 1872, when six Polynesian teachers and
their wives were left there by Murray and Gill# Lawes
established himself at Port Moresby in 1874, and Chalmers
3 3
arrived in 1877. They brought large stretches of the coast
under mission influence, through *a system of planting native
teachers at various spots . until they succeeded in
establishing a line of communication from the Papuan Gulf to
34.
the Louisiade Archipelago* •
Chalmers in particular, possessing many of Livingstone*s 
attributes and using many of his methods, influenced native- 
white relations deeply in the pre-Protectorate period; and, 
indeed, his influence was of great importance to local 
officials under both the Protectorate and the Colony. He has 
described his own arbitral functions, and his intercession 
in tribal wars (which contrasts strangely with Homilly*s
32) J. Chalmers, Pioneer Life and Work in New Guinea# 1877*1894# 
p. 146# ....... ' .. ....
33) Ibid., p.vii, 148.
34) Romilly, The Western Pacific and Hew Guinea, p.241: H# 
Goodall, A History of the iiondon Missionary Society# 1895- 
1945, p.4l2 ei seq.
inaction in New Ireland)} and there were many testimonies
to his remarkable influence almost from the time of his
35first contact with new groups* Romilly as Deputy
Commissioner was not slow to pay tribute to the work of the
missionaries: fit is very largely owing to the influence they
have over the natives that so many white men have visited
u
the country without accident#* The mission was at that
time protecting the lives of British subjects, and averting
clashes, in a way which the High Commission was unable to do*
Sir Arthur Goarâon also paid an elaborate tribute to their
law-and-order functions in his Royal Commission Report. In
one case noted by the Commission the natives of Tupuseleia
had been induced by Chalmers to submit to the authorities
their claim that one of their number had been shot by the
master of a trading ship* #Instead of retaliating, the
natives waited for a man-of-war to come and enquire into their
37wrongs; but none came#*
Thus, the London Missionary Society made the first real 
attempts to bring peace amongst the native peoples themselves. 
One influential native is said to have remarked in 1882, 
after Chalmers arbitrated in a feud between the Kabadi and
35) R.Abel, Charles Abel of Kwato. pp.43-4. Tribute by Dr* 
Doyle Glanviiie, a member of Scratehley's staff, in 
Lovett, op.cit., pp.281-2; also in Lennox, op.oit., p*137. 
See Chalmers, Pioneering in Hew Guinea* ch.Ill, passim.
36) Romilly, The Western Pacific and Hew Guinea, p.242.
37) W.P. Royal Commission Report (1884), cit.sup., pp.271-2 
and footnote*
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Manuraanu peoples, that 'but for the missionaries ••• we 
should have taken everything from you, and burned every 
house in your village'.38 And in 1884 Chalmers persuaded 
the Kabadi and Motumotu (Toaripi) peoples to exchange valuables 
under his aegis, as a symbol of peacemaking* At the same 
time he was firm: fI told the Motumotuans to clear out, as 
they were a bad lot, and no village was safe whilst they were 
on the coast; that we should soon visit them to give them 
teachers, and that I hoped they would then be better.'
Consolidation of influence by the appointment of native 
teachers was paralleled by the Administration later, with its 
village constables. Along the south coast the teachers were 
generally first established, and spiritual and temporal 
authority tended to go together; here were the seeds of 
conflict and bad relations, not only at the village level, 
but between the Administration and the missions generally.
Although from this viewpoint the missionaries were pre­
disposed to resent tighter official control in New Guinea, 
their mission teachers were in constant danger, a fact which 
makes Lawes' reaction to the proclamation of the Protectorate 
all the more remarkable. Indeed, on occasions in the pre- 
Protectorate period the missionaries co-operated in facilitating
38) Chalmers, Pioneering in New Guinea, p.96.
39) Ibid., p.110. Chalmers himself set up a station at Motu­
motu in 1887* Lovett, op.oit., pp.295-370; also see C*S. 
Horne, The Story of the L.M.S». pp.409-10* general re- 
arrangement.
11
Wolverene 'punished* the natives of Kalo for their massacre
of the mission teachero, and Chalmers clearly regarded this
as the only course open; he noted that afterwards the natives
in the area were • anxious to have a teacher again stationed
40with them, and ... promised to treat him well'. It would
appear that, to some degree like governments of the period,
'in this genuine devotion to great ends, they were often
41careless of unjust means* •
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that until 1888, when 
effective jurisdiction began to be established over British 
New Guinea, the London Missionary Society missionaries played 
the major part in bringing peace amongst those coastal 
peoples with whom they came in contact, and between natives 
and Europeans. This in turn laid a basis, slender but 
significant, for effective administration under the Colony.
the administration of ’commodore justice*. In 1881 H.M.S.
40) Chalmers, Pioneer Life and Work...» p. 140*
41) Cambridge History of the British Empire» III, p.347, 
referring particularly to the Radical Imperialists.
CHAPTER 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OP NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
(b) PROTECTORATE ADMINISTRATION. 1884 - 1888
(i) The Powers of the Special Commissioner in Relation to 
Native" Tolicy------ K------  --------------------------
On November 6th, 1884 the British government proclaimed a
protectorate over south-eastern New Guinea, bounded to the
north roughly by the central cordillera, and to the east by
longitude 141°. Australiafs Interests at this time are said
to have amounted to no more than preventing a field for
commercial exploitation pass into German hands; while the
L.M.S. missionaries had reconciled themselves to 'some
assumption of authority' and thought British control the least
of the threatening evils.1
In the 1880s the declarations of a protectorate, even over
territories possessing rulers of treaty-making status,
generally implied wide rights without corresponding obligations
l) Ward, op.cit., p.319; Legge, loc.cit. (1949), pp.42-3, 47; 
Lovett, op.cit., p.260. Por the confusion over boundaries, 
see Gordon, op.cit., p.248. According to Jacobs (loc.cit. 
p. 106) it was a matter of shared costs rather than any 
doctrinaire theory of non-intervention *hich prevented 
earlier British acquiescence in annexation. The 1883 
Inter-Colonial Convention agreed to share costs (ibid., 
p.114; Gordon, op.cit., pp.191-3).
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and responsibilities* In New Guinea, the implications of 
the declaration were extremely vague* The adequate regulation 
of relations between the natives and Europeans was supposedly 
one aim; but the imbalance between this assumed responsibility 
and actual powers and capacity was great* In fact, annexation 
of *ihich the consequences were to be avoided, and undertaken 
primarily to forestall another power, provided little incentive
%
for the development of sound administration*
When Sir Peter Scratchley was appointed Special Commissioner 
in November 1884 his powers were only those of a Deputy 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific* S*W* Griffith, when 
asked for a legal opinion on Scratchley*s powers, replied that 
he had no legislative powers, and *only such administrative or 
executive powers as may be exercised by a Deputy
4
Commissioner**** By omission, Scratchleycs Commission so 
limited his powers over natives. Only one section dealt with
2
2) •Protection* at that time had a connotation as diffuse as 
that of 'sovereignty*, on which it depended. Arguments in 
international law generally revolved around the Austinian 
theory of the indivisibility of sovereignty, which reduced 
responsibilities and obligations towards protectorates to 
the status merely of club rules of morality* See Collected 
Papers of John Westlake on International Law (ed* Bppenheim) 
p*i86; M* iflalne, international Law* pp*S8-9; L* Oppenheim, 
International Law ( ed* tauterpacht), I, p*196 note 1; H#
Lauterpacfat in C * H* B * E *, III, p*681; Birkenhead, Inter­
national Law* p.W.
3) T* Baty (The Canons of International Law« pp*399-400) stated 
that ’control and responsibility must go together*; but 
this was written in 1930* However, African precedents had 
shown that even at that time the type of internal responsi­
bility and control which could be expected was far from 
definite*
4) Griffith to Sir A. Musgrave, 18*5*1885: Report on British 
New Guinea, 1884—5, Appendices pp.26—7*
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his duties towards natives! this simply instructed him to 
promote ’religion and civilization’f to protect the persons 
and lands of the natives, and ’by all lawful means to prevent 
and restrain all violence and injustice which may in any 
manner be practised or attempted against them’.®
The Colonial Office instructed Scratchley that his major 
duties were to make himself acquainted with the country, to ( 
establish friendly relations with the natives, and to try to 
’inspire their confidence and acquire their good-will*. The 
theme, then, continued to be the protection of whites from 
natives and to a less extent natives from whites. Any attempts 
at administration beyond that suffered from the fact that the 
protectorate was regarded, at best, as an interim arrangement 
under which the Imperial government could weigh up the 
problems of administering a country it had eventually acquired
g
precipitately and about i&ich it knew practically nothing* 
Scratchley had a little more independence than a Deputy 
Commissioner, in that he was enabled to correspond directly
5) Commission, para* II, dated 20.11.1884 — CPI (Prot.), set 
7, N.G. Letter Book 1* The remainder of Scratchley*s 
Commission largely repeated the principles of, and the 
Regulations made under, the Western Pacific Orders in 
Councils that all land transactions should go through the 
Administration, that legitimate trade should be encouraged, 
that all dealings with natives In arms or ammunition, 
explosives and liquor should be prohibited, and finally 
that • every lawful obstacle should be placed in the way of 
the recruitment of labourers from the protectorate’.
6) Herbert (C*0.) to Scratchley, 17*11.1884-CP1 (Prot.), set 
7, N.G. Letter Book 1.
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with the Secretary of State about the protectorate, and 
within the lix&its of his Commission he was to act on his own
7
discretion, though keeping the High Coamissioner Informed*
When Douglas succeeded Scratchley as Special Commissioner 
the Colonial Office once again insisted he could make no laws 
binding on natives or non-British subjects; a fact which, it
Q
said, Scratchley had not fully understood* He was to make 
regulations even for British subjects only 'if *** able to
9
enforce them* •
What the Special Commissioner was empowered to do inevitably 
determined, to a large degree, both his general policy and what 
was actually done at the local level* To the extend that 
•commodore justice* was continued, however, and the Commission 
exceeded, there was scope for the working out of a rudimentary 
approach to the elements of native administration*
(ii) An evolving native policy
The status of the natives under the protectorate was 
extremely vague; this allowed Scratchley, Romilly and Douglas, 
as well as their deputies, to adopt individual approaches 
towards the problems of local control*
The rationale of the protectorate was that the proclamation 
was essential to guard thé lives and property of the natives,
7) Ibid*
8) C*0* to Douglas, 9*1*1886* Queensland V* & P. 1886, II, 
p*991*
9) Ibid* Original italics*
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who would otherwise have come under the control of another \ 
power which might not have respected their rights in the way 
which the High Commission intended.1®
Scratchley knew virtually nothing of colonial administ­
ration; he was a professional engineer who had made himself 
popular in Australia as an Imperial defenoe adviser*11 In 
considering means of approaching and controlling the natives 
he had a few precedents and some advice. The principles em­
bodied in his Commission and in his Instructions derived from 
the alms of the High Commission, for the protectorate amounted 
to little more than the tightening of High Commission Juris­
diction, broadly on the lines Gordon had suggested in the 1884 
Royal Commission Report* In addition, Gordon gave Scratchley
♦much valuable information and advice* when they met in
I P
Colombo in January 1885«
Moreover, Scratchley could hardly depart from nhat had 
already been done, for example by Commodore Erskine in recog­
nizing principal chiefs along the coast* Erskine*s senior 
commander, Capt* Cyprian Bridge, went to the trouble of 
advising Scratchley on the organization of a government, with 
some notes on native policy. Bridge set out the concept, 
later repeated by Scratchley, that ,the principle of
10) Legge, op.cit., p.28; Joyce, op.cit., pp*6-7; C. Lyne,
New Guinea, pp.22-4*
11) Hence his appointment: 'something was necessary to please 
Queensland* - C.O. 422/3, quoted Joyce, op.cit*, p.16
note 24.
12) Scratchley to Derby, 15.6*1885. CPI (Prot.), Set 4*
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administration should toe, of the natives; for the benefit of
the natives, as well as of our fellow-countrymen; by the
13natives themselves as much as possible.v British naval
officers such as Bridge feared a strong Queensland voice in
14
the determination of policy, as did Romilly*
The structure which Bridge advised was in fact very 
similar to that eventually set up: he thought that an official 
chief should be chosen for each village or tribe, and that 
the succession should be fixed. The chiefs would come under
Q
Government Agents, wh would, in addition to the usual agency
functions, advise the chiefs, adjudicate in disputes, and
protect the natives against visitors* He also advised that
efforts should be made to find the real chief, as well as the
15customs relating to succession*
Under Douglas, the discussion of native policy was left 
largely to Hon* Anthony Huegrave, an Assistant Deputy 
Commissioner. Musgrave deplored the fact that Scratchley had 
not passed on any instructions about native policy; but he 
rejected out of hand Scratchley*s idea that Hew Guinea should 
be governed for the natives, by the natives* This, he said 
•would be a costly and chimerical experiment in colonial
13) Bridge to Scratchley, 11.2.1885 - CPI (Prot.), Set 6,
2; cf* Report 1884-5, p*20*
14) Romilly, Letters,*.» p.209: probably a principal ground 
for the strongly pro-native emphasis*
15) Bridge, loc.cit.
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organization, inevitably resulting in failure*. He claimed 
that because of the lack of what he described as •tribal 
discipline*, to govern by the natives was a sheer impossibility? 
In point of fact, the lack of staff, funds, and transport, 
quite apart from inadequate powers, dictated that any approach 
to the consolidation of government influence would have to be 
made through supposed native chiefs, while the protectorate 
lasted. One may suppose that statements to the contrary 
really represented an assertion of the proposition that
17Queensland rather than Britain should determine policy.
(iii) The policy in practice, from the Proclamation a
New Guinea of course lacked the traditional rulers with 
whom treaties could be made. Commodore Erskine nevertheless 
felt that the significance of their being placed under Britieh 
protection should be impressed on the natives at as many 
points along the coast as he could visit.
In Port Moresby Erskine, with the help of Lawes, Chalmers 
and the native teachers, gathered together native leaders 
within a radius of fifty miles, from Hedscar Bay in the west 
to Round Point in the east. On November 5th, 1885 they were 
all gathered on board the Nelson and Erskine explained to them, 
through Lawes, the meaning of the proclamation ceremony.
He told them:
16) Report 1886, App. D, p.17.
17) Douglas: Memo, on Future Government, 24.3.1886 - 
Queensland V. & P. 1886, II, p.994.
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Your lands will be secured to you, your wives and 
children will be protected. Should any injury be 
done to you, you will immediately inform Her Majesty's 
officers, who will reside amongst you, and they will 
hear your complaints, and do you justice* You will 
look upon all white persons whom the Queen permits 
to reside amongst you as your friends and Her Majesty's 
subjects. The Queen will permit nobody to reside here 
who does you injury* You will under no circumstances 
inflict punishment upon any white person; but if such 
person has done you wrong, you will tell Her Majesty's 
officers of that wrong, that the case may be fairly 
enquired into.*. You will all keep peace amongst your­
selves, and if you have disputes with each other you 
will bring them before the Queen's officers, who will 
settle them for you without bloodshed* If bad men come 
amongst you, bringing firearms and gunpowder and intoxi­
cating liquors, you are not to buy them, and are to give 
notice at once to the Queen's officers, so that such men 
may be punished.
Romilly had early appreciated what the difficulties of
administration would be, in the absence of 'responsible men',
though he saw that such a lack also had advantages in a lack
of concerted opposition - an ambivalent attitude which played
19
a notable part in later administration.
Erskine also immediately appreciated that the 'multiplicity
of native authorities* would make the task of dealing with
the natives very difficult. Therefore,
he saw the necessity for selecting from a tribe the 
chief possessing the highest claim to be regarded as 
the most important chief in his district, and in­
vesting him with such authority as would make him the 
means of communication with the Commissioner respecting
18) Lyne, op.cit., pp.9-10* The accuracy of lyne’s account 
was vouched for by Erskine (letter dated 31*1*1885, re­
produced p*viii), also see Gordon, op*cit*, pp.249-51* 
Proclamation in Viet. P.P. 32/1886, App. 27*
19) Romilly, The Western Pacifie and New Guinea, p.27; 
Letters**?. ----------
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any matter which any branch or member of the 
tribe might desire to bring to the Commissioner’s ^  
knowledge *
Erskine, of course, had no means of recognizing the extreme 
segmentation of Papuan society, and he tended generally to 
equate linguistic with political groupings. An apparently
influential native of Port Moresby, named Boe Vagi, was
selected as Head Chief of the Motu; but his jurisdiction was
by implication applied to all the peoples represented, some
of whom were not even Motu—speaking.
Erskine presented Boe Vagi with an ebony stick with a
florin set in the top, Queen’s head up, and encircled by a
band of silver. Handing this to him, Erskine said*
I present him with this stick, which is to be an 
emblem to him of his authority; and all the tribes 
who are represented by the chiefs here are to look 
to the holder of this stick, Boe Vagi. This stick 
represented the Queen's head, the Queen of England; 
and if, at any time, any of the people of these 
tribes have any grievance, or anything to say, they 
are, through this man, the holder of this stick, Boe 
Vagi, to make it known to the Queen's officer, in 0n 
order that it may be enquired Into.
9
There was no statutory authority at all for such an in­
junction; but Erskine felt it necessary to repeat the flag- 
raising ceremony at as many points along the coast as could 
conveniently be visited. During this cruise, Lawes and 
Chalmers played in indispensable part in the selection of
20) Lyne, op.cit., p.12.
21) Ibid., pp#12-lo. The Implication is quite clear; but it 
will be noted that authority was not specifically 
delegated.
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pre-eminent leaders. In effect, their nominees were often 
recognized as representatives of peoples quite beyond 
traditional precedent. Although Boe Vagi, for example, was 
generally known as a weakling Chalmers justified his selection 
on traditional grounds, in that he was said to be the
legitimate heir of a chief who had in the past been recognized
22as the leader of all the Motu people#
So arbitrary was the selection, in fact, that an old man
was recognized as 'principal chief of the Milne Bay district*
by Erskine because of his benevolent appearance; though he
was not traditionally even the principal leader of his own
village (Rabi),23
Lawes thought that the natives grasped the 'central idea
24and principle* of the ceremony, Romllly, not so sanguine,
felt that as the natives had no idea of civil authority -
knowing only two kinds of white men, traders and sailors -
25the ceremony was meaningless to them.
When Scratchley succeeded to the task of administration,
actively in August 1885, he acknowledged his indebtedness to
the advice he had received, and largely sustained what had
26been done and adopted what had been suggested. Until the
22) Chalmers, Pioneering,,., p.207. As already remarked, many 
of the •chiefs1 present represented non-Motu people to the 
east. See Appendix A: Central Papua.
23) Lyne, op.cit., pp.206-8,
24) J, King, W.G. Lawes of Savage Island and New Guinea. p.226,
25) Romilly, Prom My Verandah,,., pp. 191, 224,
26) Viet. Printed Paper No, 35/1885: p.8, para, 4,
22
12th October he was concerned with buying land at Port Moresby 
and with visiting coastal villages east to Samarai* During 
the rest of October he had to investigate the killing of 
Europeans in the south-east of the protectorate5 and in 
November, lacking a steamer, he went inland to the base of lit. 
Owen Stanley to the camp established by the naturalist H.O* 
Forbes*27
During his first month of administration Scratchley again 
formally recognised Boe Vagi, but this time apparently only 
as chief of Port Moresby, the twenty-five leading men of which 
were enjoined to refer to Boe Vagi all cases requiring 
arbitration*^® Although the elementary pattern of native 
contact and control had been laid down, Scratchley gave 
renewed thought to the question during his brief tenure of 
office. He realised that, for the most part, the recognition 
of a Government Chief was Introducing something new into 
native life, creating an artificial position* When he did 
meet a really outstanding leader, such as Koapena of Aroma, 
with apparently extensive authority, Scratchley concluded that 
he combined the military, patriarchal and magical attributes 
in his person* For the most part, however, he felt that there
27) Report 1884-5, p*3. Forbes became a Government Agent under 
Douglas* Also see Romilly, Letters* ** * pp*249-50* Romilly 
formed a high opinion of Scraichley's administrative cap­
abilities - ibid* pp.253, 269* See Modern Appreciation in 
Pacific Islands Monthly* XXIII, 1, 1952, pp.66-9, 72-4*
28) Report 1884-5, p*5; Romilly Letters* * *, p.259*
was a need for what he described as 'a modified font of the ' 
Java system, crushing out the minor chiefs, and making the 
Government elected chief the recipient of a certain annual 
payment*.2**
In other words, the recognized •chief* was to be essentially 
a government appointee, who could be made responsible for the 
safety of foreigners and the maintenance of order. Scratchley 
had no legal authority to do this. Nevertheless under the 
protectorate individual natives were held responsible for 
offences, despite the absence of specific jurisdiction* 
Scratchley also felt that the chiefs could be used for positive 
development, in introducing new crops and in promoting the 
raising of living standards.3^
(iv) Delegation within Government
Delegation of functions to subordinates was undefined.
In practice the Special Commissioner undertook most of the 
investigation of disturbances himself, although Douglas was 
absent from the protectorate for long periods. Ultimately 
the sole object of administration at this stage was pacifi­
cation. Scratchley was uncertain of his jurisdiction in 
dealing with natives, arid with whites offending natives; while 
Komilly during the whole four years of the protectorate was
29) Report 1884-5, p.10. Suggestions broadly on these lines 
had been made by La wee and Chalmers previously - see 
King, op.cit., pp.209-14*
30) Report 1884-5, p.20.
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acutely conscious of the legal inability of issuing
31regulations and awarding punishment to natives.
Nevertheless, they felt an obligation to deter the natives 
from attacks on Euro^epns; although they both recognized that 
almost all the incidents arose from ’direct or indirect 
aggression by whites’, and that many of the attackers (in­
cluding returned labourers from Queensland) had good cause 
to hate the Europeans they had come in contact with.
fhe principles that Scratchley and Douglas themselves acted 
on inevitably constituted precedents for their subordinates,
Scratchley in fact largely perpetuated 'commodore justice*,
33 /'burning towns and smashing canoes*. He recognized the in-
34
herent injustice of this ; he also saw that arbitrary naval
bombardment, as was administered in the Captain Webb case,
35would embitter relations *for years to come*. But he felt 
that the administration of a deterrent should be paramount*
31) Port (Private Secretary) described Scratchley as *a mere 
Pooh-Bah, possessed of a high-sounding title, but devoid 
of any executive authority whatever* - Port, op.cit.,
p.35. Cf. Romilly, Letters..., pp.212-3, 255. 265, 301. 
310-1#
32) Report 1884-5, p.9; Romilly, Letters..., p.269.
33) Romilly, Letters.. .. p.268s letter dated 17.10.1885 fro* 
East Cape, how thai a protectorate had been declared, 
Chalmers voiced strong disapproval of this kind of re­
taliation, while noting that everybody detested it. He 
recognized that it represented a continuation of the ’act 
of war* philosophy, but he had no solution, beyond bringing 
the situation to notice in Britain - Chalmers, Pionnering..» < 
p•155•
34) Scratchley*s diary, 16.10.1885, quoted C. Kinloch Cooke# 
Australian Defences and New Guinea, p.345.
35) Cooke, op.cit., pp.349-51; Port, op.cit., p.66.
25
In addition» however, Scratchley made some attempt to
deal with the natives in their own terms. After the murder
of Capt. Miller, one of the killers who offered compensation
(Diravera, of Milport Harbour) was taken to Samarai and Port
Moresby for ’remedial education* - a method later elevated
36into an administrative technique under MacGregor - while 
the other, who did not, had his village burned down. According 
to Port, Scratchley was so uncertain that he had the power 
to deal with Diravera in this way - clearly the more effica­
cious - that he placed the matter for decision in the hands 
of the Secretary of State.37
Scratchley saw that the mere punishment of native 
murderers was inadequate. Pacification demanded constant 
reminders of government authority. A deterrent to prevent 
the commission of murders was what was wanted; he favoured 
constant patrolling by a crew of Samoans or Fijians under an 
English officer. This would avoid the necessity for later 
'commodore justice*.38
Under Douglas it clearly became impossible for the 
Special Commissioner himself to deal with all the matters 
requiring attention - indeed, Scratchley*s brief tenure had
36) Report 1897-8, p. xxviii.
37) Fort, op.cit., pp.69-70; Romilly, L e t t e r s . « p.369; 
Romilly, From My Verandah...« pp.2&8-37.
38) Report 1884-5, p.27. Capt. Bridge had suggested this: 
Bridge to Scratchley, 11.2.1885, CPI (Prot.), Set 6.
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indicated that - so that more adequate delegation was essential*
Staff necessarily had to be selected ad hoc from the few
relatively educated Europeans available« Romilly noted that
everything depended on the personal approach of individual 
39
officers; * this was particularly true in the years 1886-8
when Douglas was so often absent and Romilly so often ill,
and when local officers were inadequately empowered* A.
Musgrave, the Assistant Deputy Commissioner, later to be
Government Secretary until 1908, was highly regarded by
Douglas, but, as MacGregor recognized, was often impractical
40and beet euited to deek-woric. ^
A number of local Europeans were appointed 'Native Agents' 
under these men* Mus grave relied heavily on the twin Hunter 
brothers, and on P*E. Lawes, the son of the pioneer missionary. 
They all had a good knowledge of Motu* Unfortunately, their 
personal failings were also considerable, and for Douglas it 
was a question of balancing the advantage of their local 
knowledge against the disadvantage of their local involve­
ments, particularly with native women. These factors created 
considerable local difficulties: in February 1888 Robert
39) Romilly, 1.6*1888 - Letters* *.. p.307: 'If he is possessed 
of tact he possibly, or rather probably, comes off all 
right; if not, he comes to grief'*
40) Douglas to C.O., 19.3.1886 (CPl(Prot. )) , Set 2: 'His 
patient and consistent policy is thoroughly recognized, 
and his position is respected'. Cf* MacGregor's diary, 
27.4.1892: MacGregor was prepared to reoommend Musgrave
•as President of some West Indian island9, a vapid sine­
cure*
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Hunter was transferred from Port Moresby to Samarai because
the Hanuabadans complained of his * overbearing and irritating1
attitude. This meant bringing Lawes back to Port Moresby,
where he had already been in *scrapes with women*, according 
41
to Douglas*
The naturalist, H.O. Forbes was employed for a time as 
Government Agent at Samarai; a Burns Philp agent named Edelfelt 
was also enlisted as part-time Agent in the Manumanu area«
The western area was particularly interesting, in view of the 
discrepancy between the boundaries ©f the protectorate (141°E) 
and of the Special Commissioner’s jurisdiction (143°E)« This 
area was overseen by Hugh Milman, the Queensland9Government vs 
Deputy Commissioner in the Torres Straits. Douglas 
eventually divided the protectorate into three convenient 
divisions* western, to the Aird River; central, from the 
Aird River to Toulon Island; and eastern, from Toulon to 
Rossel Island**2
Because of this ad hoc recruitment without training, the 
lack of sufficient powers and of an effective policy; and
41) The Hunter brothers were ‘sons of an English county family* 
and had originally been employed on the recommendation of 
Dr« Lawes (Report 1886, p*21). Also see Douglas to R. 
Hunter, 22.2.1888* *The maintenance of order among the 
people themselves mist depend chiefly on the moral in­
fluence you can exercise*. Douglas to Romilly, 3.2.1888;
R. Hunter to Douglas, 8.4.1888; R. Hunter to Musgrave, 
8.4.1888; Douglas to F.E. Lawes. 6.4*88, 13.4.88; F.E. 
Lawes to Douglas, 7.4.88 - CPI (Prot.), Set 5.
42) Report 1887, p.l*
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the lack of a permanent vessel, each local Agent to a 
considerable degree determined his own policy. In the Craig 
case, Forbes had several villages burned on Joannet Island 
(September 1886). Douglas remonstrated with him, telling 
him that he had exceeded his instructions, and in typical 
protectorate fashion adding that he himself ’would not hesi­
tate to take life in order to vindicate justice*, but that
44the • gratuitous burning of villages' was •barbarous*.
In the Motumotu affair of June 1887, however, a scratch
force of six South Sea islanders was sent under Robert Winter
to investigate the murder of a mission teacher. This
developed into a punitive expedition, with a village being
attacked and fired on and houses burned. Maka, the chief of
Moviari (Moviavi) who had continued to dissociate himself
from the killings, assured Hunter and Edelfelt that peace
would be kept in future. Here Douglas was quite satisfied
with what had been done. Inter-village fighting had been
going on for years before this, and Edelfelt had scrupulously
45abstained from interfering.
43) C.O. (Herbert) to Scratchley, 17.11.1884; claim for a 
vessel repeated by Douglas to Palmer, 21.4.1886 - CPI 
(Prot.), Set 5.
44) H.O. Forbes to Douglas, 13.1.1887; Douglas to Forbes, 
16.2.1887 - Queensland V. & P. 1888, III, pp.267-9.
Douglas to Griffith, 19.9.1887 - CPI (Prot.), Set 5, L.B.l. 
Douglas conceded, however, that it would have been im­
possible for Forbes to have captured the actual murderers, 
and that he had acted under great provocation.
45) Douglas wrote that Hunter acted *to my satisfaction and to 
his own credit’ - Report 1887, p.7; also Douglas to 
Griffith, 19.9.1887, cit.sup.
4 3
Southern  H ig h la n d *  
District
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o n t r o l
AND DISTRICT D IVISIO NS, 1JS$
------- District Boundart*.»
CD Fully Controlled 
dm Partially Controlled
Uncontrolled (penetrativepatrols)
Queensland
Administration Central
D is t r ic t
■  S A M A K A I
Milne Bay 
District
29
It seems clear that Scratchley and Douglas began with
the idea of not interfering with purely inter-tribal fighting?
but this policy was found inadequate to safeguard native
46teachers and non-natives who became involved#
(v) Consolidation in a Defined Area
In 1886 Douglas, Musgrave and Romilly seem to have come
to an unwritten agreement on further policy. Douglas clearly
considered his principal danger as attempting too much and
doing it badly - that is, over-extending. He and Musgrave
therefore used the Hunter brothers to consolidate influence
in the area from Manumanu to Hula (already the area of most
intensive L.M.S. influence).4 Meanwhile Douglas and Romilly
seem to have come to a 'gentleman's agreement', whereby they
did not interfere with each other, and Romilly took 'complete
48control of the whole south and south-east' •
Within his area Douglas began to intervene more actively 
in matters involving natives alone. This policy followed 
three lines: (i) investigating inter-village disputes and
46) Ibid. As far as Douglas was concerned, non-intervention 
was dictated by inadequate forces at his disposal. Also 
see Edelfelt's complaint before Motumotu intervention - 
Report 1887, pp.40-1.
47) Report 1886, p.6.
48) Romilly, Letters..., p.301. Romilly felt something of a 
personal responsibi1ity for the area, for he had returned 
the kidnapped Queensland labourers there in 1885, and 
believed them primarily responsible for local murders. 
Perhaps because of the arrangement with Douglas, Romilly 
thought him 'a thorough gentleman9.
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using a scratch force (usually boat*s crew) to punish; (ii)
arranging compacts between feuding native groups, as Douglas
did between Aroma and Kerepunu;*^ and (iii) going a little
more cautiously with the selection of official chiefs. The
more careful selection of chiefs is of particular relevance.
In order to facilitate this policy within the defined area,
Robert Hunter was in 1886 given the title ’Superintendent of
Natives’; while his brother, George, set up a government
50
station at Rlgo in the same year* J
In the selection of chiefs there seems to have been little
attempt to apply traditional criteria. Advising George
Hunter in December 1886 about the selection of a chief for
Sarowa, tfusgrave wrote*
Of course you will satisfy yourself that a majority 
of the villagers desire his appointment* Advise 
them to choose a wise man for their chief, and not 
one because he has most land or friends, or is a 
great warrior or robber, but because he is one they 
can trust, and that the young men are willing to 
listen to when he speaks good words against foolish 
quarrelling and bloodshed. Also, that their chief 
ought to be a man of good temper, and never In a g, 
hurry to quarrel, like some cross old woman.
Many traditional leadership criteria were thereby
eliminated: though at that period an understanding of this is
49) Report 1886, p.6.
50) Ibid., p.21. Robert Hunter had previously been styled 
’Government Assistant’ and ’Government Agent’. This 
policy might be regarded as limited consolidation according 
to what MacGregor later defined as the ’oil~stain# 
technique.
51) A. Musgrave to G. Hunter, 20.12.1886 - CPI (Prot.), Set 
6 , 2.
A
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perhaps hardly to be expected. Musgrave clearly had no
conception of the difficulties that might arise from the use
of alien criteria. At the same time, Scratchley had speculated
on the nature of leadership, end Dr. Lawes analysed it as a
social phenomenon with surprising accuracy, even by modern
standards. He showed up the division of leadership functions
and made the distinction between influence and authority. He
recognized that redress was a private matter (in European
terms), and that no chiefs were competent-to ensure that
5 0
undertakings would be met.
To produce a government-orientated leadership, Gecrge
Hunter in 1886 began the technique of feducational tours*.
In December 1886, for example, he brought a number of Maiva
leaders to the government bungalow, where 'they received
attention and small presents'.®3
Concurrently, Douglas, Musgrave and the Hunters intervened
with less reluctance in purely native disputes. In 1886 Boe
Vagi reported trouble between the coast village of Kalle and
the hill village of Garia. The Hunters induced the chiefs of
Garia to visit Kaile, and Musgrave was able to report that
54
'peace is now considered fairly established*.
52) W.G. Lawes, The Condition of Hew Guinea. Report 1886, pp. 
24-6; same in Sydney Morning tieraid. 11.5.1886. This de­
scription is very similar to the general description of 
leadership in P.M. Worsley, The Trumpet shall Sound, p.15. 
Also note Scratchley*s ideas," Viet. P.P. ¿2/l8Ôéf pp.15-6.
53) Report 1886, p.22.
54) Ibid., p.21.
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The extent to which use was made of the ehlefs varied.
In 1885 George Hunter seems to have made no attempt to work 
through Boe Tagi in having Hanuabada cleaned up; he simply 
threatened the villagers with a stoppage of water from the
ce
government tanks unless they got to work. On the other
hand, when Douglas himself enquired into a ’very deliberate
murder case1 involving natives only, at Kerepunu, in 1887, he
ordered reparation to be made*
I attach some importance to this case, as I constit­
uted three of the principal men of Kerepunu assessors 
with me in the investigation of it, and it was they-* 
who adjudged the amount of the penalty to be paid.
In their separate areas Douglas and Romilly differed on
intervention in native disputes; Romilly, as already noted9
being very conscious of his lack of jurisdiction* This
difference was particularly important in late 1887 and during
1888, when Romilly relieved Douglas in Port Moresby.
In November 1887 George Hunter wrote from Rigo stating
that many chiefs from the Kemp Welch river were imploring him
to punish the murderers of a native there. He felt bound to
honour the promise of protection given the natives, and on the
13th, in agreement with the chiefs, decided to punish the
village responsible ’according to native customf. He refused
the chiefs* request that he destroy the betel and coconut trees,
55) G. Hunter to Musgrave, 28.12.1885 - CPI (Prot.) Set 6, 2.
56) Report 1887, p.6. Undoubtedly Douglas* experience with the 
more advanced system in the Torres Straits strongly in­
fluenced him; for later experiments see Ch.I, c; Ch. II;
Ch. Ill, 2; and Ch. V, 1.
_ _ _ _ _ _  J
33
but he supplied them with matches with which they burned
down the old village. Hunter demurred when the chiefs asVeu
57
that further punishment be inflicted#
Homilly himself was more restrained# In December he
resisted importunities from four delegations of natives to
punish their attackers. One of these appeals was from Koapena
of Aroma, the most powerful leader within the area of
consolidation. Eomilly wrote*
I have no power, either legal or physical, to punish 
their aggressors, and so I am in the agreeable 
position of having to act illegally or break the most 
solemn premises. Whatever I do, I must be wrong. If 
my hands were not tied, I could have the whole count ry_g 
quiet in a few months....
He did not say how, but from his actions in the south-east
(in the interests of Europeans) it might be deduced that he
would have had little compunction about applying mass 
59sanctions. Douglas denied that extensive promises of 
protection had officially been given the natives, though he 
admitted that individual officers could have - and the Hunters 
probably had - given such promises. Nonetheless he thought 
that Koapena at least should have been helped to ^vindicate
57) G. Hunter’s Journal, Rigo, 10-15th Nov. 1887 - CPI (Prot.) 
Set 6.
58) Romilly, Letters.... p.295: letter of 29.11.1887.
59) He had Moresby Island bombarded in July 1887 in reprisal 
for the murder of several Chinese: *... we bombarded 
villages we could not reach, and burned those we could.
We smashed all the war canoes, and fired into all the 
natives we saw. I myself only took a shotgun, and potted 
a few domestic fowls*. - Romilly, Letters...« pp.286-7. 
With the aid of native allies, he t a d  previously tried to 
come to terms with the murderers.
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his authority*. 6 0
There was considerable confusion about what had been 
promised the natives, and about the consequent support which 
their recognized chiefs could claim. Brskine’s much-repeated 
statement was unspecific and ambiguous. Rorailly felt that he 
had no authority to help Koapena, nor even to take action when 
dissaffection threatened in Port Moresby early in 1888. In a 
masterpiece of tangled generalisation, typical of the 
protectorate, Boiaglas counselled him: (j*.
Do not doubt your authority to maintain order» though 
sovereignty has not yet been proclaimed. Be cautious 
and forbearing - but be very firm with the natives of 
Port Moresby... I must caution you, however, to be 
careful to avoid any real cause of offence, or of 
bitterness.
More seriously, this confusion inevitably extended to the
Government Agents, and even to the natives, and prejudiced
good relations. George Hunter had cause for complaining:
In all my instructions I had to inform the natives of 
the different villages, if they murdered again, they 
would be taken from their villages and purished...; in­
forming natives at one time one thing, and acting 
different the very next occasion. They come to me and 
want to know why the Government don’t go and punish 
them.
60) Romilly to Douglas, 13.1.1888; Douglas to Romilly, 3.2.1888- 
CP1 (Prot.), Set 8.
61) Ibid. Scratchley had early been confronted with a diffi­
cult problem: he ordered the deportation of two traders, 
Guise and Currie, who had been molesting native women, al­
though he was uncertain of his power t® do so - Report 
1884-5, pp.8, 33. Whites were warned of areas to avoid 
(e.g. Queensland Gazette of 2.10.1885).
62) G. Hunter (Rigo) to Romilly, 7.1.1888 - CPI (Prot.), Set 6.
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(vi) Mission influence
The extensive influence of the mission on the south coast
continued to be extremely important* Sof too, were the
attitudes of Lawes and Chalmers towards administration« Lawes
wanted the natives left to themselves (or, rather, to the
mission) even under the protectorate; he argued that the
natives should be given the chance to develop within a pattern
of administration which took account of their rudimentary
political institutions, that this would be very slow, and that
therefore rapid eoonomic development was out of the question.
The implication seemed to be that the mission would gradually
educate and promote a native leadership.
Here was the genesis of a rift with the government. This
came out in 1886 *hen Lawes objected to further acquisitions
of land from Port Moresby natives, as a breach of Erskine's 
64promise. The most serious area of conflict was, however, 
the position of the mission's native teachers, who had ac­
quired a semi-official status in arbitrating in native 
disputes, Scratchley recognized the need for one chief, but 
he also recognized the position of the teacher, ’as exercising 
a beneficial influence'. Some of these teachers, however, 
were both temporal and spiritual autocrats; a good example, on
63) W,G, Lawes in Report 1886, p.24. Lawes was noted for using 
the columns of English and Australian newspapers to in­
fluence administration.
64) Report 1886, p.42; Douglas to Lawes, Lawes to Douglas, 
both 7.7.86.
65) Report 1884-5, p.5.
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mission testimony, was Piri of Boera, who instructed the
ggheadmen and dominated the Tillage from 1873 to 1888.
Mu eg rave realized the dangers of a dual authority, hut probably
accentuated the dichotomy; he thought that the influence of
the mission in maintaining peace had been exaggerated, and
that ’firm steps' were needed by the Administration to maintain
67peace through its chiefs. The issue continued to give
trouble throughout MacGregor’s administration, and indeed
68became perennial.
The mission also tried to influence the choice of chiefs; 
indeed, it was inevitable initially that the government be 
dependent on mission advice. The most blatant example was 
Port Moresby. No-one had had any illusions about the lack of
go
authority of Boe Vagi, nor that weak personal authority was 
typical of the Port Moresby area. But disagreement deTeloped 
oTer the appointment of a successor, when Boe Vagi died in 
1886. Lawes stated that the office was hereditary, not, 
electiTe, and put forward a daughter, Katoadi, as successor.
This ignored the fact that patrilineally Aoudu, the father’s 
brother's son, was the logical successor. Lawes claimed, 
howeTer, that the people supported Kabadi’s suocesslon, and
66) LoTett, op.cit., pp.130-1*
67) Report 1886, p.17.
68) See Report 1897-8, p. xxii*
69) MusgraTe called him ’mild-mannered but wholly useless1; 
Lawes *a weak man, but friendly* - Report 1886, p.26;
Lawes to Douglas, 7.4.1886, CPI (Prpt.) Set 6, 2.
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he condemned the suggested succession of Aoudu as 9coming 
70from outside9« Despite his insistence on recognized
succession, Lawes simultaneously asserted that it was only
government recognition that gave the office any importance,
and that apart from that the natives did not care much.
In any case9 they will readily acquiesce in any 
suggestion that may be made to them by you on the„, 
subject,
Douglas was prepared to accept this, noting that Kabadi
seemed to have ability and had been ’carefully educated by
the Missionaries9, But when he approached her, she disclaimed
any wish to succeed her father. He then found that the people
7Pwere quite happy to have Aoudu as chief. Meanwhile Lawes
was canvassing the succession of Kabadi in Australian news-
73papers. Native reaction revealed his manoeuvrings.
Although Douglas fully realized that an appointed chief ^
would lean heavily on government support, he was not, as a
consequence, prepared to appoint simply a mission nominee if
he could help it. He noted that Aoudu had little influence,
but commented hopefully:
... he now always wears a shirt, and appears to be 
conscious of his responsibilities. I have assured 
him that I shall support his authority, and that I 
shall expect him to keep his village clean.
70) Ibid,: Lawes to Douglas, 7,4.1886, Lawes had a good know­
ledge of regular succession.
71) Ibid.
72) Douglas to C.O., No.33, 13,7.1886 - CPI (Prot.), Set 2.
73) Sydney Morning Herald and Brisbane Courier, both 9,6.1886,
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Such men could not legally he employed to maintain order,
but they were offered inducements. Aoudu, for example, got
74
•a small subsidy in the form of a monthly dole of rice*.
(vii) Native Polioe
As mentioned above, the lack of native authorities, on
top of all the administrative deficiencies, inherent in
1
protectorate juriadiotion, directed the attention of the
Special Commissioners towards some practicable way of carrying
out the basic task of administration; punishing and thereby
ultimately preventing murder. Scratchley saw that the navy
•combined the least aaount of efficiency with the greatest
display of force'; and he felt that the most effective
instrument would be the constant patrolling of the coast by
Samoans or Fijians under a British officer, all under dose
75
surveillance. This force could also stop tribal wars.
Douglas repeated this, envisaging a force almost identical
to that eventually recruited by MacGregor. This alone could
76supply 'a substantial basis of authority*. The need for
this was emphasised by the scratch force Robert Hunter had to
77
use in the Motumotu affair of 1887. Douglas saw the South
74) Douglas to C.O., 13.7.1886, cit.sup.
75) Report 1884-5, p.9. This was precisely Bridge’s suggestion.
76) Report 1887, p.7: memo, by Douglas, 1.9.1886. Six South Sea 
islanders (boats* crew, referred to as ’water police*) 
were used. Douglas recruited six Islanders from Mack&y as 
regular ’water police’ in 1888 - Report 1888, p.3.
77) Report 1887, p.41s Douglas to Preaier of Queensland, 
19.9.1887.
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Sea islanders as only a nucleus around which a native force
78could be built up*
Resident police at the village level were given little
thought, clearly because the Special Commissioner had no
legal authority to appoint them. Bridge made the suggestion
of village constables (three or four), subordinate to the
79chief or tribal council. This was taken up by Milman, in 
the western division, in 1888. He advocated a system similar 
to that in the Torres Straits, with a chief responsible for 
administering a particular code of punishments drawn up for
each place, at which there would also be a few native police-
80men. When MacGregor first visited the western Kiwai villages
in 1890 he found that the natives were already adopting the
Torres Straits institutions, though the idea had not been
81disseminated elsewhere.
78) Report 1887, p.7. But men-of-war continued to visit the 
Territory during the 1890s (the east end) to •show the 
flag*; the artisans they carried were also useful on 
government and mission outstations - see R. Abel, op.cit. , 
p. 65.
79) Memo. Bridge to Seratchley, cit.sup.
80) Report 1888, p.17.
81) MacGregor to Norman (Gov. Queensland), No. 57, 25.2.1890, 
Encl. 2 (Cmd. 6323, 1891).
(c) BRITISH NEW GUIlffiA UNDER MACGREGOR. 1888-1898
1. British New Guinea was formally annexed on September 4th
1888, the day Dr. William MacGregor arrived in the colony.1
Romilly commented: *1 believe they could not have chosen a
o
better man for this place.* His belief was justified during 
the next ten years j though MacGregor in retrospect compared 
his task to that of a man thrown into deep water with his ) 
hands tied behind his back.
MacGregor was the first official to be adequately em­
powered to establish an administrative structure; though the 
perennial lack of funds and staff and the channelling of policy 
through Queensland imposed limits. Because of the great 
amount of work which MacGregor took upon himself, the process 
of delegation at the district and village level if often 
difficult to define.
In what follows, MacGregor’s policy of pacification is 
analysed to show the pervasive ramifications it had; this 
leads on to a discussion of native administration as it
1) Legge, op.cit., p.49.
2) Romilly, Letters.... p.339s letter of 3.9.1888 - *He will 
have a hard job before him, and I believe that the first 
year of his reign will be spent in suppressing turbulent 
tribes.* Cf. note 36 below.
3) Introduction to J.H.P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea.
CHAPTER 1
developed from pacificationf with particular reference to 
Administration attitudes towards native leadership and to 
the ways in which those attitudes determined the structure 
of native administration#
(i) The Techniques of Pacification
Dr. Mair has written of MacGregor: *He believed in the 
punitive expedition, and in the display of force as a means 
of securing respect for authority’♦ This is true, but like 
all generalisations inadequate as an explanation of policy, 
taking account of varying pressures and motives. When Mac­
Gregor arrived in the colony there had been a series of out­
rages from Port Moresby eastwards into the Louisiade Archipe­
lago* He felt a prime responsibility to safeguard the traders 
and native teachers, whose dispersal into areas declared 
dangerous had been a major problem under the protectorate*
Pacification and research were, in his own words, the twin
4) L.P. Mair, Australia in New Guinea, pp. 24-5.
5) Report 1897-8, p. xliii. The exertions of MacGregor and 
his staff in geographical discovery (preparatory to 
pacification) and in scientific investigation are attested 
by the voluminous appendices to the annual reports. See 
tribute by Chief Sec. to Lamington, 21.12.1898, in 
Queensland P.P., Ixii, 1899, p. 259. In 1895 he received 
an honorary degree from Cambridge, and was introduced to 
the Royal Colonial Institute as ’one of the most dist­
inguished men of science of the day’ - R.C.I. Proceedings.
1894-5, pp. 193-4. Joyce, op.cit., p. 82# note 3 gives a 
biographical sketch, but omits mention of his German 
education.
42
He himself later measured his success by the fact that
not one native teacher was murdered during his administration?
MacGregor believed it essential to view resistance, or
threatened resistance, in native terms; it was therefore
necessary to impress the authority of the Government in a
manner to which the natives were accustomed* Anything less
than enforced submission would be interpreted as weakness.
Even in 1898 he vigorously defended this philosophy:
There is only one thing they respect, that is force.„
They have the most profound respect for that.
Over his ten years of administration he was remarkably
consistent in carrying out this policy; within its limits he
made every attempt to be just. He insisted that fighting be
avoided if possible; on the other hand, where resistance was
threatened he believed in ’the strong hand onoe for all’.
Unfortunately, in dealing with savages punishment 
on a mild scale, carried out in a way that might 
by many be called benevolent or merciful, is only Q 
pain and suffering inflicted in vain.
His definition of resistance was much more flexible than 
that later imposed by Murray on his officers; it allowed 
unfortunate scope to the wilder spirits at the district level,
6) Report 1897-6, p.xxxii. MacGregor thought that this deserved 
special congratulation, because many missionaries seemed to 
seek martyrdom; tension between them and natives was in­
evitable, because they were generally prejudiced against 
native custom, while the natives tended to be suspicious
of mission motives.
7) Conference with Australian Premiers, 24.1.1898 - CPl(Col.), 
Set 11, typescript, p.18. The date of this conference is 
misprinted as 1888 in Legge, op.cit., p.70, note 13.
8) MacGregor to Norman, No.45, 28.10.1889 - Cmd. 6323, p.63. 
Same idea repeated at 1898 Premiers’ Conference, cit.sup.
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Oand notably to Monckton. MacGregor normally did not allow 
natives in a threatening mood to get within effective spear 
range; injury to any of his party would, he believed, deal 
a serious blow to government prestige.1®
To some degree MacGregor was forced into this attitude 
by the lack of trained staff and of a local organisation, ,
v .
and particularly by his conception of his responsibility for 
his officers.11 Before placing officers in an area he under­
took to secure their safety; and this responsibility he 
maintained. In May 1890 he was already able to report that 
law and order had been sufficiently established over large
areas of the coast for his personal control to be relaxed
IP
and delegated to subordinate officers. Thus the Resident
Magistrates - in practice one man governments in their
13
Divisions - gradually assumed responsibility.
9) Cf. Murray's Instructions of 1909, quoted Mair, op.cit.,p.25.
10) e.g. a close analysis of his report on the Ancell murder 
case reveals this - Report 1888-9, p.14. The same in 
the Merani affair of 1889: MacGregor to Norman, No.42, 
7.10.1889 - Cmd. 6323, p.57.
11) Romilly had bitterly complained of the Colonial Office's 
unconcern about the fate of their officers under the 
protectorate - Letters.... p.307: 1.6.1888.
12) MacGregor to Norman, No.74, 20.5.1890, Encl. Cmd. 6323,
p.142. The Armed Constabulary complemented this delegation. 
Definite instructions were issued by MacGregor to his 
officers that they were not to engage in ’serious en­
counters*, but were to leave them to him. Knutsford im­
plored him privately not to take such constant personal 
risks - see Sir. W. MacGregor, British New Guinea - Ad­
ministration, R. C .I. Proc. , 1894-5, p p . ^ J ¿¿9. Lazier 
page contains statement by Knutsford.
13) See Legge, op.cit., pp.62-3; Joyoe, op.cit., p.90. C.A.W. 
Monokton, Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident 
Magistrate, p.73 gives a graphic account of an R.M's burdens
The actual process of pacification had to come first, 
however# During 1889 MacGregor evolved techniques which 
paved the way for delegation to both Magistrates and natives* 
Direct participation showed him which, new administrative 
institutions were essential to sustain and extend law and 
order*
In November 1888 Mac Gregor determined to make an example 
of the murder of Capt* Ancell in Chads Bay* This, he con­
cluded, had been fa deliberately planned murder* by the 
natives» involving (he estimated) about 10,000 people in 
villages between Wagawaga (Milne Bay) and Taupota (north of 
Chads Bay). Two influential native leaders, Yacobo of Milne 
Bay and Komodoa of Bentley Bay^ were enlisted on the 
government's side, and MacGregor tried to Isolate the village 
primarily culpable. He insisted that these people demonstrate 
their friendship towards the government by assisting in the 
capture of the individuals responsible - he was anxious to 
impress personal responsibility and to avoid mass sanctions.
A serious handicap at this time was the lack of a dis-
!
ciplined armed force: a party of miners had to be made special 
constables in Samaral, and almost immediately they exceeded 
their functions by burning down a large village.
In Milne Bay the people of Abioma (Ahioma) were forced to 
surrender murderers by the taking of hostages, a tactic 
MacGregor used on a number of occasions. When all the 
murderers had been secured, MacGregor ran great personal risks
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government; he walked over the range to Chads Bay accompanied
by only one other European. Meetings were conducted at all
the villages, at which it was announced that the peace must
be kept. Influential men were selected from these villages
to be taken to Ssmarai to witness the trial. Eventually
four natives were publicly executed, one at Samarai, one at
Milne Bay and two at Chads Bay,
MacGregor defended these severe actions on the ground
that murders were 'notoriously frequent* in the Eastern
Division, and that only 'rigid justice' would prove a
14deterrent. He was later gratified at the co-operative 
attitude of the 'Awaiama tribes' which he had punished, 
reporting them 'well disposed, hospitable to strangers, honest
in their dealings with white men, and peaceful towards their
15
neighbours*. This made possible the establishment of the
Anglican mission, in an area remote from government control
16based on Samarai.
Similarly, in the case of the Cloudy Bay murders of
to re-establish the confidence of the natives in the
14) Report 1888-9, pp.12-16; Report 1897-8, p.xxii. During the 
same peri o d  punitive action in the neighbouring British 
Solomons tended to be much more summary: cf. actions of 
Resident C.M. Woodford after the murder of Jean Pouret on 
Guadalcanal, 1897 - B.S.I.P. Report 1897-8, Brit. P.P.
1899, lxii, Cud. 9046-19, p.13.
15) Brit. P.P. 1892, lv, Cmd. 6563-21, p.20. MacGregor 
reported to the 1898 Premiers' Conference, clt.sup., that 
death sentences were later almost invariably commuted.
No native was executed after 1893.
16) Mission established by Rev.A. Maclaren: MacGregor to Norman, 
No.102, 16.9.1890(Cmd.6323); Intro, to J.H.P. Murray, op. 
cit. p.27.
September 1889 MacGregor went to great pains to enlist the 
aid of neighbouring peoples, and especially of influential 
men (for example, Ino of Domara). Ino was eventually res­
ponsible for seizing and handing over the murderers, for 
whom present s were made. At the same time MacGregor had been 
forced to open fire on a threatening group of Merani ; this
17provoked his comment criticised, by implication, by Dr. Mair. 
When he later discovered the number of natives killed, how­
ever, MacGregor was overcome with remorse. fI am perfectly 
well aware that I could not be relieved of responsibility in 
respect of it, by pleading honest and virtuous intentions...f
At the same time he had no doubt that he had had no al-
18ternative in the circumstances.
This all fitted into the pattern of building up and 
supporting local authorities, European and native.
The effort had to be concentrated in the east because of 
the number of miners and traders working there. When the 
natives on Misima became restive in 1890, as the gold yields 
declined and the miners thinned out, MacGregor anticipated 
trouble by sending R.M. Moreton with a strong force to 
patrol, in order to make the power of the government quite 
apparent. 'In this way it is believed that Mr. Moreton’s
17) MacGregor to Norman, No.42, 7.10.1889, Cmd. 6323, p.58; 
Mair, op.cit., pp.24-5.
18) MacGregor to Norman, No. 45, 28.10.1889, Cmd. 6323, pp. 
63-5.
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hands will be so strengthened that his position will be
19more respected in future*.
The basic difficulty that MacGregor faced in these cases 
was that of enforcing individual responsibility amongst 
people who lacked leaders sufficiently powerful either to be 
held responsible themselves, or to be able to assist in many 
instances in securing those actually responsible. This led 
to tedious investigation and re-visiting.20 By impressing 
government sanctions and deterrents on influential natives 
MacGregor sought to avoid this, for despite his own pro­
digious energy, he lacked staff, finance and transport to
21re-visit areas as his obligations expanded.
Where a relatively strong leader existed, however, Mac­
Gregor's attitude, like Romilly*s, tended to be ambivalent. 
Even in 1889, as a result of pacification, MacGregor was 
boosting the status of native leaders beyond traditional 
limits: an example is Y^cobo of Milne Bay, where the
19) MacGregor to Norman, No.102, 16.9.1889, Cmd. 6323, p.196: 
the beginning of planned patrolling. The miners them­
selves he liked as 'respectable, honest hard-working menf- 
MacGregor to Norman, No.l. 8.7.1889, Cmd. 6323, p.2.
20) Three separate visits were paid to the Orangerie Bay area 
in 1891 in order to capture the actual murderers of a 
native - Report 1890-1, pp.22-5.
21) The idea of the public trial was continued. In Jan. 1891 
all the principal men of Mugula were brought to witness 
the trial of an Orangerie Bay native for the murder of a 
European - ibid. Note his insistence on individual res­
ponsibility, at great personal risk, in the Kiokbush- 
Nlelson case, when he persuaded the suspects to accompany 
him, alone and unarmed? the leading natives were patiently 
re-assured - MacGregor to Norman, No.102, 16.9.1890, Cmd. 
pp. 200-1.
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traditional residential pattern was the hamlet and where
Op
the pariah was little bigger*
His policy in the Aroma area, however, was different.
When there were rumours, in July 1889, of Aroma hostility to 
the government, MacGregor was troubled, because they com­
prised about four thousand people apparently forming one 
community, they were notorious for independence of character, 
and they were led by Koapena, #perhaps the most influential 
chief in British New G u i n e a ' M a c G r e g o r’s task was to win 
Koapena's support without making it appear that the govern­
ment was dependent on it. He felt a prime responsibility 
towards the mission station at Kerepunu; Koapena had given 
the mission some assistance, but 'considerable difficulties' 
had been encountered. MacGregor attributed this to the size 
and cohesion of the community:
Wherever a Papuan community is large and powerful 
it is insolent, and Aroma has, in proportion to its 
great power• in numbers, tried the patience and the g, 
courage of those good men and women...
MacGregor's policy was to visit Aroma and land without
a large force, to show that he was not intimidated: he lunched
with Koapena and his family, and invited Koapena's son to
spend six months with him. Although convinced of the value
22) On social conditions in the area, see Ch.III, 1, 1. C.G. 
Seligmann, The Melanesians of British New Guinea, pp.453-4 
states 'no chieftainship', even in Wagawaga, probably the 
most coherent Bay community.
23) MacGregor to Norman, No.3, 19.7.1889, Cmd. 6323, p.4.
24) Ibid.
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of tact and patience, MacGregor showed that he was always 
on his guard*
It should never be forgotten that Aroma, like every 
other district here, has a deep respect for power«« 
and an excellent contempt for the want of it.
The general trend to power rather than patience increased
as the frontiers expanded, as delegation to subordinates
increased, and particularly as the government had to demand
active co-operation of the chiefs. This last often cut
across customary rights or practices; in 1893, for example»
Koapena forfeited the support of the government when he
refused to give up to the village constables relatives wanted
26for offences.
(ii) The Involuntary Expansion of Control
Even before the Administration could firmly establish 
influence over the coastal areas it was being drawn Inland 
by the raids of hill people. Those coastal people who had 
accepted the authority of the Government looked to it for 
protection; but as MacGregor remarked as early as 1891, 
giving protection over such a long line taxed his resources 
to the utmost. Even on the coast there were still places at 
which the natives wished fto try their strength against the
07
Government’, before submitting to its orders.
25) Ibid., p.5.
26) Central Division, Port Moresby Stat. Journal (F.E. Lawes), 
1.8.1893; cf. Report 1897-8, p.xxili.
27) Report, 1890-1, p.xxviii. He noted in 1895 (loc.cit., 
p.223) that being drawn inland was his principal diffi­
culty.
50
It was not simply natives who appealed for protection*
The missions also did so, both for themselves and for
28friendly native groups. . In addition, the European miners 
in particular tended to blunder into dangerous areas and 
force the government to follow. The miners often took the 
law into their own hands; and mission teachers caused diffi-
90
culty by intimidating natives in the name of the government.
These unsought responsibilities beyond the fringes of 
control upset orderly extension of administration according 
to the •oil-stain' technique, which MacGregor described in 
1896. This involved working from established centres in a 
gradually increasing radiusv after he himself had made the
30
centres tenable by compelling native submission.
The Mambare murders of 1895-7 are good examples of the 
over-extension of government lines. A miner named Clark, 
who was known to be of good character and kindly towards 
natives, was murdered on the river in August 1895. His 
companions then took the law into their own hands and 
destroyed property, burned houses, and killed pigs. MacGregor 
himself twice ascended the river to make sure of the facts.
28) Rev* Copland King of the Anglican mission appealed for 
intervention in a fight between the Murawawa and Kwamana 
peoples (Goodenough Bay) in 1895, The Constabulary Com­
mandant burned all the weapons, and threatened to cut off 
the water and food supplies until two murderers were 
given up. He failed to persuade the chief of Paiwa village 
to place himself under government protection - Report
1895-6, p.xv.
29) Report 1895-6, pp.xv, xxvii; App. D, pp*15-17.
30) Ibid.. p.xxvii. Murray stated (Intro, to L. Lett, Knights 
Errant of Papua, p.x) that the method derived from the 
French.
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he ordered six young men to be taken as hostages; in the
struggle, several others were shot* This left an uneasy
truce. MacGregor was reluctant to depute; but his duty to
the miners crossed his obligations to his officers.
Eventually John Green was posted as Government Agent at the
*51junction of the Tamata and Mamba rivers. This led to
Green9s murder in 189?, a disastrous loss to a small service.
MacGregor attributed it to Green,s devotion to peaceful
3  Pmeans of pacification.
Other exploits by miners, notably their penetration to 
the western end of the Owen Stanleys in 1897, impelled 
MacGregor to use violent means in order to rescue and protect 
them. This was a punitive expedition; it could hardly have 
been anything else, in that it was impracticable for the 
government to establish its authority permanently. All 
MacGregor could hope to do was to defeat opposing groups - 
in this instance the Goromani - and, as he wrote of the 
Mambare peoples in the same year, 1 to completely humiliate
31) Ibid., pp. xv, xvi, 14-15. Copland King apparently 
considered government action too tentative: *strong- 
handed intervention on the part of the Government was 
necessary9. MacGregor said that he had not concurred 
with King as to the need for violent aotion in previous 
cases - ibid., pp.6, 11.
32) Report 1897-8, p. xlv.
When the co-operation of the natives could not be secured,
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them in the eyes of the other tribes*• Such hasty and
violent action prejudiced later relations; but MacGregor
had little time or opportunity to use *a more tentative
^A
approach* (essentially the * oil-stain *) •
Summing up in 1898f however, MacGregor saw the converse
side of over-extension:
• •• we have had up to two years ago a long area 
near the coast line where our authority was estab­
lished. Then ins ids that again along the foot of 
the main range an area in which the people were in 
their primitive condition. Those were constantly 
coming down to attack the coast tribes. We have 
been cutting in amongst these mountain people and 
we have now brought a large number of them at 
several points under our authority... each tribe 
that we get thoroughly in hand contributes to 
bringing its neighbour under our influence*
He was sanguine that within * three or four years* all
the natives that would be * worth meddling with* would be
36
under control*
33
33) Report 1897-8, p.xiv; Report 1896-7, App.H, p.33. It was 
remarked in 1897 that miners had extended to the N.E. side 
of Mt. Scratchley - Report 1896-7, p.xil. MacGregor noted 
in May 1897 that while he was occupied on the Giri river 
investigating the murder of Green, an officer provided 
miners with the government launch to ascend the Mambare - 
Report 1896-7, p.32. MacGregor was in an impossible 
position, for in view of Australian attitudes towards 
finance and development he could hardly forbid prospecting 
areas to miners; it was his responsibility to protect 
them, according to the colonies - see Viet.p*p# No. 65/ 
1886, and continuity of attitude in 1898 Premiers* 
Conference, cit.sup.
34) See Legge, op.cit., pp*70-l.
35) 1898 Premiers* Conference, cit.sup., p.18.
36) Ibid. He did not say how this general process was to be 
halted; but he was in a position where he was trying to 
re-assure the guaranteeing colonies that their money would 
not be spent indefinitely on pacification. There was some 
talk in 1898-9 of New Guinea's being abandoned - see Sir 
W. MacGregor, Bltiah Mew Guinea. B.C.I. Proc. 1898-9, pp.
53
.Despite recent criticism of MacGregor, contemporary
opinion tended to be weighted the other way, claiming the
need for rapid pacification to allow opportunities for trade,
mining and miss ionizing. Mission attitudes are a good index.
MacGregor was a firm favourite with the L.M.S. As for the
Anglicans, it has already been remarked that Copland King
37wanted even firmer action in his * sphere*#
The Catholic mission based on Yule Island had the most
difficult task, for its narrow coastline forced it inland,
amongst the truculent Mekeo, and it had a much greater
38European staff to protect than the other missions. In 1891
MacGregor took familiar action against the Mekeo: several of
the Inawaia were wounded in a government attack, and a number
of the Kibori were taken as hostages until a murderer was
39given up - the latter ’with great reluctance• * Bishop Verjus 
called at the station to commend MacGregor's actions which, 
he said, would facilitate mission work. MacGregor noted that 
the mission made good use of the circumstances to strengthen 
its influence, where formerly it had been of little account. 
Later in the same year the government and mission co-operated
37) King's letter of 11.6.1895 to R.M., Samaral (Report 1895-6, 
p. 11) is particularly illuminating: 'May I... express the 
wish that the Government will not prooeed to the district 
until it is ready to take decisive action...'
38) See, J. McAuley, The Distance between the 
the Governed. Sou^b Pacific. Yii, 8, i§54,
39) Report 1891-2: Brit. P.P. 1893-4, lx, Cmd. 6857-18, p.26.
( i i i )  Attitudes to Pacification
Government and
PP
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in the re-settlement of several tribes, which strengthened 
the influence of both,40
Only in retrospect, apparently, has MacGregor come under 
attack by the Catholics, clearly because of the notion of 
mission spheres* Dupeyrat claims that the mission defended 
the Inawaia against false accusatici» of murder;41 and that 
MacGregor considered the missions primarily as a sort of
4P
auxiliary to the police. Speaking to the Anglican Bishop,
however, MacGregor had said*
I have been compelled to shed blood in New Guinea, 
to my great sorrow* I shall not rest content till 
1 can make such reparation as is possible, I want 
to plant a Christian teacher wherever such blood 43 
has been shed under my authority,
40) Ibid., p,44,
41) A, Dupeyrat, Papouasie. p.272,
42) Ibid., p.257.
43) A.K. Chignell, Twenty-one Years in Papua, p.114. In 
supporting the Catholic case, ïhipeyrat (Papouasie, p,257 
note 2) misinterprets Mac Gregor* s remark (intro, to 
Murray, op.cit., p,27) that the best institutions he left 
in Papua were the constabulary and village police, and 
the missions. Later Governors held precisely the same 
view of the missions* role, and even drew the analogy - 
see G. White, A Pioneer of Papua. p*43; Murray, op,cit,9 
p.9; A,P. Elkin in Australian"Quarterly, XII, 3, 1940, 
p.34. The L.M.S. appreoiated MacGregor1 s policy: see 
Lennox, op.cit., pp.150-1. MacGregor himself made his 
attitude to the missions' rule in relation to administ­
ration quite clear: letter quoted Chignell, op.cit,, p,134. 
This role was essentially positive rather than pros­
criptive.
Monckton was quite wrong in the assertion that MacGregor
made ^Regulation defining mission spheres of influence 
Top.cit., p.1397; he was aware ox tnedangers or competing 
interests, and hoped that spheres would be preserved - 
MacGregor to Norman, No.75, 19.5.1890, Enel, 3, Cmd. 6323, 
p,149.
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This is more in tune with MacGregor’s known character 
than Dupeyrat’s interpretation; though of course, like 
Murray, he appreciated the value of the missions in con­
solidating government influence* The two were complementary#
44
In particular, the missions influenced native youth.
2. The Structure of Local Administration#' '  ........... - - -  - --- ........  |T r  | ... m
(i) The Trend to Direct Rulet The Uses of Traditional Leaders 
The need to pacify and consolidate influence in rapidly 
expanding areas dominated the evolution of local administ­
ration. Douglas warned in 1888 that personal government from 
the centre would have to prevail - largely repeating
Musgrave’s views of 1886 - and that central authority would
45
have to be impressed through 'a small armed force*• Yet
the influence of Gordon’s ideas on native administration was
46
initially strong. MacGregor was not only predisposed to 
govern through and by the natives, if this proved at all 
practicable, but to some extent he had this thrust upon him. 
His lack of staff and funds dictated the utmost use of the 
native people, if not from principle then from sheer
44) Heport 1897-8, p.xxxiil. This influence tended to 
counteract status-seeking through warfare.
45) Beport 1888, p.7. This was a repetition of the con­
stabulary idea, on the Fijian model, given in Report 
1886, p.6.
46) Gordon had been direct responsible for MacGregor’s 
joining the Colonial Service - see MacGregor, loc.oit. 
(1894-5), p.233; Joyce, op.cit., pp.81-2.
expediency.
He began by looking for chiefs whose authority he could 
strengthen sufficiently to serve the needs of government f 
he ended by administering largely through native police at 
the central and village level. Thus in 1898, as MacGregor
47
himself indicated, his system amounted to thoroughgoing 
paternalism; that this was the 'most suitable form* for
<.... . ..- ' L i — '"1 ^  ..... .... A fai n ^
natives at the Papuan level he then entertained 'no manner 
48
of doubt'. But this was not always so. His conceptions 
show a progression from the hope of Indirect administration 
to the reality of direct administration. In 1890 MacGregor 
was talking of strengthening the authority of chiefs to that 
they could accept responsibility towards the government; in 
" \
1898 he spoke of the village police as the best substitute 
that could be created for the tribal chiefs that did not 
exist.4**
His staff difficulties alone were formidable. But, al­
though village police after 1892 had to be supervised, 
village chiefs had to be both supported and supervised. He 
noted staff difficulties in strengthening thle chiefs'
47) J.A. Miles, Local Administration in British New Guinea and 
Papua. South Pacific. X. 8. 1959. p.62. An analogy wiifa 
Lugard in Nigeria is germane; indeed, the same argument 
might be said to apply to almost any new colonial ad­
ministration - see Hailey, An African Survey (ed. 1945), 
pp.527-8. Cf. Legge, op.cit., p. 94, caiegorlsing the 
system of administration as paternalist.
48) MacGregor to Lamington, 3.6.1898, quoted Joyce, op.olt«, 
p. 142.
49) Report 1889-90, p.23; Report 1890-1, p.xxviii; Report 
1897-8, p.xxvi.
authority in 1890. The range of functions a government
officer had to perform has already been noted. The oil-stain
principle under expansionist pressures meant the steady
creation of new Divisions. At first there were Western and
Eastern Divisions, with Government Agents at Mekeo and Rigo.
In November 1889 a new Central Division took in these two ^}y
districts. In 1892 the Louislades were made into & separate
South-Eastern Division. There were officers with limited
jurisdiction on the goldfields, and in Cloudy Bay in 1889-90
and 1894-5. The gold rush to the Mambare caused Green’s
appointment as Government Agent there in 1895; and by 1900
51
Northern and North-Eastern Divisions had been created.
Altogether MacGregor employed 64 officers during the
ten years; of these only 38 had magisterial powers; and of
52
those 389 half died or resigned. As for quality rather than
numbers, the Catholic Bishop said that after 1894 the Mekeo
district was administered by officers who ’had suddenly sprung
up from an admirabls diversity of careers, from those of
53
cook and bird-stuffer to that of doctor of medicine*.
MacGregor in fact had to take practically anyone he could 
get. It is probable that a police system demanded less tact 
and patience from of floors than administration through
50) Report 1889-90, p.23.
51) Joyce, op.cit., p.88; Report 1899-1900, p.17 (the N.E. 
Division was established in April 1900).
52) Joyce, op.cit., p.89.
53) Report of Royal Commission, 1907: evidence, p.134.
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(ii) The Beginnings and the Fijian Analogy 
(a) The position and functions of chiefs.
Legge has said that both MacGregor and his successor,
Le Hunte, applied in British Hew Guinea the lessons they
55
learned in Fiji. The case of Le Hunte is difficult to 
justify? but MacGregor certainly began by trying to dc so.
His attempt to boost the authority of native leaders was a 
pallid copy of what was done on the executive side in Fiji? 
what MacGregor attempted on the legislative side was closer 
to the model.
The early relations between chiefs and appointed native 
officials are dealt with later in a little detail, in the 
district studies. It will be necessary here simply to make
57
a few points about the attempted use of •Government Chiefs*. 
MacGregor recognized that this involved, not working through 
an established institution, but building the institution 
itself on an insecure foundation. The man who knew the Motu 
best, Dr. Lawes, had warned of this. To that extent the 
recognition of chiefs (the term •recognition* was continued
54) Talking of strengthening the chiefs’ authority, he said 
that ’great patience is required in this matter* - 
Report 1889-90, p. 23.
55) J.D. Legge, Britain in Fiji, 1858-80. pp.v-vi| he notes 
that administration there involved a recognition of the 
worth of native culture in relation to its environment.
56) Ibid., pp.208-10: outlines the indirect system as applied 
in Fiji? also see Miles, loc.cit., p.62.
57) Miles, ibid., pp.63-4: a reasonably adequate outline.
¡See. Ch. III.
58
chiefs.®4
59
institutions for thsm wsre much more closely inter-dependent
58
than in Fiji. When introducing the Ordinance for the
Better Regulation of Native Affairs, MacGregor wrote:
... the Papuan elder has never at any period of his 
life rendered obedience, never acknowledged an es­
tablished authority, and there are few or none that 
have been able to rule savs on a narrow and precarious 
tenure. Hence the difficulty of introducing law and 
of creating small centres of controlling authority is 
enormous. Too much caution and patience cannot bs 
exercised In soaking even a tentative commencement.
Leading men were thus 'recognized1 as chiefs, but their 
authority had to be 'created* for them, except in rare 
instances (for example, the Trobriands and Aroma). This 
can be illustrated from MacGregor's attempts to set ohlefs 
over districts rather than villages. The best examples are 
Yakobo and Komodoa in Milne Bay and Bentley Bay respectively, 
who demonstrated their co-operation during the Anoell case. 
These men were referred to by the R.M. as 'agents for ths 
Government*| the R.M. realized clearly that their authority 
derived from government. Yakobo also leaned heavily on the 
L.M.S. Mission. The R.M., Hely, wanted a native represent­
ative, whom he called a Government Agent, in all 'populous 
districts'. This could be achieved, he felt, by recognizing 
the * principal man', or the *one with most energy and
58) See Ch. 1(b), note 52. Report 1891-2, p.86.
59) MacGregor to Norman, No.71, 31.8.1889 - CPL(Col.), Set 6.
60) Report 1888-9, pp.32-3.
from the protectorate) and the provision of statutory
determination* as government representative. In areas such 
as the south side of Milne Bay, where he was not well ac­
quainted with the peopley he felt that ’a few days residence*
61
would be sufficient for him to pick out a suitable man*
Yet this was the ssms Division in which a later R.M. believed
gA
the ’chiefs* to have little influence. There was little
that was traditionally based in Hely’s approach. The
qualities appropriate to the functions which the government
desired were already coming to the fore in selection*
The recognition of chiefs went on constantly as government
penetrated new areas; in the older areas certain of them seem
to have been picked out for special support, and they were
given symbols of office and payments. In 1892, for example,
in the eastern part of the Central Division F.E. Lawes
presented many chiefs in the Tupuseleia and Kapakapa areas
with ’batons of office1, similar to those given out by
Erskine. This was said to have ’strengthened their influence
63
very considerably in their respective districts'* One man, 
Kwara Melo, was given a baton and a uniform as well. This 
uniform, to take the description given of the one presented 
at Wabbarabba In 1892, comprised 'a suit of clothes of the
61) Ibid.
62) Report 1893-4, p.?l. As sarly as 1890 Hely was himself 
very disappointed in the 'Native Agents** Neither of them, 
he said, appeared to have any influence outside his 
immediate vicinity* MacGregor counselled patiences *it 
will be long before the position of any chief is suffi­
ciently strong to make him an authoritative Government 
Officer* - Report 1889-90, pp.23, 104*
63) C*D. Stat. Journal, Port Moresby, July 1892, especially 
4th, 6th and 9th; Report 1891-2, p.86.
60
61
kind given to chiefs who are recognized and singled out for
empoloyment, consisting of a jacket and knickerbockers of
64
dungaree...1 Clearly the implication was that those men 
selected and paid £2 a year were intended eventually to 
exercise supervision over a wide area. In the newly visited 
villages of the Central Division in 1892 the chiefs were
merely presented with hatchets as symbols of their
65
recognition. MacGregor himself indicated that no significance
was to be attached to recognition; *no native so-called chief
understood what he might or should do9 or had the power to
66
do it, even if he did understand.* There was thus a
distinction between 'employment* and 'recognition*. In the
first two or three years the *educational process* for the
chiefs was continued» with tours to government headquarters;
they were obliged to report regularly if within reasonable 
67range.
Some chiefs, such as those in the Aroma and Mekeo areas, 
were evident; elsewhere methods of selection sesm to have 
varied with individual officers, though often a general
64) Report 1892-3, p.2.
65) C.D. Stat. Journal, July 1892. Patrolling officers had a 
form to fill in which required them to list the chiefs of 
villages visited; because they were looking for a chief, 
they always found one.
66) MacGregor, loc.cit. (1894-5), p.218.
67) Eastern Division - Report 1888-9, pp.15-16; Report 1892-3, 
p.2. These visits remained mandatory. At Inawi (Mekeo, 
20.6.1899) the chief was reprimanded for being the only 
one not to report at the government station (generally 
required monthly) - C.D. Stat. Journal.
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assembly of Till age rs was asked to name someone* Mac­
Gregor himself found complications in the Eastern Division 
in 1891; for where strong natiTe leaders were lacking there 
was scope for outside influence to determine selection* At 
the Tillage of Nada a non-native named Tetzlaff had Just 
acquired land in the area* MacGregor belieTed that it was 
at Tetzlaff*s instigation that a natiTe named Sarras was
chosen as chief; for Sarras immediately asked that no mission
g o
teacher be sent to Nada,
Vis-a-Tis the Tillage police, in the years 1892 onwards, 
the chiefs were in an unsupportable position* They were 
supposed to stand aboTe the village constables, but they had 
no legal status or powers* As Miles expressed it, 'it was 
their function to persuade the people to obserre the law as 
stated in the NatiTe Regulations while it was the duty of
70
the Village Constables to arrest those who broke the law**
The chiefs* were bound eTentually to appear dispensable. 
Moreover, with the proliferation of Native Regulations pro­
scribing many customary practices such as sorcery and the
68) C.D* Stat* Journal, 19.7.1893s Keapara village. The 
villagers here were unable to name anyone* Cf, Report 
1892-3, pp.xi-xiis the leading men at Tupuseleia and 
Tube tube were well-known to government *
69) MacGregor’s diary, 22,1,1891, Facts reflecting on the few 
landed settlers were not made public, for obvious reasons; 
cf. Report 1897-8, p.xllli. Mission ’chiefs* were not un­
common. Also; officers particularly disliked accepting 
them - see B.A. Hely’s Journal (Mitchell), 6,3.1893.
70) Miles, loc.cit,, p.64,
62
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burying of dead in Tillages, the chiefs became subject to
serious role conflict* This was generally to the adTantage
of the V.C* As early as July 1892, when the Tillage police
system was only embryonic, the constable of Hanuabada, Toua -
the first appointed anywhere - arrested Aoudu, Boe Vagi’s
71
successor, for assault. If a V*C* offended, as an official
appointee he could be dismissed and replaced; but as a
chief was a supposedly influential man whom the gOTernment
was supporting this could not be done, otherwise the basis
72
of the institution collapsed* It is hardly surprising that
preference was giTen administration through V.C,s. An
excellent example, already mentioned, was the eclipse of
Koapena at Aroma, and his Tirtual replacement, from the
73
gorernment standpoint, by six Tillage constables*
Miles states that the office of chief and Tillage con­
stable was first combined in the one person in the Mekeo 
74
area in 1894. But in NoTember 1892 when MacGregor was 
sending the draft of the Tillage constable Regulation to 
Queensland for approval, be noted that of those appointed 
on a trial basis two or three (who were both chiefs and
71) C.D. Stat. Journal, Port Moresby, 4.7.1892 (P.E. Lawes). 
Toua eventually became chief - Returns, March 1899; C.D* 
98/99.
72) e*g. note replacement of the V.C. of Kerepunu, and simul­
taneous appointment of a successor - C.D. Stat. Journal, 
26.5.1899*
73) MacGregor, loc.cit. (1894-5), p.222: C.D. Journal, Port 
Moresby, 1*8.1893.
74) Miles, loc.cit., p.64*
constables) received £2 p.a., as distinct from the two
uniforms and £1 p.a. given to the others.7** This combining
of the two offices was a process which rapidly flourished.
On a patrol to Lese from Port Moresby in 1898 R.M. Blayney
noted that of the twelve chiefs contacted , seven were also
village constables. By this time the chiefs who were not
also V.C.s were in a decidedly inferior position, though they
were still given ’presents' - such as a shirtf a belt, and
six fish-hooks. The villagers appeared to be electing
village constables as chiefs, and chiefs were putting their
77
sons forward as village constables. Thus, government 
favour was apparently already assuming importance, if not 
predominance, as a leadership determinant* Officers began 
^0 insis<fc "that both chiefs and village constables have orders 
attended to and Regulations complied with. To them, /
distinctions disappeared; but of course only the constables
78
had statutory status and statutory powers* The functional
gulf between the official appointee and the traditional
79
leaders was sometimes bridged by consultation,
76) C.D. Journal, Port MoresT^y, January 1898,
77) Ibid., 8.3.1898 (Ereva), 21.5.1899 (Boru).
78) Ibid., 20.12*1897, Port Moresby areas ’Instructed chief 
and V.C. that they had to see that in such cases (not 
throwing bodies in the river during a dysentery epidemic) 
natives assisted,*, Ordered chief and V.C. to see that 
lime was made.,,’
79) e.g. Toua in Port Moresby, 24.10.1899, when a land dis­
pute arose with the government - C.D. Journal #8/99.
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The trend to direct rule by European officials was
emphasised by the campaign MacGregor launched in 1893 to have
his officers study local custom - almost the same policy, and
for the same reasons, which Murray justified in the 1920s,
MacGregor wrote, significantly:
It has been felt that no man, or body of men, can 
rule justly and wisely a people with whose cusioms,q q  
usages and inner life they are unacquainted.
Paradoxically, this would seem to represent a concession 
to the impracticability of governing through chiefs, con­
ceptually analogous to Murray's later insistence on due pro­
vision for custom under his administration. In effect, it 
represented a substitute for the devolution of powers and 
functions to traditional leaders*
The breakdown of the projected consultative aspect of ad-  ^
ministration, and the failure of chiefs given judicial 
responsibilities, reinforced this trend*
Though the general trend was to replace chiefs by village 
constables, or to combine the two offices, in one or two 
places where rank existed the position by 1898 was extremely 
confused: these included the Kiwai and Kiriwina areas, and the
80) Beport 1892-3, p.xxiv. My italics. He reported that some 
officers were not interested - an index to the service - 
and that changes in personnel (perpetually a major problem) 
hindered progress* It is remarkable that although 
Scratchley and Lawes had tried to analyse leadership, Mac­
Gregor's officers paid almost no attention to the matter - 
ibid*, App. P - Y, dealing with aspects of native custom.
6 6
Mekeo* Monckton had acted in 1897 amongst the Mekeo with his
usual savage vigour, and during an outbreak of enteric fever
stripped all the chiefs and village constables of their
uniforms and gaoled them for having disobeyed orders. One V.C.,
who did not lie, was made 'senior village constable for the
81
district with double pay' and a special badge,
The Mekeo area did not easily fit into a system of direct 
administration. The strength of the lopia chiefs was dis­
concerting. In 1898, Judge Winter called a meeting of the 
principal chiefs of the area (undefined except that it excluded 
Maiva and Kivori) and appointed Maino of Veipa to be principal 
chief. Veipa already had a chief who had been appointed a 
village constable and was stated to be a good man. Winter also 
appointed several other young men to succeed their fathers as 
chiefs, giving official sanction to established patrilineal 
succession. The number and variety of lopla chiefs seems to 
have led the Administration into creating a chaos of 
authorities.®^ A trend developed herey as in several other 
places, for the office of village constable to become hereditary, 
to the extent that traditional leadership was hereditary.
This discussion of chieftainship has anticipated the es­
tablishment of the administrative structure,
81) Monckton, op.cit., pp,124-7,
82) Report 1897-8, p,74. See Seligmann, op.cit., pp.342-8x 
Adoption of boys into chiefly families was also common, 
however — p.344. See Appendix A, 2, on further ad­
ministration.
In 1889 MacGregor took two major steps to establish a 
structure which would have supported local authority and
provided scope for chiefs to participate in the consultative
.. ’ L-
and judicial work of government. These steps were the 
formation of the Armed Native Constabulary and the promulgation 
of an Ordinance for the Better Regulation of Native Affairs.
The Constabulary represented the 9small mobile force9 
long suggested, and the chronic need for which had been im­
pressed on MacGregor during the Ancell case. In fact Mac­
Gregor had sought an allocation of £1,500 for such a force 
within days of his arrival in the Possession. A major reason 
for the force was to support co-operative native leaders
against intransigent neighbours: he listed thirty-two tribes
84
at enmity in the Rigo area alone. Delays occurred until 
June, 1890, for MacGregor had hoped to include boats* crew in 
the force - an indication of financial stringency. Meanwhile
he was acutely conscious of the need of his local officers
85
for small corps of trained men.
In August 1890 Sir John Thurston made available from Fiji
83) MacGregor to Noiman, No.7, 17.8.1888, CPl(Col.), Set 6.
84) MacGregor to Norman, Ho.3, 12.1.1889, ibid.
85) Norman to Knutsford, No.74f (Encl. 20.5.1890), Cmd. 6323, 
p. 142. He had had to rely on the crew previously; but had 
no illusions about their capabilities: 9outside of blind 
asylums it would be difficult to find a team to shoot on 
even terms with such a squad...9 - ibid.
(b) The Structure of Native Administration.
a Sergeant and Corporal of Police on loan, together with ten
X Vv
time-expired Solomon Island labourers on three-year contracts*
given by Sections 23 and 24 to conscript natives into the 
Constabulary caused Khutsford some misgivings; but it was not 
needed, for after 1893, there were always more recruits than
of the constabulary was the training of village police. 
Service in the constabulary helped to break down *the usual
franca which became known as Police Motu, a knowledge of which 
in later years became an important criterion for selection in
west; in the South-Eastern Division for some years the force 
was self-contained, being recruited and employed locally.
The Ordinance for the Better Regulation of Native Affairs 
was originally thought of as much more Important; though 
unpretentious in appearance the future management of native 
affairs depended on it, said MacGregor. This set up a Native
86) Thurston to Khutsford, No.95, 25*8*1890, Cmd.6323, p.186.
87) Enel* Griffith to Norman, 6.10.1890, in Norman to Khutsford, 
8.10.1890, No.105, Cmd.6323, p.232. Griffith was happy to 
rely on MacGregor's discretion - Joyce, op.cit., p.98.
See Ii. Lett, Knight a Errant of Papua, pp. 18-9.
88) Joyce, op.cit., p.96.
89) of Native Place-Names. South
86
This was the nucleus of the Aimed Constabulary. The power
87
required. In the long term probably one of the major functions
88
village polity1; moreover, it spread the use of the lingua
OQ
the village police. Recruits tended to come mainly from the
69
Regulation Board and provided for Native Magistrates* Courts, 
on the Fijian pattern.**0
The Native Regulations Board was to frame laws for Papuans 
in simple terms, *relating to and taking account of native 
custom*. In MacGregor's view the great feature of it was that 
he could, through it, call upon the advice of any person with 
a special knowledge of native matters. *These persons will 
sometimes be natives; they may sometimes by Polynesians; and 
occasionally they will be Europeans'. This phrasing is sig­
nificant; it shows the high hopes MacGregor had of associating 
natives with the legislative and consultative aspects of 
administration. Although two non-official Europeans were 
appointed to the original Board, the hope of appointing natives 
was never fulfilled. It met vexy infrequently, and according 
to its Minutes simply rubber-stamped Mac Gregor* s proposals. 
Murray had it abolished in 1908.^
Section 8 provided for Native Magistrates* Courts (with 
ultimate appeal to Native District Courts); these courts 
were intended to have native members. Section 8, by stipula­
ting that the magistrate in the lower court *need not be a
90) MacGregor to Norman, No.71, 31.8.1889, CPl(Col.), Set 6.
91) MacGregor had experience of the analogous body in Fiji; 
but officials in Queensland were cautious. Norman wanted 
to hold up the whole Ordinance pending its formal approval 
by the Colonial Office, because of *the novelty of some
of its provisions*; but MacGregor dissuaded him by 
assuring him of the Fiji precedent and by urging the need 
for haste - Norman to MacGregor, No.64, 9.9.1889; No.72,
23.9.1889, CPl(Col.), Set 5. MacGregor to Norman, No.71,
31.8.1889, CPl(Col.), Set 6. Also, Native Regulation®
Board Minute Book - CPl(Col.), Set 19.
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native*, emphasised the intention that he should he. This 
'somewhat anomalous* phrasing, as MacGregor called it, was 
inserted to allow him to make better use of officers such as 
George Hunter at Rigo, who could not be entrusted with full 
magisterial powers. Although MacGregor’s intention of making 
these courts into native courts, in the full sense, is quite 
clear, he was not sanguine about the immediate appointment of 
natives. He thought there were *a few native chiefs* who 
could gradually be entrusted with judicial functions, so long 
as the punishments they could impose were confined to narrow 
limits. ^
In April 1890 MacGregor indicated that the Europeans
initially appointed as Native Magistrates would be Instructed
93
to train natives. Concurrently the first Native Regulations
proscribing stealing, doing bodily harm, and the burying of
dead in villages were submitted, and came into force before
the end of 1890.
The first court sittings were made into public spectacles,
so that the natives could see how the laws were enforced. In
94
the Mekeo area about 2,000 natives attended. MacGregor came
to the conclusion, perhaps hastily, that Papuans quickly
95
acquired a good grasp of the judicial process.
92) MacGregor to Norman, ibid.
93) MacGregor to Norman, 18.4.1890, Encl. in Norman to Knuts- 
ford, No.80, 15.7.1890, Cmd.6323, pp.168-71.
94) Report 1890-1, p.xi.
95) Report 1891-2,p.xv.
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(c) The Failure of Chiefs as Magistrates
This feeling, together with two visits to the Kiwai area
in the west, decided him to try natives as magistrates there.
Iiely, the R.M., was also enthusiastic. The Kiwai had given
evidence of sophistication. When MacGregor first visited
them in 1890 he was surprised to be greeted by the chief of
Mawatta, Gamia, *in the uniform of the metropolitan police'.
»As there was no reason to doubt his claim to his Chieftain-
96
cy he was recognized accordingly.
When Landtman worked in the area in 1912 he found no rank,
a conscious desire for social equality, and no vestige of
chieftainship, though he acknowledged that there had been
97
great chiefs *in former times*• In fact, at the time the
government first arrived in the 1880s the coastal Kiwai were
in the process of a movement westwards to Mabadauan; this
tLrew up several notable leaders. Gamia was recognized as
the leader when Milman administered the area under the
protectorate. Milman attempted to depose him for 'brutally
ill-treating the women*, and gave the official staff of
authority to 'the other chief, Gabia, whom henceforth he
98
instructed the natives to recognize.
96) MacGregor to Horman, Ho.57, 25*2.1890, Encl.2, Cmd. 6323, 
p.118.
97) G. Landtman. The Kiwai Papuans of British Hew Guinea, 
pp.167-70. He called Kiwai society ra nature-born 
instance of Rousseau's ideal community*.
98) Report 1888, pp.16-17: *They all appeared to understand 
what I had done, and to be content with it*.
MacGregor saw that Gabia was subservient to Gamia, and
therefore again recognized the latter, whom he saw to have
99
'unusual authority*• Milraan had suggested the Torres Straits 
system for the area, and it was patent that the Kiwai were 
already borrowing Straits institutions# (For the next fifty 
years the Kiwai continued to anticipate government 
innovations).
After a further visit, in March 1891, MacGregor decided 
that the progress made by the Kiwai since his previous visit - 
in improving their villages and in suppressing disorder - 
warranted the appointment of Native Magistrates and 'a com­
mencement of a village police*.100
R.M. Cameron, then stationed at Mabadauan, appointed Dubu, 
chief of Tureture, and Gamia to be Native Magistrates* Two 
native constables were also appointed to be subordinate to 
each magistrate to ’enforce their authority*.101 The appoint­
ment of these police confused an already confused situation; 
for in 1893 R.M. Hely complained of the multiplicity of 
official positions, jtfiich he attributed to the carelessness 
of his predecessors in office, though Kiwai borrowing from 
the Straits was also a factor.
99) MacGregor to Norman, 25.2.1890, clt.sup. Gabia was made 
chief of Xadowa, a village about i mile east of Mawatta. 
The two peoples were one.
100) Report 1890-1, p.xv. Even at that date there were large 
numbers of male absentees from the villages,mostly em­
ployed in the Straits. See adverse comments on the 
villages, Cmd. 6323, p.119.
101) Report 1890-1, p.78.
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(These village police were the first to be tried out­
side Fort Moresby* The idea seems to have grown out of 
the practice of appointing Special constables' for a 
specific task - an unsatisfactory makeshift method* In 
1891 MacGregor noted that it was worthy of extension, how­
ever, because it established 'a fairly sound idea as to the 
duty of the Government in repressing crime and maintaining 
order', while the natives so appointed had shown a 'decided 
aptitude' for police work.102)
The failure of the Native Magistrates was profoundly 
disillusioning* Hely did not get firm evidence of malpractice 
until August, 1893, when he found that Gamia had been holding 
natives to ransom for alleged minor offences; Gamia had been 
doing this for 'two or three years'. Other natives were 
surprised that the government knew nothing of it* By March 
1894, Hely had come to the conclusion that Gamia was 'the 
biggest rogue in the district1 and was looked down upon by 
his own community* He privately blamed MacGregor's trust in 
Gamia for all the trouble* It must be remembered that Hely 
had a slightly different conception of a 'Government Chief* - 
he wanted 'the strongest man* picked, while MacGregor still 
sought a traditional leader* In April 1894 he suspended Gamia
102) B. Hely * s diaiy (Mitchell), 6.3.1893* He later con­
cluded that the Influence of the Straits had 'spoilt* 
the coastal Kiwai compared with the estuary Kiwai - 
diary, 30*10*1893* Also fieport 1890-1, p.xix.
and recommended his dismissal; in his stead, but as chief
only, he appointed Duani, the former V.C., who was said to
103
be feared and respected by the villagers«
In the same year the other Magistrate, Dubu, was said to
be weak, and was ’severely reprimandedf for allowing a
104
prisoner to escape. Moreover, he was so frightened of
105
*purri purri* as to be useless as a magistrate. Such a 
failing was common amongst the village constables, but diffi­
cult to overlook in a magistrate. Significantly, in 1894 the 
Government Agent in the Mekeo area refused to appoint natives
as magistrates because, in his view, they would not be 
106
impartial# Clearly, MacGregor’s local officers thought that
selection by traditional criteria was Inadequate, and this
was taken as proved by the failure in the west. The trend
to direct rule through trained native officials was thereby
accentuated; amongst the Mekeo the idea developed to maintain
order by having several officials to a village, because they
107
were ’an unruly people'#
103) Hely’s diaiy, 6.3.1893, 30.8.1893, 17.3.1894. Western 
Division Stat. Journal 31.12.1892, 13.1.93, 2.4.94. Joyce, 
op.cit., p.93 note 24 states that Hely was transferred
to the west because he had proved 'ineffective* in the 
east#
104) Report 1893-4, p.52; W.D. Stat. Journal 13.11.1893.
105) Report 1896-7, p.46.
106) Report 1893-4, p.58.
107) Ibid. Among the Kiwal at this time there was an average 
of one chief and two constables to each village, though 
Iasa had four chiefs and four constables - p.xxx#
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MacGregor himself gradually came to conclusions similar 
to those of most officers about the relative administrative g 
efficiency of the village constables.10® In 1891 he had made 
his famous lament that New Guinea did not seem ’to have ever 
produced a man capable of uniting the inhabitants of two 
contiguous glensf. The Kiwai experience eroded any immediate 
prospect of creating a reliable and self-reliant government 
chieftainship, which depended on the conception that a 
chief’s authority was ’not to be exerted merely to benefit 
himself and his own immediate relations1. In view of Mac­
Gregor’s original hopes, his attitudes towards native leaders 
are not always easy to explain. It would appear that he 
regarded the lack of chiefs as due to individual inadequacy,
rather than as something integral to the social system, and
109
that he came to regard Papuans as non-leaders.
At the same time the trial system of village police was 
rapidly expanding, especially in the Western and Central 
Divisions. By mid-1892 MacGregor thought the experiment 
sufficiently successful to put it on a legal fating.110 About
108) As early as December 1892 E.M. Hely had written to the 
Government Secretary that the system of ’rural police’, 
properly conducted, was 'the most efficient system yet 
devised for maintaining law and order* - W.D. Stat. 
Journal, 31.12.1892, 69/92.
109) Report 1890-1, pp. xxvii-xxviiij W. MacGregor, Brit ish 
New Guinea. Country and People, p.41.
110) Report 1891-2, pp.xx, xxv, 86.
About a score had already been appointed*111
The village constables were given statutory recognition
and powers by Native Regulation No.l of 1892. It was stated
at the time that they were designed as a cheap auxiliary to
the Constabulary, but in 1894 their wages began to be drawn
112
from the native officials vote instead of the police vote*
As has been noted, they rapidly became more than mere police
assistants to the chief, and in 1895 MacGregor described them
113
as fof very great importance*. While the ground was being 
taken from traditional leadership by government proscription 
on warfare and by mission discouragement of feasting, the 
government was in fact training its own substitute, the 
leadership aspect of which was subordinate to reliability.
It was difficult to co-ordinate the two, because methods 
of selecting and training village police were to some degree 
arbitrary: the two main methods were service in the Constabu­
lary or imprisonment* The chiefs, as recognized officials 
and middle-aged men, were thus generally exeluded. In 1895 
MacGregor said that of the 80 V.C.s ’not a few9 had graduated 
from prison, while 9a favourite Government measure9 was to
111) MacGregor to Norman, No.84, 2.11.1892, CPl(Col.), Set 6.
112) Report 1892-3, p.vi; Report 1893-4, p.46. He said in
1895 that the village police were necessary because it 
was impossible for the A.N.C. to stop minor thefts in 
every village - MacGregor, loc.clt. (1894-5), pp.213-4. 
The cost of maintaining a member of the A.N.C. was about 
twenty times that of a V.C.
113) MacGregor, loe.cit. (1894-5), pp.213-4*
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take men into the Constabulary from a new or hostile tribe -
often originally as hostages - and after a little training
- 114
to send them back as village constables# He professed to
be sanguine about the implications for the leadership pattern:
f#.. they are accepted on their return from prison as leaders
115
and teachers of society under the new order of things;*
and he made the important Indirect admission that the constables
were »in most cases, when not men who have been in the Armed
Constabulary or in the Government service, men of influence
in the villages*#11®
In 1898 Sir Hugh Nelson, Premier of Queensland, was
given a different account, however, for he reported that ex-
prisoners were not appointed if the chief was considered
suitable; on the other hand, where ex-prisoners were
appointed, they rapidly acquired ’remarkable influence*.
The implication clearly was that forms of traditional
authority were relatively insignificant, to the Administratii&T
Many of the village constables, even in the early stages,
118
had to work largely unsupervised. This applied particularly
114) Ibid., pp.214,222,237. Report 1897-8, pp.xxvii-xxviii.
By this date gaol was regarded primarily as a training 
institution, where the prisoners learned Motu and became 
potential V.C.s - see Report 1894-5, p.28.
115) MacGregor, loc.cit. (1898-9), p.250.
116) Report 1894-5, p.xxvii. My italics#
117) Sir Hugh Nelson, Report on Visit to New Guinea# May 1898 - 
Queensland Leg, Council Journal 18^8, il, ppJ525-8.
118) C.D. Stat. Journal 4.1.1898: the V.C. of Lese, d o s e  to 
Port Moresby, had not been visited for two years.
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in the south-east, for example, where the R.M. reported
that the system would be of little use until adequate
supervision could be given. The same difficulty existed in
the Gulf country, then administered from Port Moresby; in
1896 the first visit to Orokolo in two years showed that the
119
village constables had been totally inactive. Where 
population was more concentrated, however, officers found it 
very useful to have officials who could be made legally res­
ponsible for law and order; some made little distinction 
between village constables and chiefs, issuing instructions 
to both, while others set the V.C. s to watch the chiefs.120 
In 1893 Hely told the constables at Mawatta that they would 
be held responsible if offences were hushed up - obviously a 
stratagem to get evidence against Gamia. And at the other 
end of the Possession it was thought that the appointment of 
two village constables at Bobu might rouse the chief to his 
duties; but these duties, which were of course non-statutory,
had not been defined beyond the obligation 'to maintain
121
peace and assist the teachers'.
119) Report 1894-5, p.24; cf. comment Report 1893-4, p.xxx. 
Report 1895-6, pp.47, 83.
120) Even in 1893 the R.M. Central Division appointed 'village 
constables or Government chiefs' (my emphasis) at all the 
principal villages from Bailala to Galoma; they were 
given similar uniforms and were said to be equally 
anxious to arrest offenders - Report 1892-3, p.44.
121) Ibid., pp.39, 46. MacGregor to Norman, No.50, 5.9.1892, 
CPl(Col.) Set 6. Here MacGregor recognized that the in­
hibiting effects of sorcery at Dobu would be serious - 
see Ch. Ill, 2.
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A major complication was the status of the mission teachers 
in many of the better controlled villages to which constables 
also were appointed. Struggles for precedence developed, 
and teachers sometimes used the threat of 'government* to 
bolster their authority. In the West as early as 1893 the 
teachers were haranguing the village police for * breaking 
the Sabbath; and in the Central Division they regularly 
interfered with native dancing. Judge Winter ruefully com­
mented that some teachers did not understand the distinction
between offences against the law and offences against mission
122
teaching. The Lifu teacher of Mawatta admitted in 1894 that
he had threatened Gamia - then still a magistrate - with
123
gaol if he did not do what the mission wanted.
Mission influenoe in the east was possibly the primary
deterrent to the success of the village constable system; in
this Division (for example in Milne Bay) mission influence
was both early and strong. MacGregor noted that *less use'
124
was made of the V.C.s here than elsewhere. Hely was very 
bitter on the subject!
122) Hely*s diary, 23.10.1893; Cmd. 3-15, No.292 (1900), p.20. 
Sabbath-breaking was a persistent source of friction. The 
official attitude was to encourage natives to observe tbe 
Sabbath, but not to compel - Gov.Sec. to R.M. Daru, 
30.11.1893, 1735/93 (W.D.).
123) W.D. Stat. Journal, 25.2.1894, 20/94.
124) Report 1897-8, p.xxvi. He noted how much depended on 
individual officers.
(d) Influence of the Mission Teachers,
I have never known one case where since the in­
stitution of the Government in 1888, Teachers of 
the London Missionary Society have not bolstered up 
what little power and influence they may have had 
by threats of * Government * - in the East End this, 
together with foolish statements and remarks made 
to natives by idiite Missionaries concerning the 
relative position of Mission and Government, retarded 
the advancement of the District, from our point of 125 
view, by six months out of every twelve*
Conclusion*
The change in emphasis in local administration is attested
to by MacGregor's last annual report. No mention is made of
Government Chiefs or of Native Magistrates, not even to
explain or analyse their eclipse* Instead, the village
constables - numbering 202 in 1898 ~ had become substitutes
for the chiefs and, at least from the government standpoint,
the foci of authority in the villages* The concurrent
emphasis on haste in pacification, forced on MacGregor both
by Australian pressures and t*y the spreading oil-stain, is
126
perhaps in itself sufficient explanation*
At the same time, the initial search for chiefs in
segmentary societies, and the eventual creation of government
substitutes, followed a familiar pattern, long deprecated
107
by students of traditional authorities* The process was 
recognized by Codrington in Melanesia in 1891; but he
125) W,D, Stat* Journal 25*2.1894, 20/94*
126) Report 1897-8, pp.xxvi, xliii-iv.
127) Cf. L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. p.36? L. Gray 
Cowan, Local Government in Vest Africa» pp.18-9.
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approved# In Papua the extreme segmentation influenced 
the substitution only of minor police officials at the
village level; this remained a permanent bar to any real 
delegation or devolution.
MacGregor had done precisely what Gordon warned against s 
in certain areas the ignorance or misconduct of natives in 
authority had led to their replacement, because the policy
1©9
of supporting them was slow. At the same time, New Guinea
was not Fiji, and Gordon himself paid public tributes to
MacGregor*s achievements which, in More 11*8 recent words,
1 3 0
were * little short of miraculous*. It was unfortunate 
that precedents in method had been set which were to persist 
almost unchanged for sixty years.
1  g o
V
128) E.H. Codrington, The Melanesians, their Anthropology and 
Folklore, p.46: •A trader or other visitor looks for a 
chief, and finds such a one as he expects; a very in­
significant person in this way comes to be called, and 
to call himself, the king of his island, and his con­
sideration among his own people is of course enormously 
enhanced by what white people make of him. The practice 
moreover of the commanders of ships of war by which 
local chiefs are held responsible for the conduct of 
their people, and are treated as if they had considerable 
power, undoubtedly increases their importance, nor can 
that result be regretted*.
129) Legge, op.cit. (1958), p.212, quoting Gordon’s Printed 
Records. I, p.197.
130) MacGregor, loc.cit. (1894-5), pp.233-4; Morrell, op.cit., 
p.422.
CHAPTER 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
(d) ADMINISTRATION DURING THE INTER-KEGNUM - MACGREGOR TO
MURRAY. 1898-1908.
The period following MacGregor's leaving New Guinea showed 
how much had depended on his personality and judgment; to a 
very large extent the years 1888-98 were dominated by his 
individual beliefs about the conduct of native affairs in 
relation to overall needs. This ended in early 1898» shortly 
before he left, with the uproar over the application, by the 
British New Guinea Syndicate, for 250,000 acres of land.
The repercussions of this dispute, together with the federation 
of the Australian colonies and the long drawn-out transfer of 
British New Guinea to Australian control, threw the whole 
question of policy into the melting pot.
As Vest has remarked, Australia had no experience on which 
to frame a colonial polioy, though Australians were convinced 
that a policy could be framed distinct from that of the 
Colonial Office. In this period of constitutional and policy 
confusion, 'a heavy premium was placed on the personality and 
abilities of the individuals involved in trying to govern
i  I
Papua in the absence of formal organisation'. In Papua the
1) F.J. lest, The Beginnings of Australian Rule in Papua, 
Political Science (W.2.TT T 3 5 7 7 ^ p " ,^4^-,7 7 ,'£€1------
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men in high office were found wanting; standards of ad- j 
ministration were debased, and faotions flourished*
(i) The Attitude of the Australian Colonies
The complicated methods of framing policy and approving 
legislation which were imposed on MacGregor worked well. 
MacGregor himself won over the Queensland government * especially 
through Griffith and Nelson, both of whom visited the 
g
Possession* If difficulties arose MacGregor had the right 
to consult the Secretary of State direct, but he never used 
this right.3
The Syndicate affair for the first time in ten years 
focussed the attention of the other guaranteeing colonies and 
of the Australian publio on policy in New Guinea« It was 
patent that even the other Premiers had no real oonoeptlon of
4
the polloy MacGregor had followed. The Impression grew in
Australia that British Interests in the Administration were
concerned only with promoting native welfare, to the exclusion
of commercial interests. The Melbourne Age commented:
For the pleasure of hearing once a year that a few 
British officials in New Guinea draw their salaries 
and endeavour to teach the Papuans the advisability 
of burying their enemies instead of eating them, the
2) MacGregor, loo.oit. (1894-5), p.199.
3) MacGregor to Lamington, 4.10.1898, No.38, CPl(Col.), Set 
6; also printed Report 1897-8, p.56.
4) Proc. 1898 Premiers* Conference, oit.sup.
Victorian taxpayers pay £5,000 p.a*
MacGregor, on the defensive, was driven to give retros­
pectively an unjust appraisal of his own policy:
The officers of the Possession have not worked there 
day and night for the past ten years simply to put 
down intertribal warfare and to reduce the natives 
to control. They have been trained to treat natives 
justly and fairly, and to see that they are so dealt 
with by others; to fit them for a useful place in 
developing the resources of the Possession; but above 
all to prepare the country for development by 
Europeans. There is not, and there has not been, any- 
other policy.
Joyce sees this statement, complementing Australian
attitudes revealed in the Syndicate dispute, as sounding the
death knell of the original Proclamation, which made the
protection of the natives the principal objective of the
government*7 In view of MacGregor's record, however, it was
certainly Intended as something approaching the 9dual mandate9,
8
and very close to the policy later defined by Hurray«
It is germane to mention here that since 1890 MacGregor 
had in fact tried to Induce landed settlement; but he wanted
84
5
5) Melbourne Age, 11.5.1898. At least in Queensland there was 
still a strong element which appeared to view British New 
Guinea primarily as a potential source of labour, even in 
1898. Commercial Interest was re-kindled - see Brisbane 
Courier. 17.5.1898; MacGregor to Gov. Queensland, 4.10.1898, 
cii.sup.
6) MacGregor to Lamlngton, ibid. He pointed out the need, as a 
preliminary, for adequate pacification and control.
7) R.B. Joyce, The British New Guinea Syndicate Affair of 1898* 
Hist. See. QueeFsTamTTournaT ..V.'T. l&SS? t T . W . -----------
8) West, loc.cit., p.49.
85
g
people » o f  sufficient means', This was olose to the 
recommendation later made by Atlee Hunt, when enquiring on 
behalf of the Federal government ;10 but in the Australian 
colonies, and particularly in Victoria, it was interpreted 
as a stratagem to exclude Australian pioneers, and in general 
to exclude Australian influence* MacGregor bitingly replied 
that if his despatches and reports had been read they would 
have shown that 'Australian control has pervaded every corner 
of the administration1*11 But this was the seed of the Anglo- 
Austral ian factiousness which was to tear the adalnlstratlve 
service asunder*
It had taken a strong, ubiquitous force in MacGregor to 
maintain flra local control* This disintegrated under his 
weaker successors, Le Hunte (1899-1903), Robinson (1903-4), v 
and Barton (1904-7). These men seemed to lose sight not only 
of what they were trying to do but of the proper means by which 
they might do it* The methods and standards which MacGregor 
had established depended ultimately on the quality of central 
control* This failed* Methods which MacGregor had used with 
some discretion and purpose were used with abandon, so that
9) MacGregor to Lamington, 4.10.1898, cit.sup. MacGregor had 
published a Handbook of Information for Intending Settlers 
in B.N.G. (Brisbane, 1892); and the land laws were summarised 
in ihe English Geog. Journal, I, 1893, p*282f also see Mac­
Gregor , loc.cii* (1894—S ), pp•238-9*
10) C.P,P. 43/1905, pp.6-7*
11) Turner (Vic.) to Nelson (Q.), 25.7.1898; Report 1897-8, App.
1, pp.56-60. MacGregor said (ibid., p.xliii) that agri­
cultural development had been stopped on 'political con­
siderations'.
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government influence wasf in places like the Cape Nelson area 
where Monckton was the first R.M., extended and maintained 
largely by unbridled force*
(ii) Le Hunte. 1899-1905.
The decay of administration began under Sir George Le 
Hunte who, like MacGregor, had served his apprenticeship under 
Gordon, but who showed little evidence of this during his term 
of office in British New Guinea. He was a mild-mannered 
official who lacked MacGregor's all-embracing drive, physical 
vigour end psychological command. Monckton, on his own ad­
missions one of the most ruthless officers in the Administration,
was cowed by a word of reproof from MacGregor; but he viewed
12
Le Hunte only with a kind of contemptous affection. Le Hunte 
was himself acutely conscious of his inadequacy. Venturing 
inland was physically beyond him* He lamented officially in
1901*
..* it makes me feel that it is time someone who can 
worthily follow Sir William MacGregor on land should 
undertake this task. To only know something of the ■.* 
waters of the Possession as I do ... is not sufficient.
Barton wrote later that 'officers who have passed many
years in this isolated and unhealthy country seem peculiarly
liable to become unreasonable and negligent'; but Le Hunte,
who was liked for his own sympathy and integrity, tried to see
12) Monckton, op.oit., pp.99-100, 149, 162.
13) Le Hunte to Gov.Queensland, No.73, 20.12.1901 - Cpl(Col.),
Set 6; cf. Monckton. ibid., p.206, confirming this. Also 
see Legge, op.cit. (1956), p.105.
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the same qualities in his subordinates. As Charles Abel con­
cluded, noting Le Hunte9s •boyish enthusiasm9 when transferred 
to South Australia:
... he was too good a man for the country, and never,, 
could understand the class of white man there.
Personal weakness, combined with this degree of misjudge­
ment, led to disastrous results. Le Hunte made no attempt 
personally to undertake pacification (with one or two lamentable 
exceptions) as MacGregor had done; he delegated this function, 
but at the same time refused under any circumstances to believe 
ill of his officers.1®
After 1901, moreover, an extraordinary constitutional 
situation obtained; for the British government transferred the 
Letters Patent, but the Australian government in effect failed 
to accept them. The Australian Parliament refused to pass the 
Papua Act until 1905 - it came into force only in September 
1906 - so that nominally New Guinea remained a Crown Colony.
As the celebrated Strachan case emphasised, Australia disclaimed 
legal responsibility for the Possession’s Administration.16
14) Barton to Gov. General, 12.9.1905 (Confidential) - Cpl(Col.), 
Set 9; Abel to Wardlaw Thompson, 30.5.1903 (L.M.S. Letters).
15) Some of Le Hunte9s sag in enthusiasm may be attributable to 
the fact that he was still hamstrung by the Australian 
colonies on development matters - see Report 1899-1900, p. 
xxiv. The 1899 Premiers9 Conference took no account of 
native policy - Le Hunte to Gov.Queensland, No.60, 11.9.1899.
16) West, loc.clt., pp.38-40. In October 1901 Le Hunte returned 
to New Guinea on his own responsibility, not knowing even 
which government (if any) would agree to provide the current 
year9s finances: Le Hunte to Gov. Queensland, No.55 , 22.10. 
1901 - CPl(Col.), Set 6. Atlee Hunt gave a good outline of 
the constitutional position; Goaribarl Enquiry (1904), Q. 
2116,2128, 2151-2, pp.90-1. Barton refused to go ahead with 
important legislation while his constitutional prerogatives
____ remained obscure: Report 1904-5,p.II; R e p o r t 1905-6,pp.3-4.
The previous checks, by informed people in Queensland and at 
the Colonial Office, ceased to exist* Except in extreme eases 
senior officials acted without review. This forced the 
missionaries to speak out as administration deteriorated; and 
it positively encouraged faction fights. Inevitably this 
deterioration was reflected at all levels of administration.
This declining control can be illustrated, in particular, 
from two incidents during Le Hunte*s tenure of office. It is 
not accurate to regard these as a mere oversealous application 
of methods used by MacGregor. MacGregor generally used care­
ful judgment, balancing the advantages and disadvantages of a 
particular course of action; he kept his officers under strong 
rein, and in most instances he tried persuasion or bluff, 
often at great personal risk, to conciliate natives who opposed 
him and to impress individual responsibility# The contrasting
reactions of the missionaries show how different administration
17
later became.
For example: in Milne Bay in 1899 numbers of miners were 
panning on the Gibari river. In May an affray took place, in 
which two miners named Lind on and Gray were involved. The 
testimony of the natives differed substantially from that of 
the miners; but it was clear that Llndon had been speared by a 
native, and that Gray had shot a native. Le Hunte took the 
native off to trial, while the two Europeans - despite native
8 8
17) Cf. Legge, op.cit. (1956), pp.109-110.
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testimony of beatings - were not even rebuked. Le Hunte was 
sanguine:
I have no doubt that the visit to the place and the 
promptness with which the law was enforced and the 
case was heard and disposed of, will have had a use-lft 
ful effect.
The Europeans in the country realized Le Huntevs weakness,
and knew that whatever they did would be construed as a
reaction to unbearable native provocation, Le Hunte said that
all the trouble around the Gibara go Id field had been caused
by 1die thieving propensities of the natives. This attitude
encouraged a remarkable follow-up patrol:
Mr* Symons (A.R.M., Samara!) made a trip into the 
district of the offending natives, accompanied by 
several of the owners of property that had been stolen*
In order the better to arrest culprits, and to try and 
find stolen goods in the small scattered villages, Mr. 
Symons divided his party. Some of them who were not 
under Mr. Symons* eye, were not sufficiently careful 
about keeping strictly within the law. The result was 
that exaggerated rumours of natives being wantonly 
murdered, and so on, were spread abroad. These 
rumours, when sifted and reduced to distinct charges, 
and to the evidence that supported them, showed that 
considering the circumstances, nothing very excoptio-,« 
nal had taken place*
Le Hunte*s unpublished report, however, showed that the 
intention of the expedition was *punitive* - the ter® was 
used - that four miners in Symons* party had acted quite in­
dependently, that houses had been burned and four Innocent 
natives shot. One of those shot was a woman, a second was an
18) Le Hunte to Gov. Queensland, No.32, 23.5.1899 - CPl(Col.), 
Set 6; Report 1898-9, pp.25-7.
19) Report 1901-2, p.18.
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unarmed man who was shot dead on sight, and a third was shot 
while in leg-irons.^
Le Hunte first heard of the matter, in Australia, from 
Charles Abel, Abel had pressed the matter in Samarai, in the 
face of undiluted hostility from the European community, R»M, 
Moreton and Winter, the Chief Judicial Officer, rejected hi« 
original protests, whereupon Abel accused Moreton and Symons 
of shielding the guilty miners. Only Abel’s threat to reveal
everything to The Times brought action from Le Hunte, who held
21an enquiry*
Symons and Moreton were found to have been ’negligent’;
but, despite the gravity of what had taken place, both were
retained in the service on the same terms, Ho action was taken
against the miners* Le Hunte regarded the affair, from their
standpoint, as an insoluble mystery| and with unwitting irony
he commented that -
The intricacies of the criminal laws of a civilised 
Power are probably beyond their (the natives’)
20) Le Hunte to Gov. Queensland, No,73, 20,12,1901 - CPl(Col,), 
Set 6*
21) C,W, Abel to Thompson, 23,ll,1901f H,M. Dauncey to 
Thompson, 27.11.1901 - L.M.S. letters. P. Winter told Le 
Hunte originally that Abel had been misinformed (telegram 
encl. in No.51, 3.10.1901 - CPl(Col.), set 6). Le gunte 
despatch of 20.12.1901, oit.sup., revealed that shortly 
before, on the same goldfleld, a V.C. named Lalai had 
been savagely beaten by the miners, then tied up and shot. 
His clothes had been sent in to A.R.M. Symons, who made no 
enquiry. Le Hunte seemed disposed to dismiss this matter 
as insoluble*
It is clear that Le Hunte, dependent on the charity of 
the Australian government, was in a difficult position in 
dealing firmly even with his own officers, whose actions were
interpreted in Australia as necessary for the protection of
23
Europeans. The L.M.S. in particular became alarmed at the 
turn events were taking» Lawes advised his English head­
quarters to use its 'great weight and influence* to bring 
about a change of attitude« Abel wrote direct to the res-
p A
ponsible Minister, Deakin, with 'comments and advice*. In 
view of the rudimentary structure of administration the 
personal qualities and attitudes of Individual officers were 
clearly of fundamental importance* The repercussions of 
deteriorating standards were evident at the village level.
The widespread use of savage punitive measures to some degree
91
22comprehension.
22) Le Hunte to Gov« Queensland, 20.12.1901, ibid. Moreton was 
transferred to the less onerous S.E. Division, on the same 
salary - it should have been £50 p.a. less - while Symons 
was transferred for a time to Port Moresby. The L.M.S. had 
sought more severe action: Lawes to Thompson, 16.4.1902. 
Lawes preached a sermon against Judge Winter*s allowing 
racial attitudes to affect his judgments: see F.W. Walker 
to Thompson, 22.1.1902; Abel to Thompson, 5.3.1902 - 
L.M.S. Le 11 e rs.
23) The rabidly nationalist Bulletin is said to have taken up 
the case of one of the officers involved in the Milne Bay 
affair - see Abel to Thompson, 15.9.1902, L.M.S. letters.
Bulletin was consistent in its objection to English 
influence in the Administration - see issue of 2.11.1922, 
reviewing Monckton, op.cit.; cf. review of same book, The 
Times Literary Supplement, 16*12.1920.
24) Lawes to Thompson, 16.4.1902; Abel to Thompson, 27.4.1902, 
15.9.02; Deakin to Abel, 7.7.1902 - all included L.M.S. 
letters.
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eliminated the village constable as an agent of local
control# The L.M.S. mission threw all its weight behind it«
25
native teachers, in effect vis-a-vis the government. This 
intensified the problems of working through the village 
constables when stable control was re-imposed under Murray.
Le Hunte's retaliation after the Goaribari murders of 
Chalmers and Tomkins is another example of the indiscriminate 
use of force# The largest azsed force ever assembled in Papua 
embarked on an expedition that was, and was Intended to be, 
frankly punitive# Rifles were freely discharged at native« 
who had been driven into a corner and forced to fight. More 
than twenty enormous dubus were burned down. No prisoner« 
were taken, and no attempt to investigate individual res- 
ponsibility was made.
Le Hunte was not well served by his subordinates; but 
for this he himself must accept a good deal of blame# His 
appointment of a totally inexperienced officer as R.M. at 
Baru, C.G. Murray, was indirectly responsible for the Goari­
bari retaliation, and ultimately also for the Robinson ex-
27
pedition, as Monckton claimed. But Monckton*s own appoint­
ment was a good example. He was put in charge of the new 
N.E# Divi si on in 1900, and was thereafter virtually untrammelled
25) See Ch.Ill, 2, for later development« in eastern Papua.
26) Report 1900-01, pp.xvi-ii, 29-31; also Le Hunte to Gov. 
Queensland, No.23, 8.5.1901 - CPl(Col.), Set 6.
27) Monokton, op.cit., pp.241-2.
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Monckton*s suggested policy of * shoot and loot* amongst the
Doriri; and Judge Winter, as acting Administrator, approved
of a full scale assault on the Doboduras
The sooner they are made to realize that they cannot 
cope with the Government, the sooner will they oe&se 
to be a source of trouble, and a terror to their 
weaker neighbours. With respect to the number of 
natives shot, the Magistrate probably had to rely on 
statements of the native police, who naturally do not ^  
wish to cast discredit on their skill as marksmen*
To a considerable extent, therefore, under Le Hunte
embryonic methods of native administration were reduced to
those of direct pacification. Curiously, there appears from
reports to have been more consultation with chiefs in
Monckton*s Division than elsewhere, at a time when both the
office of government chief and the notion of consultation
were falling into disuse* But this is easily explained by
the exigencies of pacification in a new area* Monckton tried
to fix responsibility for resistance and particularly for
future co-operation on apparently prominent men, several of
whom were made both government chief and village constable
by the supervision of his superiors* Le Hunte connived at
28) Ibid., pp.173, 208; Winter to Gov. General, No.80, 
6.12.1902 - CPl(Col.), Set 6. Monckton*s friend and 
colleague, Griffin, who opened the Gulf Division in 
1906, described *his propensity to shoot natives first 
and then talk to the survivors afterwards* - H.L.
Griffin, An Official in British New Guinea, p.109.
Griffin added that he thought Monckton the best R.M. 
in the country. Atlee Hunt noted in 1905 (C.P.P. 43/
1905, p.9) that officers had been * imperatively instructed* 
not to use fire-arms * except in self-defence from an 
imminent danger*; but it was left to Murray later to 
define and enforce this.
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of their tribes.2^ At the same time Monckton had little 
conception of consultation, and he came increasingly to work 
through the V. C.s, or through the chiefs as V.C.si although 
he found many of them unreliable and inefficient* In 1904 he 
had to dismiss three V.C.s and to hang ose for murder, and 
he commented that this was due largely to the 'general in­
efficiency of the village constables, coupled... in many 
instances with actual criminality*.^
In fact the number of poor V.C.s was due also to the 
bold way in which Monckton used them: he adopted a policy of 
appointing them in areas which had had only minimal control, 
in an effort, by this means, to accelerate the spread of the 
•oil-stain* • This appeared promising; but he was able to 
sustain it only by the use of 1 strong-arm* methods. In 1903
Le Hunte had to remonstrate with him for encouraging his
31
A.N.C. to use their bayonets on the Falwa. In 1905 he
issued two Koslraga V.C.s with rifles to ensure that they
would be given loyal co-operation in capturing a murderer.
This put them in a strong position to ‘negotiate* with the
3?
Koslraga chief, who surrendered the man.
30) Report 1903-4, p.27; also Cape Nelson Journal, Dec.1902.
29) Monckton, op.cit., pp.192,274. The notable chief Oiogoba 
Sara was persuaded to enlist one of his sons in the con­
stabulary, and another was subsequently made V.C. - Cape 
Nelson Journals, Nov.1902, Sept.1905, CPI, Set 35.
31) N.E. Division Report No.99, 11.3.1903 and enclosures 
(Cape Nelson).
32) Cape Nelson Journal, Sept. 1905.
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The issuing of anas to Tillage constables was sympto­
matic of an increasing reliance on them, not as represen tat ires 
of their peoples but as natiTe agents of an Administration 
increasingly dedicated to ’direct* methods. MacGregor had 
insisted that Tillage constables not be armed; and as a
further measure of control in his time the keys to handcuff«
33
were withheld. But aa early as 1899 at least six Tillage 
constables were found to hare guns, within a short distance 
of Port Moresby.^*
(iii) Robinson and Barton. 1903-07.
When Le Hunte was appointed Gorernor of South Australia 
in June 1903, he was succeeded as acting Administrator by 
Judge Robinson, a young man who had been only a short time 
in the country and knew nothing of natlre administration, 
tie determined to clean up the Goaribarl affair, as Le Hunte 
had promised, but not done, by securing the murderers and 
recorering the remains of the bodies. In March 1904 natires 
were inreigled on board the gorernment steamer at Goaribarl, 
and an attempt was made to detain seme of them as hostages. 
Fighting broke out, in which ereryone but the Constabulary 
Commandant lost his head. Robinson himself fired indiscrimi-
33) MacGregor, loc.cit. (1894-5), p.214; Report 1895-6, p.56.
Of course the object of this was to scale down risks of 
extortion.
34) C.D. Station Journal, Port Moresby, 24.5.1899. At the 
same time in the same area chiefs were being urged to go 
out and make arrests, a function statutorily confined to 
V.C.s
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The L.M.S., even before the Goaribari affair, claimed 
to have discerned a fvery marked1 change in the governments 
attitude towards the natives. Abel said of Robinson, in an 
uncomplimentary sense: 9 He has initiated a new order of 
things1. He warned Atlee Hunt of it on the very day, 4th 
February, 1904, when Robinson*« expedition to Goaribari was 
assembling at Daru. Hunt acknowledged that he had had similar 
reports from other quarters, and that consequently the Prime 
Minister was determined to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor a« 
soon as possible.36 On an expedition to the Todda goldfield 
in July 1903 Robinson had given the police virtual cart« 
blanche 9to shoot aimed scouts when they encountered them*,
37
*with a consequence that a number of natives lost their lives9. 
He was clearly under the influence of Monckton on this occasion.
When the Goaribari affray became public, Abel, who had 
been in Australia, raised an outcry which went a good way 
towards forcing a Royal Coamission. Robinson was replaced by 
Capt. Barton, his subordinate, who had formerly been R.M. of
35) Robinson to Gov. General, No.15, 23.3.1904 - CPl(Col.),
Set 6. One of the object« of taking hostages was, ironi­
cally, to train V.C.s, on the pattern established by Mac­
Gregor.
36) Report 1903-4, p.8; Abel to Atlee Hunt, 4.2.1904, Hunt to 
Abel, 10.2.1904 - Atlee Hunt Papers. Abel was quite wrong 
in his claim that this was the first occasion on which the 
police had been provided with bayonet« - s«e note 31, above.
37) Robinson to Gov. General, No.31, 10.8.1903 - CPl(Col.),
Set 6. (The date of this despatch is given as 31.8.1903 in 
Report 1903-4, p.7).
35-nately at native canoes in the water.
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the Central Division. Robinson*s suicide put Barton in an 
invidious position* In the furore which followed discipline 
collapsed almost entirely, and to some degree every officer
7 0
became his own master* This was particularly serious in view 
of Australia*s continuing failure to accept legal responsi­
bility for administration, and in view of the entire lack of
39
a definite policy beyond pacification, as Hunt claimed in 1905.
Atlee Hunt himself maintained an unorthodox form of central 
control through his extraordinary correspondence with both 
officials and non-officials; of the latter the L.M.S. 
missionaries were probably most useful* The L.M.S. attitude 
was curiously ambivalent: on the one side they stead for a 
very pro-native policy which would prevent any form of mal­
treatment; on the other, they were determined to stamp out 
'baneful* customs. In the 1890s MacGregor, who shared some­
thing of this view, suggested that they proscribe bride-price; 
Chalmers set out to destroy the Moguru initiation ceremonies
in the Gulf, while Lawes attacked 'heathen dancing* in Port 
40
Moresby. By the end of the century, however, the idea was 
growing amongst the missionaries that a more positive native 
policy was needed by the Administration; this derived from the
38) Monckton, op.cit. ,pp.247-9; Sydney Daily Telegraph* 
30*4.1904 - interview with unnamed passenger, vessel 
'Australia*, at Brisbane. Barton to Atlee Hunt, 19.6.1904 - 
Hunt Papers. Also see Robinson's statement, 19.6.1904 - 
Goaribari Enquiry, Ex.7, pp. 29, 43*
39) C.P.P., 1905, II, p.173.
40) MacGregor to Thompson, 16.7.1897: Chalmers to Thompson, 
31.5.1893; Lawes to Thompson, 1.8.1893 - L.M.S. letters.
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’native industries * approach which the mission, led by Abel 
and Walker, was itself introducing (though to Lawes* 
disgust)*41
Pryce Jones wrote from Iokea (Gulf) in 1901 that the
natives were becoming very lazy, because they were not being
asked to do anything to better their own social condition:
I personally should hail the more active interference 
of the government in native affairs as tending to 
the higher development of the tribes, if left alone 
as they are at present they will degenerate by the 
very contact of civilisation, for the sun ever is -p 
fatal to moribund organisms.
The L.M.S. therefore welcomed the appointment of Barton
as a 'just fair man in all native affairs', who would not
43
tolerate the abuses of the previous years* He quickly 
alienated the mission, however, by approving customs to which 
the mission had long been opposed.
Barton could ill afford to lose the support of the very 
group which might have been expected to support him; though he 
viewed the revival of custom as an opportunity for the Ad­
ministration to win the confidence of the natives and to 
gather large numbers of them (including traditional enemies) 
together#44
41) See Abel's evidence to the 1906 Royal (¡omission (Report, 
p.xliv) recommending compulsory labour by natives on govern­
ment plantations*
42) Jones to Thompson, 6.12.1901 - L.M.S. Letters. The contro­
versy over mission plantations eventually led to the Kwato 
breakaway - see Ch.Ill, 2.
43) Lawes to Thompson, 21.5.1904 - L.M.S. Letters*
44) Barton to Gov. General, No*30, 4.7.1904 - GPl(Col.), Set 6.
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The policy, however, was too out of touch with general
European opinion. The ’direct* officials came to regard hi«
45
as impractically humane. Because of the policy and con­
stitutional vacuum in Australia the only policy he could have 
forwarded would have been one that had strong local support. 
Barton largely ended by marking time. It is not surprising
that a missionary, Seville of Millport Barbour, should have
46
described him in 1906 as 9a useless figurehead9 •
Barton, then, came to see the major obstacle in the way
of a progressive native policy as inefficient or corrupt staff,
and he made efforts to remove them, beginning with Musgrave,
the Government Secretary. Within six months of taking office
he complained that 9there is not a single old man in the
47
Service on whom I can confidently rely9.
Both Atlee Hunt and the Royal Commission of 1906 agreed 
that the administrative service needed drastic overhaul. The 
Commission commented that, despite the 9strong leaven of 
conscientious and capable officers9, there was no escaping the
45) Turner to Thompson (L.M.S.), 1.8.1904; Lawes to Atlee Hunt,
11.8.1905. Monckton, op.cit., pp.208-9 - though Monokton 
generally supported him before *he Royal Commission.
Barton had some supporters, however - see H.W. Champion
in South Pacific. VIII, 2, 1955, p.44.
46) W.J.V. Seville to Thompson, 27.8.1906 (L.M.S.). On the 
causes of the Anglo-Australian factiousness, see J.T. Ben- 
sted in South Pacific. VII, 12, 1954, pp.926-9; and P.J. 
West, Souiih PaoificT’Vll. 10, 1954, pp.858-62.
47) Barton to Atlee Hunt, 1.11.1904, 7.2.1905, 7.1.1905 - Hunt 
Papers. On the Richmond case, which began the active 
phase of dissension, see C.P.P. 72/1906 (p.4: 9No justifi­
cation9 for Richmond9s charges), and West, ibid.
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oonolusion that in the past Papua had, vat times, been
regarded as a convenient place in which to lose certain men
48
who were not wanted elsewhere*•
The importance of this issue oan hardly be exaggerated;
for senior officials, particularly after the Riohaond case,
devoted more attention to bickering than to the proper
business of administration. Resulting dissension continued
until World War l.4^
In shaping future policy Barton felt himself hamstrung by
the lack of enabling authority; but the Royal Commission
hearings end report showed that his ideas were In any case
quite out of aooord with those held in Australia snd forcibly
so
expressed in Papua by Judge Murray. Barton, like MacGregor, 
feared for the future effects on administration of throwing 
the possession open to large numbers of wandering miners and 
of accelerating the acquisition of land from the natives*
Both the Commission and the future Governor, Judge Murray,
48) A* Hunt in C.P.P. 43/1905, p.25; Royal Commission Report, 
p. evil*
49) West, loc.oit. (1957), pp.47-8; see L. Lett, Sir Hubert 
Murray of Papua, pp.208-10; Bensted, loc.oit., pp*Ÿ04-é. 
Exactly half oî the Report of the 1906 Royal Commission 
was devoted to ’Administration - In Relation to Individuals* 
(pp.lxv-xxxiv), and the other half (pp.vii-lxv) to all 
other aspects of administration - an indication of the im­
portance attached to sorting out accusations and jealousies. 
(Objects of the Commission in C.P.P. 61/1906, pp.2-3).
50) See Barton to Hunt, 1.11.1904 - Hunt Papers! Barton to Gov. 
General, 29.8.1905 (Confidential), CPl(Col.), Set 9; R.C. 
Report, p.123.
51) Barton to Gov. General, No.66, 5.9.1905 - CPl(Col.), Set 6; 
R.C. Report, pp.86, 114, 128.
101
were wholly out of sympathy with this view. Their primary 
emphasis rested on the need to promote settlement and develop­
ment by Europeans. It was in tune with the ideas of the day 
that this was seen as complementary to native administration9 
and in itself a basic means of consolidating civilized In­
fluence; for making the natives work was seen as the only 
way to save them from debilitating indolence*
With suoh an emphasis, it is hardly surprising that 
relatively little attention was psid to an examination and 
re-definition of methods of native administration. The Royal 
Commission hearings devoted exactly 12 questions, out of a 
total of 3,275, to the functions of village constables*
Barton was asked nothing on the subject* It is not surprising 
that the Commission's recommendations on native administration 
were less than profound; but they largely foreshadow opinion 
and policy in Papua up to 1918.
The Armed Native Constabulary was oommended, but its 
numbers were said to be inadequate (that le, principally to 
afford protection to Intending settlers). Papua was said to 
be held more by the personal Influence of a few white officials 
than by the ’totally inadequate force* at their command.
en
The Commission recommended a system of planned patrolling.
On the village constables, the Commission reported that 
the system was the best available, in view of the fact that
52) R.C. Report, pp.xl-xli; of. Ch. II.
i
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the chief8 exercised no real authority. The only con­
structive proposal made during the hearings on the subjeet 
came from Robert Hunter, who suggested that four principal 
men of each village - in effect, a small oounoll - should be 
held responsible for its good conduct and cleanliness. In 
his view, the appointing of village constables had 'demeaned* 
the men of influence, while appointing an influential man 
as village constable only promoted jealousy.
By implication, however, the Commission advocated un­
relieved paternalism: the traditionally influential men, per 
se, had no place in their proposals* To take one example, 
the Commission proposed a system of native taxation; but a 
difficulty arose in making natives responsible for its 
collection» The existing chiefs, it said, were useless.
This might be got over by creating new chiefs; but this 
suggestion was again quashed because of the lurking possi­
bilities of extortion» It was finally recommended that each 
native be made individually responsible direotly to the 
Resident Magistrate.®4
Reports of blackmail and extortion fcy the village con­
stables also worried the Commission; and clearly It supported 
the system only for the want of something more 'reliable*.
In order to control abuses, It reoommended that more oare be 
used in the appointment of village constables, that their
53) Ibid., pp. xli, 11 (Q. 292-7).
54) Ibid., p.xlv.
orders be more explicit, and that they be supervised more 
closely. It m s  pointed out, quite accurately, by a settler 
named Buchanan, that in the west, for example, already Tillage 
constables were often not visited for twelve months at a 
time; and that in view of their low wages their temptation
ee
to blackmail and extortion was great.
The Commission recognized this, and further recommended 
that their pay be raised, particularly in view of the extra 
duties that would deTOlTe on them if settlement went ahead. 
(The district studies show that this was not done). This 
acknowledged a trend, already deTeloping, towards making the 
village oonstable the executive agent of government; indeed, 
in that the V.C. was bound to see to the enforcement of 
Native Regulations which, for example, forced villagers to 
maintain roads, he was indirectly made responsible for all 
work demanded by the Regulations.
The Commission reflected current opinion. In view of the 
poor quality of the service and the tact and patience needed 
in dealing with native leaders, it is not surprising that the 
tendency to work solely through the village constables 
accelerated during this period. There were 202 village 
constables In 1898, 356 In 1905, and 401 In 1907.57
55) Ibid., p.83 (Q. 2012).
56) Ibid., p.xlvi. The V.C.s were also unable to take outside 
employment.
57) Report 1904-5, p.19; Report 1906-7, p.23 (this exoludes 
any increase in the Northern District, not received).
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Concomitantly, the number of paid government chiefs declined
rapidly# By 1904 there were only 30, all in the Western
Division; and in that year the R.M. asked that they be paid
off, as they received £2 p.a* and were often, in his view,
simply useless encumbrances: 'the expense of their keep can
be more profitably used in the payment of village constables#^8
59
After 1906 paid chiefs were dispensed with*
The changed status of the village constables was reflected
both in changing criteria for their selection and in native
attitudes towards the appointment* The trend increased for
influential natives to put their sons forward as village
constables# At Dalava (eastern Papua) in 1904, for example,
the old chief proudly produced the shirt which 'Kovana
Mak-la-ga' had given him as government chief many years
before, and announced 'Government shirt, Government man'*
But he put his son forward as village constable. R#M*
Campbell - who, it might be noted, had Polynesian experience -
was pleased at this, and accepted him; though he added that
the son was a good type and had previously assisted in
60
capturing a deserted carrier* His being the chief's son was 
not the only or even the most important qualification required*
58) Report 1903-4, p.43.
59) Report 1905-6, p.46.
60) Samarai Station Journal, 9.7.1904.
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or connections became increasingly important x for example,
at Upaai in 1903 a village constable was appointed on the
61
recommendation of the Armed Constabulary. Graduation from 
the Armed Constabulary, and a knowledge of Motu in pidgin 
form (significantly known as Police Motu) beeame important 
criteria for selection. In 1904, at the suggestion éf some 
village constables, a pamphlet was issued containing the 
Hative Regulations in Motu. It was said that one of the 
objects of this was to make apparent the advantages of 
education,62
That the transition from traditional to administratively 
useful criteria had its disadvantages oan be Illustrated from 
the case of the Wamira (eastern) V.C. in July 1907. The 
young village constable - for youth also was often a criterion 
had failed to arrest an older man on the R.M.'s instructions. 
The R.M. then sent the smallest member of the Armed Constabu­
lary into the bush to arrest the offender, nho subsequently 
apologised for not going with the V.C., but explained that 
*the V.C. was a young man of no standing while he had been 
a big fighting man in the old days*.63
Appointment as village constables by no means always 
conferred local authority, from the native standpoint, on
61) Ibid., Aug. 1903.
62) Report 1903-4, p.15*
63) Samarai Station Journal, 25.7.1907 (GS.1163/07)? N.E. 
coast*
Criteria other than traditionally influential status
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the appointee. In the more remote areas the Tillage
constable might be of no consequence in the Tillage except
at the times of government Tisits; in the more sophisticated
areas he might be a front for other interests - for example,
64
the mission - or use his powers for his own ends* Because 
of the elementary nature of the institution and of the 
consequent necessity for constant European control, these 
difficulties persisted as the frontier expanded.
64) Particularly in the east the influence of the mission was 
Tery strong. In 1903 at Normanby Is. (Methodist) a 
mission teacher presented his own nominee to the R.M. for 
appointment as V.C.j the R.M. coamented, *1 prefer to 
select my own men* (Ssmarai Stat. Journal, 11.11.1903).
At Ityfe Bay (L.M.S. Station) in 1905 the teacher went 
into business partnership with a murderer wfcom he had 
induced the V.C. to release (ibid., Jan. 1905).
SIR HUBERT MURRAY'S NATIVE ADMINISTRATION« 1908-40.
Sir Hubert Murray was Lieutenant-Governor of Papua for 
the remarkable period of thirty-two years. An understanding 
of his personality and outlook is therefore essential for an 
appreciation of his administration. A good deal of relevant 
material has been published in recent years. It is enough 
to say here that Murray was a humane and scholarly man, 
deeply versed in the roots of Western, and particularly 
Classical, civilization. In Papua he spared no effort to 
bring the natives, as he saw it, closer to his ideals . 1
When Murray arrived in Papua as Chief Judical Officer in 
1904 he knew nothing of native raoes. This was apparent in 
his evidence before the 1906 Royal Commission, where he 
accused Barton of matters which occurred or were promoted
P
during his own administration. When Murray took offioe 
Papua was riding on a crest of commercial hope, and until
CHAPTER II
1) L. Lett, Sir Hubert Murray of Papuai The Papuan Achieve­
ment (2nd ed. 1945) - eulogistio. Concise summaries of 
his native policy in L.P. Mair, Australia in New Guinea. 
pp.44-53; J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy, pp.1^4-9. 
Critical discussion by"J.T. Bensted and West. South 
Pacific, VII, 1953, pp.675-82, 701-9. F.J. West, Sir 
Hubert MurrayiThe Man and his Policy, Aust. Terrltories.
I, 6 » Oct. 1561, pp.4-1$ - points out that Murray should 
be judged on total achievements, not native policy. For 
notes on Murray's personality, see Gilbert Murray - An 
Unfinished Autobiography, pp.76-7 5 Mr. Justice Nicholas,
Sir Hubert Murray , K.c TM. G ., Aust. Quarterly, XI1, 2 ,
1946, pp.6 -8 .
2) Royal Commission Report, p.8 8 . Cf. Papua Reports, 1914-5, 
p.10| 1927-8, pp.90-108; 1929-30, p.3; 1930-1, p.14.
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World War I Murray largely devoted himself to the enoouragement
3
of European enterprise. He believed that the natives would 
profit from this: indeed, that native progress and develop­
ment by Europeans were complementary. It has been said
that this was close to the 'dual mandate' concept;
4
MacGregor had expressed a very similar idea.
At no stage could Murray's ideas or methods of native
administration be described as original. The essentials of
his system, the Armed Native Constabulary and the Village
Constables, he inherited from MacGregor. His other ideas
were common elsewhere. As early as September, 1907 a
comprehensive bill providing for native taxation had been
framed; but the outcry in Australia was so strong that the
federal government could not assent to it; the idea was not
forgotten. It aooorded with Murray's view, expressed at
the 1906 Royal Commission;
The natives have been treated extremely well; perhaps 
too well. I think they have been plaoed on a g
pedestal far too long, with absolutely no result.
This was the doctrine of native salvation through
enforced labour.
3) Staniforth Smith; 'great possibilities* in Aust. Review 
of Reviews. XXVI, 1905. p.464; of. warning of Atlee hunt 
(apparently discounted) C*wealth P.P., 1905, II, p.187.
4) West, Aust. Territories, loc. cit., p.8.
5) R.C. Report, p.85; A.M. Campbell to Atlee Hunt, 15.9.1907; 
Hunt to Murray, 23.10.08; B.W. Bramell to Hunt, 29.5.1912. 
Murray also sent a bill providing for compulsory land 
purchase from natives, but later thought better of it - 
Murray to Ext. Affairs, No.192, 2.10.1907; No.229,
28.11.07. CPI, Set 6.
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A major problem which Murray faced In the period to 
1914, which would have made any progressive policy 
difficult to apply - and which, indeed, hindered pacification - 
was a critical lack of experienced staff. Senior officers 
who had been commended by the Royal Commission resigned, and 
in 1908 only one R.M., Bramell, had more than two years 
experience of natives. Fortunately, Murray was able to rely 
on his Government Secretary; but there was dissension and 
confusion at the head of the Service.
As settlement expanded, quite serious shortages of labour
developed. Murray was committed to supplying adequate
labour, and he was subjected to vociferous critioism if it 
7
lagged. When the supply was particularly short, in 1911-12, 
Murray launched a large-soale campaign of pacification, which 
would open up new recruiting ground; it was initially 
justified on the ground that plantation labour would rescue
6) H.L. Griffin, An Official in British New Guinea,
pp. 154-6; CampbeTTTo TKnï, " M . ^ n W ^ ' T O T J 5 7  11.7.08, 
13.1.09, 1.4.1911, 7.1.1913. Monokton*s resignation 
cleared the way for more temperate methods of 
pacification; but see R.C. Report, p. ci. Campbell had 
served Thomson well in Tonga - see B. Thomson, Diversions 
of a Prime Minister, pp. 24,62. The Administrator, 3. 
Smith, in 1 9 went so far as to threaten Murray with 
revelations of alleged administrative brutalities - 
Smith to Hunt, 3.9.1912.
7) e.g. statements of P. Charpentier (settler), Brisbane 
Daily Mail. 17.11.1910 - he also criticised t&e in- 
experience of R.M.s; public meeting, Port Moresby, 
Brisbane Daily Mail, 7.7.1911; H. Mahon, M.H.R.
(Parliamentary delegation). Sydney Daily Telegraph. 
7.7.1911.
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the natives from 'racial despair'; and later, on the ground 
that the prime object of the campaign was really the 
suppression of barbarous practices, the existenoe of which
p
was 'a disgrace to an Australian Territory'.
The organization and control of this extension of 
government influence were possibly Murray's greatest 
administrative success; for, with one or two notable 
exceptions, he successfully impressed on his officers that 
pacification was to be accomplished by patience, and that 
fire-arms were to be used only as a last resort in self- 
defence.®
MacGregor's original bil-stain' technique had developed 
so far, by 1914, that it was possible to institute a system 
of linking up the outstations by regular patrolling.1^
This system generally aohieved the consolidation of the areas 
in terms of the suppression of feuding and of attacks on 
Europeans; but Murray toiled at a furious paoe over the 
Papuan countryside and he expected his officers to do the same. 
This did not encourage patient follow-up enquiry or 
consultation; it tended to perpetuate police rule, for it
8) Papua Report, 1911-12, pp.7-8,11; Report, 1912-3, p.7.
9) Handbook, Information for the Guidance of Newly Joined 
Patrol Officers (Mitchell). These principles, after 
15087 were rigorously enforced - see J.H.P. Murray, Papua 
or British New Guinea, pp.370-1.
10) Report 1914-5, p.12.
I l l
was tempting to appoint great numbers of village police
as seldom-visited talismans of control (see ’Western Papua*).
It is at least arguable that the effort to pacify and
patrol increasingly large areas of country, after 1912,
was responsible for the failure to introduce more advanced
methods in those coastal areas whioh were known to be
relatively sophisticated.11 This emphasis on the expanding
frontier, which waxed in the 1920s and 1930s with the
expeditions of Karius, Champion and Hides, diverted
attention from the need for new administrative methods, and
appears to have been the genesis of the now traditional
attachment to uniform development.
In 1911 MacGregor had suggested, inter alia, a review
of the functions of the Aimed Constabulary and of the
IP
Village Constables. Murray himself was not entirely
happy about the system - in 1912 he noted the propensity of
V.C.s to extort from their fellow-vlHagers - but before
13
World War I he had no ohange in mind. The system was 
reasonably adequate as a control measure, but it was not 
oriented towards development. This became particularly 
important after 1918, when legislation was introduced
11) See chs. on Western Papua, Papuan Gulf; note his 
comments on the Kiwai*s organizing a strike in the 
pearl fisheries, Report 1911-2, p.10.
12) Sydney Morning Herald, 17.6.1911s advioe for a Federal 
Parliamentary delegation.
13) Murray, op. cit. (1912), p.244*
providing for Native Plantations and a Native Tax*
compulsion was ultimately always necessary for »a people
at so low a stage of evolution', but Papuan concurrence
14
made progress more rapid.
Murray believed that the way to secure this concurrence 
was to give his officers a better knowledge of anthropology# 
Paternalism was thus not infringed: there was no suggestion 
of delegation to natives, Murray believed that his 
Administration was being 'true to the spirit' of indireot 
rule by taking cognizance of native customs. Murray had 
long proclaimed his respect for custom; but he did not 
believe that it would or should stand in the way of Western 
civilization - in effect, he looked forward to cultural 
assimilation, leading eventually to administrative integration
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14) J.H.P. Murray, Anthropology and the Government of 
Native Races. Report 1919-io, p.Tll. This also derived 
from lilac Gregor. W.E.H. STarmer, The South Seas in the 
Modern World, p.25.
15) Murray, ibid., p.106. He quoted as 'an extreme instance 
of the indirect method' the Administration's inducing 
natives to be vaccinated by representing the mark on 
the arm as a symbol of government sorcery. He never 
understood indireot rule, and did not recognize that, 
institutionally. its essentials could be applied in 
non-chiefly societies - West, Aust. Territories, loc. 
cit, p.15; Mair, op. cit., pp.44-5.
Papua was among the first colonies to appoint a 
Government Anthropologist (1920, paid out of Native Tax). 
Murray had thought of employing Malinowski in 1915; 
but Malinowski proved unamenable to direction ('practical 
objectives' were required) and completed his research 
only in the face of Murray's opposition (CP146, 21/866). 
Murray was prominent in establishing an Anthropology 
Chair at Sydney Univ.(1925), but withdrew from proposed 
cadetship recruitment in favour of personal selection in 
P a p u a _ C P I ,__V, 7/8/1-6; U* Murray, Papua of Today, p.227. 
A.P. Elkin, The Place of Sir Hubert; IftXrTHy in mt l v e
Admini st rat ion. Aust. Uuartlerly, Xli, 3, 1940. p.so.
with Australia.16
For the natives, he believed that the preservation of
custom, until they fully accepted Western civilization,
was literally vital? for he agreed with Rivers that any
severe disturbance of the inter-related elements of native
17
society could cause despair and depopulation. On the
other hand, the equal emphasis on European conoepts and
ideals in the work of administration meant that authority
could not be delegated to Papuans until they could use it
18
within the Western context. The result was a polioy of 
extreme gradualism within a framework of extreme paternalism# 
His Administration, he said, had to be oareful not to be led 
too far and too fast by an excess of devotion to advanced 
democracy.
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16) Murray, op.cit (1925), pp#ix, 244-5; also op.cit. (1912), 
p. 9. Undated letter (1939) to Mrs. Lett - Mitchell
A *3142. The policy was generally defined as 
•association* (a notion apparently equated with the 
♦dual mandate) attainable through *a modified system of 
direct administration*; but there is no doubt that the 
ultimate aim was cultural assimilation. Association on 
the British pattern demanded institutional avenues - 
see rote 43 below; cf. Elkin, loo. oit., pp.25-6;
Murray, op#cit. (1912), p.9.
17) Report 1919-20, p.110; Report 1920-1, p.9; Papua of 
Today « pp.240-1; W.H.R. Rivers, Essays on the 
Depopulation of Melanesia (1922).
18) H. Murray, Indirect Rule in Papua, (A.A.A.S.) , pp.333-5; 
in Essays presented to Gilbert Murray, pp.165, 171, Cf. 
his statement in Ï920s *some form of despotism seems to 
be a necessary stage in human development* - Review of 
the Aust. Administration, 1907-20, pp.21-2. Murray " 
claimed that the Papuans were content with direct rule 
(Indirect Rule in Papua, p.333); same sentiment in
nat ionailsiic Sydney Bulletin, 5.4.1923.
19) Essays presented to Gilbert Murray, loo. oit.
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The real question was, however, how these factors were
ever to be resolved if any form of native local government
were to appear. It was assumed that indefinite time lay
ahead; but Murray doubted whether Papuans were capable of
good government or even of industrial advancement. He
believed, and publicly stated, that Papuans in general were
on
intellectually inferior to Europeans. In this view he
was supported by P.E. Williams, the Government Anthropolo-
P1
gist. He therefore dismissed the idea of a Papuan elite:
if the natives were to progress at all, they would have to
be lifted uniformly to a higher stage of civilization.
Still ... I hope that some day we may be able to 
hand over petty acts of administration and trivial 
native oases to Papuans themselves to deal with pp 
... but when that day will come is hard to tell.
Thus, when the simple village police system came under
pressure after World War I, Murray’s purpose was to persuade
the natives that government policy was in their own interests,
not to delegate authority to them. A change of policy was
indicated by changed conditions in Papua: European and native
20) Report 1919-20, p.104; Report 1937-8, pp.20-1j implied 
in Papua of Today, p.ix; elaborated in address on 
native adm ini s t rati on, Holland, 1934, typescript pp.36-7, 
42: Papuans inferior in ’natural gifts’, i.e. sense of 
justice and responsibility. (Mitchell A.3138,1).
21) F.E. Williams, Native Welfare in Papua, Aust. Rhodes 
Review, 1934, p.48$ Adelaide A dve rtis er, 14.5.19¿4 - 
’the natives are inferior mentally io whites’.
22) Report 1937-8, pp.20-1.
interests had not proved as compatible as Murray had earlier 
supposed, and the application of the Navigation Act to the 
Territory (on which he attacked the Australian government)
forced him to look to native agriculture rather than to
P3outside capital. Compulsion remained, but there was a need
to enlist native co-operation. There were also external
pressures on Murray to modify administrative institutions,
from criticism by functionalist anthropologists and from
Murray’s wide reading in comparative administration. These
pressures were generally counter-balanced, however, by the
preconceptions desoribed above. Administratively, there was
some tentative experimenting but little basic re-thinking.
As for administration elsewhere, Murray was sensitive to
comparisons, but he was able to counter them with the
24argument that the Papuan situation was unique. Specific 
criticism was different, though it was unfortunate that 
much of it was informed by an extreme form of functionalism - 
such as Fortune’s violent attack on the sorcery Regulation -
05which Murray shrugged off as administratively unrealistic.
Yet some of it disputed his claims to be applying the ’spirit
23) Report 1921-2, p.6; Melbourne Age. 14.2.1925.
24) Murray to F.E. Williams, 21,1,1931. CPI, V, 16/26?
Report 1937-8, p.21 (on justice in Africa), Murray never visited colonial Afrioa.
25) Fortune to Murray, from Dobu, 22,4.1928; Murray to Sec. 
Terr., 24.5.28. CPI, V, 16/41/3-5. Fortune said that the whole administration was alien; Murray replied that 
it was the duty of a government to govern. Adequate critical opinion was laoking. Murray’s own facility
in disarming oriticism was a long-term handicap - see Papua of Today, p.266,
116
of indirect rule* - and in 1925 he felt that hie native
pgpolicy was the ’distinctive part* of his administration -
so that he was put on the defensive.
The Village Constable system continued. In 1912 Murray
acknowledged that service in the Armed Constabulary was the
97first criterion for selection. In the period 1923-30 
Pitt-Rivers attacked the negleot of traditional leaders:
V.C.s were forbidden to take extra wives. This, he said, 
deterred the Administration from appointing real leaders 
and the leaders from seeking appointment.He also 
asserted, in effect, that V.C.s, because of the insistence 
on European oonoepts and ideals, were bound to be involved 
in role conflict; and he dismissed the argument that 
European officers could take aocount of custom, particularly
C Oin the Courts for Native Matters. As will be seen from 
the district studies, there was a good deal of truth in these
26) Papua of Today, p. viii.
27) Papua or British New Guinea, pp. 244-5.
28) G. Pitt-Rivers, Some Problems in Mental Anthropology and 
the Problem of Civilization, ftres. Address, ¿ect. F,
A.A.A.S., 1923 - Proo., XVI, pp.497-517; Murray to Sec. 
Terr., 11.7.1924, CPI, V, 16/32/1. Gov. Sec. Instruction of 27.10.1927 (amplifying No. 161) reapeated that V.C.s 
could not take extra wives - a temptation to corruption. 
There was great confusion among officers on this point - see distriot studies.
29) Man, XXIX, no.l, 14; XXX, no.11, 152. The Administration 
oontinued to be surprised by V.C.s' ’falls from grace’, especially in areas on the margin of control - see F.E. Williams, Papuans of the Trans-Fly, pp.272-3. Role 
Conflict in tke long-administeredareas was more difficult to discern; though Murray had long recognized that ’a 
good village constable is of course unpopular’ - Papuaor B.H.G.. p.244.
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assertions, intemperate though they were; but Murray denied 
them.
In 1923 a tentative beginning was made with the appointing
of non-statutory councillors in the villages, Murray
described the institution as one of ’village counoilsf, but
it usually consisted of the appointment of one or two
individuals in each village, selected by the people in most
instances. The purpose was more effectively to get the
co-operation of the natives in their duties under the 
30Regulations. The councillors could assist in mitigating
continual compulsion through the courts:
The perpetual round of prosecution and imprisonment is the least attractive feature of our Native Administration. It is probable that this feature 
may disappear, or at least become very much less 
prominent, if natives can be brought to realize that the Government is really working in their interests throughout •
Murray never acknowledged that in seeking a form of 
native local government - in fact, his system amounted to 
nothing like it - he had been anticipated by the natives 
themselves (Western Papua) and by the missions (Eastern 
Papua) . 32
The Government Anthropologist emphasised that the only
30) Papua of Today, p.279,
31) Instruction 124, Ciro. 971/A123/25, 4.6.1925.
32) Cf. Papua of Today, p.279.
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way in which the councillor system oould succeed in winning 
native support was by incorporating a genuine consultative 
element t
If you have gained the big man, you have gained,, 
the whole village with him.
Williams realized that the prime difficulty lay in the 
'direct* administrative tradition whioh had been built up.
34Patrols were too rapid and the officers too brusque.
In the very first area in which councillors were appointed,
however, (North-Eastern Papua) their principal duty was stated
as ’assisting the village constable*, and Murray oould never
35erase this conception. He sent out circulars stressing
that councillors were not assistant village police but
representatives of the people; but in practioe he did not
consistently rebuke officers who treated councillors as
36unofficial policemen.
Although officers were instructed to ask for suggestions
from councillors, their propagandist function had priorityi
Administration will be much easier and will go muoh more smoothly if we oan get the natives in general to see what the most intelligent of them see already, that we are really doing all we can to help them.
33) F.E. Williams to Murray, 27.4.25. CPI, V, 16/42.
34) Ibid.
35) Report 1923-4, p.23.
36) Murray to Gov. See., 29.4.19®. CPI, V, 16/42.
37) Ibid.
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The natives were probably just as confused about the 
subtle practical distinctions between the V.C.s and the 
councillors as were the Administration officers.
Traditional status had for long been at a disoount; and the 
natives had learned, at least in coastal areas, to look to 
appointment as a V.C. as the highest level of favour. The 
councillors were given no powers, yet they were to be 
regarded, in theory, as the fbig men* representing their 
people. It is probable that in some well-patrolled areas 
government favour and official powers as V . C .  had already 
become the path to recognized leadership.
Everything depended on th*? attitudes of Administration
39officers. In the late 1920s and 1930s there was a strong 
element which, generally worried at the growing ‘indiscipline* 
in the villages, sought to restore something of traditional 
authority - the best example is the Trobriands. On the 
other hand, beoause of Murray's ideals they found it difficult
38) F.E. Williams, Natives of the Purari Delta, p.110 - but cf. Hanuabada (* Cent ral tapua' bel ow); !p . "Brown (From 
Anarchy to Satrapy, unpublished) corroborates this for 
Chimbu in recent years noting especially the pro­longation of leadership under government. Studies are needed like J. Middleton and D. Tait, Tribes Without Rulers (1958) (dealing with African segmentary systems) 
before an adequate assessment is possible.The natives had to grasp the idea that they were not 
police and not chiefs. The Orokaiva councillors had to 
be dissuaded from calling themselves 'chiefs'. R.M. 
Wurth noted* 'Explained this was not the case, and gave 
instances of duties, such as trying to find reasons for 
sickness ...'. Buna P.R. 6/1927-8i 12.11.1927.
39) M. Perham (Native Administration in Nigeria, pp.351-2) pointed out that, as natives under colonial rule had no 
avenue of protest, the only solution was to raise the standard of officers.
to shape a definite course in this direction! but in the
1930? (in Eastern Papua, for example) there were indications
of a groping towards institutions #iich would allow some
measure of local authority. Little real progress was made,
but councillors from numbers of parishes came together
fairly regularly, and on at least one occasion in Milne Bay
a meeting decided, with the Administration's connivance, to
40back up its resolutions with sanctions.
Murray rejected the conception of native courts; before 
the natives could be given any judicial authority they would 
have to learn the meanings of law and justice in Western 
terms. As a form of training, and as a guide to magistrates,
the use of councillors as assessors in native oases was
41begun in 1929. They were originally intended to advise the 
magistrate, particularly in assessing sentences, on points 
of oustomj but they often added judgments of their own, and 
in Eastern Papua - apparently with Murray's connivance, for 
he read every patrol report - official sanction was given to
1 2 0
40) Changes of officers often meant wildly fluctuating 
policies at district level} but all officers were chary of giving latitude to certain peoples, notably those 
with embryonic chieftainship and oultist tendencies, 
such as the Purari and Mekeo. Williams advised Murray in 1931 that in the past the Administration might un­
fortunately have belittled these 'chiefs'; but he was 
not greatly concerned, because they had used their authority in their personal interests. He re-assured Murray, diplomatically, that suoh leaders could be 
adequately recognized as councillors within the existing 
system - Williams to Murray, 11.2.1931. CPI, V, 16/36.
41) Report 1929-30, Appendix D.
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their sitting independently in customary oases. In this 
area Murray was toying with the idea of appointing Native
A OMagistrates at the time of his death.
With the centralisation of oontrol, however, and the 
lack of local flexibility, it is doubtful if the appointment 
of natives as magistrates in the existing Courts would have 
meant more than replacing white men by brown. There was no 
conception similar to that of the British Solomons D.O. who,
43in 1941, welcomed the introduction of native oourts on Ys&bel.
Local administration in Papua, therefore, in 1940 was 
still essentially a village police system. Most of its 
statutory elements derived from MacGregor and were handed on 
to the joint Administration after the war. Even more important 
for the development of native local government, however, was 
the outlook which was handed on* for current polioy is
42) Wilfred Beaver, a no able pre-1914 B.M., favoured the 
Torres Straits system* inoluding Native Magistrates - Unexplored New Guinea« p.30.
43) See Appendix C, II. Contrary to Murray*s belief, his approach (see L.P. Mair, Native Polioies in Africa, p.56) was nearly the opposite of tTie British, rooted in 
English liberalism and looking to the development of native government sui generis - E. Barker, Ideas and 
Ideals of t he British Empire. pp • 155-6 • The British Native Authority concept steadily took on a dynamic 
aspect, though theory often outran paternalist practice (F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate, pp.196-7 , 217-25j Perham, 
op.cit. pp.345-^6j Hilton Young Commission, Cmd. 3234, 
1929, p.78). For practice in comparable social conditions 
see Hailey, An African Survey (rev. 1956), pp.446-51; J. Mower and S.'La Fontaine, local Government in Kenya,
pp. 19-24. Cf. Murray, The Ivlachlnery of indireot Rule, 
p.157 - a static conception.
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dominated by the same conceptionst the uniqueness of the 
Territory's problems; cultural assimilation; education before 
rather than through institutional delegation? uniform 
development; the neoessity for paternal control from the 
centre; gradualism*
CHAPTER III 
POLICY AND PRACTICE, 1888-1942
The following three sections analyse the techniques of 
native administration as they were applied in three parts of 
Papua, Because of social conditions, terrain and local 
administrative traditions, each district's history has a 
certain unique unity and continuity. It is therefore best to 
analyse the application of policy during this period in this 
way. On the other hand, even to outline the administrative 
histories and distinot problems of every distriot would require 
more space than is available. The distriots analysed here 
represent, therefore, only selected case studies.
Attention is drawn, however, to two further case studies 
in Appendix A, dealing with this period. Particularly important 
points from these studies which might be mentioned here include 
the regular borrowing by the western Kiwai people of more 
advanced administrative institutions - a fact which shows 
that needs and aspirations existed which Papuan methods did 
not fulfil; and the ouriously ambivalent attitude of the 
Administration towards the Mekeo of Central Papua, an attitude 
which has a good deal in common with that shown in the first 
of these studies, on the Papuan Gulf.
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1* The Gulfs The gear of Combination and the Impulse to Direot 
Rule#
(i) Social Conditions and Traditional Leadership
Physically, conditions in the coasted parts of the Papuan 
Gulf, from Cape Blackwood to Cape Possession, are very similar 
to those in the delta areas further west. Difficulties of 
communication and means of subsistence are correspondingly 
similar; sago forms the basis of the native diet, and is the 
most important item of exohangs
The physical conditions, however, have not constituted a 
barrier to the formation of coherent communities of a size un­
equalled elsewhere in Papua. From the Purari to Cape Possession 
these communities were formed around the ravi or eravo 
(eastern Elema), a kind of sub-clan olub-house which was also, 
in Williams' phrase, 'town-hall, market, cathedral and ooffee- 
ppalace'. Amongst the eastern Elema Brown distinguishes three 
types of socio-political units sets of hamlet dusters, each 
hamlet centred on an eravo; a compact village, consisting of a 
number of eravos with the family dwellings of each eravo around 
it; and the dual village settlement, comprising two villages 
exercising ritual and politioal collaboration, and immediately
1) See F.R. Barton, The Annual Trading Expedition to the Papuan 
Gulf, in Seligmann. tfhe Melanesians of British Sfew Guinea.TJETVlli, pp.96-lgO.~T K ' la s W i rme¥a“^brro^eJ 'an3----extended the idea, ibid., pp.118-9; H.A. Brown, The Eastern 
Elema, p.150. Brown notes the readiness of the Elema to 
adopt and adapt foreign institutions - of. p.187, where this continued post-war in the co-operative movement.
2) F.E. Williams, Natives of the Purari Delta, Papuan Anthrop. Report noVb, p.74. -
oontlguous to one another - the best example la probably 
Moveavi, which has a total population of over 2,000.
Within these communities there existed forms of leadership 
which were more formalised than in most other parts of Papua,
In the Purari, Williams recognised the ’village1 as the unit 
centred around the ravi. with the larger communities being a 
series of inter-locking villages. Each of these ravi-centred 
villages had its paidi amua (chief) and two ravi amua (of the 
right and left sides - secondary chiefs). The term amua 
denoted an aristooratic class, with patrilineal suocession to 
title. In the old days Williams believed that the paidi amua 
was implicitly obeyed, and that he settled disputes and exacted 
penalties or awarded compensation. The functions of the ravi 
amua were principally ceremonial. There was also a non- 
hereditary office of iakl amua. or work ohief, who was 
responsible especially for the erection of a ravi. In addition, 
Williams believed that (traditionally) within the amua class 
the exercise of influence depended on personality; while the
4orders that were given usually followed village opinion.
Amongst the Elema at Orokolo there appeared to be mors 
flexibility in the system, for although the amua existed, it
3) Brown, op.cit., pp.34-5.
4) Williams, op.oit., pp.110-7; of. J.H. Holmes, In Primitive New Guinea. pp*37-8, a less definite account, where he re­affirms the hereditary principle, but says that all chiefs 
possessed the qualities of leadership, and that commoners 
possessing these qualities could establish a chiefly line.
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was common for an able man to lead a breakaway group to set 
up its own eravo. Such authority as the amua possessed 
depended more on his personality than on his rank. 'Elema
csociety is remarkably democratic.' In one ravi, Avavu, a
man named Haio had no hereditary posit ion, i.e. was not an
amua. but it was he who roused the people to work. Conversely,
6several of the leading amua were, in practice, nonentities.
To the east, Brown emphasises the formerly important role 
of the informal age-sets and of the more formal age-grades. 
•Every man, providing he lived long enough and was not lacking 
in mental powers, ultimately beoame a person of standing In 
7the community.' Despite age-grading, there were no dear 
cut offices in eastern Elema leadership, and a man's personal
oqualities played a part in determining his status.
Brown also claims that the eastern Elema were conscious of
possessing a common culture; for this reason he oalls them,
from Koaru to Ciapu, one tribe, divided into four sub-tribes.
Linking them were ten dispersed clans, which used to come
otogether for the Semese ceremony.
Prom the point of view of administration, then - and of 
mission work - these were communities with considerable facility
5) F.E. Williams, Drama of Orokolo. pp. 84-92.
6) Ibid., p.199, footnote 2.
7) Brown, op.cit., p.100.
8) Ibid., pp«115~6.
9) Ibid., pp.24—5, 41-5: Semese was a male spirit.
for relatively large-scale combination} moreover, there was 
scope within the system for the selection and support of able 
men as government (or mission) representatives,
(ii) Administrative Influence of the Missions
J*H. Holmes, the pioneer L.M.S. missionary in the Orokolo 
area, remarked that the Administration of British New Guinea 
•wisely left the Gulf and its wild tribes very much to them­
selves* until some time after he established himself there in 
1894^. Chalmers had founded the station at Motumotu (Toaripi) 
in 1887, and from there 'placed South Sea Island teachers and 
Papuan evangelists in some of the villages along the coast 
between Cape Possession and Orokolo1.11
MaoGregor visited the Purari river villages in 1893 and 
1894, and had to beat off a serious attack in 1893 by the Koriki,
led by Kauri, who impressed MaoGregor with his formidable
I Pbearing and independence. MaoGregor was fully consolous of 
the difficulties of future control in the area. The dozens of 
swift-flowing rivers and the difficulties of sailing during 
the south-east season meant that extension on the oll-staln 
principle would be prodigal of staff. The physical conditions 
posed problems for both government and mission. As A.R.M.
10) Holmes, op.cit., p.20. Until the end of the oentury the LM.S. had great difficulty in getting missionaries to go 
to the Gulf - see District Committee Minutes, Abel to 
Thompson, 12.5,1893 (L.M.S. letters). The lack of control 
in the Gulf was noted.
11) Holmes, ibid., p.19} Orokolo was reached in 1892 - J. 
Chalmers, Pioneer Life and Work, p.207.
12) MacGregor to Norman. 3.5.1893, CPI (Col) 6. Chalmers dis­covered the Purari in 1879.
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Keelan remarked in 1920, from his headquarters at Kikori, it
was •almost impossible to go 5 yards in any direction without
13being waist-deep in water*.
Robinson, after his ill-fated expedition in 1904, paid a 
tribute to what the missionary Holmes had achieved under these 
conditions. Lacking government control, Holmes inevitably 
had to lean on the friendship of the native leaders.
Holmes himself said of the relationship with Kauri, Mac­
Gregor’s old foei ’The peculiarity of our friendship was mutual 
tolerance of one another*. He made use of Kauri’s friendship 
to get in touch with the Evara hill peoples.14
Robinson was wrong, however, in thinking that Holmes had 
been entirely left to his own devices since the time of 
MacGregor. R.M. Blayney from Port Moresby visited the Purari 
in 1900 to investigate feuding between Malpua and Koriki} he 
remarked that it would have been utterly Impossible to have 
secured prisoners without local assistance, but the chief of 
Malpua proved co-operative and handed over three men.1®
Control over the whole of the eastern Gulf was nevertheless 
minimal. Indeed, it was admitted in 1904 that the coast between 
the mouth of the Purari and Cape Blackwood was still
13) Report 1920-1, p.27.
14) Robinson to Gov. General, No.14, 23.3.1904. CPI (Col.),
Set 6; Holmes, op.clt., p.267.
15) Report 1901-2, p.xxvil. The Purari were visited from 
Mekeo in 1902} and the Koriki chiefs met the Central 
Division R.M. in 1903.
uncontrolled, mainly beoause of the difficulty of landing
16there during the south-east season#
Holmes at that time estimated the population of the Purari
to be about 40,000} it was largely on aocount of this
concentrated population that the L.M.S. station had been
17established at Orokolo. In the same way, Chalmers had 
previously seen the station at Motumotu as the key to con­
version of the Elema (possibly meaning only the eastern Elema)
1 flwhose numbers he estimated at well over 20,000.
The L.M.S. 'oil-stain', therefore, outdistanced the 
government, and was a practical and moral embarrassment to it, 
as well as an embryonic source of contact and control.
(ill) The Power of Combination! Chiefs and V.C.s.
Without a government station in the Gulf, officers from 
Port Moresby simply had to arrange a compact between chiefs 
and trust in its being kept. The following is a good example 
of procedure at the timet
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16) Ibid., p.9. Administration was said to be practicable 
only during the short changeover period between the S.E. 
and N.W. seasons« The population was described as 
'numerous and warlike'. Europeans were said to be interested in the area only as a promising labour 
recruitment ground in the future. In the map attached to Atlee Hunt's 1905 report (C.P.P. 43/1905), published in August of that year, the unoontrolled area is shown 
extending west as far as the Bamu.
17) Estimate quoted by Robinson in dlspatoh No.15, 23.3.04, oit.sup. In 1908 the Administration estimate was down 
to 20,000 - Report 1908-9, p.18.
18) Chalmers, Life and Work in New Guinea, pp.132-3. The policy of extending instead of consolidating, even in the 
1880's, was locally determined! 'The Directors put no 
limit on extending ...' ibid. p.122.
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I spoke to all the natives assembled of His Majesty the King and the Government and of the blessings and 
security of a peaoe between Koriki and Iai, which 
was all eloquently interpreted by Natona in im­passioned words and gestures* He spoke with his mouth 
full of betel-nut but strange to say this did not 
appear to render him less intelligible to his hearers 
and possibly it was a source of inspiration ...Finally, after some argument between them as to how the balance stood, I joined the hands of the four chiefs 
in token of a brotherhood between themselves and the Government and an end of all strife. In the morning in order to make the natives realise that the Govern­
ment is capable of enforcing its authority when 
necessary, they were shown an exhibition of rifle fire.
At Iai, Robinson ohose a village oonstable on the
recommendation of Aklavi, the chief who had accompanied him
to the Koriki villages* The appointment of the V.C. was the
only feeble insurance the Administration had that peace would
be maintained. It was long realized that a further government
station was essential in the Gulf, but funds and staff were
not available until 1906, when H.L. Griffin arrived at Kerema
goBay with fifteen police to establish one. By that time
there were five Europeans trading in the new Division for
sago and copra, with trading stations manned by native
employees dotted along the coast - their protection, and the
regulation of their relations with the natives, were added
©1reasons for a government station.
One of the first things Griffin had to do was to enquire
19) Robinson dispatch, oit.sup., typescript p.24. CPI (Col.)
6 «
20) The date was 12th May. Report 1906-7, pp.14, 50.
21) Ibid., p.51.
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into alleged irregularities by L.M.S. native teachers; for, 
even with Holmes at Urika, Pryce-Jones at Iokea and Bartlett 
at Orokolo, the L.M.S. had difficulty in maintaining 
surveillance over its staff. In 1907 the R.M. spoke bluntly 
of the need for greater control over the teachers, in order 
to reduce the •unnecessary friction* between them and the 
natives.22
In 1907 the principal objects of government in ths Gulf 
were defined as (i) bringing the thickly populated Purari 
delta under control; and (ii) establishing friendly relations 
with the Kukukuku, ’a mysterious people inhabiting the country 
at the back of the eastern side of the Gulf of Papua, who, 
by their constant raiding, had made themselves the standing 
terror of the coastal villages*.2®
Effective penetration into Kukukuku oountry in fact had 
to wait until the years after 1916, when the coast had been 
controlled. Between 1906 and 1916 the basic demands of 
paolfication, especially in the Purari, as well as the 
prospects of commercial development and the need for labour, 
forced the Administration’s exiguous resources to be expended
22) H.L. Griffin, An Official in British New Guinea, pp. 119- 
121; Report 1966-7, pp.fe6-l; Report 196^-8, p.43. Within 
months of arriving at Kerema, Griffin was also given ths Mekeo area to administer, for ths A .R.M. there went on 
leave - Griffin, op.oit., p.124.
23) Report 1907-8, p. 18. The Kukukuku were by no means on# people (see Griffin, op.oit., p.126). Murray called the 
term *a nickname derisively applied to them by the Motu 
traders*, though he added that the ooastal Gulf natives had *an almost superstitious fear* of the Kukukuku - Papua of Today, p.184.
laterally, Griffin tried to make a beginning inland by 
appointing a V.C. at Hawai-u, about forty miles up the
04Vailala; but he was unable to do more.
Despite the relative influence of the chiefs and the size 
of the Gulf communities, it is remarkable to *hat extent, 
even in the first year of concentrated administration, 
emphasis was placed on the village constables. Administrative 
thinking had already driven into a rut. Griffin expected a 
great deal of the village constables, and he judged them 
strictly in European terms. Although he was pleased with 
the number of indictable offences brought before him, he 
was dissatisfied with the paucity of cases under the Native 
Regulations, particularly of sorcery. From this he deduced 
that the V.C.s were in the hands of the sorcerers, and that 
most of the cases were settled privately in the villages.
He came to the conclusion that the Gulf native lacked 'the 
power of ruling his fellows’, and that the village constables
O Rshowed 'a want of character’.
The extensive and relatively tight-knit organization 
amongst the natives, particularly on the Purari, alarmed 
Murray and the looal officials. Murray was worried that the 
existing ’solidarity* might be extended on the lines of the 
traditional Koriki confederation in the Purari delta* he felt
24) Report 1907-8, pp. 41-3.
25) Division Report, typescript, 1906-7. Kerema Station 
Journals 35/351. There were 35 V.C.s in coastal villages.
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that a league of the six big Purari groups 9 although not 
probable, was possible* Thus although, like Mao Gregor, he 
constantly complained of the lack of chiefs and of the mall 
social units, his attitude was equally ambivalent• Having 
found natives with at least the potentiality for combination 
and firm leadership, he reacted defensively. His attitude 
was that the Purari natives would need to be watohed and 
controlledi
In other parts of Papua the Government has been assisted by diversity of language and by want of combination. In the case of the Purari villages, there is Identity of language and considerable 
power of combination, as shown by the size of thepfi 
villages ... All require careful handling.
Because of the possibility of this league against the
government, said Murray, *the problem of the Purari is the
most diffioult one in the administration of native affairs 
27in Papua*•
In view of his distrust of the traditional leaders Murray 
had no satisfactory answer to conditions in the eastern Gulf. 
Like MacGregor, he was inclined to insist initially on sub­
mission to government and compliance with government law.
At this time Murray was increasing penalties for non-oompliance
flOwith some of the Native Regulations. In the long term, he
26) Report 1908-9, p. 18; see also his Preface to F.E.
Williams, Natives of the Purari Delta, pp. iii-lv. My italics, fff. fearton, Appendix A #i.
27) Ibid.
28) Murray to Min. Ext. Affairs, 20.12.07. No.263/07 - Aimed Constabulary Bill. CPI (Col.)# Set 6.
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placed his faith in recruiting for outside labour as a 
•civilizing medium*•
To some extent, however, the Administration was forced 
to rely on the traditional leaders. General opinion in 1907 
was that the appointment of V.C.s had been premature, 
particularly in the Purari, for many old quarrels lay un­
resolved, with which a V.C. through his limited official 
prerogatives was unable to deal. Traditional pressures out­
weighed government 'loyalties*. R.M. Higginson noted in 
October 1907 - having dismissed two V.C.s on the Vailala 
river, one for lying and one for assault - that it was better 
to do without a V.C. altogether, than to have a useless one*
One can generally get what one wants through ths people themselves, and in many oases the V.C. «q 
appears to be the last to hear things.
Some of these people, however, were anxious to have a
representative of the government amongst them and in these
circumstances a chief, or the son of a chief, was often
chosen. Higginson noted that when the old ohief of the Kiri
villages died, the government brought back his son, who had
been working on the Northern goldfields, to succeed him.
30Higginson appointed him V.C. *on trial*. Once appointed 
V.C. however, an influential man was judged solely as a 
government official*
29) Patrol to Keuru, Lakiki Creek, Oct. 1907 . 35/324.
30) Ibid., Kiri villages, Vailala.
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(iv) Pacification of the Purari
The Purari presented the most difficult problem with 
village police. Feuding was still at such a pitch that it 
was virtually impossible to get a V.C. who would make even a 
pretence at enforcing tlis law. It was essential to choose 
a man with some influence as V.C., but these were the very 
men who had a vested interest in feuding. Such a man, 
remarked R.M. Higginson disapprovingly, was principally 
distinguished by *fame as a fighting man, a villainous 
countenance, and the possession of numerous wives’.
Despite the appointment of V.C.s therefore the Purari 
villages, at the end of 1907, were still not under control.
The V.C. of Kaimare had been dismissed for getting old and 
losing his influenoe, and his successor, although ’a well- 
disposed boy1, was too frightened to aooompany the R.M. to 
Oikirave. From the Oikirave headmen the R.M. learned that 
the Kaimare had been stealing sago, a heinous offence under 
delta conditions. Moreover, feuding was continuing between 
the Koriki and the Iai, the latter having killed some of the 
former at a feast to celebrate the conclusion of peace between 
them. The Iai V.C. admitted this, but claimed that he would 
be killed himself if he tried to assert his authority.^2
31) Patrol, Purari, Dec. 1907. 35/324.
32) Ibid. The killing of traditional enemies was the 
oustomary rite whereby the young men proceeded to sooial manhood.
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In 1908 violence in the Purari delta reached a peak with
the attaok by the Oikirave on two Europeans, Charpentier and
Buchanan« The attack was led by the V.C., Karara; after
dismissing him the R«M« described him as 'a menace and a bar
to the settlement' of the delta« 'As the accredited
representative of the Government, he took part in all the
33tribal fighting'* In April the R.M« led a government
expedition to Oikirave; it was aooompanled, unasked, by 57
Kalmare war canoes, each containing about 18 men« As Murray
wrote later of the subduing of the Vaimuru when a supporting
party of Oikirave natives fortunately arrived too late!
Fortunately, ••« for a party of cannibals on the war­
path would prove embarrassing as allies9 and yet it 
would have been difficult to refuse their assistance«
This is precissly what happened in April 1908« Not
surprisingly, the Oikirave, concealed on the river banks,
fired on the expedition, *hioh was foroed to fire baok and
then to retire« The Kalmare had misinformed the R.M« of the
disposition of the Oikirave villages*
On the 25th April, Murray himself arrived on the 'Merrie
England', and realized immediately that the apparent flight
of a government party would spur the Oikirave to further
violence« A return was therefore made with the augmented
force; when, by the 30th, the Oikirave had not acceded to
demands for the ring-leaders, Murray had their principal ravi
33) Report 1908-9, p«52«
34) Murray, preface to Williams! Natives of the Purari Delta. p«v.
«* K ,burned down. At this time Murray had few qualms about
such direct action in the delta - he noted that only the
36•power* of the government maintained control.
A list of the delta villages and their leaders 9 prepared
in December 1908, shows the names of all the eravo chiefs, and
reveals that most of the village constables were chiefs, the
37remainder being the sons of chiefs. The real method of 
administration, however, seems to have consisted of the R.M.’s 
assembling the headmen (presumably ths amua) and threatening 
them with punishment if his in junctions were disregarded. The 
appointment of a V.C. merely established a tenuous official 
link with each village, creating a facade of control through 
native officials.^8
Meanwhile there were signs that the authority of the head
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35) Patrol, R. M. Higginson to Purari, April 1908« 35/235. 
Higginson noted that the country was so difficult that 
it was impossible to get captives by pursuit; they had to be induced to submit. On further patrols in August and December 1908, R.M* Bell concentrated on assurances 
of the peaceful intentions of government; both communal 
and individual punishment were ignored. A similar account of the April 1908 aotion is in Murray’s diary (Mitchell 
A3139), 30.4.08) also a substantially similar account 
appeared in the •Sydney Morning Herald* of 9.5.1808. The burning of the ravi was described in ihe Annual Report 
1907-8, p.33. In February 1909 Murray made a point of 
personally returning four prisoners to their parents in 
the ravisi ‘Everyone insisted on shaking hands.• Diary, 
5.2.15537
36) Report, 1909-10, p.14.
37) Patrol, R.M. Bell to Purari, Dec. 1908. 35/235. Most of the large villages (e.g. Maipua, lai, each with populations
of 1500-2000) had only one V . C .
38) Note the action of Higginson at lai, July 1908 (35/235); he warned the chief men about stealing, *and told them anjp future misbehaviour would be promptly dealt with*. He determined to replace tne V . C .  because he did not like himu
J
men - maintained through their control of the eravo and of 
initiation - might be crumbling* At Orokolo new ways of 
accumulating wealth made it possible for more men to build 
eravos (though less imposing ones than of old)f while it was 
noted that the younger men were more inclined to ignore the 
eravo customs and requests from the elders, and to work off 
their energies brawling in the village.
Administration polioy at this time was Inadequately thou^it 
out; action was largely ad hoc and depended on individual 
offioers to a great extent* These generally distrusted the 
traditional leaders in seeking the rigorous application of 
the law; but at the ssme time there was no adequate administ­
rative substitute. The settlement polioy oomplioated matters, 
for this required the rapid acquisition of pockets of land, 
and this in turn - for the problems of acquiring land from
segmentary societies are notorious - required the assistance
40particularly of olan and lineage leaders. To take an 
example, R*H* O’Malley bought extensive timber rights from 
the Akauda people on the upper Vailala in March, 1909, after 
lengthy discussions with the two chiefs, who paid over trade
39) Two Toaripi eravo leaders complained to the R.M. about 
the behaviour of the young men. Patrol, R.M. Bell to Orokolo, Oct. 1908, 35/235; also Report 1909-10, p.41.
40) In a dispatoh of 28.11.07, 229/07, Murray reviewed the 
operation of the 1906 Lands Ordinance during 12 months - more than 100,000 acres had been bought from the natives; 
only in one instance, he claimed, was there any suspioion 
that land had not been bought from the true owners.
139
The principal chief, Haihai, 'appeared to be a man of great
41authority*• Similar transfers of rights were signed at 
other villages further up the river) in every case relations 
were with the chief or chiefs, the V.C.s being referred to
40only as messengers or minor intermediaries.
A dramatic change in policy came with a new Patrol Officer,
H.J* Ryan* This man was one of Murray's particular proteges,
prepared to patrol under great hardship with great perseverance,
43and to enforce the law by invariably 'getting his man'. 
Unfortunately, men of this stamp were rarely oapable also of 
patient consultation with traditional leaders) there was no 
policy definition on the matter, and a man of Cyan's autocratic 
temperament used the most direot methods* On a patrol from 
Kerema to Cape Possession (eastern Elema) in August 1909, 
nowhere was a ohief consulted* At Moviavi he 'shook the V.C.s 
up about the state of the village and ordered it to be 
cleaned', and at Motumotu (Toaripi) he 'called the V.C.s and 
impressed on them their duty with regard to seeing that the 
children attended school*
41) Patrol, R.M. O’Malley to upper Vailala, March 1909) entry 
of 16.3*09.
42) Ibid., passim. After this acquisition the Akauda quickly made gardens right up to the limit of the timber - clearly 
to make further encroachment impossible.
43) If Staniforth Smith can be believed, Ryan was a * roughneck* 
extraordinary - Smith to At lee Hunt, 1st Jan. 1914. Hunt letters.
44) Patrol, H.J.Ryan, Aug* 1909. 35/235* Only the V.C.s figure in the reports.
for the rights to all the owners in O'Malley's presence*
I
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When, in October 1909, Ryan beoame relieving R.M., he
adopted a similar demanding attitude to the west of Kerema,
viiere affairs were even more critical - he was simultaneously,
45it must be added, acquiring land. In Deoember 1909 he
arrested the old crippled chief Bai—i, whom he described as
*the most powerful sorcerer in the Delta*| and at Iai he
demanded that five men be brought to him on a charge of ’having
46used seditious language *.
There is little doubt that the more ambitious V.C.s took
advantage of officers like Ryan to boost their status. When
Ryan visited the Purari area in 1910, aoting on information
from V.C. Mama of Kairu he arrested ohief Koivi of Oikirave
on a charge of wife-murder. This was an excellent way for one
47village to get rid of a powerful leader lii another. One of 
the persistent faults of the V.C. system generally was the 
propensity of officials to report only those offenoes committed 
in neighbouring villages. The bolder V.C.s also used their 
position, within the village, to get rid of powerful opponents 
or rivals. For example, at the same village, Kairu, in 
September 1910, the same V.C., Mama, and a chief, Kaipa, 
informed of murders allegedly committed by another villager, 
Aku, who was the son of the previous ohief Kairi, and who was
45) R.M. 0* Mai ley, patrol of Oot. 1909, 17.9.09) Patrol, H.J. Ryan to Vailala, 12.12.09. 35/235.
46) Ibid.
47) Patrol, H.J. Ryan to Purari delta, 2.3.1910.
said to be Mama* s brother.
When R.M. Hennelly went to arrest Aku the men of the
village assembled and seemed on the point of offering
resistance, while a number of women - Aku had ten wives -
set up a wall nearby. It is likely that the accusations
against Aku# clearly 'an individual of considerable importance',
49were primarily a means of removing a rival.
A major factor in this situation, where the Administration 
was being used by the natives in quarrels both within and 
beyond the village, was the chronic lack of experienced staff. 
There was only one Resident Magistrate of two years standing 
in the Territory.®0 Hennelly, the Gulf R.M. in late 1910, had 
been 'led' by his polloe while in the North-Eastern Division, 
according to the Government Secretary.51 Nevertheless, Hennelly 
made some attempt to recognise the authority of the chiefs 
alongside that of the V.C. and to discuss matters with them.
He noted that in Olklrave the V.C. had 'practically the same 
amount of power and commands the same proportion of respect
50from the people that the two chiefs obtain'. A patient and
48) Patrol, R.M. Hennelly to Purari, Sept. 1910. 35/235.Quite possibly a classifioatory relationship.
49) Report 1911-2, p.68.
50) Gov. Sec. Campbell to Hunt, 13.10.08; Atlee Hunt paperf.
51) Campbell to Hunt, 13.10.08.
52) Patrol, R.M. Hennelly to Purari, Sept. 1910.
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tolerant policy, however, did not earn commendation of the 
kind accorded men like Ryan; the criteria of success were 
practical results, as the Government Anthropologist Williams 
ruefully acknowledged in the 1920s.
Hennelly's more sympathetic approach was both evident and 
useful on the land question. He negotiated the sale of L.M.S# 
land at Urika, from the Maipua and Kairu people, in February
1911, although the natives were becoming increasingly hostile 
to land alienation because of the crude methods sometimes 
employed.®4
Beaver, who had briefly succeeded Ryan in the Gulf, 
emphasised the necessity for tact and patience, and pointedly
BErefuted the conceptions of his predecessor# Another officer, 
O'Malley, had described the Gulf native as unintelligent, 
unreliable and lazy; but Beaver stated that he was no worse 
than all the natives from Samarai to Cape Possession, and he 
defended the eravo system which taught youths 'to subordinate 
the individual to the family and the family to the clan*.®®
These were the two extremes in outlook, O'Malley claiming the
53) Report 1909-10, p. 14, where Ryan is commendedi that is, 
ends rather than means#
54) The British New Guinea Co# was using the method of 'illegal squatting', sometimes right in the middle of a 
village without the natives' consent* Patrol, Hennelly to Purari, Jan-Feb, 1911# 35/235.
55) Report 1910-1, p.59.
56) Report 1909-10, pp.51,57; Report 1910-1, p.59, Hennelly also defended Gulf natives as 'more intelligent individuals 
than they are thought by some employers' and 'men of spiritand independence'. He also tried to analyse the,functions the eravo, and doubted vohether its breaking down - then beginning - was desirable. Report 1911-2, p.70-1.
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Gulf native to be ’imbued with superstition* and respecting
only demonstrations of force, Beaver, more objeotlve,
counselling tolerance and a more personal approach. As for
the administrative repercussions, the laok of direction or
definition from Port Moresby is remarkable; individual officers,
as long as they maintained control by humane methods, could
follow their own bent* The basic problems of native
administration in the area, and notably the use or neglect of
traditional authorities and institutions, received scant
attention at the policy level.
(v) Three Pool of Village Authority
By mid-1912 the R.M. was able to report that the delta
was well under control. It seems to have been taken for
granted that there was a direct correlation between the
establishment of control and the decline of chieftainship.
It was reported that -
The chiefs still rule, but with gradually diminishing powers, and the "Governor", as the Delta folk call every Government officer, has now a comparatively easy~~ 
task of it on his visits of inspection and patrol*
The extent to which the authority of the chiefs was in fact
slipping was obscured by the continued appointment of chiefs*
sons as village constables, and by the increasing trend for
the larger settlements to break up into smaller units - a
process probably facilitated by the eravo system when the
57) Report 1912-3, p.78.
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proneed for large defensive alliances had passed.
There were three fool of authority in the oo&stal villages* 
the traditional leaders, the village constables, and the L.M.S* 
teachers* These last seem to have taken advantage of firmer 
control and protection in order to enhance their temporal 
authority* On a patrol to the east of Kerema In April 1912 
one officer found many oomplalnts against the Samoan teachers* 
An officer was faced with a dilemma in dealing with L*M*S* 
teachers, for their influence was generally recognized by 
government as desirable; if an officer derogated from their 
status in the village, their influence would suffer corres­
pondingly* On the other hand, if their demands were immoderate 
or their actions unjust, they had to be restrained or even 
prosecuted* On the patrol mentioned, F*0* Henry found that 
at Movlavi the teachers forced children to build fences without
pay; at Ma-aru the teaoher had failed to pay for a canoe log;
59and at Silo a teaoher had severely beaten a schoolgirl*
At the same time the V.C.s were considered unsatisfactory*
At Iai in 1912 the V*C* was gaoled for six months, and 
recommended for dismissal, for a common offenoe - committing 
adultery with the wives of absent labourers* The R.M. 
despaired;
58) Patrol, R.M* Hennelly to Purari, Aug* 1912. 35/326* The 
sub-clan eravo formed a settlement nucleus.
59) Patrol, P.O. Henry and R*M* Brown, east of Kerema, April
1912. 35/326.
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Have oome to the oonolusion that the only safe way 
to work the Delta Tillages is to appoint the V#C#e 
in each, on the principle of setting a rogue to watch a rogue« The pay allotted to these men Is not 
sufficient in these times to keep them straight and we are oontlnually having to change the personnel of the force« There is no doubt that a great deal of 
extortion is carried on by the V.C«s9 but although 
complaints are made the parties aggrieved will seldom or ever ### make a definite charge against them for 
fear of after oonsequenoes# I would strongly advooefce• •• that the appointment of V«C.s be reviewed with theg0 
object of improvement of the system.
Hennelly himself suggested a District Police Foroe, the 
members of whioh would be moved around every three to six 
months« Meanwhile f he began the policy of appointing dual 
V«C«8 at Iaif to replaoe the man dismissed# The policy met 
with a brief but crushing comment from the Government Secretary! 
'It would take a lot of money'#®1
Ironically, the paoifloatlon of the delta for reorultlng, 
which Murray characterised so confidently as a 'civilising 
medium', resulted in a chain reaction which made the 
consolidation of order difficult# Murray had warned that
60) Ibid#, comment on front jacket# There had long been 
arguments about having local natives in the Constabulary 
force; this was the policy followed in the S.E# Division#On the one side was the argument that strangers were impartial; on the other, that looal natives had indis­pensable local knowledge# The potentialities of looal natives were shown In June 1913« when a European trader complained of a taravatu (taboo) on his trading, at 
Toaripi# L-Cpl# Jlnga9 a local native, was sent to in­
vestigate» as it was suspected that the V«C« had instigated the taboo - Patrol, R«M. Brown, June 1913# 
35/328#
61) Patrol, H.M. Hennelly to Vailala-Purari, Aug« 1912« 35/326# Cf« MacGregor's view, Ch# II, note 12.
recruiting might succeed differentially - that is, that
there might be a rush to the plantations, leaving the miners
without labour - without realizing that the same argument
62might apply to government service# This happened! R.M.
63Hennelly was unable to get recruits. Suitable men were
generally unavailable as village constables| while the social
disruption caused by the departure of the youqg men opened the
way for the adulterer and the opportunist* It was usually
agreed that in view of the fact that village constables
received only iO/- (senior ones occasionally 30/-) a year,
it was 'astonishing1 the work some of them did; it was even
more remarkable that so many of them did anything at all.
64Extortion, of course, compensated.
Pacing this tripartite division in village authority it 
was inevitable that the Administration, despite attempts at 
oonsultation by individual officers, should increasingly throw 
its weight behind its statutory representative, the village 
constable. This was apparent particularly after 1912, when 
the Administration began following Murray's announced policy 
of complete pacification through an intensification of the 
'oil-stain' principle. In March 1913 a new Division, called
62) Report 1912-3, p.7.
63) Hennelly patrol, Aug. 1912, oit.sup. He noted specifically 
that private traders in the same area were offering far 
better pay.
64) Report 1913-4, p.84. Comments on V.C.s were generally 
vague, and always reserved! 'they do their work fairly 
well, everything considered'.
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the Delta Division, was created, with its headquarters at 
Kifcori. The Purari became part of the new Division#®® In 
the residual Gulf Division this made possible, for example, 
more active work up the Valíala river and, after 1916, 
penetration and control of the Kukukuku country.
Until the repercussions of the war halted economlo
development, however, a good deal of this enhanced aotivity
was directed towards securing land, recruiting labourers, and
buying sago for labourers elsewhere. To some degree this
operated to prolong negotiation with the chiefs. On a patrol
to the Purari area in 1912-3, for example, P.O. Stennett spent
much of his time trying to induce chiefs as well as village
constables at Maipua, Oikirave and Ial to get recruits and
67labourers for him.
Thus, despite the general trend to direct methods - vfaioh 
left more time for penetration inland - the Administration 
remained nonplussed over the surviving influence of the eravo
65) Report 1913-4, p.7; Gov. Gazette No.5, 11.3.1913. Previously the Lakekamu goldfleld had been officially opened on 
13.12.09, and a R.M. with 2 A.R.M.s stationed there. The 
object was primarily to protect the miners and to look after labour conditions. In Jan. 1910 a short patrol was 
made by A.R.M. Bowden to the so-called Kukukuku of the 
upper Tiveri river; but this was purely exploratory - 
Report 1910-1, pp.60-5.
66) Report 1913-4, pp.81-2; Sir H. Murray, Papua of Today, 
pp. 184—5.
67) Patrol, P.O. Stennett to Purari, Dec. 1912, 2.1.1913.35/327; also see patrol, R.M. Broim to Orokolo, Dec* 1913, 
dealing with an unsuccessful attempt to buy land in 
Orokolo Bay for Papuan Industries Ltd. , an industrial offshoot of the L.M.S. 35/329.
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chiefs* R.M. Massy-Baker In 1915 announced his philosophy
as a judicious mixture of force and persuasions
It has been my object to inspire a wholesome fear 
of the Government for evil-doing, and, on the other 
hand, by kindness and justice, and by an Interest in their occupations and village life generally, to show them that the Government has their welfare at 
heart. It was neoessary to use rather severe measures at first.
A few minor examples will show what this amounted to in
practice. At Orokolo there had been persistent brawling? the
R.M. assembled all the people and addressed them for fifteen
minutes, in the hope that it would 'bring these lazy and
69insolent people to their senses'* To the east, when several
European miners complained of the threatening behaviour of
the Moviavi people, the R.M. fined 25 natives - on the
information of the miners' Head Boys - for using threatening
language. In addition, he oolleoted the head men of the 21
Moviavi eravos and addressed them on the need for law and 
70order* Complementing this, the R.M. was also giving 'a few
minutes lecture' on the Native Regulations to gatherings of
71V.C.s as he passed through an corea* Massy-Baker realized 
that the social stage had been reached at whioh a real effort 
should be made to retain men who were both more active and 
more Europeanised, as village constables; but he was not
68) Report 1915-6, p.69.
69) Patrol report 12/1914-5, Mar. 1915. Kerema.
70) Patrol report 6/1915-6, Kerema. Kukipi 14-18*3*1916.
71) Report 1915-6, p.73.
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The removal of some of the very old village 
constables also requires consideration. Although 
they have doubtless done valuable work in the past their influence is on the wane, and this is not to 
be wondered at, as the conditions now prevailing in 
their villages are very different to what they were some eight years ago, when they were first appointed.The younger generation are more self-assertive and 
independent, owing to their contact with European« and their wider outlook from having travelled, and they require a somewhat stronger hand and a man who 
will deal with them without fear or favour.
At the same time, it is a matter that will have to be dealt with in a delicate manner, as some of tiiese 
old men are very proud of their "clothes”, and they 
might easily give their suooessors a good deal of trouble, A little diplomacy would, however, in most«« oases lead to a voluntary resignation, I think,
(vi) Extension into Kukukuku Country
In the later years of the war ~ rather surprisingly in
view of the enlistment of one-third of the field-staff - the
most significant event was closer oontaot with the Kukukuku 
73peoples. In Maroh-April 1916 A,R,M, Skelly for the first 
time visited their villages in the area bounded by the Valíala 
and Kerema rivers, and the Dohiti river and Nabo range to 
the north.
As so often in frontier areas, taking a village constable 
with the patrol proved invaluable, Skelly took V.C. Lohai of
unaware of the difficultiest
72) Ibid, This situation was still considerably in advanoe of that in the Delta, where Ryan, patrolling from Kikori, 
was working on the theory of mass arrests and the im­
position of levies to stop feuding - any reliance on V,C.s was minimal - ibid., pp. 84-6.
73) See Murray, op,clt,, p.xi.
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the upper Vailala, who had accompanied Griffin to the Kukukuku
periphery ten years before* Lohai was able to establish
friendly relations with a man of influence named Arivi - thus
enabling the patrol to surmount peacefully the unpredictable
initial contact - and Arivi was induced to promise that he
would try to consolidate the scattered Kukukuku settlements
into villages*
He was given a shirt and some Turkey red, and also 
a tomahawk and a knife*
The Kukukuku nevertheless were suspicious; Skelly remarked
on their marked proclivity for fainting away at the first sight
of a European, and he was unable to persuade any to accompany
him to Kerema. One was then taken forcibly, shown the
74station, given presents and sent baok to his people*
By 1922 government influence had progressed to the stage 
at which the Kukukuku had lost their nervousness and tended to 
be effusive in their weloome of strangers. The R.M. noted 
that numbers of them were visiting Kerema, and that brisk 
trading was going on with coastal natives for steel implements* 
By this time the Administration was coming to the conclusion 
that the population in the mountains was small and scattered, 
and its pacification not of such moment as had once been 
believed*7®
(vii) The Vailala Madness: Causes and Administrative Reactions 
At this point the Administration had to contend with one
74) Kerema Patrol Report 7/1915-6. 35/331*
75) Report 1922-3, pp* 10,45*
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of its most notable problems - the Vailala Madness, in some
respeots a model of the 'cargo cult* movements to whloh
Melanesian administrators have by now become inured. In
Williams's words, the Madness involved -
on the one hand, a set of preposterous beliefs 
among its victims - in particular the expectation of an early visit from their deceased relatives - and, on the other hand, collective nervous symptoms-g 
of a sometimes grotesque and idiotic nature.
The movement spread from Nomu, at the mouth of the Adele,
to Oiapu, and took hold of virtually all the coast villages,
together with many of the inland villages, especially up the
Vailala river, where it was found 60 miles from the mouth.
The ancestors were expected to return - in some plaoes they
were expeoted to be white - and to bring large quantities of
cargo in a steamer. Williams recognized 'a strong undercurrent
of Christian teachings in the doctrines'. At Maipua the
village flag was produced, together with a faded portrait of
George V, who was stated to be the younger brother of Jesus.
The flagpole and the idea of village flags had apparently
77been introduced by the L.M.S. mission.
Williams acknowledged that the Madness may have had its
78genesis some time before 1919, when it first became manifest •
76) Gov. Anthrop. Report No.4, p.l.
77) Ibid., pp.3, 14-5, 18-9, 23. Strongly analogous has been the post-1945 Torchbearers' Cult, which also took over an L.M.S. institution. This also infected the eastern Elema 
and spread to the Manumanu Motu. (Personal research! also information Dr. M. Groves, Mr. H.A. Brown, Miss D. Ryan).
78) Kerema patrol reports 4/1919-20, Sept. 1919. a/R.M. G.H. 
Murray. 35/335.
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One man believed to have had some of the first psychological
disturbances, Evara of Iorl on the lower Vallala, claimed to
have experienced symptoms (head-he-go-round) after the death
of his father many years before* Another imputed originator
was Ha reha, a V.C* of Vailala East* Although some of the
leaders were elderly men, the most remarkable feature of the
Madness was the universal contempt for and destruction of the
old ceremonies and oustoms* Williams attributed this aspect
79of it largely to LM.S* anti-custom influence.
He also levelled an accusing finger at the demands of 
plantation and government labour, which took so many of the 
young men from the villages. Rivers in particular was con­
currently propagating the belief that the prime effeot of 
outside oontaot and government oontrol was to remove traditional 
interests and emotional outlets, so that the native lost
interest in life. It was in this belief that Williams pleaded
80for the retention of oustom.
In commenting on government attitudes and policy Williams
was in an invidious position* He hinted, however, that the
Administration might be pushing the nativee into work, in the
villages, village plantations, and on the roads, which was
81unwanted and resented*
79) Williams* op.cit*, pp. 28, 37-41.
80) Williams, ibid., pp. 41-3, 55, 64; W.H.R. Rivers, Essays 
on the Depopulation of Melanesia.
81) Williams, op.olt*, p.43 footnote: he quotes a comment by 
the Administrator on a patrol report, oommending zeal, but cautioning against over-enthusiastic pushing.
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It is a common postulate - for the missionary, one 
presumes, a necessary one - that the native does not know what is good for him. By accepting this postulate we set ourselves the difficult and res­
ponsible task of deciding what is good for him.
... it is justifiable to ask whether the Papuan is 
everywhere given a proper admixture of guidance and liberty, or whether he is not sometimes hustled by 
the scruff of the neck up the wrong path of righteous­ness • •• what with the zeal and energy of various reformers, the native's soul has sometimes an ill time 
of it between the upper and nether millstones of 8? Materialism and Christianity.
When he was consulted son» years later by Murray, he was
more specific on the need for consultation with, rather than
direction of, the natives. However, Murray wrote in 1923
almost the antithesis!
To my mind, the most obvious, and possibly the only solution is to encourage, or if necessary to compel, the native to work for his own benefit# This is 
what we are attempting in Papua.
Murray believed that Christianity provided an adequate
substitute for the old rituals, and that the old oustoms would
eventually have to go) but he announced his intention of
directing his offioers to adopt a more sympathetic attitude
towards the maintenance or revival of oustom. His only comment
on government compulsion was that Williams had not considered
that it had had *any appreciable effect* on causing dis-
84turbances to the old oultures# There was, therefore, little 
mitigation of the issuing of orders as a regular feature of
82) Ibid., p.45. Wartime offioers re-interpreted the ’Madness' 
as 'an outburst against European rule' rather than just
'a religious mania1 - see J*L. Taylor in ANGAU Conference, 1944, II - CP763, Set 4.
83) Report 1923-4, p.16 (Part of his address to the Pan- 
Pacific Conference, 1923).
84) Forward to Anthrop. Report, No.4.
repercussions of this philosophy at the divieional levels
• •• there has been a number of breaches against the Native Regulations t -Çhese figures appear high as a 
result of systematic patrolling, and a more rigid enforcement of the Native Regulations - especially 
in reference to the improvement of villages. It is 
to be hoped that when these improvements are effected one and all will realise that it is for their well­being* Although they resent the work which this 
involves and which is foreign to their traditions and old regime I think it is only a matter of time when the offences against the Regulations will be con- 85 
siderably less than they axe now*
The only direct administrative result of the enquiry into 
the Vailala Madness seems to have been Murray's advice to his 
offioers that they should not appoint as village constables 
any men afflloted by or inclined to the Madness,
The conflicting influences and demands on the eastern Gulf 
natives before 1919 were so heavy - particularly on peoples 
who had previously had little outside oontaot, and who had 
traditionally considerable social oohesion - that In retros­
pect oultist reactions are not surprising* It was taken for 
granted that customary leadership was declining with the 
disintegration of the eravo pattern and the self-assertion of 
a new type of young man with outside experience. The only 
features of this oulture change to which most offioers paid 
any attention were the difficulties of getting effioient
85) Report 1924-5, p,19,
86) Memo* preceding Anthrop* Report No,4,
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native administration*
In 1924 the R.M* of the Delta Division illustrated the
The deep-seated tensions that must have existed were given
little administrative consideration.
When the V.C. at Orokolo was threatened with pourri-pourri
in 1917, and fled the village for Paramanu, the patrol officer
simply arrested 215 men. All except eight of these,
desoribed as old men of 'the Dubu Oricle (sio) variety* were
eventually released to return to their homes. The old men
87were taken away for trial. Though an extreme case, this 
ad hoc method was typical; little thought was given to long­
term consequences.
If Williams is right, by the 1920s ohanges in the leadership 
pattern had already gone a long way in the Purari delta.
It may be stated at the outset that the funotions of the paidi amua are more less moribund? they have been 
usurped by tke wielder of vice-regal authority in the 
person of the belted policeman (i.e. the village policeman). Sometimes the two personages are one and the same; in other oases the polloeman claims and Is 
acknowledged to be the paidi amua when he is in reality8g nothing more than a rank commoner.
Amongst the eastern Elema Brown thought that the village 
constables had not been a success because government orfleers 
'did not understand the amorphous nature of Elema gerontocracy^
village constables and of inducing the natives to work.
87) Kerema P.R. 3/1917-8, P.O. Fitzpatrick, Aug. 1917. 35/333. 
The attribution of European values was also common. In 
Oct. 1920 the R.M. said that the Orokolo natives were 'cunning', and that the appointment of 'suitable' V.C.s 
amongst them was very important - Kerema P.R. 2/1920-1.
88) Anthrop. Report No.5, p.110.
89) Brown, op.oit., p.159.
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He believed, however, that the reason for the failure of 
the village oonstables was their deferring to the elders, 
a conclusion whioh it is difficult to reconcile with other 
evidence and opinions*
Apart from the effects of government office, two other 
factors were important* the influence of the mission, and of 
the looal planters and traders* Rev. Pryce-Jones of the L.M.S. 
seems to have been more olosely involved, for example, in 
events leading up to the Madness, than appeared at the time.
It is well-known that until the 1930s the L.M.S. had a 
thorough contempt for native custom. In addition, however, 
the L.M.S* had before it the object, clear and declared, of 
a self-governing Native Churoh; translated to the village,
90this meant 'self-reliance' or something approaohing autonomy.
The report of the patrol to the soene of the initial out­
break in September 1919 shows that Pryce Jones was exeroising 
a more direct influence then the published reports indicated,
and that this influence was interpreted by everybody exoept
91the mission as antithetical to government, V.C. Hareha, 
whose visions were said to have started the Madness, was 
when questioned the bearer of a message from Pryoe-Jones whioh
90) Report of the work of the L.M.S. in the Port Moresby Distriot - Report 1919-20, p,99 (App. B), Murray oommented 
(ibid., p,7) that this was 'intensely interesting to those of us who have been inclined to deny the qualities of self-reliance and initiative to the natives of Papua'.
91) Kerema P.R. 4/1919-20, a/fi.M. Murray, Sept. 1919. 35/335.
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stated that Hareha was a man of hypersensitive charaoter and 
needed careful handling* Pryce Jones had written the note 
to quieten Hareha, who feared arrest because he had cutt off 
his hair and done away with his ancestral charms and urged
Q ©others to do the same. It seems clear that Hareha had had 
very close relations with the mission.
The European traders on the coast were hostile to the 
mission for taking an active part in transactions to ensure 
that the natives were not defrauded. The result, on the out­
break of the Madness, was a letter by the Director of the Oil­
fields stating his belief that a ’white influence' lay behind 
it somewhere* Williams though; that a sermon by a white
missionary, 'misconstrued by hie congregation', may have been
93one of the origins of the Madness.
Fryce Jones, it would appear, made a practice of rushing
to the side of the natives if he thought that any Injustioe
had been done or was likely to be done, either by local
Europeans or by the Government. This led natives to believe
94that mission and government were opposite foroes.
In 1921 R.M. Liston-Blyth aocused Jones of 'ignoring the
92) Ibid., letter quoted.
93) Letter from A. Wade of 8.9.1919 - inoluded with P.R.4, supra; also see Anthrop. Report No.4, pp. 27-8. The Europeans in the area jumped to the conclusion that there 
was to be a native rising. Williams admits elements of 
this early in the Madness - p.15.
94) Kerema P.R. 6/1919—20, P.O. Connelly, Vailala* 35/335.
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traders. Jones had also taken a native direct to Port Moresby
to assist him in a suit against an employer for assault«
In my experience of other Missions, and I have spent most of my service life in tropical countries (some
17 years now), I have never met one yet that interfered so oontinually in the material affairs of a district as the one here does. I have several times informed them that I welcome reports from anyone whioh tend to 
keep me au fait with what Is going on in the villages, and which bring abuses and offenoes to my notloe, but the sort of constitution of the Mission into a kind of 
Court of Appeal makes our position very diffloult and 
great taot is needed to prevent an open rupture overQ5 some matters of native policy#
The planters and traders, by reaction, beoame adept at
suborning the natives through village oonstables, who were of
course susceptible to temptation because of their low pay#
In April 1922 A.R.M. Rentoul noted in Valíala East that a
planter named McDonald, who had a property up-river» had
'tremendous influence' in the villages, so muoh so that the
natives tended to ignore other authorities. This was espeolally
significant in an area where the Madness was very strong and
96where the eravo system had been decaying rapidly# In the 
same month Rentoul found in Moviavi, to the east, that one of 
the two V.C.s was absent getting copra for a trader named 
Curryi while the V.C.'s wife was running a trade store for
Divisional authority' in taking the side of natives versus
95) Kerema P#R. 12A920-1, Vailala, 6.4.21# 35/335. Several natives bluntly told the R.M. that the mission had said that the export price of copra had not dropped and that 
they were being swindled by the traders. The R.M. 
assured them that the price had dropped - 9.4#21#
96) Kerema P.R# 11/1921-2, Western boundary, 1#4#1922#
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Curry in the village. Curry, however, was generally detested
97by the natives because of his bad debts for oopra collected.
98Similar cases Involving V.C.s had to be checked to the west.
The natives were therefore being pulled in several
directions at once. Aggravating this were the deficiencies
of the Administration itself* Several of the best officers,
such as Beaver, had not returned from the war, and new men had
to be recruited and trained. R.M. Liston-Blyth attributed
the bad state of the Division, and particularly the laok of
control over the village constables, largely to a very poor
99type of patrol officer*
All these factors oreated a vicious olrole, for the 
further government control disintegrated, the more difficult 
it became to re-establish* The temptation then was to use 
very direct methods to achieve quick results. That this was 
a general problem is shown by Murray's Circular Instruction 
No. 138, which forbade 'unnecessary harassment' by excessive 
zeal in looking for offences.100
Even Rentoul, however - one of the more perceptive officers- 
at the height of the Madness in Vailala East had all the
97) Kerema P.R. 14A921-2, Movlavi, April 1922*
98) Kerema P.R. 8/1921-2. At least two V.C*s were intending to use village labour to make oopra for traders.
99) Kerema P.R. 1A920-1, Toaripl, Sept. 1920. In practice 
there were no educational qualifications for entry to the service, and training was acquired by patrolling.
100) Quoted Murray to Canberra, 24.5.28. CPI, V, 16/41/5? also 
Report 1928-9, p.8, where he states the instruction had been issued 'a few years ago'*
paraphernalia of the oeremonies destroyed, then assembled 
all the old men and told them that if there were any more 
oomplaints of slackness there would be 'plenty of trouble', 
that carriers had to be supplied when demanded, that all 
government works had to be carried out and the V.C.s obeyed.101
At Toaripi in February 1923 the acting H.M., on the 
complaint of a private European that natives were pestering 
him and ignoring his orders, gave them 'a talking to, and to 
make it more impressive ... four cuts with a cane each, across 
the shoulders.'102
(viii) The Demands of Government and Direot Administration
In this complex situation, further burdens were added both 
to natives and to field staff whioh accelerated the trend 
towards direct methods. These resulted from the introduction 
of the Native Tax and the Native Plantation Ordinances, in 
accordance with Murray's perennial philoeophy of salvation 
through work.
In the Gulf considerable resistance to this policy 
developed, especially in those areas most acutely affeoted by 
the Madness. At Vailala the Assistant Inspeotor of Native 
Plantations appealed for help, as the natives told him that
101) Kerema P.B. 11A921-2, Vailala. 1.4.1928.
102) Kerema P.R. 11/1922-3, a/R.M. Muaoutt, Feb. 1923. Th.
Got. Sec. wrote an angry remonstrance (appended), but 
excused Musoutt on the ground that he had not had over­seas leave for ten years. Standing Instructions laid It 
down that corporal punishment was never to be inflicted 
'except in exeoution of the sentenoe of a Court of 
competent jurisdiction'.
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he was not the •proper Government * and that they would not
obey him. This quickly became total defiance of government,
the Vailala natives threatening that if the 'Government'
came they would remove his clothes and send him back naked
to Kerema. The patrol offioer reacted by calling a meeting
of villagers, at which he told them that they were thousands
of years behind the rest of the world, and that in forcing
them to plant cooonuts the Administration was only anxious
that they should oatoh up. He then marked out areas for two
Native Plantations. The native owners of the land, however,
refused to part with it, whereupon the offioer, ignoring
their protests, ordered work to begin.
Even though the land is not yet purchased, decided 
to commence work on it, otherwise the people will be scoring a victory over us, and the effects of suoh a victory will be disastrous among the people of Orokolo.
The Government Secretary commented!
The natives of this Division are proving very diffi-lrv- 
oult to deal with. iU0
A similar situation arose in the Silo area, a few miles
east of Kerema. In July 1924 all the small villages under
the V.C. of Silo stated that they had no desire to make a
plantation? instead, they wanted to continue making copra
privately, implying a continuation of tax payments in oash.
The patrol offioer, however, 'informed them it was not what
they desired; it is their business to do as they are told'#
103) Kerema P.R. 9/1922-3, P.O. Lambden, Vailala, Nov. 1922. 
The a/Administrator, Judge Herbert, wrote 'Seen* on the report.
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He organized village plantation gangs and appointed 'boss- 
boys' to them#
The Government Seoretaiy appeared suddenly to realize the
implications - but his reaction is significant*
In the Gulf Division they seem to be making the natives start plantations whether they want to or 
not. I am telling the R.M. that the policy is to let them choose between paying tax in money and 
having a plantation. We will have no money if 
the natives are not allowed to choose#
Thus allowing natives any choice was diotated only by
a possible lack of funds or by administrative expediency*
The threat of compulsion, which Murray claimed ultimately to
be behind every administrative aot, was unmistakeably
prominent. W.R. Humphries concluded in 1944 that only
compulsion had kept the plantations scheme going.10®
104) Kerema P.R.l and 3/1924—5. Gov.Sec. memo, to Murray, dated 3T.8.24, attached. Murray approved, though insis­
ting that if the natives once started a plantation they 
had to stick to it. Ivan Champion, who accompanied P.O. Lambden to Silo, wrote in 1960 that the idea of the scheme was that 'natives could plant economic orops in lieu of paying tax'. T.P.N.G. Public Service Journal#
II, 1, p.3: Sir Hubert Murray of Papua.
105) H. Murray, Review of Australian Administration. 1907-20, p.33; W.R. Humphries, A Review of Native Plantations i?44. quoted J. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy. p,l74» 
Compulsion was even more neoessary later, when the price of copra fell from £17 to £5 a ton - see R. Firth,J.R.S.A.. 1953, p.806. In the Lakekamu area the 
Administration was trying to compel the planting of rice, but the natives preferred to raise tax from their own 
coconuts. Many nuts were allowed to rot, and Murray asked 
the R.M. whether, over and above the tax, he could suggest a way of compelling the natives to use the nuts. Humphries cogently pointedout that the natives earned about £4250 from oopra, of which £1000 was paid in tax; 
yet they had had nothing from the Native Tax Fund since its inception - see Kerema P.R. 6/1924-5: 24.9.24.
(For Humphries1 Review.. « « see ANGAU Conference, 194-4 - CP763* set 4-)
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The village constables became responsible for keeping 
the villagers up to the mark on tax payments and plantation 
work. This imposed a great strain on the village constables, 
though they generally continued to receive only 10/- p.a, as 
pay, plus an occasional unifoi®. Humphries pointed this out 
in 1923. Moreover, the more intelligent V.C.s pointed out to 
him that before the days of tax and plantations they had had 
to deal with only one official, the Magistratej now they had 
to deal with several officials. Humphries thought their 
duties in connection with rice-planting alone, in certain 
areas, worth more than 10/- p.a.10®
The exeoutlve responsibilities of the V.C. were advancing 
beyond the original conception of his functions? theoretically 
this could perhaps be justified, in that the plantations and 
tax both lay within his sphere of enforcement but the 
practical implication was that he beoame responsible for 
ensuring that people under his Jurisdiction met their 
obligations. Humphries thought this particularly difficult 
in the Gulfi
In some Divisions I know the V.C.s have an easy life, 
but their lot is not oast among a people who fight 
and quarrel on the slightest provocation and who are spirited or undisciplined enough to defy and oppose 
anything that does not meet with their approval.
106) Ibid.
107) Kerema P.R. 11/1925-6, Vailala East, July 1926. In 1925—6 in the Gulf 190 natives were oonvicted of fnot wanting to grow rice'. The number convicted the previous 
year was almost the same - Report 1926-7, p.38.
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(ix) Councillors: Their Appointment and Functions
In 1926 Murray announced that councillors were being
appointed generally throughout the Territory; but it was
some time before this was applied in the Gulf. In 1927 the
R.M. of the Delta Division stated that the idea had been
welcomed, though there had been no official appointments -
some villages had selected candidates for appointment. But
10 ftin the Gulf Division, councillors were not mentioned* In
view of the urgent need for consultation in the Gulf, one
would have thought the appointment of councillors imperative;
but the contemporary administrative mind did not work in this
way. Several factors probably inhibited a beginning: (i) the
continuing fear of combination in the Gulf villages, with
their notoreity for independence; (ii) apprehension about a
possible revival of the Madness under cover of councillors;
and (iii) the need firmly to impress government authority -
a continuation of the traditional 'submission' concept,
evident in the early 1920s,» Getting councillors was, in a
sense, a reward for co-operation*
The Gulf had an unenviable reputation for lawlessness;
but in 1927 H*M. Liston-Blyth reported a remarkable decline
in all offences, in those districts which had village
109constables and were regularly patrolled. This brought the 
prospect of councillors closer. Moreover, at this time the
108) Report 1926-7, p.20; Report 1927-8, p*33.
109) Report 1928-8, p.33.
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local officers were promoting a revival of custom to try 
to regenerate stability, despite Murray's malediction on 
artificially supporting tradition. The appointment of 
councillors could again give the older men status.110
In fact, the Gulf natives began requesting councillors 
before the Administration promoted the idea in the Division.
In January 1927 A.R.M. Thompson appointed the heads of the 
eravos at Moviavi to be councillors, at the request of the two 
V.C.s. 'and told them that they were to help the Village 
constables in their work'. This was precisely the wrong 
attitude towards the functions of councillors which Murray
111had deprecated; but no oomment was expressed at Port Moresby.
The first official statement on the appointment of 
councillors in the Gulf gave the impression that the 
Administration had initially promoted the idea at Toaripi in
110) Kerema P.H. 9/1925-6, fi.M. Humphries, Orokolo, April 1926. He told the assembled natives that their fathers' customs should be preserved, and awarded a prize of 6/- 
for the best headdress. The R.M. Gulf reported the re- ereotion of some eravos - Report 1927-8, p.36. The major 
difficulty was still the attitude of the L.M.S., because 
the rebuilding of the eravos implied the revival of 
initiation oeremonies. finally in May 1927 A.R.M. Thompson won over Moir-Smith to the idea - Kerema P.R. 
8/1926-7, 21.5.27. The traders, however, were also 
opposed, beoause they feared a revival of traditional articles of wealth, to the detriment of that regard for cash which they had sedulously encouraged - Kerema P.R. 
3/1927-8, Nov. 1927.
111) Kerema P.R. 4/1926-7, 19.1.27. Another reason for a lack of interest in councillors here may have been that 
government attention was strongly oriented towards the 
frontier. Humphries' patrol in Dec. 1926 to the head­
waters of the Vailala drew a great deal of oomment - Kerema P.R. 3/1926-7.
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IIPMoviavi had asked for councillors twelve months before.
The failure to promote the system in the Gulf was
important, because it was known to many returning labourers
that much more progrees had been made in other areas of the
Territory which were more severely segmented and whose peoples
113had shown less economic activity# Attempts to work with 
or through councillors were more half-hearted and short-lived 
than almost anywhere else in the Territory# Up to about the 
middle of 1931 the appointment of councillors and occasional 
consultation with them seems to have gone ahead; but after 
that time there would appear to have been an almost total 
relapse, in the Gulf, to direot administration#
The first oouncillors were officially appointed at 
Tavafuru, east of Kerema, in November 1928# No system of 
appointment had been defined, and little is disoemible from 
the descriptions given. Councillors were generally elderly 
men nominated by the villagers at a mass meeting, and were 
usually taken by officers to be ravi amua. At most villages 
(e#g. Iokea, Blaru) eaoh councillor represented about 100 
people; but at Moviavi there were twice as many councillors#
112) Report 1928-9, p#24. The idea was brought before the Toaripi first, the report claimed, because they were 
further advanced than the natives west of Kerema (who 
were said to be indifferent towards everything), and 
more anxious to improve their conditions#
113) The energy and initiative of the Moviavi-Toaripi peoples 
had been officially noted in 1922 - see Report 1922-3, 
p. 46#
1927-8, there being no admission that the neighbouring
There ie little indication that the A.R.M. had any clear 
intention of consulting with them, though he thought that 
they might be useful in land disputes, and he instructed the 
Lese councillors to meet those of Motumotu to determine their 
boundaries on the Lakekamu sago lands.114
West of Kerema some councillors were appointed in March
1929, but the R.M. noted that their appointment was not being
rushed, only those actually requested being appointed (seven
villages made such a request). In other words, the local
Administration was not actively promoting the system. At
Arihava, with an estimated population of 1500, thirteen
councillors were appointed; Murray objected that this seemed
excessive, but made no attempt to define selection methods,
The local officer noted vaguely that ’they appear to be the
right type of man1.11® Wherever councillors were appointed,
they were given a talk on their duties, with the emphasis on
encouraging their people to tend their coconuts and make 
116copra.
Meanwhile, on their own initiative the Moviavi people, 
having more than twenty councillors and dual village cohesion,
114) Kerema P.R. 4/1928-9, A.R.M. Lambden, Nov. 1928« entries 
especially of 17.11.28, 26.11.28. At Moviavi both ravi amua may have been appointed, with only one amua else­where .
115) Kerema P.R. 8/1928-9, March 1929 , Murray's comment attached* The R.M. urged the councillors to get their people to maka copra, but noted that they seemed 
interested only in sago - clearly for the Hirl exchange - 
and sold their nuts to European traders for a little tobacco*
116) e.g. Kerema P.R. 10/1928-9, Koaru, May 1929.
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were organizing •counoil * meetings) for in June 1929 they
aeked the R.M. to appoint a native literate in the local
vernacular as olerk to the oounoil. The R.M. complied,
impressing on the man that he was not a councillor but was
only to record prooeedings and to write letters on behalf of
117the council to the government station. This was an 
exoeptional development! and seems to have been confined to 
Moviavi.
There seems little doubt from the evidence that, from the
local Administration standpoint, the appointment of
councillors had the sole object of propaganda, and particularly
of increasing copra production. This was the theme of every
coastal patrol in the period 1929-31) by 1931 the price of
copra had fallen so low that it was hardly an inducement to
higher production. This insistence on oopra production and
tax collection may have been a factor in the breaking up of
villages into sub-clan sections (each now with its councillor)
118which took to the bush or the swamps to live.
Murray was undoubtedly sincere in his original desire to 
promote consultation with the oounolllors) but, at the 
divisional level, linking their appointment with demands for 
tax and with other forms of compulsion was a major blunder.
As the struggle for money increased in 1930, the injunction 
not to harass the natives seems to have been forgotten.
117) Keréma P.R. 11/1928-9, R.M. Oldham, June 1929.
118) Kerema P.R. 3A930-1, Kukipi, Oot. 1930.
1G9
Acting R.M. Lambden noted that the Kerema Bay villages 
could not hope to raise more than £400 altogether, In copra 
production, labourers1 wages, sales of sago and Family Bonuses. 
Of this they were expected to pay £348 in tax. Despite 
Lambden's protests, he was forced Into the position of 
threatening to sentence 234 defaulters, sending them In 
batches to gaols throughout the Territory. The V.C.s and 
councillors were to be used as levers, reporting to him those 
natives who were not making a detezmlned effort to raise 
their tax.11^
Inevitably, under these circumstances, and as the prices 
of crops oontinued to slump, native resistance hardaned.
This rebounded on the village constables and councillors, 
who were held partly responsible. R.M. Dick noted In March 
1931 that he was not favourably impressed by the councillors, 
who appeared to him to lack 'influence1 because the people 
ignored their injunctions. The natives themselves were
119) Kerema P.R. 6/1930-1, Deo. 1930. The Family Bonuses were 
already paid out of the Native Tax Fund. The Government Secretary justified these actions by the remarkable argument (with which Murray agreed) that the money the 
natives raised oould not be called 'income', as without 
the tax they would not bother to produce any copra at all. For this reason Murray specifically commended compulsion. 
Comments attached P.R. P.O. Hides noted, as Humphries 
had earlier, that the natives west of Kerema, who paid about £1400 p.a.4 eeemed to get nothing from the N.T.
Fund - Kerema P.R. 5/1930-1, Vailala.
categorised as •unwilling*
(x) Assessors. Informal Councils and Direct Administration
In this atmosphere, the further step of using councillors
as assessors was not greeted enthusiastically by divisional
staff| though Murray noted that everything depended on the
1 «1attitudes of the Resident Magistrates, The simultaneous 
policy of compulsion threatened this experiment from the 
beginnings the Gulf natives, like the Mekeo, were notoriously 
unamenable to *direct* treatment. Nevertheless, in April 1931, 
east of Kerema, the R.M. had councillors present at all 
sittings of the Court for Native Matters, but stated that he 
found the language barrier insurmountable* Moreover, with all 
his other burdens he had to ’rush through oasee as quiokly as 
possible*, so that no time was available for educating
1  opassessors in their functions.
Further spasmodic attempts were made to use assessors, 
particularly by A. R.M. Lambden, who showed more interest in
12 ;
trying to make the system work than most of the other officers.
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120) Kerema P.R. 9A930-1, west of Kerema, March 1931. By this time both natives and offiosrs were beooming anta­gonistic to the Copra scheme, though for different reasons. The natives stated bluntly that they did not 
wish to make copra; in order to promote it of£Lcers were forced to supply bags and to arrange shipment and remission of profit to the producers - they complained 
that this left no time for administration.
121) Report 1931-2, p. 20.
122) Kerema P.R. 11/1930-1. Between 17 March and 13 April, 14 
sittings of the C.N.M. were held and 114 oases dealt 
with, in addition to census-taking and work eonneoted 
with the copra scheme.
123) Kerema P.R. 13/1930-1, June 1931. At Motumotu the Uritai •senior* councillors sat as assessors, and the V.C.s presented the oases - no other details given.
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A.R.M. Horan used councillors as assessors in numerous
instances west of Kerema, but he found them 'of little use,
124excepting in giving information regarding native custom'.
The institution of the councillor itself eeems gradually
to have suffered a similar fate» though Lambden organized
large and ambitious meetings in the first half of 1931. At
Karama 39 councillors representing 21 villages with a
population of 3350 assembled; and at Moviavi 59 councillors
representing 13 villages with a population of 4448 attended.
After thirty years of polioe rule, however, Lambden expected
too much of them. He explained to the assembled councillors
that the meetings were held to allow them to plaoe before
government any matter v&ioh might be troubling them, but every
councillor assured him that he had nothing to say. 'This rather
1P5squashed the whole proceedings'.
For more than two hours the meeting then turned into a 
propaganda lecture, with Lambden explaining the Native Tax 
Fund, the Native Regulations, better gardening and oopra 
production. He had only two questions, asking when the govern­
ment was going to pay councillors and to issue them with 
uniforms.
Lambden had a similar laok of response at group meetings 
of oounoillore elsewhere along the coast. The councillors
124) Kerema P.R. 7/1931-2, A.R.M. Horan, July 1932.
125) Kerema P.R. ll/1930-l, east of Kerema, Mar-Apr. 1931.
126) Ibid.
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raised or diseussed nothing, simply agreeing solemnly with 
whatever the A.R.M* said. Clearly they had beeome inured to 
other methods, a difficulty which Murray also found in Port 
Moresby and which he interpreted as an attachment» by the
127natives, to the principle of direct rule*
Councillors had in fact already been used as agents of 
compulsion in the promotion of government policy. Murray 
found it hard to appreciate the reasons *fay government propa­
ganda in the early 1930s was apparently falling on deaf ears, 
and why the natives did not react to the argument that tax, 
copra production, and so on, were being enforced for their 
benefit.128
A vicious circle was created, for *hen officers found
councillors unreceptive they reverted quickly to direct 
129rule* After Lambde^s abortive but short-lived attempts 
to promote discussion, the whole concept of consultation with 
councillors seeme to have lapsed, and in praotice they became 
subordinate but unpaid village officials. To take one 
example, in the same area, in September 1933, R.M. Zimmer
127) Kerema P.R. 13/1930-1, June 1931; H. Murray, Indirect Rule in Papua. A.A.A.S., 128, p.333.
128) Report 1933-4, pp. 23-4. This promoted Murray to 
speculate whether perhaps the natives were unintelligent*
129) Murray wrote to the Gov. Sec., 29.4.1929 (CPI. V. 16/42) again insisting that councillors were not to be treated 
as assistant V.C.s
instructed the V.C. and councillors of Popo Tillage to see 
that their people followed a number of injunctions. 1 3 0
This appears to have been the pattern of administration 
until the war#
130) Kerema P.fi. 2/1933-4, Sept, 1933. Similar instructions were issued to V.C.s and councillors the following 
year. Kerema P.R. 10/1933-4, May 1934«
CHAPTER III 
POLICY AND PRACTICE« 1888-1942
II. Eastern Papua: Mission Pressure towards Delegation«
(i) Social Background
By 'Eastern Papua9 is meant the coast from Cape Rodney 
to Cape Nelson, together with such inland areas behind the 
coast as were administered before World War II (the Eastern 
Division), together with all the eastern islands nhich 
constituted the South-Eastern Division«
By the time systematic ethnography began in eastern Papua, 
considerable culture change was already under way« Chalmers 
and the L«M«S« had been busy appointing native or South Sea 
teachers on the mainland coast, and in the early 1880s labour 
recruiters were active in the Loulsiade Archipelago and in 
Milne Bay: a native teacher of the L«M«S. in Milne Bay 
testified and interpreted at the Royal Commission provoked by 
the notorious cruise of the 'Hopeful* in 1884.1
The Mailu, notable as the subjects of Malinowski's first 
fieldwork, occupy the coastal areas from Cape Rodney in the 
west to the middle of Orangerie Bay in the east« Saville 
states that on Mailu island there were four patrilineal, 
patrilocal clans, each of which had as leader one man 
possessing more authority than his fellows, recognizable by
1) Queensland V« & P. 1885, II, pp. 797-988.
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2his bearing and ornaments* In the old days the Mallu said 
that they had had chiefs (vere)» who had been hereditary; 
but these had died out* It would appear from the Initiation 
carried out on some of the elders living in Savi lie's time
Sthat these chiefs had died out only a generation or two before* 
As far as any authority was exercised in an institutionalised 
way, it was done through clan councils consisting of the clan 
head and the sub-clan headmen» usually the oldest male member* 
This council dealt with all important clan affairs, especially
4the main focus of social activity, the feaet. Such joint 
authority of the elders was quite limited, however. In the 
1920s they could not even induce the younger people to
gmoderate their noise in the villages at night*
Little information is available on the authority systems
of the inland peoples; but the Dlmuga had a clan dubu system,
6and the headmen appear to have been readily distinguishable* 
Further east, grouped around Milne Bay and its enclosing
2) W.J*V* Saville, In Unknown New Guinea* p. 34. The Mallu, ae distinct from the ¿outhem Massim further east, lived in 
villages which were the real socio-political units - see
B* Malinowski, The Natives of Mallu* Trans* Royal Soc*South Aust*, XXOi, 1915, p*5l6T
3) Ibid., pp. 104-10.
4) Ibid., pp. 35-7.
5) Ibid., p.77. Malinowski said that the clan headman 
commanded a certain amount of respect; but his position 
was far from clear or well-defined - probably only the most influential amongst the headmen of the sub—clans - 
loc.cit., p.519.
6) Ibid., pp. 299-302*
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capes, are the peoples classified by Seligmann as the 
Southern Massim. One of their distinguishing features is 
their matrilineal descent and matrilocal marriage* 
Traditionally, and indeed, in the 1890s , they lived in small 
scattered hamlets rather than villages! these were tenuously 
linked by dispersed clans and by local, sometimes temporary,
7
alliances* Neither in Milne Bay nor in Tubetube were there 
any big chiefs, or even clan chiefs in any executive sense* 
Certain men were recognized as important because of four 
factors: their wealth or leadership in feasts; their age;
Q
their knowledge of magic; their special skills*
In Bartle Bay, however, near the headquarter® of the 
Anglican mission, Seligmann recognized headmen or chiefs who 
possessed 9 a considerable amount of influence and authority9. 
Besides these chiefs (gulau)* there were experts, particularly 
in garden magic, called taniwaga. The two of floes of gulau 
8111(3 taniwaga were often united in the one person, the offices 
passing to a brother or to a sister's son* Age plus wealth 
were thought to be two main factors in deciding a gulau9a 
position of authority* At Yauyau, an inland community, 
Seligmann noted that the gulau was set apart and deferred to
7) Saville, ibid., p.28; Seligmann, op.cit*, pp.453-6; C.W* 
Abel to Wardlaw Thompson, 29,10*1891* L.M.S* letter No* 
5979: 9The country here is thickly populated but the 
natives live almost like settlers* Villages with from two 
to twelve houses are the general rule9* Also see C*S* 
Belshaw, In Search of Wealth* A*A*A* Memoirs, No*80, p*14; 
South Pacific, Aug* 1951, p,104*
8) Seligmann, ibid, ' ,
g
markedly, even by the taniwaga.
The natives of the northern d’Entrecasteaux had a pattern 
of habitation even more fragmented than that of the Southern 
Massim, The basis of social organisation was the family» 
consisting of a man and his wife and descendants; each hamlet 
then comprised a number of closely related families. These 
hamlets, in 1911, had little permanence because of migration. 
Local interests brought hamlets of a district together. There 
was no central authority. Each hamlet had a kauvea, or 
headman, who in pre-European times used to have a knowledge 
of incantations and led in war; but in 1911 his authority was 
negligible. The usual sanctions of Melanesia had been Imposed 
on wrongdoers according to the consensus of opinion; social 
ostracism, direct retaliation, and magic. When In 1911 a man 
of one hamlet raped a woman of another, at Mud Bay, where the 
Methodist mission had established itself in 1898, the men of 
the woman's hamlet debated whether to retaliate directly or 
to wait for the magistrate: eventually they waited, though 
realizing that he might not come for six or twelve months. 
Meanwhile the offender escaped to the hills
Some Islands of the Louislade Archipelago appear to have
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9) Ibid,, pp, 456-8, It is notable that the Milne Bay people 
now claim to have had guyau and taniwaga. In pre-European 
times these men are said to have played a prominent part 
in warfare, the taniwaga being the local clan head,
10) D. Jenness and A, Ballantyne, The Northern d'Entrecasteaux, 
pp. 37-9, 42, 63, 76-80, 131-2. iftiis was the only mission 
station in the northern d fEntrecasteaux.
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had leaders with considerable authority. As late as 1908 the
natives on Eossel were said to regard their principal chief
as fa person of unlimited power*.11 The natives of Sudest
told the H.M. in 1911 that before a chief built a new house
i©
someone used to be killed and buried under it. On these
outlying islands which were difficult to patrol the old
’fighting chiefs' retained some of their authority into the
1 3
early years of the century.
(ii) Administrative Influence of the Missions
The missions have played a particularly important part in 
the administrative development of eastern Papua. The L.M.S* 
by the 1890s was already active along the coast as far as 
East Cape. In 1891 the Anglican miss ion began work on the 
north-east coast; and in 1890 the Bev. George Brown of the 
Methodist mission visited the Islands. The Methodists began 
work at Dobu in 1891.14
The most influential of these missions, both directly and 
indirectly» was that branch of the L.M.S. which beoame the 
Kwato Extension Association after the first World War. This
11) Kulumadau P.R., 18.9.08; 27.11.11 ( 5 2 7 A 9 H ) l  Papua Report, 
1908-9, p.104. W.E. Armstrong (Rossel Island, pp.185-8) 
was uncertain on chieftainshipy believing status to depend 
on the clan» on qualified succession within the clan, on 
locality and other factors. Murray believed that there 
was one head chief for the island (Report 1907-8, pp.14-16; 
Diary, 2.4.1908 - Mitchell A. 3139, Vol. 2).
12) Kulumadau P.R. 5 2 7 A & U *  27.11.11.
13) See the case of Boiamai (Murua) who killed natives of 
another village in retaliation for the death of his 
daughter. Nivani Station J . , 1-2 July, 1901.
14) Autobiography of Rev. G. Brown, p.483; Report 1893-4; 
p.xxvii.
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was founded by Charles Abel and P.W. Walker on a small island
near Samarai, in 1891* From the beginning it had an apocalyptic
15
fervour. Abel and Walker developed the idea of training
native leaders, both men and women, in Christian surroundings
at the mission station, at the same time teaching then; trades 
16
and crafts. Prom this developed the idea of mission-sponsored
industries, such as copra making and boat building, which was
17
put to the District Committee meeting of 1903# Although the 
idea generally won the field in Papua, the London directors 
of the L.M.S. remained unenthusiset ic, and in 1916 they began 
to clamp down on the mission plantations. Abel in 1919 then 
formed the separate Kwato Extension Association, which relied 
on American subscriptions and on its own industrial efforts.18
In effect, by keeping boys and girls at the mission station 
for periods of ten or fifteen years, Kwato produced a Tillage 
elite, which gave the mission deep and pervasive influence.
This influence increased after 1927, when Cecil Abel brought 
back the teachings of the Oxford Group movement from England.
15) Abel to Wardlaw Thompson, 30.8.1891. No. 5964, L.M.S. 
letters« ’Walker and I are together and are simply going 
to set this end on fire*.
16) G. Currie Martin, The New Guinea Mission (1908), p.88.
17) R. Abel, C.W. Abel of Kwato. p.104.
18) N. Goodall. The History of the London Missionary Society.
pp. 430-1. GoodalT  T i'ates .! ! > . 'gohlenkeF'Tlrsf 'Triiro-
duced the 'settlement principle* into the Papuan Mission. 
See New Guinea Tidings. Vol.l, No.l, Oct. 1923 giving an 
outline o£ Kwaio*s odjects - skilled work, plus evange­
lization on New Testament principles, to stop the natives 
losing interest in life.
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There followed orusades of personal surrender to God,
particularly by native leaders* 'In 1931 revival that was
1 9
more akin to revolution swept the Kwato district*# By 1937
Kwato had built up a field of concentrated influence from Cape
Eodney to N.W. Milne Bay, extending inland as far as Mts*
Brown and Suckling#^
When Abel and Wialker first arrived in the east end in 1891,
however, the hold of the mission had been tenuous - as, indeed,
was that of the government# Abel blamed the fact that
teachers had been left too much to themselves# The faults of
the system at that time paralleled those which the
Administration faced with the village constables#
The case of Iakobo at Teste Is# was a conspicuous 
instance# This man was left for long intervals and 
then the "Harrier" would go and stay perhaps twelve 
or twenty-four hours and leave again, not returning 
probably for five or six months. The result was he 
was thrown into the hands of the traders and 
completely lost his character as a missionary#
Nevertheless, despite its unevenness, mission influence
was generally in advance of the government in eastern Papua*
In 1903 H#M* Campbell complained of the 'excessive influence'
which the teachers had exerted up to that time; and this had
indeed occasionally had undesirable eonsequenoes - for example,
19) Kwato Mission Tidings, Jan* 1936, p.3j Jan. 1938, p#3; 
July 1940, p.6. An adcount of Kwato work appeared in 
Drums of Peace# 0#U.P#, 1936. CPI V. 16/I4/48*
20) Ibid., June 1937, attached map) also account by R# Abel 
of work amongst natives behind Duramu, 13.7.36. CPI 7# 
16/14/45; for an account of inland methods and influence 
see P.E.Williams, Mission Influence Among the Keverl of 
S*E. Papua# Oceania* xV# £« 1^44, pp. 111-42.
21) C.W.Abel to Wardlaw Thompson, 29.10#1891. L.M.S. letters
No. 5979.
181
the cult movement in Milne Bay in 1893, when a 'prophetf 
named Tokerua stated that he was the new government, and 
ordered the Gabagabuna natives to kill their pigs and move 
inland*^
Campbell had continually to remonstrate with the village
constables for confusing offences against the moral code with
those against the law:
One can always be sure that a case of adultery w i l l ™  
be reported before a case of murder or robbery.
He noted that with only one exception had a village
constable been appointed to an area where there was not already
a mission teacher, no matter how large the populations not
served by the missions*
It seems to have been the rule that the V.C. follows 
the native teacher, not as it should be, the teacher 
following the constable and law and order* I am 
about to appoint a number of constables to new districts*
A contest thus developed at the village level between the
mission and the government* Because of Kwato's 'settlement
principle*, its teachers were not isolated in the villages,
22) ’One or two other cases were reported at Samarai, but 
the aocused were gaoled'. Report 1894-6, p*71; also 
E.W.P* Chinnery and A*C. Haddon, Five Hew Religious Cults 
in British New Guinea* Hibbert Journal* XV, 1917, pp*458- 
¿d* ihere was a similar cult on $ergusson Is. in 1905 - 
see Samarai Stat* J*, 9*12*05, Bergussi.
23) Samarai Stat. J., Jan.1903* In 1899 there were only 34 
V*C*s in the whole Eastern Division, which at that time 
extended to the German border. Report 1899-1900, p.83*
I»e Hunte had commented on the inadequacy of staff , con­
cluding that settled natives would have to be allowed to 
settle others — Report 1898-9, p. xxii*
24) Samarai Stat* J*, Jan* 1903*
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but formed part of a small, partly dissociated, elite* Their
influence was therefore particularly strong* This led to
frequent friction with government* In 1903 the A.H.M*
accused the Milne Bay teachers of Kwato of 'trying to hold
25
the natives aloof from the government'• Later the Kwato 
representative in Milne Bay was accused by the Administration 
of attempting to create native resistance to the alienation 
of land, at a time when there were excellent prospects of 
establishing a European plantation Industry in the Bay* In 
1911, when Abel was beginning his mission plantations, a Kwato 
teacher in the Bay was circulating letters advising the natives
0 7
not to part with land to the government*
Then in 1919 the A*H*M* accused Kwato teachers in Milne 
Bay of having deliberately obstructed oensus-taking, although
no
the Anglican teachers on the N.E* coast had been helpful*
In the 1930s, as Kwato's person conversion campaign got under 
way, there were alarming signs of tension in the societies 
under its influence: a minor cargo cult developed in Milne
25) Report, A.R.M*, Jan* 1903 - Stat* J*
26) Again, there were cult elements here* The teacher told 
the natives to kill all their pigs, as Europeans were 
going to take all their land - Samarai Stat* J*, Oct*
1907*
27) P.R., E*D. file 38, 24*8*1911, R.M* Henderson; R* Abel, 
op.cit., p.134* The mission's plantations were co­
operative, each man contributing a piece of land. It ±m 
clear (Samarai P*R* 16/1921-2, May 1922, A*R*M* Vivian) 
that alienation was excessive in Milne Bay* It left an 
unfortunate legacy of suspicion*
28) Samarai P.R. 13/1918-9, March 1919*
forbidden by Kwato to pay tax, make feasts, or sell pigs,
and in the inland areas behind Abau natives sought to join
the Constabulary in order to escape what they Interpreted
30
as outright mission proscriptions on custom.
Although Sir Hubert Murray generally approved of Kwato* s
31
industrial and educational policies » local officers appear 
to have relied less on this mission than on the others. There 
were cases on the N.E* coast of officers seeking the advice
of Anglican missionaries on the appointment of village
32
constables ; and the sons of the L*M*S* missionary at Fife
Bay, Rev. C.F. Rich, became patrol officers in the 
33
Administration* The influence of Kwato continued however, 
to be an important» not to say a predominant, feature of 
administration in the district*
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29
Bay » natives told the government officers that they were
29) Samara! P.fi. 7A931-2, 24.2.1932.
30) Samarai P.fi. 10/1931-2, 3/1932-3. The trouble behind Abau 
may have been caused» as Abel claimed» by the intrusion 
of the Seventh Day Adventist mission» which began work in 
the Marshall Lagoon area in November 1928 (Abau P.R. 7/ 
1928-9). See Abau P.R. 3/1936-7» R. Abel denied Kwato 
proscriptions on custom (to Gov.Sec* 4.10.37, 11*1*37*
CPI V. 16/14/51) | but the Seventh Day Adventists had 
sought government action against custom, unsuccessfully 
(see Sir H* Murray to S.D.A., 9.2.1933, 16/14/41). Abel 
said that 'when an individual has experienced conversion 
he then may do away with things he finds incompatible with 
his new outlook9* There is a graphic description of 
'conversion1, by Phyllis Abel, in R* Abel, op*cit*, pp.244-
31) R* Abel, op.cit.. pp.181-2. Also see Ch. V, 2. Williaas 
(loc.cit*, p.128; regretted Kwato's 'resolute blotting 
out of the past9*
32) Samarai P.R. Nov.1912/1341: Kuga? P.R. 14/1920-1: Wedau.
154
In many respects the extension and consolidation of
government influence followed a pattern similar to that in
other districts* John Green noted in Cloudy Bay in 1894 that
the Domara (Mailu), who had already obeyed the government
injunction to stop fighting, were in a difficult position
when attacked by inland peoples who eared nothing for the 
34
government. The R.M. wrote of the country behind Table Bay
in 1908*
The maintenance of order on the extreme limit of 
Government influence is always a difficult problem*
To adequately protect the partly civilized and peace­
ful native against the incursions of his savage neigh­
bours on the other side of the border would require a 
permanent garrison of many thousands of police; he is 
unwilling and often unable to protect himself, for he 
has been told that if he fights "the Government"
(which he seems to look upon as some ferocious creature 
of supernatural strength and cunning) "will be wild"... 35
In these areas the Administration inevitably had to try to 
use the influence of the native leaders. Thus, we find the 
chiefs being instructed to stop 'pay-back* murders and inter­
tribal quarrels in the country behind Abau, even in areas 
where villages had a V.C* The repercussions of the period 
of resistance to government could be difficult both for the 
native leaders - leaders in war traditionally - and for the 
government. At the village of Bam, inland of Cloudy Bay, an
34) Cloudy Bay J., Oct. 1894. 7/94.
35) Report 1908-9, p.20.
36) Abau P.R. 407A2, 5.11.1912.
(iii) Pacification, Consolidation and Native Officials
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which resisted the government; he was personally responsible
for the murder of an A .C. In January 1914 he was captured
37
and sentenced* By 1918, however, he had returned to his 
village, idle re his influence appeared undiminished, and was 
unofficially exercising the powers of a village constable*
The A.R.H. unsuccessfully recommended his official appointment* 
He was again recommended in 1921 when the A.R.M*, who knew 
his record, stated that he seemed energetic and that there
•JjQ
had been nothing against him since his return from gaol. 
Although Murray had written that chiefs, where they were 
existed, were given priority for appointment as village 
constables, in a ease suoh as this he felt that appointing 
Aiva would be going a little too far.**5
The problem then was to find a man who could serve as 
V.C. In 1922 a native named Bom was appointed* He served 
the government excellently, but was quickly at loggerheads 
with his own villagers and with neighbouring peoples, whom 
he reported to the government. Bom had in fact been away from 
the area too long and become too •civilized*• A V*C. who 
served the government too assiduously could not hope to keep 
the co-operation of his own people* Bom had spent six years 
in government service at Samarai, so that it was said on his 
appointment s
influential native named Alva had been head of a faction
37) Abau P.R. 24/14, 11.2.1914.
38) Abau P.R. 5/1919, 30.8.1918.
39) Abau P.R. 10A920-1.
He has improved and bene fit ted to a remarkable 
extent by his stay there» so much so that he seems 
to be out of place with his own people. It is 
noticeable in many ways: his thoughts, manners, 
and speech alike are quite different*
This proved his downfall* Clearly, Aiva's influence proved
too powerful; by 1923 he was again running the village, and
maintaining it to the governmentfs satisfaction, without
official responsibility*42
Conversely, influential men were sometimes found who
could not be induced to become village constables* Like the
African headman, but at the village level, the V*C, was at
the crossroads of two cultures and was therefore subject to
43
role conflict. Sir Hubert Murray recognized clearly that 
44
this was so* There was a notable example of this at Bahuni 
(Mullins Harbour): in 1911 the R.M. noted that the V.C* was 
'a most useless individual * but said that It was impossible 
to get anyone better*4® By 1923 the situation was still the 
same*46 Similarly, at Teste Island an ex-A.C* who had been 
unofficially acting as V.C* refused official appointment
47
because *it would interfere with his sailing about the islands*
41) Abau P.R. 2/1922-3, Hov* 1922*
42) Abau P.R. 4A923-4, 31*10*23; 1A925-6» 11*8*25*
43) Cf* comments of M.Gluckman introducing a symposium on the 
African headman» Africa, 1949» XIX, 2*
44) J.H*P* Murray, op*cit*, p.244*
45) Samara! Stat. J*, 18*11*1911*
46) Samarai P.R. 8A922-3, 2*1.1923*
47) Samarai P.R* 22/1926-7, 16*6*27*
As these men were paid only 10/- per annum and given an
occasional uniform, and as their duties steadily increased -
especially with added labour and plantation responsibilities
in this Division in the 1920s - men who wanted to accumulate
wealth, popularity, and influence in the traditional manner
48
naturally eschewed appointment#
Where a chief or headman was prepared to become a V.C.,
he needed exceptional intelligence or considerable ingenuity
to strike a balance between the demands of government and of
his own people. The qualities needed in such a situation were
often beyond or differed from those needed in a traditional
leader. Amongst the Dimuga, for example, the son of notable
chief was described as intelligent and energetic, with a good
deal of influence, and he was recommended as a village 
49
constable. * But in 1920 another officer described ihis man, 
Aubi'a, as *a hopeless sort of person, tut probably the best 
available being the son of the chief* In an effort to get 
the Dimuga to consolidate their scattered settlements, the 
patrol officer consulted directly with the old chief.
Humphries later agreed with this assessment of Aubl*a, 
remarking that although the old chief* s authority was un~
48) The plantations were officially begun in 1921-2 in this 
Division. H«M* Iyons, who had first experimented in the 
West, had been transferred to the East - see Abau P.R. 
5/1921-2, March 1922; Bwagoia P.R. 3/1921-2, Oct. 1921.
49) Abau P.R. 5/191?.
50) Abau P.R. 8 2 0 - 1 .
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questioned in the Tillage, hie son waB ’a characterless
dwarf, who will lack influence among the people after his
51
father has gone*. It was then necessary for the Administ­
ration to look for a man with more satisfactory qualifications« 
This generally meant eTaluation by administratiTe criteria» 
even in areas such as Dimuga relatively untouched by alien ways* 
A number of other factors predisposed the Administration 
against the appointment of traditional leaders« The two most 
prominent of these, were polygamy and sorcery. Confusion on 
the question of polygas^ was just as great in Eastern Papua 
as in other parts of the Territory. In 1905 R.M. Campbell 
stated bluntly that fI have always made it a rule that no V.C«
g o
is to have more than one wife*. In fact, the practice on 
this point continued to be quite arbitrary and to vary with 
individual officers. In 1920 a patrol officer ordered a V«C.
51) Abau P.B. 4/1921-2« The difficulties of appointed
officials had early not been appreciated» especially in 
the South-East Division where, in 1899, the H.M« Saw the 
problem as simply one of enhancing the authority of men 
who already had a little authority (Report 1899-1900, 
p«86)« Some V«C.s relied heavily on government support; 
e.g. the V.C. of Madara village, Murua» in 1913 attributed 
the dirty state of his village to the people's dis­
inclination to listen to his orders. On his information 
11 natives were gaoled (Kulumadau 108/1913» 1.11.1913). 
What happened to such men between government visits can 
only be conjectured. Visits particularly in the S«E«were 
notoriously infrequent and hurried. A .R.M. Symons found 
a V.C. on Misima in 1913 who had not seen an officer 
since 1907 (Kulu. 108/1913» 6.5.13). Calculations show 
that in 1907 the R.M. travelled an average of 22 miles and 
visited 7.4 villages per patrol day (Report 1907-8» p«46). 
As late as 1930 the V.C.s on Misima were said to have no
52) Samarai Stat« <J«» 31« 3.05.
on Perguaeon island, who had six wives (clearly a man of
substance and influence), to 'get rid of all but one'. On
the other hand, Topio of south Goodenough, who was said to be
the most influential and efficient V.C. in the d'Entreoasteaux,
54
had five wives at the time of his death*
The question of polygamy really came to the fore in the
1920s, when it was debated by Murray and Pitt-Rivers.55
Although at this time there was a swing to a <n asi-traditional
bias in the Administration, polioy on the point was not
definite. Pitt-Rivers was clearly right in most instances in
the contention that the proscription on more than one wife
inhibited influential or ambitious men from becoming village
constables. The natives were confused on the pointt a
dismissed V.C. pointed in 1928 to several other V.C.s on
Normanby Island who had not less than three wives each. Yet
in 1929 on the N.E. coast, and in 1930 on the south coast -
to take only two instanoes - other village constables were
57
dismissed for having more than one wife. In that the rule 
was designed to protect the natives, the ban on polygamy 
represented a curious form of misguided paternalism.
In certain parts of eastern Papua the question of sorcery
53) Samarai P.R. 5/1920-1.
54) Samarai P.R. 3/1919-20; 13/1923-4.
55) Correspondence on CPI V. 16/32 - See Ch. II.
56) Samarai P.R. 1 0 2 7 - 8 .
57) Samarai P.R. 7/1928-9| 4/1930-1. The latter ooncerned 
the village of Dahuni (supra) where it had proved im­
possible for so long to get a satisfactory V.C.
189
190
on village officials. In 1903 the R.M* had welcomed the
raising of the penalty for sorcery to 1 years imprisonment
with hard labour, at a time when gaol as a training institution
58
was considered to solve most problems, ' Sorcery was
particularly rife at Dobu, where the Methodist mission had
its first station, and where two of the earliest ’rural
constables’ had been appointed to ’rouse the chief to his
59
work’. Fortune’s research in 1927-8, however, showed that 
sorcery was one of the foundations of the social system: great 
prestige attached to stealing and adultery, and the man who 
could get away with these activities was the one with a know­
ledge of the most potent forms of sorcery* 'It is assumed
throughout that social success is necessarily gained at the
60
expense of others’* Fortune was particularly worried, in
accordance with the tenets of his time, about destroying
customary sanctions? though Murray replied that the government
had to govern, and he ridiculed suggestions that it intended to
61
lock up all the sorcerers on Dobu.
Nevertheless, it was clear that, as the bases of Dobuan 
social life ran counter to those promoted by the /dministration,
58) Report 1903-4, p.24. Section 432 of the Criminal Code, 
promulgated on 1.7 »1903* The maximum had previously 
been 3 months*
59) Report 1893-4, p.46.
60) R. Fortune, Sorcerers of Dobu. pp.84.135: R. Benedict. 
Patterns of Culture'.' 'w.-'Sgg.
61) Murray to Sec,. Canberra, 24.5.28, CPI V. 16/41/5; 29.6.28, 
CPI Y. 16/41/12.
also raised unusual administrative difficulties in its bearing
had any native officials been conscientious they would have
been in an impossible position. They used their powers
according to social noras. Hence the confusion of the R.M.
in 1907 in dealing with a manslaughter case, when the V,C,
of Dobu was found to have intimidated witnesses in order to
secure a conviction, and the Crown witnesses to have lied
consistently - va regular plot to have an Innocent man
punished*. He commented, utterly mystified, that *the lying
proclivities of the community surrounding Dobu are beyond
description*. In praotioe, the cultural conceptions of the
Dobuans and of the Administration were so dissimilar that
only administrative inaction prevented frequent clashes*
Sorcery often reduced V.C.s to impotence as government agents
63
administering unpalatable laws.
The uncertain attitude by the Administration towards 
sorcerers, and towards village oonstables menaced by them, 
inter alia gave considerable scope for what was interpreted 
as extortion* Some officers took a sanguine view of 
extortioni for example in 1905 the V.C* of Boianai (north­
east Coast) was simply refused his allowance of tobaoco for 
attempting to 'blackmail' a married woman - coercion to
62) Samaral Stat. J#, 13,2*1907.
63) e.g. Abau P.R. 12/1920-1, V.C* Lo'o of Magori was 
extremely frightened, unable to oontrol natives under 
the sway of a sorcerer named Mama, Similarly Mapamoiwa 
2/1927-8, Busalewa, Good enough} and Samara! 13A&23-4, 
where the V.C. of Wagipa Is. had deserted to Goodenough.
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adultery was a particularly caramon failing of Y.O.s On
the other hand, where the comuunity seemed united in
opposition, a village constable attempting to extort was 
65
dismissed* Occasionally cases were reported of village
constables ’holding court*: one case of a trial for murder
at Gameta, Pergusson island, was revealed, but ten years
after it had taken place* The V.C., since dead, had fined
the offender 1 arms hell, 1 bagi, and 1 pig, in return for
66
which the murder was hushed up*
Apart from the practice of extortion and the straight- 
forward exercise of unofficial judicial functions, the Y.C* 
often tried to extend his powers into the sphere of custom*
This also offended the Administration, however* Y*C*s 
suffered official rebuke for such matters as punishing an
67
alleged sorceress on the advice of the rest of the community,
and for intervening in marriage disputes, even at the request
68
of one party. The lack of officially recognized customary 
jurisdiction remained a troublesome lacuna in Papua's 
administration*
64) Samarai Stat* J*, 3*4*05* Where a Y*C* had considerable 
authority, the Administration sometimes connived e.g* 
fíabi, Milne Bay, 19JS , where the Y*C* was gaoled for 2 
months for adultery, but retained his position because 
the councillors requested it and because he 'kept his 
people up to the mark1 (Samarai P.R. 2/1929—30).
65) e.g. Giligili, Milne Bay. Samarai Stat. J., 2.9.05.
66) Samarai P.S. 7/1925-6, 7.12.1925*
67) Samarai P.R. 12/1925—6. Awalama, 8.4.26*
68) Mapamoiwa P.R. 2/1930-1* Guleguleu, Normanby, 1.10.1930*
1S2
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which were aggravated in eastern Papua. Strong matrilineal
influence and occasional uxorilocal marriage amongst the
Southern Masslm meant that village constables sometimes went
to live elsewhere, a fact discovered months or even years
69
later by the Administration. Other peoples formed communities
that were constantly breaking up and re-foxmlng, which made
the task of a village constable, individually accountable to
the government for the whole community, extremely difficult.
Many of the Dobuans, for example, officially resided on Dobu,
70
gardened at Normanby, and maintained a food depot at Udulai.
Another problem was the pattern of habitation in scattered
hamlets instead of villages; particularly in the mountainous
d'Entrecasteaux this made supervision of the work of the V.C.»-
whioh in the absence of any foxm of council or superior
appointments was practicable only by official visits to
V I
each hamlet - virtually impossible. Policy was undefinedi 
attempts had spasmodically been made to compel or Induce 
natives to consolidate their settlement, and even to move
69) e.g. Milne Bay, Samaral P.E. 1913, 5.7.13; South Coast 
Samarai P.E, 11/1922-3. One V.C. on Normanby married 
and went to live at Dobu, returning to his own coasaunity 
only when a patrol was Imminent (Samaral P.E. 4/1922-3).
70) Samarai P.E. 2/1924-5.
71) Samarai P.E. 3/1924-5. Normanby. The hill villages had 
not been visited for three years. Only the coast peoples 
were paid the *Baby Bonus* from the Native Tax Fund. In 
effect, the Administration wanted to avoid this, by some 
form of uniform administration, but Without adequate 
institutional delegation.
There were other problems also with the village constables
194
close to roads* Some officers supported this, others 
rejected it«**
Village constables were sometimes appointed solely for 
the purpose of consolidating settlements; but, once con­
solidated, the settlements were open to recruiters and to
73
tax collectors, both disintegrating influences*
The pressures of recruiting, which many officers regarded
74
as excessive in eastern Papua , imposed added strains on the 
intra-clan and village authority patterns, and aggravated the 
y.C* *s problems further. In the 1920s and 1930s both the 
missions and the more perceptive officers became conscious
of the serious rift between the sophisticated younger
75
generation and the older men.' But the Impulse to compel,
for the natives* own benefit, remained predominant in the 
76
Administration. The selection of village constables, even
72) A.R.M. Vivian, Goodenough (Saaarai P.R. 3/1924-5, 18.12.24) 
rejected previous consolidating policy. A.R.M. Atkinson 
felt the policy should have been persisted with, as It 
assisted the work of the officer and native officials 
(8/1931-2); but about the same time in the S.E. Division 
R.M. Rentoul said that he would not persist with con­
solidation (Bwagola P.R. 3/1931-2) to the disgust of
P*0* Champion, who complained of the impracticability of 
contacting Rossel and Sudest natives (Bwagola P.R. 15/ 
1931-2); also see Report 1913-4, p.112: Murua.
73) Oiamamania (Farm Bay), South Coast, March 1925. Samaral 
P.R. 6/1924-5. A.R.M. Vivian.
74) Ibid. The young man not only became subject to outside 
influences, but at least for a time on their return, 
they were able to be economically independent and were 
often scornful of normal pressures and sanctions.
75) See Bishop H.Newton, Twenty-two Years After. (1930), type­
script, CPI V. 16/44, p.8.
76) J.H.P.Murray, Native Administration in Papua, p.10; Report 
1939-40, p.23; Report 1928-9, pp. 37, 39.
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after the introduction of councillors 9 therefore had to be 
made primarily dependent on their outside experience and on 
their ability to understand government instructions, rather 
than on any traditional standing or influence.
An analysis of V.C. records of service - the only ones
7 7
which have survived in reasonable order - from the South- 
Eastern Division for the 1920s and 1930s shows that of 32 V.C.s 
the major criteria for selection were 'general personality* (11), 
•intelligent or energetic* (13), and *speaks English' (11).
Only on three recommendations was it stated that the appointee 
was related to a chief; and on only another three was it 
stated that the appointee had the confidence of the people.
Seven of the men were stated to have previously had good 
records in government or private service. Ten out of the 
thirty-two were eventually dismissed for offences such as 
murder (4), or for laslness, Incompetence, or corruption - 
that is, 31#. Six of the remaining twenty-two had had un­
favourable reports, and only four of them had had definitely
77) It would appear that until 1919 no systematic, con­
solidated record of V.C.s was kept at each outstation.
In that year the R.M., S.E.D. was asked for comments on 
a projected Station Roll Book to be printed, to include 
details of all V.C.s in each Division, so that a new 
officer could make himself acquainted with them (G.S. to 
R.M. 1.10.1919. S.E.D. correspondence, file 16). During 
1916 •Registers9 had been issued to V.C.s showing 
personal details, so that officers on patrol could record 
comments and instructions (Kulumadau P.R. 6/1915-6).
The idea of the Registers had been originated by P.O. 
Jackson at Kokoda - see Murray *s diary (Mitchell A3139), 
2.1.1915. In Jan. 1922 A.R.M. Vivian was still com­
plaining of the lack of V.C. records in the Samarai office* 
•Mahomet must go to the mountain*, Samarai 11/1921-2* 
11.1.1922.
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favourable reports on their service, the remainder being 
78
inconclusive« The deficiencies of the V«C. system in the 
culture-contact situation were, therefore, many and obvious«
(iv) Mission Initiative towards Native Local Government
Direct administration on this elementary pattern through 
patrol officers and village constables was patently unsatis­
factory from both the Administration and the native viewpoints: 
in practice it amounted to wild fluctuations between complete 
independence of central control and complete subjection to 
the local officials« Lugard had noted this undesirable 
dichotomy in Africa, and had regarded his Native Authorities
79
as a means of reaching a flexible administrative compromise*
In eastern Papua the Anglican and L.M.S. missions came 
to a similar conclusion in the church context« In 1905 the 
Anglican mission conference considered the question of the 
establishment of 'village councils'; as a result, the Bishop 
issued a pastoral letter to native congregations recommending 
the establishment of such councils in localities containing 
fifty or more Christians« These councils were to consist of 
three representatives, two chosen by the 'electoral body* and 
one nominated by the priest« Their function was to 'give
78) R.M. S«E«D« to Gov« Sec. Pile 36« V.C. Records of Service* 
On dismissals, cf. 16# in one year, 1905-6, Eastern 
Division - 'but it is to be remembered how great are the 
temptations for an almost raw savage to abuse the powers 
conferred upon him, and how strictly he is dealt with when 
his misconduct inevitably comes to light* - Report 1906~7, 
p*10* There was no apparent correlation with traditional 
leadership«
79) F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate* pp* 196-7.
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advice', and in 1906 they were said already to have proved
80
of service* An embryonic element of self-government already
existed in the Anglican mission, evidenced by the annual
Anniversary meetings of non-European staff and * native
81
representatives*«
These councils then lapsed, for unspecified reasons, but 
were revived in 1912, when the non-European Anniversary 
meeting adopted a suggestion of the annual conference. In 1913 
the Bishop devoted part of his annual address to the question 
of 'Native Self-Government*, looking forward to reporte on
on
the progress of the councils* It was this address which
first attracted Murray*s attention) he wrote to the Bishop
83
expressing interest and asking for further information.
At the annual conference of 1914 the results of the
84
councils were described as *more than encouraging*. The 
constitution of the councils had changed from the original 
proposal of 1905 - this perhaps explains the success of their 
revival. Now the numbers of elected and nominated members 
were equal, and meetings were presided over by the priest* 
Nevertheless, the object of the councils was stated to be 'to
80) New Guinea Mission Report, 1905-6,p.11) SP.G* Historical 
Sketches: New Guinea (1907). pp. 11-12.
81) Ibid. These were held in August, the conference of senior 
(European) staff in May.
82) Address delivered Daguna, 28.5.1913, p.3. (Copy made 
available by Mission headquarters» Daguna).
83) Judge Murray to Bishop of New Guinea, 12.9*1913 (172/L3), 
CPI (Terr.), 3, Set 18.
84) Report of New Guinea Mission, 1913—4, p. 11.
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greatly need1* Their functions were supposed to be confined
to church matters! the building of churches and schools, and
counselling with regard to the fitness of candidates for
baptism and confirmation.85 In 1914 the councils at Warnira
and Vedau had overcome some village opposition in the
voluntary building of churches; but the councils had gone
further at Boianai and Vurawara, conducting open-air services
every evening in the villages to reach the non-Christians. At
Boianai, under the influence of Rev* S.R.M. Grill, the council
built *a very fine hall* in the village and was #energetio in
attending to the cleaning up of the village and the making
of roads9• These councils met once a month, and discussed
with the priest the work needing to be done, and new areas
86
requiring to be opened up by the mission.
The Boianai council was first noticed by a patrol
officer, K. Bus hell, in July 1914* He reported enthusiastically!
An admirable institution, whioh has recently been 
installed in the Boianai district, is the native 
village council, which undoubtedly imparts a valu­
able influence among the people. Boianai is a 
very populous and compact district comprising some 
six big villages. Sach village is represented on 
the Council by two members who are elected by the 
people of the village, and the term of office is 
twelve months. Any reforms considered necessary 
are discussed and deoided upon. Suoh features are 
untidy roads, old houses and dirty villages; these 
are brought to the Council’s notice and a resolution 
is passed asking the Village Constables to have the
foster in natives a sense of responsibility, which they
85) Ibid., 1912-3, p.12.
86) Ibid., 1913—4, pp. 11-2.
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trouble remedied* The members of the particular 
village in question, or "in trouble", use their 
influence with the result that I found no feature 
that the most fastidious Government Officer could 
find fault with* Houses, villages, roads, were 
in first-class order and the value of this new q 7 
innovation was noticeable through the villages*
Murray made no official comment, but drew the attention
oo
of the Commissioner for Hative Affairs to the report* When
he visited Boianai himself, however, in September 1915, he
discounted native responsibility and gave all the credit to
the missionary, Gill:
A wonderful place ~ Gill the missionary a genius*
It is generations ahead of any other village* 
Scrupulously clean, houses better built, no crime, 
no absentees from school* Gill runs the whole show 
but so that the Village Council think they run it 
themselves* They are lavish in their donations of 
food - his difficulty is to get them to accept 8q 
payment*
By 1917 the village councils seem to have become an 
accepted part of Anglican policy, for their constitution and
87) Samarai P.R* A129A914, 11*7*14* He gives an extended 
account in K* Bushell, Papuan Epic * pp*300-3, where he 
states that it was the first institution of its kind in 
Papua* He estimated the Boianai population at fabout 
6000f and said that the council met weekly* and also dealt 
with such matters as sickness and crime in the district, 
offenders being taken to the V*C*s and difficulties 
being taken to Rev* Gill. In retrospect it is difficult 
to grasp the administrative attitude of an officer such 
as Bushell, for at about this time he was alleged to have 
•used a stick pretty freely* on some Pergusson Is. natives 
(comment, A.R.M* McAlplne, Samarai P.R. 11/1915)• Pre­
sumably he did not realize the consultative significance 
of the Boianai council*
88) Ibid., jacket direction, manu.
89) Murray’s diary (Mitchell A3139), 4.9*1915.
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functions were formalized* At this period Gill and the 
Boianai council were still very active! the councillors asked 
Gill to start a boarding school for girls, and they were said 
to realize that it was their own responsibility to keep the
91
villages clean - an obligation in law policed by the V.C.a 
The Administration, however, appears to have paid no 
more attention to the councils* A*H*M* Borrows in January,
1915 dealt exclusively with village constables* Relations 
particularly with the Wedau natives steadily worsened. In
1916 several men were fined for having been deliberately
Q  p
neglectful* of Administration orders. By 1924 even those
Wedau natives living close to the mission station were said
to have dirty villages* A.R.M* Vivian re-asserted paternalism:
*•• the remedy lies in more frequent patrols in­
stilling into the people the necessity of living 
in a befitting manner, on the pain of being 
punished.
The L*M*S* at this time was following a policy similar 
to that of the Anglican mission* The mission had become 
worried about the divisions within the church caused by
90
90) Gerald, Bishop of H.G., Diocese of New Guinea: Its Rules 
and Methods, (1917), pp. &?-§• The constitution"and 
functions were similar to those at Boianai, except that 
it was specified that mission teachers were not members 
ex officioi ’Often it is best to have purely "village 
men"*f
91) Report of N*G* Mission 1916-7, p*18? 1917-8, p.14?
1918—9, p.13*
92) Samarai P*R* 12/1916.
93) Samarai P.R* 14/1923-4, March 1924* Vivian seems to have 
had a personal preference for the L*M*S* — he notes (ibid.) 
•sound training, by the L*M*S* at all events, in the 
direction of social betterment**
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traditional segmentation; in 1915 the District Committee 
decided *to form church councils wherever the church life 
of the district is sufficiently developed*. This was then 
carried out in most districts, although the councils are 
said to have been for fellowship and discussion rather than 
for decision making***4 In 1919 the L.M.S. officially 
announced the policy of a self-supporting and self-governing 
Native Papuan Church; financial committees were already being 
conducted by the natives themselves*®5 Meanwhile, Kwato had 
been moving in this direction, even before the rift with the 
L.M.S. Logea had been the site of large-scale experiments 
with mission plantations, run co-operatively, in 1911* By 
about the end of World War I Logea natives also had a 
council functioningi
X
At Logea, the community nearest to Kwato, the 
Christians organized their own counoll of menfcers, 
elected from each village, to look after the order 
in the villages, and to deal with the matters that 
affect the common welfare of the people. The 
council was an exact reproduction of the Kwato 
council, a body that met at stated Intervals, and 
was responsible for making, altering and maintaining 
the laws on Kwato, as well as for admlnisterlng 
discipline* Abel was never forgetful of the ultimate 
goal of independence, for his people* More and more 
they were altering into the work, and were beginning 
to bear the burden of it themselves. The council at 
Logea, quite an august body, was a great success*
They were recognised by the Government, to idiom they 
were responsible, and who co-operated with them in 
their first efforts at self-determination. Many 
public improvements to houses and roads were the out-
94) N. Goodall, op.cit., pp*441-2.
95) Report 1919-20, App. B, pp.99-100*
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-come of the council’s work. With the aid of 
Government a communal plantation was foxved, 
though they needed to be assured that the venture 
was really theirs and that outside agencies were 
entirely disinterested* The Logea council was the 
forerunner of similar councils in other communities 
that have been of great value in awakening a sense 
of responsibility and in helping the people to 
realise that the Government is a power working in 
their best interests* These elementary first steps 
in racial self-consciousness were greatly welcomed 
by those who had the welfare of these people at 
heart, and who know the intense individualism and 
lack of corporate feeling in the Papuan*
This was a development peculiarly suited to Kwato’s methods 
of evangelizing; for in each village there tended to be a 
small Kwato-trained elite, literate and at least super­
ficially Europeanised, to which the villagers looked for 
leadership* Because of the great Influence of this elite,
Kwato was not so concerned with the delimitation of functions 
of councillors later laid down by the government; for it was 
able independently to manipulate pressures against ’back­
sliders’*
The Anglican mission, however, remained concerned about 
the failing influence of the older men and social dis­
integration which resulted in tite villages* The Bishop in 
1930 sent Murray an advance copy of a suggestion, later 
published, that the councillor system be further developed. 
Newton wrotet
96) R* Abel, op.cit*, pp.170-1* The references to the making 
of laws and administering of discipline are particularly 
significant. Even at Keveri, Williams (loc*oit., p*114) 
had noted that the village leaders were ’all men with 
Kwato at heart’*
The Government has a system of village councillors 
who are supposed to advise and help the magistrates 
in their work in the villages. Perhaps some develop­
ment of this system might he devised to help the 
transition stage. If some real authority, and 
perhaps some right to punish young men for neglect 
of work in gardens, in the villages, or other minor 
things could be given to councillors who are old men,^« 
the transition would be easier.
What was construed as the serious decline in social 
discipline also preoccupied the Rev. Savllle (L.M.S.) at Mailu. 
He was particularly interested in the introduction of the 
assessor system. In 1931 he wrote that the mission was in­
dependently encouraging each congregation to settle its own 
affairs: it is clear that these functions overlapped those of 
the Administration and of the native officials. Every month 
the misconduct of any members was discussed in the presenoe 
of the offender; those guilty of sorcery, for example, were 
awarded ’Church punishment *. ’All kinds of things arise at
these gatherings’, said Saville; and the natives were en-
98
couraged to ventilate them.
This discussion has anticipated the appointment of 
government councillors; but the special interests and emphases 
of the missions are obviously extremely important. Clearly 
the Administration was strongly influenced by the mission 
councils, for in eastern Papua from the beginning of the 
scheme in 1925 councillors were regarded as members of a 
council rather than as individuals, which was the case
97) M.J. Stone-Wigg (revised H.Newton), The Papuans: A People 
of the South Pacific, pp.62-5; also fflPY, v, 16/44.
98) W.J. Saville to Sir. H. Murray, 26.7.1931. CPI,V, 16/48.
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elsewhere. Other factors which favoured this approach were 
the reaction to the scattered nature of native settlement 
(which was wrongly believed to be due to fissiparous tendencies 
brought about by law and order), and the extent of Native 
Plantations at the time councillors were appointed (the 
plantations providing a focus for joint effort, and indeed 
in some places a raison d ’etre for councillors* appointments),
(v) Administration Councils and Councillors
R.M. Lyons began defining council ’districts* in Milne 
Bay in May, 1925. The bases of definition were not at the 
time laid down, though from later comments it can be deduced 
that traditional co-operation was the main criterion* The 
cohesive influence if Kwato was also clearly important. The 
concept of ’councils* - note, not ’councillors* - was explained 
to gatherings within these districts and, unsupervised, they 
were asked to select three councillors for each district 
within a week. In some inetances this entailed some 
alterations to the areas of jurisdiction of the village 
constables, for it was stated that these were not to extend 
beyond the council districts. The concept was outlined to 
four distriots within three days, in Milne Bay
Lyons was not sanguine that the natives of the Eastern 
Division would take up the council conoept as had those in 
the Western Division. He listed two major obstacles, as he
99) Samarai P.R. 11A924-5. (V.C. districts).
saw them: firstly, the •matriarchal1 social organisation
(the nature and potential effects of this were not defined);
and secondly, the tendency to decentralise, or to break up
into smaller groups, which he wrongly believed had been made
possible by law and order; as I have shown, scattered hamlets
100
were traditionally typical of the Southern Massim. Never­
theless the fact that the R*M. had this reserve about 
promoting councils must be taken into account in assessing 
their implementation*
The demarcation of council districts was completed in 
Milne Bay in March, 1926, with ten districts. On current 
population figures - there has probably been no increase - 
this would give an average of about 500 natives in each 
•district'* A.R.M. Leonard, like Lyons, was again careful 
to group together those people who had •cordial relations* 
with one another. There can be little doubt, from the reports, 
that at this stage the councillors were looked upon primarily 
as executive assistants*
Leonard looked forward to improvements in village 
housing, which some weak village constables had proved in- 
capable of securing; he urged (and Murray agreed) that the 
councillors should be issued with a badge by government, to
100) Report 1925—6, p.36. Lyons repeated the inhibiting 
influence of the * matriarchy * in a private letter to 
the writér dated 17*7.1959; but he clearly had no 
understanding of the meaning of the term, nor could 
he explain how the relatively high status of women was 
a deterrent.
j
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raise their prestige and hence their efficiency.
Meanwhile, Lyons had extended the council concept to
the south coast. His caution in grouping the natives was
warmly commended by Murray. The L.M.S. missionaries, Saville
at Mailu and Rich at Fife Bay, were consulted on projected
groupings; of Saville, Lyons said that -
he had the knowledge of the early relationship 
between the village groups, and this will assist 
me to avoid grouping people in villages not over- 
cordial in their past relations to each other.
Along the south coast there were six council districts
as far west as Mayri Bay. Some councillors had districts of
considerable size to look after: for example, three
councillors shared all the villages in Tauwaliha Bay and
Baxter Bay# It was unfortunate that the object of the
Administration in working through the councillors was so
transparent; this applied particularly to the Native
Plantations, for which the councillors were given special
responsibility. Resistance was resented. A.R.M. Leonard
noted that most 'men of influence' in Baxter Bay were opposed
to the idea of having a plantation there. These men, he said,
were mostly in their middle twenties and had 'retired' with
sufficient cash to pay tax for the rest of their lives after
working in 'sheltered occupations' as houseboys and hotel
waiters, occupations which gave a veneer of sophistication
101) Samarai P.R. 9/1925-6. Appended eonraents by Murray.
The badge became, and remains, the mark of a councillor.
102) Samarai P.R. 1/1925-6, July 1925. Rioh was asked to put 
on paper his ideas of the best groupings of villages 
further east.
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as well as money. Their agricultural efforts produced
enough for them to subsist on, therefore they were violently
103
opposed to the idea of labour on plantations.
The connection between the appointment of councillors
and the supervision of Native Plantations was even more
marked in the islands irtiich at that time foimed the separate
South-.Eastern Division. On Panaeati Is. (Panaete) the
fousing of ’village councils ’ and the establishment of the
Torlesse Native Plantation were raised simultaneously with 
104
the headmen. In these islands where supervision was even 
more infrequent than on the mainland, the fear seems to have 
been that the councillors would have nothing specific to do: 
on Panaeati, as elsewhere, there were frequent complaints 
that councillors had only a vague idea of their duties. 
Plantation responsibilities overcame this, as well as 
returning half the proceeds to the government.*^5 In 1927 
the R.M. urged the V.C. and councillors to ’use their
106
influence* to see that people worked on the plantation.
In 1932 a new ’boss-boy* of the plantation at Torlesse
103) Samarai P.fi. 14/1925-6, May 1926. Note Murray, Papua of 
Today, p.125: ’our natives ... are usually under no 
strong economic compulsion to go to work, for they
can, as a rule, live fairly well in their villages’.
104) Bwagoia P.R. 3/1925-6, 4.2.26.
105) Ibid., 1/1927-8, 10.8.27. In the Loughlan Is. the B.M. 
urged the councillors to ’buck their people up* in 
copra-making (ibid., 10/1925-6).
106) Bwagoia P.R. 7/1927-8. Elsewhere also the councillor® 
were clearly held responsible for the state of the 
plantations - see Abau P.R. io/1926-7.
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complained of ’interference* by two councillors, supporters 
of his dismissed predecessor, with the result that they were
dismissed also, and two other 'aged men * were chosen as
107
councillors. On R.M. Rentoul's patrols in 1931 the 
principal function of the councillors seems to have been to
108
inspect the Native Plantations with the village constables*
This motive was even more bluntly stated in the area of
Woodlark, patrolled from Kulumadau. In 1926 when 'councils'
were in process of formation, the R.M. told the Government
Secretary that one was to be set up at the Muniweo Plantation
group of villages; this, he said, would help the smooth
109
running of plantation operations. When appointing 
councillors in the eastern part of the island in 1928, A.R.M. 
Rogers on remarked! 'Having a councillor at these places will 
help considerably in getting instructions carried out'.^°
In June 1926 the council scheme was extended to the 
north-east coast and to Goodenough. There are Indications 
that the appointment of councillors went ahead too quicklyt 
inevitably the appointees were uncertain of their functions -
107) Bwagoia P.R. 1/1932-3.
108) Bwagoia P.R. 1-5/1931-2.
109) R.M. Kulumadau to Gov. Sec. 14.3.26, 182/475/26. S.E-D. 
correspondence file 36. The councillors acted as 'boss- 
boys' of the plantations at Woodlark - Report 1926-7, 
p. 49.
110) Kulumadau P.R. 2A928-9, 10.10.1928. Waiavat village.
It was felt that the councillors could overcome diffi­
culties with a trading population, for when the V.C. 
was absent instructions could be left with the 
councillors.
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1928 in the Wedau area it was found that all three
councillors belonged to the smallest of the four clans; the
A.R.M. himself, therefore, chose one councillor from the
three major clans, with the V.C. belonging to the fourth*1*1
This was the equitable pattern of appointment also
lip
adopted by A.R.M. Grist at Mailu in 1926. In the area
patrolled from Abau a similar pattern was adopted to that in
the other parts of the Eastern and South-Eastern Divisions:
that is, villages or hamlets were grouped into districts,
each of which was generally represented by three councillors*
Grist, however, was very conscious of the divisions within
the authority systems of the Mailu people produced by
culture change, and he therefore chose the councillor«
himself. He tried to reconcile government needs and village
preferences in selection: at Boru, east of Abau he -
Went into the question of a councillor and decided 
eventually on one Tavlll, a married man with a 
family and some influence in the village. It is 
better» I think» to choose the elders in the 
villages for the position, especially among the Magi 
people (Mailu) where they have a great deal of 
influence as a rule*
Similarly» at Mailu the appointees were the old men 
'who are regarded as the head of the clan» and although I am 
not at all certain that they are the best men for the work,
as were many Administration officers. More seriously in
111) Samarai F.B. 16/1925-6, 15/1926-7, 2/1928-9.
112) Abau P.R. 1/1926-7.
113) Ibid.
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it is worth a trial to see if they really have the power 
they are alleged to wield*.114
Grist was determined that they should wield this power 
as the Administration decided; if they did not do so he was 
quite prepared to forego traditional leadership* For this 
reason he was convinced that there would have to be many 
changes of personnel - *a judicious weeding-out process* - 
before groups of councillors could be got who would 
'materially assist in ordering the life of the village*.115
Because of this emphasis on their executive responsi­
bility it was a logical stepf once the traditional leaders 
had been abandoned, to regard appointment as a councillor 
as one step on the way to becoming village constable*
Selecting a V.C. from amongst the councillors became quite 
common. It was a corollary that, in selecting councillors» 
an officer should have his eye out for potential V. C*s» an 
attitude which inevitably altered the critera for selection116
114) Ibid* He intended to restrict the councillors to the 
coastal villages» 50*7*26.
115) Ibid.
116) Grist was watching this when making his Initial 
appointments - ibid*; also Abau P.R. 2/1926-7; Samarai 
P.R. 6/1928-9» 8/1932-3* However» when A.R.M* Flint 
extended councillors to the mountain Dlmuga people»
he went to the other extreme and allowed them to select 
not only their own councillors but their own V.C.«
(Abau P.R. 8/1927-8). At this period it was found 
particularly difficult in Milne Bay to get natives to 
exercise auliiority on bel&f of golpemment - the A.R.M. 
expressed dissatisfaction with the younger appointees 
possessing *pushful ways* and a knowledge of English. 
This may well have influenced the Administration here to 
proceed to extensive councils, rather than relying on 
individuals (see Samarai P.R. 11/1927-8; 2/30-1).
(vi) Councillors * Exercise of Judicial Functions
The missionaries had seen the councillors as an
institution which might help to restore ’discipline* and
tame the wild younger men in the Tillages; hence their
argument for rudimentary judicial functions. As early as
1927 A.R.M. Leonard, assessing the first twelve months of
working with councillors, stated that one of the major
successes had been in the suppression of crime. He doubted
whether 28 V.C.s and 21 councillors along the south coast,
for example, could have entered into a conspiracy to conceal
offences, though there had been no occasion for a single
sitting of the Court for Native Matters. One of the reasons,
he felt, was that the settlement of ciYil disputes out of
court, through the councillors, achieved a more binding
settlement than a mere court order, for *it takes a brave
117
man to defy public opinion in a small community*• Sig­
nificantly, the Milne Bay councillors consulted him on
points of law, particularly concerning depredations by pigs
118
in gardens.
There was, therefore, already a tendency for councillors 
to assume that they could act in a semi-official capacity 
in settling disputes. Under mission influence they 
occasionally went further; on Goodenough the Methodist
117) Samarai P.R. 21/1926-7; General Remarks. In Feb. 1928 
A.R.M. C rid land eohoed the same sentiments, though he 
clearly recognised that the V.C.s and councillors were 
settling oases themselves - Samarai P.R. 16/1927-8.
118) Samarai P.R. 5/1927-8, 11.9.27.
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missionary, impatient of dilatory government appointments,
appointed his own councillors, and authorised them to impose
fines, in coconuts, on those who refused to obey him. This
necessitated a public enquiry attended by about 2,000 natives
at which the A.R.M. insisted that only a magistrate had the
119
power to inflict fines and punishments.
The assessor system was introduced into eastern Papua In
120
1930. A.R.M. Atkinson made use of the councillors and 'some
of the men of the village’ in Milne Bay, ’Just as a Jury is
1P1
used in other places*. Indeed, from the beginning the 
councillors and occasional elders who sat as assessors 
exercised functions far beyond what is generally understood 
by the terns they adjudged guilt or innocence as well as
assessing punishment, and settled disputes brought to Court,
1 PP
sometimes quite independently of the magistrate.
When, in 1931 and following years, the Administration 
promoted larger area councils in Milne Bay and on the north­
east and south coasts, Informal Native Authorities had In 
effect been established. They lacked only their own executive.
119) Rev. A.Waters. Samarai P.R. 16/1925-6. In 1926 the Rabe 
councillors in Milne Bay were found to be enforcing 
Sunday observance as a law - Samarai P.R. 3/1926-7,
Sept. 1926.
120) Abau P.R. l/1930-l, July 1930.
l a  ) Samarai P.R. 6/1930-1: ’Assessors’.
122) Samarai P.R. 3/1932-3. In a land dispute in Milne Bay, 
the magistrate decided that an expression of opinion 
by the ’assessors' eould be more binding than any 
judgment he could make.
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together all the V.C.s and councillors on the north side
of Milne Bay, from Bou to Rabi. One of the objects of these
meetings was to disseminate government propaganda, though
Murray was of course also conscious of the need to break
1P3
down traditional suspicions and antipathies. At the same 
time Murray had become increasingly aware of the need to 
preserve custom; from this standpoint he was therefore more 
sympathetic to mission arguments, noted above, for officially 
recognizing native jurisdiction. It is notable that the only 
active function of this first meeting was to adjudicate in 
a matrimonial dispute, which officials were forbidden to 
deal with. This case was heard publioly; in effect, the
1«4
councillors sat as a court administering customary law.
It proved extremely difficult to get the councillors 
at these large meetings to discuss village affairs; but they 
were ready to give their opinions on punishments that should 
be awarded for breaches of the Native Regulations.1^5
A meeting of 15 councillors on the north-east coast, in 
January 1932, raised the question of declining village 
authority more directly. The elders complained that in the
123) Samarai P.R. 3/1931-2; see H* Murray, Papua of Today.p.x.
124) Ibid.
125) Samarai P.R. 4/1931-2. This was a similar meeting for 
councillors on the south side. They considered penalties 
for adultery and sorcery too lenient, and recomended 
public beatings to *shame* the offender.
The first of these meetings, in September 1931, brought
214
old days their word had been law; but now when they gave 
an order the young men simply went off to a plantation for 
a few months* They felt the need for some local mechanism 
for re-asserting their authority. Murray felt that their
complaint was 'especially justified during a transition
IP?
period - as at present in Papua*.
By 1932 the meetings in all areas in the Eastern 
Division were being held at three-monthly intervals. The 
October meeting on the north side of Milne Bay was categorised 
by the A.R.M. as 'very successful'; Murray thought so much 
of it that he sent details to Canberra and consented on it 
in the annual report. The influence of Kwato is clearly 
dlscernable in the tone and trend of the resolutions. The 
meeting was left entirely to the councillors. They resolved 
that gardens and houses should be made for widows and their 
children; that people who disobeyed orders to clean roads 
and the village should be punished by forcing them to do 
other useful work; that villages be built according to a 
regular plan; that food be made available St government rest- 
houses; that the old and the sick be assisted; that natives 
eligible for tax be warned to get it ready, and those not
126) Samara! P.E. 5/1931-2.
127) Ibid., Murray's handwritten comment on jacket.
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ready *be punished1. What is notable about this meeting,
is that the councils were in fact legislating, and that they
were threatening to back up their orders with sanctions,
with the approval or at least connivance of Hurray and the
local officials*
Moreover, at the same meeting the council administered
customary law by awarding compensation for the death of a
child* This Murray especially commended, noting that it was
no doubt bad law, but that it was good in Milne Bay, for
no one dreamed of disputing it. Murray was proud of the
•high level* of capacity shown by the natives at this
meeting; he hoped for similar competence particularly in
Port Moresby, and in the North-Eastern and Western Divisions,
130
where the councillors seemed to be well entrenched.
Murray generally looked forward to the councillors*
131
adjudicating in customary disputes.
Thus, the functions being performed by councillors, 
acting in concert in the Eastern Division, turned out to be 
very similar to what the missions had urged. Mission 
influence continued to be noticeable in the resolutions
128) Samarai P.R. 3/1932-3, 26.10.1932. A.R.M. Atkinson.
A great deal depended on individual officers - 
Atkinson is the same man who Initiated councils 
experimentally from Banlara in 1923 - these refferred 
to by Murray, Papua of Today* p.279; of. functions 
Kwato council,note 9i.
129) Report 1933-4, p.25.
130) Murray to Sec. Canberra, 7.12.32, CP 141. AQ.O. 840A/5. 
This also contains Atkinson's minutes.
131) Report 1932—3, p.17. He remarked, like the local 
officials, on the willingness of the natives to accept
councillors* decisions.
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carried by the councils, representing an effort to reshape
village life, with the Administration’s semi-official
backing, according to mission values. For example, in
March 1933 a meeting of councillors to the east of Mullins
Harbour carried resolutions (over the protests of the A.R.M.)
imposing a 9 p.m. curfew in the villages and asking the
government to pass a law preventing the association of men
132
and women after that hour.
Indeed, the missions continued to arrange periodical
meetings of village leaders over wide areas. In the 1930s
Kwato in particular was concentrating on evangelisation
through its elite,some of whom were councillors. One Papuan
Leaders' Conference, held in Milne Bay, brought together
180 men 'from most parts of the district', including the
133
primitive Mt. Thompson area. On occasions village opinion
on government proposals was canvassed through the 
134
missionaries.
The most remarkable aspect of the use of councillors In 
eastern Papua at this time is undoubtedly the development 
of their judicial functions; for during this same period 
Murray was specifically rejecting the precedents of African 
native courts as being applicable to Papua, and gloomily
132) Samarai P.R. 10/1932-3, A.R.M. Atkinson*
133) R. Abel, op.cit., p.249. Rich of the L.M.S. also held 
meetings on the south coast.
134) Samarai P.R. 14/1927-8, 9.2.28. R.M. Lyons asked 
Rev. Saville to consult Mailu elders on the proposal 
for a new mainland village. 'He will advise me in due
course'.
anticipating lengthy preparation before natives could 
develop a 'judicial mindf. Although he continued to reflect 
that their judgments were 'coloured with personal feeling, 
fear of sorcery, and other external considerations', 
nevertheless the 'assessors' continued to give judgments as 
well as to assess penalties, and in fact to adjudicate on 
what were assumed to be purely customary matters quite 
independently. As Murray remarked, sending details of 77 
Abau cases to Canberra, it was a waste of the time of skilled 
officers adjudicating on offences involving a bunch of 
bananas or a few coconuts. Conceptually therefore he went 
more than half way towards a native courts system; but his 
inhibitions about native conceptions of justice prevented hi« 
from going further. Neither he nor his officers had the 
slightest check on what was done in these informal courts; 
this does not appear to have troubled him. However, he was 
encouraged by the work of the assessors, so much so that in 
1939 he asked the R.M. of the South-Eastern Division whether 
he knew of any natives who could act as Magistrates for
135) Report 1937-8, p.30.
136) Murray to Sec. Canberra, 9.7.1937. CPI T. 16/48. The 77 
cases heard dealt with matters as diverse as assault, 
adultery, oivll claims, careless use of fire, wife and 
child maintenance, stealing, spreading lying reports, 
and threatening behaviour. Up to 9 assessors sat 
together, and gave judgments as well as penalties. This 
was seen partly as training. Murray generally commended 
councillors' settlement of cases 'out of court', 'althoqgj 
of course their advice or decision or whatever you like 
to call it has no binding force whatever' - draft 
autobiog., Murray Papers Mitchell A.3138, p #196.
j
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Native Matters ’or in any other magisterial or judicial
capacity’. The R.M. suggested two men and recommended one,
a telephone mechanic possessing an extensive knowledge of
137
court routine and ’an extraordinary lack of bias’.
There were, indeed, generally hopeful signs that, had 
the war not supervened, changes in outlook within the 
Administration might have forced changes in methods that were 
extensive and permanent rather than local and experimental«,
The impression was growing within the Administration that the 
natives had, and pertiaps were entitled to have, methods, 
morals, and aspirations of their own, and that these could 
not be submerged simply by legislating. As the R.M. wrote 
to the Government Secretary in 1941 on the question of
138
gambling« ’One cannot control morals by Statutory Rules’.
Even in the more backward parts of the district, ill- 
prepared for consultative institutions» there were some 
indications of different emphases, if not a change, in 
administrative attitudes. There was little opportunity for 
consultation in the d'Entrecasteaux, largely because of terrain 
and the dispersal of population. In May 1933 the V.C.s and 
councillors from Dobu and Bwaioa were brought together by the
137) Murray to R.M. t 28.8.1939» S.E.D. correspondence, ref. 
2164/281/39} R.M. to Gov. Sec., 7.9.1939, ref. 675/23/39. 
Pile 36.
138) R.M. S.E.D. to Gov. Sec.» 6.10.41. This was a change from 
1933, when the R.M. endorsed the restrictions on the 
wearing of clothing by natives 'on account of its effects 
on both the morals and health of the natives, who have to 
be protected against themselves by this very wise 
regulation.’ (ibid. 11/23/33).
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practices; but such opportunities for convention were
limited.1®® In 1941 P.O. Timperley remarked that Dauwada
(Normanby Is.) was 'one of the few areas nhere councillors 
140
are helpful*. Timperley*s conception of ’helpful*, how­
ever, consisted primarily of a wllligness on the part of the 
councillors to have instructions obeyed. His patrols were 
conducted at breakneck speed and left little time for question, 
discussion, or argument. He conceived it as his function to 
'shake up* the village constables» and he set a premium on 
unquestioning obediencei
These Meudana people seem to be the pick of Hormanby 
Island ... Meudana folk are a very obedient crowd 
and their roads and villages for the most part are 
the finest I have seen since I arrived at Mapamolwa.
Both the H.M. of the Division and the Administrator com­
mended Timperley for *fine work*; but it was perhaps again a 
sign of better things that his predecessor at Mapamolwa, A .H.M. 
P.A. Champion, raised some doubts about Timperley*s methods*
I have learnt from my experiences in the Gollala country 
that if the natives are continually harassed and bullied 
they break up into small family groups and live In the 
bush and treat the Government as an enemy Instead of a 
friend•
I think that an appeal to their finer instincts will do 
far more good than filling up the countxy’s gaols.
139) Mapamolwa P.R. 5/1932-3. This patrol post was set up In 
1927.
140) Mapamolwa P.R. ll/1940-l.
141) Ibid., 2.4.41. Timperley had previously been in un­
controlled frontier areas - see Appendix C, II.
142) Mapamolwa P.R. 8A940-1, Feb. 1941. Comments by Champion 
attached.
Administration to discuss the violation of traditional kula
j
CHAPTER III 
POLICY AND PRACTICE
3. The Trobriand Islands: Chieftainship and Direct Rule*
(i) The Comparative Setting.
The British system of indirect rule was branded as long 
ago as 1936, by a former Nigerian official, as 'a formula' 
and 'an occult science'.1 Since the war many of the younger 
African nationalists have seen the system as 'a sort of
p
quasi-apartheid policy'. These criticisms stem largely
from what is believed to be the failure to develop the
system, so that it has held native peoples back from
achieving advanced standards, particularly politically. What
is overlooked is the socially dynamic aspect which indirect
rule took on in the 1920s and 1930st as Meir defined it, 'the
system devised by Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron consists
in the progressive adaptation of native institutions to
* 3
m o d e m  conditions . Lord Stanmore, who had applied the 
principle in Fiji, certainly saw the dynamic aspect in 
Lugard's policy, involving 'the power to make them (native
1) W.R. Crocker, Nigeria, p. 215.
2) li.U. Akpan, Epitaph to Indireot Rule, p. 29.
3) L.P. Mair, Native Policies in Africa, p. 56.
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races) act in their own way • •• in the direction in which he
4
wishes them to g o 1» Cameron spoke of Nigerians ’developing
5
in a constitutional manner from their own past1} - at the
same time where genuine tribal authorities could not be
£
revived or created he admitted direct administration»
While it is undeniable that certain of the repercussions 
of indirect rule have been embarrassing from the admini­
strative and political standpoints, it is equally undeniable 
that indirect rule, during stressful transition stages, has 
enabled development with cohesion; indeed, tribal socio-
Tf
political cohesion has sometimes strengthened. Where the 
difficulty arises at present in Africa is in the balance 
between the eduoated unranked natives and the traditional 
rulers; Lugard tended to treat the administrative rather than
o
the basic political aspect of this problem.
In view of the history of indirect rule in Afrioa and in
9
parts of the Pacific , and in view of Sir Hubert Murray’s
4) Quoted M» Perham, Lugard. I f p.371. The Fijian version 
of indirect rule was rather more ’direct’ than Lugard*s, 
however. Ify italics.
5) D. Cameron, The Principles of Native Administration and 
their Application, p »1 1 p »7 8 Cameron also waxed strong on 
the" dangers of reactionary native authorities»
6) Ibid., p.18; Africa, Oct. 1934, p»424»
7) See, for example, J.G. Liebenow; The Chief in Sukuma Local 
Government. Journal of Afrioan AdminTstration, , 2, ppT 
84-92. Note the Chagga’s acquiring of a paramount chief, 
also. See Hailey, An Afrioan Survey, (rev. 1956) p.205»
8) F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate, pp. 84-5.
9) The Spate Report on Fiji (1959) is highly critical of the 
stagnation, relative to the Indians, brought about by the
adherence to the principle»
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interest in the system, the policy that was followed in the 
Trobriands, the only part of Papua possessing powerful 
chiefs and a system of rank, is particularly interesting. 
Moreover, the problems that have arisen in Africa are only 
just emerging in the Trobriands, for an educated elite hardly 
exists, while native local government iB still to be intro­
duced,1^ Despite a tradition of most direct rule in the 
Papuan administration, and a fluctuating policy which often 
took little account of traditional leadership, the culture 
of the islands and the power of the ohiefs seem today little 
altered from what they were in Malinowski’s time,11
(ii) The Social System.
The intensive research and brilliant analytic writing of 
Malinowski reveal in retrospect however, the stresses to 
which Trobriands chieftainship has been subjected.
Malinowski showed that chieftainship in the Trobriands is a 
combination of two institutions: headmanship, implying 
authority over a village community; and totemio clanship, 
whereby the islands are divided into castes, each with a more
10) JJuring 1959 Mr. C. Julius, Government Anthropologist, 
spent six months in the islands with a view to recomm­
ending how local government could best be implemented.
His report was not available. The population of the 
islands is about 10,000.
11) See C. Julius, Malinowski’s Trobriand Islands, Journal 
of Public Service, Territory of Papua & tfeiw Guinea, June 
1960, p.64: '... its feudal villages, all busily occupied 
in a continuous rhythm of hereditary duties, activities, 
and ceremonies.' H.A. Powell, Competitive Leadership in 
Trobriand Political Organization, J.H.A.i., Vol. 9 0 , 17 
p.142.
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or less definite rank* There are four matrilineal totemio 
clans, each divided into a number of sub-clansy which to 
some extent are localised in village-clusters. The pre­
eminence of the Tabalu sub-clan of the Malasi totem clan is 
recognized everywhere; although the relative position of the 
lower ranks is debated, residents in various village- 
clusters tending to regard their own guyau sub-clan as next 
to the Tabalu.1^
The most important features of chieftainship to the 
Administration and the mission have been its support by 
polygamy and sorcery. These fitted within the framework of 
competition, for rank and heredity did not of themselves 
confer authority, the right to which had to be earned; this 
process was governed by a complex pattern of reciprocity. 
Within any particular village-oluster belonging to a sub­
clan, competition for leadership depended largely on energy 
in making presentations to senior members of the sub-clan 
(pokala) and, partly as a result, being allocated larger
responsibilities in meeting the sub-clan’s urigubu obligations
14
towards the husbands of women in the sub-clan.
12) B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, p.62.
13) Powell, loc. cit., p.129; M. Groves, Man 1956, 190;
Julius (loc. cit., p.59) feels that the main Toliwaga 
chief may have lived in Toboada, not Kabwaku, as 
assumed by earlier officials and by Malinowski.
14) Powell, loc. cit.# pp. 125-7.
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Special conditions, however, applied to the guyau sub­
clans, which had added rights and powers and privileges.
The Tabalu possess special magic controlling the weather, 
capable of influencing the fortunes of all Kiriwina.
Every member of the Tabalu, including women, enjoyed the
16
personal privileges accorded those of highest rank. A
wide range of taboos and oeremonial applied to rank, which
the chiefs vigorously protected by employing powerful
sorcery or by having paid henchmen put transgressors to 
17
death. A really ambitious guyau leader, however, built up
and maintained his power by an extensive pattern of
marriages, usually facilitated by his predecessor’s
18
marriages into other sub-clans. This gave him a number
of tributary alliances, from which he drew a yearly income
in yams, services, and tokens of respect, and participation
by his allies, on his behalf, in wars, festivals and 
19
expeditions. Malinowski remarked that polygamy was thus 
’the foundation of a ohief's or Headman’s power', because
of its tributary aspect, adding that 'Power in the
PO
Trobriands is essentially plutocratio'.
15) Ibid., p.128; B. Malinowski, The Sexual Life of Savages, 
p .133•
16) Malinowski, The Sexual Life, p.lgO.
17) Ibid., pp.31-2; B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in 
Savage Society, p.92.
18) Powell, loo. cit. , p#131.
19) Malinowski, The oexual Life, p.130*
20) Ibid., pp.34, 130.
THE TROBRJAND ISLANDS 
■ Government Station 
t  Methodi*t Mission Headquarters
(Note: *k'iriwina' is sometimes applied KA! B0LA
/b //re whole group, sometimes 
to the main island, and some­
times to the N.E. of the main 
island■)
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Enamakala had laid waste most of the villages of Tilataula,
apparently because the Toliwaga of Kabwaku had refused his
24
demands for a wife. At this point the government arrived.
(iii) Initial Control by Submission.
In 1892 MacGregor called the Trobriands 'the last really 
unknown important group of islands in the Possession' but
their contact with traders, generally of a poor type, had
25
been extensive. MacGregor immediately reoognized that
the social system was unique in British New Guineas
Of course the chief in every instance received special 
consideration at my hands, but there was no difficulty 
in putting them in the position of inferior chiefs 
towards the Administrator. Good opportunities pg 
occurred several times for doing this publicly ...
During the early years MacGregor and Enamakala were on
friendly terms. Enamakala offered gifts, which MacGregor
interpreted as a sign of submission - for overt submission
27
he demanded everywhere • Enamakala was informally enlisted
23the Tabalu guyau of Qmarakana. In 1885, however,
23) Ibid., p. 142.
24) Ibid., also Seligmann, op.oit., pp.664-8.
25) Report 1891-2, pp.3-4,7. MaoGregor paid a brief call 
in 1891 - Report 1891, pp.7-8.
26) Report 1891-2, p.4. At Kavataria (p.6) he turned a 
number of men off the central platform in the village, 
and sat there himself.
27) Report 1892-3, p.10. It is quite possible that ohiefs 
such as Enamakala did not have the authority which Mao­
Gregor, or even Malinowski, attributed to them. In a 
forthcoming book, Politics of the Kula Ring, J. Singh 
argues that the relative authority of these ohiefs (cf. 
the Sinaketans for example) was exaggerated#
po
in government staff by giving him presents in return.
They spent some time together discussing the relative
authority of the Queen, MacGregor, the Methodist missionary
29
Bromilow, and Enamakala himself. As MacGregor became 
better acquainted with the true state of affairs in the 
islands, however, he became more uneasy; he disapproved of 
widespread polygamy and suspected hostility amongst the 
natives and towards the traders. The Methodist mission 
established itself at Kavataria (Kulumata native district) 
in 1895, and provided a channel of communication to the 
Administration.
In 1895 the natives began to behave in a threatening 
manner towards the mission, and particularly towards the 
pearl-traders; MacGregor admitted provocation by the latter, 
whom he described as 'so reprehensible as to be in a high 
degree discreditable to themselves and to the colony'; in 
addition, their influence in many directions were quite
opposed to that of the mission, so that the natives were
31
patently confused. Nevertheless, MacGregor aoted against 
the natives, ordering a government party to cross the island
28) Report 1893-4, p.19.
29) Ibid., pp.19-20.
30) Rev. George Brown had visited the island with MacGregor 
in 1890 (Autobiography. p.483); Report 1893-4, p.xxvi, 
Report 1895-ë, pTxxlil.
31) Report 1895-6, p.32; L. Austen, Cultural Changes in 
Kiriwina, Oceania. XVI, 1, Sept. 194$, p. 5?.
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and break every spear they saw, ’to put down on the spot 
once for all any show of resistance, and to punish 
promptly any defiant or provocative conduct on the part 
of the natives .. • ’ •32
Moreover, acting on mission-filtered information, Mac­
Gregor launched a oampaign to ’reduce Enamakala to a 
condition of respectability’. He visited Omarakana, made 
Enamakala sit on the ground in front of him, told him that 
the domestic life he led was ’a discredit to a chief’, and 
forbade him to take any further wives from Kavataria, where 
the mission was established. He was forced to grant land 
in Omarakana for a mission station (in 1893 he had promised 
it). MacGregor explained, however, that it was not desired
to diminish his authority as a great chief, but 
rather to maintain it and enforce it, provided 
that his own conduct is such as to merit support,’
Enamakala is reported to have perspired profusely with
alarm. MacGregor was not to know that both the Regulations
and the alien code of ethics to which Enamakala was being
subjected out at the very foundations of his authority;
though in 1894 he had almost stumbled on the purpose of
polygamy,34
32) Ibid# The party was greeted in a friendly manner 
everywhere*
33) R. 1896-7, pp.v, 38; R. 1893-4, p.19, My italics,
34) R. 1893-4, pp*19-20* In 1897 the Magistrate was also 
enforcing the Burial Regulations, a bone of contention 
between Murray and Malinowski 30 years later. Mac­
Gregor specifically warned Enamaiala that he would not 
support a chief who kept aloof from the mission in his 
district - R. 1896-7, p.38.
There is little evidence that, on their hasty visits 
during the 1890s# officials made any real attempt to work 
through the chiefs, even through Enamakala. In 1896 R.M. 
Moreton pursued a number of murderers through Kiriwina, 
and eventually captured them at Kaipupu, after a struggle.
Uo mention is made of any attempt to secure the oo-operation
rrp r
of the chiefs# MacGregor had used Enamakala*s influence
to stop local thieving36; but Monokton regarded Enamakala
as responsible, in some fashion, for all thieving, and
marched him down to the coast under deliberately humiliating
37
circumstances in order to force him to hand over offenders.
This must have seemed an admirable time for the Toliwaga
to retaliate for the defeat of 1885. The attack by the
Toliwaga chief, Moliasi, in 1899, hardly seems to fit
Powell's analysis, however, for if warfare was undertaken
to preserve a balance of power, there was no cause for the
Toliwaga to act at a time when the bases of Enamakala*s
38
authority were under pressure from outside. One 
explanation could be the tendency for some officials,
Monckton for example, to exaggerate Enamakala1s traditional 
power.
35) R. 1896-7, pp.38-9.
36) R. 1893-4, p.20.
37) C.A.W. Monokton, Some Experiences of a N.G. Resident 
Magistrate, p.91.
38) Powell, loc.cit., p.142.
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In October 1899, Rev. Fellowes of the Methodist 
mission reported that Moliasi of Kabwaku had driven out 
Enamakala and destroyed Omarakana and, further, that he 
was threatening 'to kill Enamakala, then the missionaries, 
then the Government'. At that time the Trobriands con­
stituted part of the Eastern Division (being transferred 
to the South-Eastern Division in 1901) so that it took a 
government party almost six weeks to arrive and subdue the 
aggressors. Moliasi asserted, and Moreton was inclined to
agree, that the root cause of the trouble was Enamakala's
39
grasping nature.
(iv) The Frasion of Chiefly Power.
Nevertheless, the Administration determined to restore 
Enamakala to the place he had previously occupied.
According to Fellowes (quoted with reservations by 
Seligmann) the peaoe-making (kabilula) fitted into the 
traditional patterns it involved an exchange of gifts and 
the rebuilding of Omarakana by the Toliwaga and, in effect, 
a complete public re-submission to the Tabalu. Moreton, 
however, ascribed the restoration largely to government 
compulsion; he himself enforced the payment of 60 baskets 
of yams by the Toliwaga to Enamakala. This was plainly 
done on principle, for personally he preferred Moliasi to
39) Samarai ¿tation Journal, Nov. 1899. The Gov't, party 
arrived on 7.11.1899. R. 1899-1900, pp.9-11, 20-1, 79.
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both Enamakala and his heir, To'uluwa. He had thought of 
making Moliasi a Government Chief, but rejected the idea 
because he was not of 'Royal blood*; at the same time he 
hoped to 'get a definite charge* against To'uluwa, whom he 
regarded as a *bad man* so that he could take him to 
Samarai for twelve months ’corrective training*; but
40
To'uluwa's sudden accession as guyau chief forestalled him.
Despite this personal dislike, Moreton made every effort
to reestablish the Tabalu chief of Omarakana; this does not
accord with Powell's conclusion that, beoause of the play
of tradition, To'uluwa was able to rebuild his following,
41
despite the opposition of Government personnel. The 
attack on the status, functions, and authority of the chiefs 
and especially of To'uluwa, was generally indirect, and 
barely realized; it resulted from the belief that the 
acceptance of certain standards and values must be para­
mount •
This was the basic difficulty - the laok of any flexi- 
bility in the Administration's approach. Until the late 
19208 the same methods were adopted and the same demands 
made in the Trobriands as elsewhere in the Territory, the 
attitude being that the ohiefs would have to conform or 
suffer. Their traditional prerogatives were considered
40) Ibid., Seligmann, op.cit., pp.663-8; Sam. Stat.
Journal, July 1900.
41) Powell, loc.oit., p.142.
obstacles. Their authority was supported by sorcery,
but sorcery had to be suppressed; they had a monopoly of
the produce of the coconut and betel-nut trees, but coconut
planting by all males according to Regulation 84 had to be
adhered to. The tracks and villages had to be kept olean
at all costs, and this was most easily done simply by
gaoling slackers, not by appealing to the chiefs, although
the chiefs traditionally had calls on the labour of
commoners. There was none of that 'tolerance of the
4 P
chief's misrule', which Lugard advocated ', nor of adjusting
immediate requirements to the customs and wishes of the
43
people, which Perham described as the British ideal.
Under these conditions it is not surprising that the
village constables had an exceptionally difficult task and
proved unsatisfactory. As early as March 1899 Moreton
reported the simultaneous gaoling of three village
constables; by 1903 the group had only ten V.C.s, who were
44
said to require constant supervision. In 1904 R.M.
Campbell was appalled at the state into which the villages 
had fallen, and said that a government officer should be
42) Lugard, op.cit., p.220.
43) M. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.349. It 
is mentioned elsewhere that in Kenya the traditional 
leaders (e.g. Masai or Nandi laibon) were originally 
exempted from the proscription on sorcery.
44) Sam. Stat. J a m a l ,  March 1899; R. 1903-4, p.30.
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stationed permanently there. A.R.M. Bellamy opened the
46
government station at Losuia on 6th October 1905.
Bellamy was a Cambridge graduate with an interest in 
47
anthropology ; nevertheless, he looked forward to the
liberation of the oommoners from the fear of the chiefs*
displeasure, whioh he regarded as baneful, and Murray
48
concurred.
It was made quite clear that the chiefs* prerogatives
were not to stand in the way of the Administration’s
purposes. Admittedly, Bellamy’s task was difficult for hie
prime responsibility was to treat the rampant venereal
disease in the islands, and this left him little time for
other administration. In one period of seven months he
49
examined 6395 natives for the disease. But as soon as he 
began he was at loggerheads with some of the chiefsi on his 
first patrol, in Sinaketa, he found that the chief, who was 
also a village constable, was *unco-operative and apathetic*, 
so much so that he had to be restrained from obstructionism
CA
by the Constabulary. Up to this time chiefs had
45) Sam. Stat. Journal 3.12.1904; R. 1904-5, p.31.
46) R. 1905-6, p.35. Austen says the station was opened in 
1907 (loo.cit., p.19); this must refer only to con­
firmation of permanenoe.
47) R. 1906-7, pp.65-6, 14.
48) J.H.P. Murray, Papua or B.N.G.» pp.126-7. The system of 
chiefs was not *an unmixed benefit*. Bellamy thought 
that the new generation of enlightened ohiefs would 
abandon authority based on fear.
49) Losuia Journals Oct. 1911-May 1912.
50) R. 1905-6, p.35.
" " 'V' ' - ? - ■ % . ; ■ ?-r. 5 ' -V‘I
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generally been selected as village constables; but Bellamy 
concluded that they were *worse than useless*, for they had 
rights to the labour of commoners and were therefore 
reluctant to have them sent to gaol for breaches of the 
law. The selection of chiefs as village oonstablee was 
therefore discontinued. This policy was publioly endorsed
BE "I
by Murray in 1912, and again as late as 1924. It does
not seem to have ocourred to anyone that a more flexible
application of the laws might have saved the chiefs, or that
alternative sanctions might have been found.
About 1907 Bellamy also began systematically enforcing
the Regulation providing for the compulsory planting of
coconuts. This was again opposed by the chiefs, for it made
nuts available to commoners whereas they had a traditional
monopoly of all nuts in the islands; being able to make
gifts of coconuts was one of the privileges of high rank.
The effects of oompulsory planting were not felt for seven
or eight years, when the trees came into bearing; but it was
a constant source of friction between the Administration and 
52
the chiefs. It was common for chiefs to be made culpable
51) R. 1906-7, p.14; Murray, op.cit., pp.244-5; Murray to 
Sec. Canberra (answering Pitt-Rivers* criticisms on the 
destruction of traditional authorities) 11.7.1924.
CPI.V.16/32/1.
52) Austen, loc.cit., p.19. In July 1913 Bellamy assembled 
the chiefs, to give them some *plain speaking' on the
Regulation - Losuia P.R. 2/1913-4.
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one occasion Bellamy mentions having 'made himself unpleasant'
54
to a particularly prominent man to secure 'co-operation'.
The destruction of the chiefs' monopolies was not 
entirely of the Administration's doing, Austen had pointed 
out that the introduction of steel tools gave the commoners 
added independence, for it made their cultivation of the 
chiefs' gardens less onerous and time-consuming; moreover, 
the pear 1-traders often paid conwioners in pigs and betel-nut, 
also formerly restricted to the chiefs. In retrospect 
Austen regretted that these facts were not realized, and
er
that nothing was done to bolster the chiefs' authority.
In point of fact, the Administration before the first world
war made it policy to destroy these monopolies. Bellamy
described an instanoe from N.E. Kiriwina, vihere the chief
of Kaibola tried to retain his privileges; he was told that
the government no longer permitted them.
He replied, "Government gaga", which means badtg6 
No doubt it is from his view-point.
The Trobrianders were put in the position of having to
53) Losuia P.R. 4A913-4. Nov. 1913.
54) Losuia P.R. ref.I81/14. June 1914. Chief Vanoi Kiriwina, 
said to be the second chief in the Trobriands.
55) Austen, loc.cit., pp,19-23,
56) Losuia P.H. 2/1916: 15,3,1916. Murray of oourse 
believed it useless artifically to bolster customs 
(H, Murray, Papua of Today, p.244),
53for the non-planting of nuts in their villages^ ; and on
236
choose between customary loyalties and government law*
There was a very direct instance of this at Obulaku, where 
the chief was wanted for an offence, but hid in the bush. 
Bellamy secured the 'moral assistance* of his villagers in 
capturing him by making them cut tracks and plant coconuts 
until he was given up: 'after some days enthusiastic
planting their one wish was to get him in and for me to get
.57away.'
The chiefs quickly ceased to play any active part in 
administration. Bellamy generally maintained social 
relations with them while on patrol, aid thoae within reach 
regularly visited the government station to report on the 
weather or the state of the gardens? but there was little
RQ
beyond this. Yet Malinowski, writing of the period 1915-8,
remarked of the Trobriand Chief:
... the remnants of his power are still surprisingly 
large, even now, when white authorities, very 
foolishly and with fatal results, do their utmost to59 
undermine his prestige and influence.
The Trobriands, as distinct from every other part of
Papua, at least had the mixed blessing of continuity of
staff. Bellamy was the A£.M. until 1916 v-hen he was
57) Losuia P.R. 1/1913-4: 7.8.1913.
58) Losuia Station Journals, 10.8.1912, 1.5.1915. On 
occasions chiefs were warned to assist in the capture 
of offenders, e.g. Sinakata, Oct. 1911, ibid.
59) B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Paoifio, p.63.
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succeeded by a former Medical Assistant named Whitehouse,
who remained until 1928« Whitehouse had no academic
leanings and believed in administration strictly by
regulation; soon after his arrival he wrote wonderingly of
the strange social system on Kiriwina, but for him it was
60largely an anachronistic curiosity* He regarded
’superstition and custom' as the enemies of good government,
and listed the important duties of a patrol as (i) the
medical examination of the natives; (ii) the sanitary
arrangements of the village; (iii) the improvement of
housing; and (iv) the supervision of tracks and planting of
61coconuts. He had little time for the chiefs' exclusive
claims to land ownership, which held up coconut planting.
When dealing with the claims of the chief at Lobua, in
N.W. Kiriwina, he wrotei
I instilled into his head the fact that a new order 
of things existed and that he was to bring his 
troubles to Losuia when every effort would be 
exercised to bring about a satisfactory and agree-gg 
able settlement to such troubles.
The chief of course realized that a 'satisfactory and 
agreeable settlement' would mean the abrogation of his 
traditional rights*
In many respects Whitehouse found conditions more
60) See Losuia P.E. 7/1916-7, April 1917.
61) Losuia P.E. 1/1981-2, May 1922.
62) Losuia P.R. 4/1920-1, August 1920. Ths chief is 
described as 'the Claimant'.
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congenial in southern Kiriwina, where the status of the
chiefs was relatively low* He reported that the village
constables exercised all the authority vested in them, and
that 'the villagers realise that the Government is a living
63
foroe and regard it as such* • So far had the appointment
of native officials departed from the concepts of indirect
rule, however, that in 1921 the V.C. of Vakuta Is. was not
64
a Trobriander but a Suau native*
About 1923-4, however, Whitehouse began to take a rather 
kinder view of the chiefs, particularly those *fao seemed 
sympathetic to the government's objects and affected 
attitudes of dignified gentility* There were probably two 
reasons for this change» firstly, the anxiety that began to 
agitate Murray and some of his offioials, that the 
fashionable doctrines of indirect rule were not in fact 
being applied in Papua, and that this had or might have 
undesirable social consequences; and seoondly, the growing 
conviction that the willing co-operation of the chiefs, 
particularly in making land available for the new Native 
Plantations, might be very useful* On the social aspect, 
the ohiefs were reported to be just as worried as the
63) Losuia P*H. 36/1919-20* Also southern V.C.s oommended 
in P.E. 3/1916.
64) Losuia P.R. 3/1921-2* The natives resented him as an 
'outsider*, and he was replaced on this patrol by an 
ex-A.C. Some of these V.C.s had extensive districts to 
supervise - the V.C. of Kaileuna Is. had ten villages, 
303 huts, 843 people to look after (P.R. 1/1921-2).
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Administration at the deoline in population in the
65Trobriands 5 and it had already become apparent that
unless the chiefs willingly made land available, there was
no hope of inducing the people to prepare plantations, a
task which had proved sufficiently difficult elsewhere.
In October 1923 Whitehouse spoke of the chief of Kapwapu
as a capable man vàiose sole ambition was to work with the
government. 'The general tone of the villages is superior
to other villages whose chiefs are lax or # 10 have only a
67
commoner as headman.' Again, writing of Kaduwaga village, 
Whitehouse wrote1
The natives of this village are superior to the 
general run of Kaileunians, and are under the 
control of a "chief” who is living up to his station 
in life, with that quiet dignity and person adorn­
ments which denote his rank.
He professes an aotual interest in the welfare of 
his subjects and the demands of the government and 
to this end he is willing to hand over a section of 
good coconut land for cultivation as a native reserve..,'
65) Losuia Journals 1/25/45x 28.10.1925.
6 6) e.g. see Losuia P.R. 9/1924-5} Journal 8/25/451 
14.11.24. The difficulty with Native Plantations in 
the Trobriands was that money was available from 
pearling and beche-de-mer; nevertheless the Adminis­
tration, with scant concern for local conditions, 
persisted in attempts to set up plantations. The first 
copra in the group was made in 1925 - see Murray's 
comment, Losuia P.R. 6/1925-6. Deo. 1925. To some 
extent the neglect of the ohiefs was attributed to the 
chiefs themselves} in Report 1926-7, p.46, they were 
said to be realizing the importance of 'taking an 
interest in the agricultural activities and social 
organization of their people.'
67) Losuia P.R. 2/1923-4. Oct. 1923.
6 8) Losuia P.R. 3/1923-4* 6.12.1923.
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However, where a ohief insisted on his traditional 
prerogatives, to the frustration of government plans, 
Whitehouse’s irritation knew no bounds. Having unsuccess­
fully tried to persuade To'uluwa to make land available for 
a Native Plantation, he wrote: 'Thus progress is again
go
retarded by the lies ofihis powerful old fool,'
(v) Consequences of Direct Rule and a Reversal of Policy,
Perpetually lying just below the surface was the
determination to *get things done', even at the expense of
the agencies whereby this was to be accomplished. This was,
and remained, a fundamental tension in the Administration;
but after 1923 some attempt at least began to strike more
of a balance. Sudden and intense concern appears in the
patrol reports at the deoline of custom and particularly in
the eroding of the marks and privileges of rank. The
Administration for example had been trying to promote the
building of long, rectangular houses in place of the
traditional ones; but it was found that the chiefs began
70to build the same houses as commoners. This polioy was 
reversed, and the A.R.M. went around the island telling the 
chiefs, in the hearing of their villagers, that Murray
71wanted them to build again on the traditional pattern.
69) Losuia P.R. 7/1925-6; 30.1.1926.
70) Losuia P.R. l/l923-4{ Sept. 1923.
71) Losuia P.R. 9-10/25/26} 22.3.27.
Murray, again, warmly welcomed the revival of traditional
72canoe-building.
As a corollary, an awareness beooraes apparent, in the 
reports, that the old policy of direct administration had 
failed, because the people were declining in numbers and 
becoming more discontented and disorderly* The young men 
were said to have become sceptical towards the traditional 
beliefs; at the same time it was remarked that the qualities 
of dignity and reserve had been lost, and that disrespect­
ful attitudes had developed* The Administration clearly
was worried that these attitudes applied to it as well as 
73to the chiefs. The village of Tokwaukwa was cited as one 
of the few villages left in the Trobriands vifoere real 
contentment still reigned, and this was attributed to the 
fact that there had been relatively little disturbance 
caused by European oontact, and that native law was still 
administered by the chief.
Institutional openings for the ohiefs were provided with 
the introduction of the village councillor and assessor 
systems. Moreover, Murray was able to report to Canberra 
in 1928 that the insuperable obstacles to the appointment
72) Losuia P.R. 12/25/27, Sept. 1927.
73) Losuia Stat. Journal, Nov.1923; P.R. 9/25/28: 23.2.28.
74) Losuia P.R. 6/25/26. Nov. 1926. This village belongs 
to a sub-clan of Tabalu rank - see Powell, loc.cit., 
pp.122-3.
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in 1924, had suddenly been overcome and that of the 14
V.C.s in the Trobriande 9 had hereditary powers, 5 being
75
Toliwaga chiefs.
The factor ràiioh most influenced a local ohange in
administrative methods, however, was the replacement, in
1928, of Whitehouse by A.C. Rentoul as A.R.M. The new
offioer, Rentoul, immediately toured the island, urging
the villagers to give due honour and restore the old
privileges to their chiefs. He concluded that men of rank
had a better chance of success as village constables: at
(¿umilababa he dismissed the commoner who was the V.C.,
describing his position as ten unenviable one', and appointed
76in his stead a member of the Malasi totem clan* At
Kavataria he suggested to chief Tugalai and the villagers
that Tugalai should become the village constable, and the
suggestion was welcomed*
No better way, said Rentoul, can be found of 
governing the people than by taking advantage
of chiefs as village constables, which he had confirmed
75) Murray to Sec. Canberra, 28.6.1928. CPI.V. 16/32/4.
76) Losuia P.R. 2A929-30: 25.7.1929.
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of their already established system of feudal«^ 
adrainistrat ion.
It was a question of restoring it rather than of simply
using it, however. The status in particular of To'uluwa
of Omarakana had declined sadly. To what extent this was
due to his age and personal unpopularity, or to the
processes of culture ohange, or to his neglect by the
Administration, it is impossible to assess. But oertalnly
the Administration's neglect was important, as Rentoul was
able to demonstrate. Whitehouse had tried to induce
To'uluwa's nominal subjects to rebuild his food house« in
78
1927, but had not persisted. Rentoul was more determined. 
He brought together the old To'uluwa and Uwoilasi, Toliwaga 
chief of Toboada and successor to Moliasi in authority» 
and gave offioial recognition to To'uluwa as Paramount 
Chief. He cast shame on the assembled natives for letting 
To'uluwa's food-houses rot, and persuaded them to agree
77) Losuia P.H.1/1928-9s 9.11.1928. The chiefs had them- 
selves already realized the advantage of being V.C. 
in some areas. At Vakuta, where admittedly chieftain­
ship was comparatively weak, chief Debudebu was made 
a councillor in May 1927, but in December he asked to 
be made Y.C., for 'without a Government uniform the 
people ignored his oommands. * - Losuia P.R. 12/25/27: 
18.5.27: 4/25/28: 6.12.27. Thereafter, even where 
the chief was not himself appointed V.C., he was con­
sulted in the appointment: in 1932 before appointing 
a V.C. at Kabwaku the A.R.M. discussed the matter 
with the powerful Toliwaga chief of Toboada, who 
controlled the villages. Losuia P.R.4/1932-3: 17.10.1932.
78) Losuia P.R. 13/25/27: 28.5.1927.
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that if houses of half the existing capaoity were built,
they would fill them with the first fruits of the garden.
He also recommended that the Administration pay To'uluwa
79a »small grant1 of 1 lb, of tobacco per month. Yet
Rentoul was not hopeful about redeeming the situation,
which he bluntly attributed to the Administration's un-
discriminating proscription on sorceryi
Toulu has made a great fight to retain his failing 
authority, but it is too late now, for as soon as 
the Government set its face against the practice 
of sorcery, from that date the power of the chiefs 
began to wane, as was inevitable. Now there is 
beneficent as well as malignant sorcery, and it 
seems a pity that more discrimination was not used 
during the first impact between the Government and 
this intricated system of ohieftainship founded not 
altogether, but to a certain extent on the power of 
the sorcerer.
The fame of this Chief reaches throughout a great 
area in the Western Paoifio, he is an old man, and 
compared with his former greatness has little left80  
to subsist on.
On the question of the practical preservation of custom, 
Murray at this time, through correspondence with Fortune 
on Dobuan sorcery, with Malinowski on Trobriand burial 
rites, and with Pitt-Rivers on the undermining of 
traditional authority, was being pushed on to the defensive. 
In the correspondence with Fortune there is an insistence
79) Losuia P.R. 2/1928-9. Deo. 1928.
80) Ibid.
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on the Administration's reserve in acting against 
sorcerers.81
A complication in changing policy in the Trobriands,
however, was the militant anti-custom attitude of the
Methodist mission, which Rentoul had to overcome. The
mission, to Murray's mystification, had even withdrawn its
approval from the kula. in addition, of course, to
forbidding its adherents to practise polygamy and soroery.
The new policy of the Administration, therefore, involved
a repudiation not only of what it had done in the past,
82but of *hat the mission was still doing. The importance
of the mission's attitude could hardly be exaggerated, for
as early as 1907 it claimed to have converted half the
total population, aid by the late 1920s Mitakata, To'uluwa's
heir, had been persuaded to adopt monogamy, while the
mission's Fijian teacher dominated Omarakana. According
to Rentoul, the mission was not interested in showing
84
sympathy or support for Trobriands chieftainship ; it seems 
more probable that, like the Administration a few years 
earlier, it simply held inflexibly to its principles and
81) See Ch. II. OPI.V. 1 6 A V 1 0 »  16/41/4j 16/19/11.
82) Losuia P.B.11/25/28, May 1928 — Murray's comments 
appended. Actually there had been an increase in kula 
transactions, 1918-28.
83) S.E.D. Journal, annual report, Bonagai, 1906-7, type­
script p.6? Losuia P.R.11/25/28. May 1928: P.R.8/1929-30.
84) Losuia P.R.1/1928-9 : 9.11.1928.
trusted that God would smooth out the sooial repercussions.
Scrivin, the resident missionary, tried to persuade Murray
that the new approach promoted by the anthropologists was
unbalanced, and in particular that Malinowski was wrong in
saying that the practice of sorcery was indispensable to
85the ohiefs* power.
Both the Administration and the chiefs themselves, 
therefore, had to tread warily if attempts to restore the 
statue and the desirable functions of chieftainship were not 
to arouse the active opposition of the mission. It did not 
prove difficult,for example, to persuade the natives to 
bring food for To'uluwa againi in 1929, despite a bad 
harvest, his food houses were filled for the first time in
Q g
three years ; and after Mitakata*s accession a few months
87later enormous supplies of food were provided.
But the other props of his authority presented greater 
problems. Mitakata assured A.R.M. Austen that he had no 
wish to practise sorcery, for To'uluwa had lost the support 
of 'his more enlightened people' - clearly the mission-
Q O
educated element - through its use. Despite the mission
85) Scrivin to Murray, 29.8.192* . CPI.V. 16/14/20.
86) Losuia Journals, 21.8.1929.
87) Losuia P.R.l/l932-3i 22.8.1932.
88) Austen, Oceania, loc.cit., p.33.
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attitude, however, he found it expedient to take up 
polygamy, though he abandoned the custom of keeping his 
predecessors* wives, MacGregor had written of Enamakala*s 
wives, that *if the best features of all of them were 
united in one person, she would not make an attractive 
woman*• Mitakata adapted custom to allow him to marry
8 9
eight young girls. For this he was expelled from the 
mission. At the same time, he tried to stay on good terms 
with the mission so that he could retain the support of 
its converts. In 1937 he told a mass meeting of 
councillors and constables that he was glad that his people 
had accepted mission teachings, for *Churoh and Government 
both taught the same good laws of life*.®^
(vi) The Need to Reshape Custom.
The Administration, as its policy developed, showed 
that it was concerned with the re-shaping of custom rather 
than simply with its restoration; but to achieve this the 
incorporation of ohieftainship into the administrative 
structure was the prime desideratum. Murray wrote of 
Austen, A.R.M. during most of the 1930s, that *his polioy ... 
is to make what use he can of the power of the chiefs in 
forwarding the general welfare of the community; but he 
fully realizes the impossibility of keeping the commoners
89) E. 1893-4, p.20| Loeula P.B. 11A933-4s 1.3.34.
90) E. 1936-7, p. 28.
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in their former position of dependence# * Adaptation 
of the bases and functions of chieftainship was therefore, 
Austen saw, essential# Austen claimed that this policy 
in itself was a major factor in the revival of chieftain­
ship: that is, that it survived at all only through 
deliberate adaptation -
Little by little the commoners began to realize 
that their chiefs were being treated as people in 
authority, and the Government was deferring to 
them in small matters, and allowing them with the 
help of the Councillors to advise in minor matters 
affecting them as a whole. The native missionaries, 
too, who had at first no desire to see the 
authority of the chiefs reinstated, began to see 
that the Government was not working against them, 
and where they were chiefs with authority, they 
themselves might gain more ground in their workup 
with such chiefs on their side*
This rapprochement between the Administration and the
chiefs was largely achieved through the institution of
village oounoillors. Initially these were appointed on
Vakuta island, where it was found, after five months
without a village constable, that the headmen of the
villages were capable of keeping order; the A.R#M. thought
that they could be constituted into an informal oounoil,
with the chief as an appointed councillor - an added
incentive was the Administration's anxiety to promote a
93native Plantation. In the north it was found, for example,
91) R. 1933-4, p.25.
92) Austen, Oceania. loc.oit.. p.22.
93) Losuia P.R.13/25/27I 18.5.27i 4/25/28: 5.12.1927.
91
that when Chief Tobewaga of Kaduwaga had government
policy explained to him, he could 'readily formulate a
plan of aotion satisfactory to all concerned'♦ He was
94
made a councillor ; and during 1928 most of the chiefs
95in north Kiriwina were also appointed councillors. The 
special position of Mitakata posed a problem, for he 
objected that his appointment as councillor put him on 
the same level as other councillors who were his subjects, 
Murray and Austen agreed that he should be issued with a 
special badge inscribed with a simple crown; they believed 
that the granting of the badge would 'represent a real
96liaison between the Paramount Chief and the Government'«
Within each native district the District Chief aoted
as the chairman of an informal council, consisting of
himself and other councillors from the villages under his
control* Ivan Champion conceived the idea of a permanent
Council House in each district, and Austen agreed, primarily
because it would help to fix oouncil districts more or
less permanently; he felt that the chiefs' authority could
thus be contained within the district and channelled
through the councillors, and that this might overoome 'the
97difficulties of chieftainship based on polygamy'.
94) Losuia P.R. 10/25/28 « 23.2.28.
95) A.R.M. Losuia to Gov. Sec. 13.11.28. S.E.D.224/36/28.
96) Bwagoia S.E.D. to Gov.Sec. 295/25/32» Losuia 7.12.1932.
97) E.M. S.E.D. to Gov.Sec. 71/20/34. Then gradually, he 
hoped, the traditional method of extending authority 
would lapse.
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Austen also discussed with the district chiefs and 
councillors a compromise plan over betel-nut trees, the 
individual ownership of which by commoners militated 
against the traditional prestige of the chiefs. He thought 
that he could restore this, as well as increase the betel- 
nut supply. 98
The chiefs as councillors were thus made responsible
for adapting and redefining oustom, including their own
prerogatives. Indeed, this became their major funotion
and virtually their only active one; to the extent that
it reduced direct intervention by the Administration in
customary matters, government by regulation was mitigated.
For example, the Administration appealed to a councillors'
conference to stop the unhealthy burial customs which it
99had previously tried to stop through the courts. 
Unfortunately in this oase official patience was short s 
the A.R.M. quickly by-passed the chiefs and reverted to 
the practice of instructing the village constables to stop
"I OQ
it. Despite the intention to work by consultation with 
the chiefs, councillors, and other influential natives, 
ingrained methods and habits of mind tended to prevail,
98) Losuia P.E.6/1932-3. Deo. 1932.
99) Losuia P.fi.1/1930-1. July 1930.
100) Losuia P.E.7/1930-1« 1.12.1930.
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even with a man lilce Austen. Thus on one occasion we 
find him improving the gardens in Sinaketa by laboriously 
persuading the towosi (garden magician) to get the natives 
working longer; but on another occasion he is regretting 
that the concept of incest embodied in the relevant Native 
Regulation does not cover forme of incest common in the 
Trobriands. 1 0 1
It was in the judicial or arbitral sphere that the 
chiefs and councillors were able most effectively to assume 
responsibility from the Administration. Austen considered 
the council meetings, first and foremost, as informal 
court sittings dealing with customary disputes. As general 
policy, in 1929 Murray had sanctioned the experimental use 
of native assessors in the Courts for Native Matters; 
but the system quickly developed beyond that, as Murray 
himself later oonceded. In the Trobriands, at an early
stage it was envisaged that the councillors would act as
TOP
'a kind of jury*. By 1932 councillors were sitting as
1 0 3independent courts hearing civil disputes. Austen looked 
forward to the day when they could ’try oases other than 
civil cases*, but he stated that he was not prepared to
101) Losuia P.R.5/1932-3s Austen, Oceania, loc.cit., p.53.
102) S.E.D. Correspondence, Losuia 489/24/29.
103) Ibid., Losuia 77/36/32. Offioially, of course, 
they had no legal powers.
252
recommend that until he was sure the pov^r of the chiefs
104had recovered. He was quite definite that judicial
functions should be restricted to the chiefs, although he
believed that the average education of the commoners was
a little better.
The chiefs were first used, and were most useful, in
106
deciding the ownership of land. Austen summed up their
offioially sanctioned functions as being to -
discuss and determine all civil claims, including 
such matters as ownership of land and trees, 
matters relating to kula, payments due to a man 
on the remarriage of M s divorced wife, and any 
other minor disputes whioh could be settled outside, 
of a government oourt.
The chiefs continued, in addition, to act as assessors 
in the Courts for Native Matters, but by 1937 the 
Administration was coming to the conclusion that there 
they were less successful. The A.H.M. complained that in 
oases of assault and adultery their suggested sentences 
were coloured by their personal involvement - the almost 
universal failure to develop what Murray called the 
’judicial mind* - and that in cases of sorcery they usually
104) Ibid., Losuia 90/36/34. Dec.1934; Murray to Sec. 
Canberra, 28.1.35. CPI.V. 16/42.
105) Ibid.
106) e.g. Case at M'taua left to 8 'assessors1. On the 
same patrol a chief was appointed 'arbitrator* in a
land dispute between two villages - Losuia P.R.1/1933-4s 
20.7.1933. *We got them together to settle matters in 
their own way* - Austen, Oceania, loo.oit., p.49.
(vii) Limitations of the Paternal Conception.
In summary, there is no doubt that the prestige of the 
chiefs improved during the 1920s and 1930s under the 
Administration's umbrella; but, apart from the maintenance 
and application of custom, there was little soope for 
them in the Administration's scheme of things. Even the 
judicial functions which they assumed had no legal basis 
and were largely unofficial, in that they depended on the 
inclinations and discretion of an individual official. It 
is true that quarterly meetings of councillors took place 
at Losuia, but the object was fundamentally propagandist; 
they were opportunities to explain government policy. The 
councillors on oooasion were able to get the Administration 
to intercede to stop outside interference with custom, 
especially with the Kula; but even here the Administration 
appeared to regard the meetings as media whereby it could 
'eradicate bad customs' by discussion rather than compulsion. 
Austen said that he avoided forcing his views on these 
meetings 'unless absolutely necessary' - a significant 
qualification.
All legislative and executive functions remained with
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refused to name a sentence at all.
108) S.E.D. R.M. to Gov. Sec. 14.4.1937. S.E.D. 40/23/37.
109) S.E.D. Losuia 76/36/32; Circular 355/32 of 9.4.1932.
central government} the judicial and consultative functions 
exercised by the chiefs, although an advance, were still 
slight. By supporting the chiefs and a revival of custom 
the Administration had in fact prepared the ground for 
something on the lines of the British Native Authorities} 
but administrative preconceptions prevented any such 
devolution. The chiefs themselves complained that, as 
councillors, they had no authority. Because the chiefs 
were never delegated authority, they felt little 
responsibility for its preservation} it is no surprise 
that when the islands were evacuated in 1942 the traditional 
political concepts reasserted themselves, and Mitakata and 
the Toliwaga chief, Wailassi, entered into a compact whereby 
the former demanded wives and tribute from the villages to 
the south and west, while the latter plundered European 
property and those villages which had grown prosperous on 
European trade. 1 1 1
In 1945 Austen was still insistent that 'the Murray 
tradition' be continued in the Trobriands; the watchword 
he said, was 'Go slow'. The native desired no radical
110) S.E.D. Losuia 41/23/37 (Journals).
111) Powell, op.cit., p.142.
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change, and wished only to return to fa normal native 
life1* Over a long period of time native society would 
absorb democratic ideas. The white official would again
be looked to respectfully for native welfare and just
I I Padministration.
112) Austen, Oceania, loo.oit., pp.58-60. He repeats 
the fallacy popularised in the 1920s that sudden 
change would cause a collapse of native society 
and depopulation. In the period 1945-60 there was 
no attempt at gradual adaptation5 so that fitting 
the Chiefs into local government will probably 
present greater problems than in Tanganyika. The 
lack of educated men and minimal functions of N.I.G. 
may offset, however.
AUSTRALIAN DOMINANCE. AND THE WAR. 1940-6.
(i) Australian Control
In 1938 Sir Hubert Murray told Basil Hall that Papua was 
due for a complete re-orientation of ideas, after he left 
the ©cane,1 But as Sir Hubert had trained his nephew and 
successor, Mr. Leonard Murray, over a period of more than 
thirty years, it is impossible to say how he envisaged such 
a re-orientation occurring*
Sir Hubert had effectively kept the shaping of policy» 
as well as the direction of government, largely within his 
own hands. His prestige was immense: in the 1920 3 he had 
been secure enough publicly to challenge the application of 
the Navigation Aot to the Territory. It would almost appear, 
however, that the Federal government had been waiting for 
Murray's death to strengthen its control. In 1940 a number 
of amendments was made to the Papua Act (1905-34), which 
signified this trend. The title of the Lieut• -Governor was 
changed to Administrator; the appointment and suspension of 
officers of the Territory's Service were specifically trans­
ferred to the Governor-General (in praotice, the Minister) 
(Sections 17-18); and Section 33A was amended to provide that
1) Basil Halit The Murray System and the War, The Australian 
Quarterly. t V T T T T ^ & f ; p T S E --------- -------------- --
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Minutes of Legislative Counoil meetings were to be sent
, g
as soon as practicable to the Minister# Lewis Lett has 
remarked that Leonard Murray was made * subject in all
3
things to the dictates of Canberra*.
Enquiring into the state of affairs in Port Moresby in 
January-February 1942, Mr. Justice Barry complained that 
•reference to Canberra was regarded as essential before any 
decision of real gravity was taken*| matters of *real gravity*
4
seem to have encompassed all but the most routine decisions.
Paradoxically, however, the Commonwealth continued in
practice to be apathetic torards its responsibilities. The
Department of External Territories was not created until
June 1941| and even then it was administered by the
Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department!
It is no over-statement to say that until the geo­
graphical existenoe of New Guinea was forced upon 
Australians by the grim possibility of imminent 
invasion, the Territories were considered as areas 
so remote from Australian life that they rarely^ 
entered into political consideration.
2) R. 1941; p.5} Commonwealth Aots, (No.47 of 1940), XXXVIII, 
1940, p•8 2•
3) L. Lett in J.R.A.H.S.. XXXIV, 1949, p.144. Lett at this 
time employed in the Gov. Seo*s office; he may there­
fore be regarded as reliable here#
4) Barry Report on the Cessation of Civil Administration in 
1942, para.174. Cf. L.P. Malr: Is the British Colonial 
Empire Becoming Centralized? South Paolflo. II, 8 .1948f 
p. 155: coordination at V/esiminster.
5) Barry Report, ibid. At the time Barry reported (1945),
Mr. E.J. Ward was both Minister for !Bansport and Minister 
for External Territories - the former was always listed 
first#
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In Barry’s view this led the Papuan Administration to 
a re-assertion of autonomy# particularly in native affair®. 
This resulted in a disastrous break with the military 
authorities in the orltioal days of February 1942« Had 
Leonard Murray decided to co-operate» he could have - and in 
Barry’s view, should have - continued to control native 
affairs; but he put his experience at the service of the 
Commandant only on 14th February» eight days after the 
Commonwealth decided to suspend civil administration» Conflict 
between instructions issued by the War Cabinet and by the 
Department of External Territories added to the oonfusion.6 
By that time a condition bordering on anarohy had developed
7
amongst the natives» as government authority broke down*
(ii) ANGAU and Wartime Administration
The war seemed to have a revolutionary effeot» not only 
on the local native populations, but also on the attitudes 
of Australians towards the Territory. In the long view, 
however» it can now be seen that revisions of attitudes in 
New Guinea and in Australia were not as profound as they 
seemed shortly after the war. Nevertheless, the natives
6) Ibid.» paras. 179» 181-2. Comments of 'Sydney Morning 
Herald1. 2.6.1945» reporting the presentation of the 
Report to Parliament. The War Cabinet decided on a 
•call-up’ in the Territory; but the Dept, stated that 
'essential services' and 'civic activities' should 
continue.
7) D. McCarthy: Pacific War. First Year, p.43.
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were brought into contact with Europeans and Asians at war 
with one another, and they were shown the massive power of 
modem technology.® Administratively, ANGAU, the civil 
branch of the wartime Administration, brought men with fresh 
minds into touch with problems of native welfare and 
adminis trat ion•
Because of Leonard Murray's attitude, and the chaos in 
Port Moresby in February 1942, all civil as well as military 
affairs were brought under the control of Brig.-Gen. Morris, 
the military Commandant. Early in March he created the 
Papuan Administrative Unit, under Elliott-Smith, the former 
R.M. at Samarai, and a similar New Guinea Unit. These were 
merged on 21st March to become ANGAU, Initially, ANGAU had 
to maintain law and order, provide requirements for the 
fighting services, and try to keep up the production of war 
materials, notably copra and rubber. It also had to look 
to the welfare of the native population, and to maintain 
medical services; eventually medical services were better 
than those provided pre-war, though offset to some extent by
Q
the results of bad labour conditions and over-recruitment.
8 ) Malinowski has recorded the bewilderment of the Trob- 
rianders during World War I, as they tried to reconcile 
accounts of the war with government proscriptions on 
fighting amongst themselves, and with the mission 
advocacy of brotherhodd - Crime and Custom, p.83, note 1.
9) McCarthy, op.clt., p.43 - Malr says ANGAU was created in 
Aprils Australia in New Guinea, p.185; also on pp.186-91, 
197. J.K. Murray, The Provisional Administration, p.23.
2C0
Thus, instead of making provision only for those 
matters over and above normal administration, Morris had 
to create an entirely new organization which could oope 
with all these functions. ANGAU was divided into three 
sections: Field Services (later called District Services); 
Production Services; and a Native Labour Service. District 
Services, however, became responsible for recruiting - 
indeed, a study of such reports as are accessible indicates 
that this became its major task.10
An unavoidable result of the inadequacy of the two 
Administrations before the war was the recruitment into 
District Services of a considerable proportion of men who 
had had no previous experience in New Guinea; on the figures 
quoted by Mair, 32$.11 This involved some minor administrative 
mistakes, but it was salutary in cutting across the in- 
breeding and parochialism of the Papuan service in 
particular.
An example of native administration during the war is 
given by the Western Division, which had always had a high 
rate of labour recruitment and was most remote from the 
fighting areas. Reports reveal that much the same pattern
10) Barry Report, paras. 187-94. Mair, ibid. pp.185-6.
11) Mair, ibid., p.194. It is regrettable that no history 
of ANGAU is planned by the war historians. In the 
official histories the Native Labour Section is 
prominent, because the making of roads by natives 
figured largely in the campaigns - e.g. McCarthy, op. 
cit., p.581: the Edie Creek-Bulldog road. But the 
areas only indirectly affected by war are of no interest 
to the chroniolers of campaigns.
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of patrolling was continued, but that the officers were 
instructed to ooncentrate on serious orime and on the 
prevention of unrest, while ore of the major functions of 
every patrol was the recruiting of labour.
Warrant Officer Hicks, on a patrol to the Morehead River 
area in July 1943, had to pay all the V.C.s, make enquiries 
about the incidence of V.D., distribute seed corn, and 
obtain twelve natives for work at Daru. His report is as 
comprehensive as those of the pre-war period. His superior 
found time to reprimand him for wrongly applying the law 
against adultery (N. Reg. 82); extensive tutoring in the 
field had been common before the war - as a system of cadet­
ship and training was lacking it could hardly have been
Ip
otherwise. A further interesting aspeot of this report
is the revelation of the sensitive feelings of the pre-war
officers, a major post-war factor. Major Leo Austen, one
of Murray's R.M.s, reacted strongly to a comment that this
13area had 'evidently been neglected in the past*.
A further patrol to the Suki Creek area in October 1943 
had as its objects the arrest of a murderer and the warning 
of the native population about serious orime - there had
12) Daru PR 3A943-4 j 3.8.43-3.9.43. D.O. Capt. Paithorn 
to ANGAU H.Q. 27.9.43, attached P.R. Prom the viewpoint 
of native relation it was unfortunate that, beoause of 
the discontinuance of the Civil Administration, all 
officers should have become military officers.
13) Ibid., attached comments by Austen, dated 5.11,43. Lt, 
Col. Taylor, a/A.D.D,S. to D,0, Daru, 8.10,43, H,Q.
DS 1155/43,
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been reports of unrest, The instructions on recruiting
are illuminating:
On the return journey recruit natives from the 
villages of Pisarami, Asarami, Sapara and Aduru 
on the Fly River. You will, probably, find these 
natives difficult to contact. On the up journey 
the V.C.s of these villages are to be told in no 
uncertain manner that all able-bodied natives are 
to be paraded before you on the return journey.
A reliable A.C. may be dropped for that purpose.
It was unfortunate for the new, young officers, and for
the post-war service, that necessarily they had to work in
an atmosphere of ooercion and oonscription, Through the
search for labour however, the administrative repercussions
of the war, on the natives, were profound and far-reaching.
As is remarked elsewhere (Appendix C, II), ANGrAU even
penetrated the remote Tari basin in the search for recruits.
Dr, Mair has commented on the sympathetic attitudes towards
the natives of the troops with whom these natives served -
quite different from those of the pre-war offioials and
settlers.15
There were even AMJAU officers who came to appreciate 
the native attitude to the war, rather than proclaiming 
♦treachery* whenever a native treated Australians and Japanese 
alike. Capt. G.R, Whittaker, felt sufficiently
strongly to write direct to the Minister on the subject, 
explaining that many natives tried to be neutral, and gave
14) D.O. Faithorn to W.O. Rich (who also calls himself 
•patrol officer»), 24.9,43, Daru PR 5/1943-4,
15) Mair, op.oit,, pp, 201-2,
2G3
information impartially to both sides; the native, he 
said, is *a gentleman and during times of war is too 
truthful'.16
Nevertheless, most natives unquestioningly served the
allies when called upon. The native labourers earned the
affection of the troops by their prodigious efforts on low
rations; and it was reported that the village constables
17
had been ’loyal* without exception.
(iil) The Post-War Reaction
It was inevitable that, after the war, tensions would 
develop. The Administration naturally conceived its 
functions largely in pre-war terms; while many of the 
natives had new ideas and conceptions, and looked forward 
to something better. Unfortunately, amongst the 
Administration there was some bitterness over wartime 
»native misdeeds1 i several Binandere were hanged for 
betraying a party of fleeing missionaries (a fact still not 
forgotten) but in addition there would appear to have been 
numbers of local ’investigations1 of suspected collaboration* 
In 1946 the Department of District Services felt it 
necessary to bring out an instruction proscribing further 
post-mortems and urging officers to forget the past and to
16) G.R. Whittaker to E.J. Ward, 7 .1 .4 5 .  CP 141. N .8 1 5 A A i
17) Hall, loo.oit., p.71. Hall felt that the V.C.s had 
earned the right to greater trust and responsibility.
* Such liberal sentiments were far from general; see ANGAU Conference, 
1944 - CP763, set 4.
assisted the enemy were still to be refused war compensation,
so that ’preliminary investigations• of alleged oollabo-
18rators were still sanctioned.
Positively, there was still a ourious obliqueness in 
the administrative approach to expressed native aspirations. 
The more sophisticated natives felt thatf although they 
might get compensation to rebuild their houses and remake 
their gardens, ultimately they were simply going back to 
the pre-war stagnation. These people had desires, sometimes 
far-fetched, for economic and social development; but the 
Administration's appreciation of these aspirations was in­
adequate. Cultist reactions must be attributed at least 
partly to this Administration failure.18®
The Manus natives, led by Paliau, wanted the Americans 
to take over their administration because they felt that 
they were simply going to revert to being work-boys, whereas 
they wanted education and a positive role and lead in 
development. The Administrator called for a speoial effort 
there, but his emissary, the Director of District Services, 
showed a failure to appreciate the justice of much that the 
natives claimed. When they pointed out the failure to give 
them education, he replied that natives had beoome success­
ful artisans and olerks without education, and that such a man 
drawing £8 per month was really as well off as a European
18) D.D.S.& N.A., C.I 27/1946-7, 30.10.1946, _  t
18a) Post-war policy was foreseen merely in terms of 'Native Welfare' - see 
ANGAU Conference, 1944> II? CP763, set 4«
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encourage the natives to do so; but natives who actively
265
on six times as much.
in 1948, Mr. J.R. Halligan, Secretary of the Department of
External Territories, similarly fobbed off native complaints
that changes they had been led to expect during the war had
not materialised. The Porebada councillor said that when
the Minister visited his village in 1944 he had promised
that after the war they would be like the white man, enjoying
the same benefits. Why had this not come about?
Mr. Halligan said that he had aocompanied Mr. Ward 
on that trip in 1944 and he was very glad to know 
that the native people had remembered the visit. He 
said he would tell Mr. Ward that the people had 
remembered the previous time he was in the Territory 
and he hoped that when he oame up to the Territory«q 
again the people would see him again.
Granted that the natives may have been led or deluded 
into expecting a good deal during the war that was impossible 
of fulfilment, yet with Administration understanding, more 
adequate compromises might have been possible in the post­
war period. The repercussions of pre-war attitudes are 
described in the following chapters.
19
At a conference of village councillors in Port Moresby
19) J.K. Murray to Gov.Sec. 25.2.1947; D.D.S.&N.A. J.H. Jones 
to J.K. Murray, 9.4.1947. CP.141. Y 840/1/1. Also of. 
the Tommy Kabu Movement in the Papuan Gulf - R.F. Maher: 
Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta. Oceania, xxix,
2, Dec.19^8, pp. V5-90. The fact -that they were simply 
going to revert to pre-war stagnation was precisely the 
argument the natives used with the Americans, when 
asking to be placed under the U.S. - Conference between 
Cmdr. Baker and Luluals. 22.8.1946.
20) Minutes of meeting, 24.9.48, CP 141. AR. 840/l/l*
Numbers of practical points were raised by councillors» 
e.g. the delay in cooperatives legislation; pleas for 
water supplies; complaints about delays in works; and 
low wages for wharf labourers.
CHAPTER V
m approach.to ,
1» The Abandonment of the Native Authority Concept.
Dr* Lucy Mair has remarked that in 1946 it was proposed 
that ’institutions on the lines of the African Native 
Authority system, in so far as this is applicable to very
In September, 1945 the anthropologist H.I. Hogbin, whose 
studies in the British Solomon Islands had partly been 
responsible for the decision to set up councils and courts 
there, expressed the hope that ’the newly established 
Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea will be
as fully alive to its responsibilities and follow the
2
example of its enlightened neighbour.*
(1) The Anthropological Approaoh*
^  Hogbin was one of the group whioh oame together under
/ ANGAUJand was later associated with the Australian School 
of Pacific Administration. It was well known that this 
group had the ear of the Minister, Mr* E.J* Ward, in the 
shaping of policy to a greater extent than his own
1) L.P* Mair, Australia in New Guinea« pp*229-30*
2) Oceania. XVI, Sept* 1945, p.61*
small political units, should be introduced generally*'1
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Department* This was a situation viewed with extreme
disfavour in the Territory, where senior officials felt
that they were being dictated to by a dedicated visionary
p a
advised by impractical idealists*
It was probably inevitable that Hogbin should have been 
responsible for the suggestion that the essentials of the 
Native Authority system be applied in New Guinea; though 
his continued and active promotion of the suggestion was 
certainly a tactical blunder* Hogbin had seen British 
African precedents adapted and applied in the British 
Solomons, in social conditions closely resembling those in 
New Guinea* In 1944 he spent about six months in the 
village of Busama in the Huon Gulf, with the objeot of 
studying the nature of village leadership and the manner in 
which the appointed native officials used their powers* He 
found that the paramount luluai in Busama, Bumbu, had 
tyrannised over the village for more than twenty years, 
under the cloak of government office, and that he had been 
supported uncritically by a succession of government 
officers*^
2k) The policy struggle between the 'Murray tradition' group 
(settlers and old officials) and the Army Research 
Section (later A.S.O.P.A.) is too well known to need 
elaboration* See Sydney Morning Herald, 28*3*1946 (Dr* 
Mair), 10 *12* 1946 (attacking 'oiogisi* influence);
Pacific Islands Monthly, Nov. 1946, pp.72-3 (policy 
supported by missions)9 May 1947, p.8 (opposed by 
business interests); also attack on Army Research Section 
by T.W. White, H. of R*, 1*5*1947, Hansard, Vol.191, pJ816.
3) H.I. Hogbin: Local Government for New Guinea, Oceania. 
XVII, 1, Sept. 1946, p.44.
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The traditional pattern of individual leadership had 
collapsed, for reasons familiar throughout the Territory; 
raiding had been forbidden by the government, the worship 
of the old gods had been given up under mission influence, 
and the opportunities for displays of wealth had disappeared 
when a cash economy replaced the former extensive trading 
expeditions. The only form of resistance to Bumbu had come 
from three or four elders, most of whom had been mission 
teachers, and who, through the mission, kept up the tradition 
of village assemblies. The mission had become a rallying 
point, for Bumbu had been suspended from membership for 
immoral conduct. Meetings at the mission were therefore 
free. The elders discussed matters concerning the mission, 
and also the modification of custom; in addition, they 
exercised some of the judicial functions \/rtiioh had 
traditionally been those of the village assemblies, though 
extending their jurisdiction to cover the Commandments and
4
the Native Regulations, as well as oustomary law.
In brief, Hogbin was at pains to show that even in New 
Guinea there were some traditional precedents for the 
essentials of the liative Authority system, that it oould act 
as a bulwark between over zealous or corrupt officials and 
the villagers, and that it would more effectively preserve 
law and order, administer justioe and promote welfare by
4) Ibid., p.51.
harnessing village opinion.
Hogbin found that after Bumbufs removal the people 
spontaneously reorganized their traditional oounoil 
(wolokulai). Under one of the elders - not always a luJaai - 
this also re-assumed judicial functions, not only over 
offences recognized only by themselves, such as laziness and 
seduction, but also over offences recognized by government, 
such as adultery and theft. Hogbin emphasised the importance 
of the informality of their procedure* initially complaints 
were taken to an elder, or to one of the two luluais, or to 
the mission teacher. A meeting of the wolokulai was then 
held before the assembled villagers. Great showmanship and 
oratory were used in presenting the cases; the crowd 
demonstrated emotionally as facts were brought out and
e
discussed by the elders, who eventually gave judgment.
Hogbin thus argued for the Native Authority system, and 
particularly for the judicial part of it, as something which 
the natives understood, in contrast to the alien procedures 
to which they had been subjected by the administration in 
the past. If this argument was framed to convert men in 
the Administration it could hardly have been more ill-designed, 
for it cut across the arguments on the subject put forward 
by Murray and others before the war, the premises of which
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5) Ibid., pp. 52-64
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remained part of Australian policy. These insist on a 
lengthy period of education in the principles and procedures 
of British justice before courts are instituted. The 
courts described by Hogbin, whether the natives favoured 
them or not, were seen as agencies of partiality, in whioh 
the protection of the individuals liberties was abandoned# 
Moreover, Hogbin»s insistence on traditional institutional 
precedents was unfortunate, in that it was easy for opponents
a
of the system to deny that these generally existed.
Unfortunately, he made little of the flexibility of the 
system in accordance with culture change (perhaps in 
retrospect in Africa its major feature ); though he did say 
that the Busama, in his view, had a better chance of making 
a success of their own courts than the Malaitans of the 
Solomon Islands, for they were more familiar with European 
ways and would therefore grasp the elements of procedure
o
igore easily. Moreover, the powers of the luluai and the 
jurisdiction of the court would need, he said, to be 
carefully delimited. Too little attention was paid to this 
aspect of the proposals.
6 ) See J.R. Mattess Native Courts, South Pacifio* X,5. pp.112-
. ................ ... . '......  21.
7) Haileys An Afrioan Survey (1956), pp.623, 630-4. Flexi­
bility is1 the- lceynotes "»it is its records (of the Native 
Court; that supply the most reliable authority for 
recording the modifications produced by the changing 
conditions of African society*.
8) Hogbin, loc.cit., p.64.
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(ii) Administration Reserve#
Hogbin*s plea for a statutory system of native councils 
and courts appeared in September 1946, while he was in the 
Territory consulting the Administration and the natives on
9
the subject, on the Minister’s behalf. It was a curious 
form of consultation, in that the Administration and the 
natives were told that the policy decision, to introduce 
both councils and courts, had already been taken, and that 
Hogbin, as *an emissary of the Minister' (in Chief Justice 
Phillips’ phrase10) was asking for advice merely on the best 
method of implementing the policy#
In that month Hogbin, accompanied by D#0. Watkins, 
attended a meeting called by the Hanuabada council to discuss 
the introduction of councils and courts. This council, 
though non-statutory, had been in existence since 1927, and 
its members represented the most sophisticated group of 
natives in the Territory. They had thoughtfully been 
issued in advance with a booklet on the system in the 
Solomon Islands, and had a prepared statement of what they 
wanted, put forward by Gavera Arua. According to Gavera 
and to Meia-Aru, the idea of councils and courts had been 
discussed amongst them for some years, and they had outlined
9) Notes and News, Oceania. XVII, p# 92#
10) Phillips to Administrator, 24.9.55. Law R. 41/451/55.
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proposals to Leonard Murray, the Administrator from 1940-2, 
on the subject. It was clear, however, that their 1946 
proposals were deeply influenced by the information they 
had from the Solomons. Gavera and his son Willie thought 
a beginning could be made by introducing a system of headmen 
and assistants (self-interest on the part of the Gavera 
family was undoubtedly involved here). It is notable that 
Meia-Aru put forward a view in the Murray tradition, seeking 
better education before Hanuabadans were appointed magistrates.
Gavera, however, summed up what was probably the majority 
feelingi
We, representing the people of Papua, do not want to 
be altogether free, but we want some part in the 
government of ourselves and our country. We want to 
run our own race ... We, the councillors, want some 
work to do ... actually we have very little to do at 
the moment ... we want the power to hold courts, have 
authority in respect of the affairs of the village of 
lianuabada, be taught hygiene and sanitation and etc.,, 
(sic). 11
Gavera bluntly asked the D.O. whether the government was
sympathetic towards their efforts for self-government. The
D.O. gave a guarded replyt
You can rest assured that His Honour and the 
Australian Government want you people to have local 
administration, and if you are ready for it, native 
courts presided over by a native magistrate. Sir 
Hubert Murray often said that it was the aim of his 
Administration that you would one day be masters of 
your own destiny, and attain full self-government.
His Honour thinks that the time has come for the 
beginning of the implementation of that policy of his1p 
predecessor.
11) Minutes of meeting (undated), D.O. Port Moresby 14/2.
12) Ibid.
self-government was seriously discussed by the natives
with the Administration.
Hogbin had throughout been careful to insist that, even
in Melanesia, there was an inherent need for something on
the lines of the Native Authority system. He told the
meeting that in the Solomons the plan had come from the
13people, not from the Administration.
Amongst Administration officers the proposals for native 
councils were not received unfavourably, Ae the Chief 
Justice saw it, the councils could be regarded as a natural 
development; the legislation would give recognition 'to 
institutions which native communities are ready for and
which they have been familiar with (in various less defined
\ 14forms) for a very long time.*
He did not admit that precisely the same argument could
be applied to the oourts, various semi-official forms of
which had functioned for some years, particularly in the
Mandated Territory. Administrative reaction to the native
courts proposal, could have been predicted. W.H. Humphries,
at that time the Director of Native Labour and formerly one
of Sir Hubert Murray's Resident Magistrates, regarded the
proposal for native courts as an attack on the basic objects
13) Ibid.
14) C.J. Phillips to Administrator, 10.11.46, D.S. 14/3/15 
Port Moresby.
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This meeting was probably the first occasion on which
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Humphries tried to bring the argument to the fundamental
question of assimilation. He was, he said, concerned to
learn that the Administration’s objectives were not 'one
law, one language, one people'. This was an argument
typical of Murray's officers, who regarded native custom
and English law as two absolutes which could be bridged -
and would be ultimately - only by education. There was
little conception of transitional stages, nor, despite the
lip-service paid to the blending of cultures, of the gradual
evolution of a socially adapted fora of common law.15
Are we still to have two legal systems, one for the 
white man and one for natives of this country in 
fifty or one hundred years time?
(This oonfused the legal system with systems of law). 
Humphries went further, claiming that the existing Courts 
for Native Matters were extremely popular, 'for both men and 
women resort to them on the slightest provocation’. He 
believed, following Murray, that the more advanoed natives 
had largely abandoned their own culture, and that what was 
left was of little value and was doomed to complete 
extinction. He denied that there was any traditional 
justification for native courts, and asserted that the
15) Memo. 'Suggested Establishment of Native Courts', 
Humphries to Administrator, 9.12.46* DS 14/3/15.
16) Ibid.
of the Administration; indeed, on 'the Murray tradition*•
government courts ’were designed to meet the needs and fill
a void in the lives of the people*, and that they had done
so* As an alternative, he wanted natives to be trained as
magistrates to sit in the existing courts vshere, free of
the ties of ’clanship interests and prejudice* they could
17administer true British justioe.
It was clear that the prinoiple of councile was widely 
accepted - though later considerable resistance developed in 
practice} therefore, objections to the native courts were 
the prime obstacle in the way of the Native Authority system. 
In view of the great importance attached to these courts 
as an integral - often the initial - part of the system in 
British colonies, this obstacle was extremely serious. In 
September Hogbin, in association with the Territory*s Crown 
Law Office, was hurriedly preparing Ordinances for con­
sideration whereby, said the Administrator,
the establishment of a few (perhaps six in all)
Courts in a tentative and initial way might be,R 
done. ±
The Native Courts Bill was destined never to become law#
On the 30th September the .Administrator sent the two draft
bills, for native councils and native courts, to the Chief
Justice for comment. Phillips felt himself to have been
placed in an invidious position, beoause, although he thought
17) Ibid.
18) J.K. Murray to Canberra, 12.9.46. CP 141. AQ.840/1/3.
ill considered, and premature1, he was not supposed to say
19so. Nevertheless, in two lengthy memoranda to the 
Administrator, dated the 11th October and 2nd December,
he expressed the view that if the native courts proposal
20were implemented at once it would result in disaster. He 
considered that the 'Kivungs* in the Mandated Territory 
before the war had functioned well in their 'municipal* 
role, but that they had failed lamentably as judicial bodies, 
because of extortion and corruption. He believed that there 
was only one forai of justice, and that native courts would 
not observe it. (It is for this reason that, in their early 
stages, native courts in British territories have been kept 
under administrative surveillance and out of the hande of 
professional lawyers). Phillips, like Humphries, wanted 
natives trained as magistrates for the existing courts; 
he quoted the American sociologist Reed to the effect that 
the natives accepted the courts.
Though no-one seems to have taken up the point, Phillip» 
quoted Reed out of context. Reed had said that the system 
of courts was 'readily understood when explained to the 
natives in simple terms'; but he was puzzled by the apparent 
acceptance by the natives, almost without question, of the
19) Chief Justice to Administrator, 24.9.55, cit.sup*
20) Chief Justice to Administrator, 11*10.46 and 2.12.46.
DS 14/3/15.
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the decision to establish native courts 'ill conceived,
j
Biropean authority to make and enforce laws. He came to
the conclusion that this derived from fear. Moreover,
Reed pointed out the difficulties of offioials dealing
with complex native disputes, the customary background to
21which was a closed book to them.
It is this feeling on the part of the natives that they 
are being arbitrarily subjected to alien laws which a 
native courts system is designed to overcome; and indeed, 
it was in these terms that the system had been welcomed in 
the British Solomons in 1940. This point was not taken up 
adequately in New Guinea in 1946.
Once the Chief Justice had been oonsulted, his 
opposition was a serious deterrent to the introduction of 
the system. Phillips interpreted a further submission by 
Hogbin (dated 26th October) in which Hailey, Lugard and 
Cameron were quoted, as an indication that polioy was not 
in fact fixed. He argued that the proposed Ordinance would 
have imposed native courts on native society. The latest 
memorandum led him to believe, he said, that the government 
was now considering the development of a native courts 
system from within. Though opposed to both systems, he
••
indicated that he preferred the latter, for he conceded 
that the natives had their own tribunals for settling
21) S.W. Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea, pp.173-4, 
177 note 46.
disputes; but, using delaying tactics and ’the diplomatic 
language of suggestion’ (as he described it to a 
sympathetic Administrator in 1955) he urged caution, arguing 
that it would be better on so important a matter to spend
time formulating policy rather than rueing an unsuitable
op
system later.
Two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee on Native 
Development and Welfare were held in January 1947, attended 
by the directors of the principal departments, and by Dr. 
Hogbin. The meetings were held to consider the proposed 
Native Authority system, but the results were inconclusive. 
Hogbin emphasised that the proposal was based on what had 
been done in Tanganyika, Kenya and the British Solomons, and 
was therefore thrice tested. He now proposed that the 
native courts initially would deal purely with customary law
22) Phillips memo, of 2.12.1946, oit.sup. Hogbin mentioned 
that in the Huon Gulf the Lutheran Mission for many 
years had run courts ’which functioned excellently’, 
and which imposed the penalty of suspension from church 
membership. Phillips remembered them in 1927-8 and 
said that according to the Lutheran missionaries a 
German district official had permitted the courts, and 
had allowed them to mete out severe penalties to trans­
gressors. A statement for the Permanent Mandates 
Commission (5.4.1932) mentions the Morobe councils 
and courts, which were 'dominated by the Lutheran 
mission'. As for the courts, it regarded this as an 
advantage. Where there were two or more missions, 
personnel would have to be selected 'with the gravest 
care'. CP 141. AQ 840/1/3.
in selected villages, and that their jurisdiction would 
be concurrent with that of the Administration’s courts 
for native matters. He stressed the fact that the first 
courts would be experimental, and that their powers would 
be gradually extended on the D.O.*s recommendation, only 
if they functioned well. He had some support from W.C.
Groves, the Director of Education, who said that in hie 
experience primitive courts definitely existed in New 
Guinea; and from J.R. Black, the Assistant Director of
District Servioes, one of the few men in New Guinea who had ^
23 / fU.
had colonial experience elsewhere# /^r-cfo*1*/ w "
(iii) Elaboration of the Proposed Courts.
Against this unsatisfactory background, the Administrator 
went ahead with the proposal for native courts. ’Notes to 
courts* on the lines of those long in use in British 
colonies were prepared. These explained the constitution, 
functions and duties of the courts in elementary terms. 
Generally, the oourts were intended to settle all oases 
concerning native custom, property, native marriage and 
divorce, and inheritance#
23) Meeting of 7.1.1947. D.S. 14/3A5. It is doubtful if 
J#K. Murray himself appreciated the grounds for the 
system - his reference in Admin, memo, of 8.9.47.
GH.2-1-1# In the Buka area, the luluais had regularly 
imposed fines - B. Blackwood, BothSides of Buka 
Passage, pp. 48-9#
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The Governmercfc knows that some villages now have 
their own courts where the big men of the village 
settle oases without going to the Government 
courts. If these are good courts and the people 
like them, the Government will make them proper ^  
village courts under the new law.
The natives knew that they were to get their own courts.
This was also the assumption in the Administration,
evidenced by the issue of a Circular Memorandum on 21.3.1947
dealing with their establishment?
The edifice of effective local government and small 
courts for village communities will be gradually 
built up on the indigenous authority where it has 
survived and, in its absence, on a committee of the «¡t 
dominant people who regulate village life.
The system initially was to be tied to the village, and
the proposal for instituting headmen was specifically
rejected as savouring of direct rule. The sentiments, like
the legislation, were borrowed directly from Cameron's
Tanganyika.26
During 1947 various amendments to the draft were made, 
to satisfy departmental critics and the Crown Law Office. 
Eventually the Interdepartmental Committee accepted all the 
technical and terminological amendments, and a final draft
24) ’Notes for Native Courts', DS. 14/3/15.
25) 'Proposed Village Courts and Village Councils Ordinance'.
26) D.D.S.&N.A. to Sec. Canberra, 25.10,48 (Terr. A 846/5/27) 
said the Ordinance principally used as a model was the 
Native Authority Ordinance of Tanganyika, as reprinted
in Cameron's Principles of Native Administration and 
their Application' (IffifoJ,' r
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w a s  submitted to the Administrator, for transmission to
27Canberra, in November 1947. By this time the draft of 
the Native Courts Ordinance had grown to sixteen foolscap 
pages and 46 sections, compared with the 25 sections of 
the corresponding British Solomons Regulation (Cap. 30/1942). 
The attempt to compromise with all the objections had 
produced a draft which had been framed to accord with legal 
rather than with administrative requirements. Legislative 
direction had replaced the administrative discretion of 
the British models. Opponents of the prinoiple of native 
courts had achieved a bill so cumbersome that protagonists 
of the principle would have found it unworkable. Efforts 
to avoid this impasse marked the later stages of the dispute.
Little need be said about the draft bill, except that 
one or two aspects indicate the trend of administrative 
thinking. Appellate jurisdiction was to be conferred on 
the Administration courts, with ultimate appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the native courts was to 
be parallel with that of the Administration’s courts for 
natives, so that either the litigants or the Administration 
could choose one system or the other. The jurisdiction of 
the proposed native courts was to be particularly carefully 
delimited on land questions} Mr. Justice Gore objected even
27) a/Crown Law Offioer to Administrator, 31.5.47. CLO 4/25} 
Minutes of Committee 18.8.47 ( D S  14/3/15); marginal 
note, draft, by E . B .  Bignold, 10.11.47.
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to this, on the remarkable ground that native land questions
28
would be too complicated for natives to deal with. This
comment in itself is indicative of the problems which those
favouring the Native Authority concept had to face.
When the draft bill reached the Department of External
Territories a further stream of amendments followed, notably
those seeking to make the provisions even more specific,
particularly on the matter of procedure. This was another
reflection of the influence of metropolitan precedents,
which at about the same time had made the Co-operatives
29
legislation farcical. Despite this, the Director of 
District Services still viewed the proposal for Native 
Courts as an integral and accepted part of the advance in 
native administration. In April, 1949 when propoeing a 
special Native Authorities Section to supervise the setting 
up of native councils and oourts he described it as 'one 
of the most important steps, if not the most important step, 
we have taken in connection with Native Administration',
28) R.T. Gore to Administrator, 16.8.48. Law R.21/145/48.
On appeal the Supreme Court was not to have the power 
of overrule 'provided that substantial justioe has been 
done by such court* (i.e. a native court). But who was 
to decide 'substantial Justice'?
29) Sec.Terr, to Admin. 21.6.48. Terr. A 846/5/27} C.L.O. 
to Gov.Sec. 13.11.48. CLO 4/25} a/Adrain. to Sec.Terr. 
20.1.49. CA 6/66; D.D.S.&N.A. to Sec.Terr. 4.4.49. DS 
14/3/15. The initial co-operatives Ordinanoe was drawn 
from N.S.W. legislation and was designed for both 
native and non-native organization®} for natives it was 
unworkable. Sec. statement by Minister Ward, South 
Pacific, III, 4, p.82.
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and as *a positive step in the process whereby the native 
people will advanoe towards the ultimate goal of self- 
government ' . ^
(iv) Policy Re-affirmed, 1949> Complementing the Councils.
The native people were similarly assured that the complete 
system would be introduced. The Director’s representative 
told a village councils* conference in Port Moresby in 
April, 1949i
Now we think the time has come when some groups can 
help to govern themselves, and two Ordinances - the 
Village Courts Ordinanoe and the Village Councils 
Ordinance - have been prepared. These are awaiting 
approval by the Government in Australia. When they 
are approved, the Administrator will be able to say 
what villages can have councils and courts in 
accordance with the new system. You have already 
been told that Hanuabada will be one of the first 
places where these council and courts will be tried.
The natives were promised that native custom would be
borne in mind when the native courts were constituted:
It should not be long now before the two Ordinances 
are approved by the Government in Australia.
Councils and Courts like these have been tried out 
in Africa and in other British countries, and they 
are the first step in training the people so that 
they can take a bigger share in the government of», 
their countries.
When the Papua and New Guinea Bill was enacted by the 
Australian Parliament in July 1949, it provided for native 
courts (section 63) as well as for village councils, as they
30) a/D.D.S.&N.A. to Admin. 5.4.49. DS 14/3/15.
31) Address by W.R. Dishon, 27.4.49. DS 14/3/15.
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were then called (seotions 25-7), In 1950, after the
change of government, the Parliamentary Draftsman asked
for, and apparently got, a policy clearance on the draft
32native courts Ordinanoe, for it continued to grow# In
1951 the rules of evidence were transferred from the Native
33Regulations of .Mew Guinea to the draft.
Meanwhile, the 1950 visiting U.N. Mission had also been
assured that native courts were to be introduced, though
the precise steps to be taken were left vague. It was
suggested that the councils would act as courts. The
Mission hoped that, whatever form they took, they would be
34set up *with speed and success*.
In 1952 the Director of District Services was still
35confident that the Native Courts Ordinance would become law.
D.M. Fienberg, the Senior Native Authorities Officer who had
visited Tanganyika, emphasised the inter-relationship of
native courts and councilsi
A Native Court is a necessary adjunct to the Local 
Government policy. Councils have wide police powers™* 
but no judicial powers.
32) Principal Assistant Draftsman to Sec.Terr. 2.5.50. 
Attorney General 49/1191#
33) C.L.O. to Gov.Sec. 6.11.51. CLO 4/25? D.D.S.&N.A. to 
Gov.Sec. 15.11.51. DS 14/3/15? Admin, to Sec.Terr. 
23.11.51. CA 35/1/6.
34) Report U.N. T/899, 1950, pp.4-5.
35) D.S.S.&N.A. to D.C. New Britain, 18.4.52. DS 11/3/66.
36) Fienberg to D.D.S.&N.A. 2 2 .1 0 .5 2 . Rabaul DS 1 4 /1 1 /6 A 2 - 1 .
285
lie noted that in all controlled areas the practice had
grown up of village officials and other influential men
hearing and settling disputes.
When first establishing councils in this area (i.e. 
the Gazelle Peninsula) two years ago it became 
necessary for us to firmly reassert the existing«« 
legal position.
2?he kivungs had become in part unofficial courts, as
the Director noted in 1949. Fienberg repeated that there
was constant pressure on councils to perform judicial
functions, and that the gradual extension of such undefined
and uncontrolled functions was dangerous.
We cannot adequately test the system until all its 
component parts are operating. We do not know 
ye¥ what effects theintroduoiion of Native dourts 
may have on the popular status of councils, or on 
the maintenance of law and~brder_in council areas, 
including the policing of council rules ... tlnilT 
we commence this “basx there must remain large gaps 
in the Local Government pattern, with a constant «« 
tendency for these to be filled in irregular ways.
Local government in the Gazelle Peninsula was being used
as a testing ground. The failure to introduce the Native
Courts Ordinance, in Fienberg's view, made an adequate test
impossible, for the two Ordinances had been designed as
complementary parts of the one system of native administration
This delay ultimately held up the extension of looal
37) Ibid.
38) Ibid.
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Pienberg realized that the draft Courts Ordinance had
become too complicated to be used as a basis for jurisdiction 
39by natives* It was intended that Ministerial approval be
40obtained to the principle of redrafting* In this re­
drafting Pienberg found an enthusiastic ally in C.J. Lynch, 
a senior draftsman in the Crown Law Office* Lynch did a 
redraft from scratch, and eventually produced a proposed 
Ordinance on simple lines similar to the original British 
legislation from whioh a beginning had been made more than 
seven years before.41
(v) Ministerial Rejection, 1955,
By June 1954, however, no decision on the principle of 
redrafting had been received from Canberra. At that time 
the Administrator was visiting Canberra* When he made 
enquiries about the proposed Ordinance he was told, to his 
astonishment, 'that the initial draft ... had just been 
overlooked and the file put away*. Cleland advised the 
Department and the Minister that a new draft was being
prepared and would be sent down for the Minister's con-
42sideration. When the new draft was eventually submitted
39) Memo, of 21.12.52. Rabaul DS 14/U/6.
40) D.D.S.&N.A. to Gov. Sec., 20*10*53. DS 14/3A5*
41) Lynch to Pienberg (semi-official), 29*12*53 and 5*1*54. 
DS 14/3/15* Lynch later accused the Administration of 
being too legalistic over native land tenure - See Ch. 
VIII, 2.
42) Quoted by a/Gov.Sec. to D.D.S.&N.A* 3,6*54. CA 35/1/6*
government* After going into the question, however,
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since November 1951, when the previous draft had last
been considered, no further correspondence on the matter
had been received either from the Department in Canberra
43or from the Minister#
In view of Cleland’s approach of June 1954, and of the
time given and importance attached to native courts by
those promoting local government in the Territory, this
was surprising; but the Minister*s reaction to the new
draft can be described only as astounding. He angrily
complained that for some reason which he could not disoover
the very principle of having native courts had never before
been brought to his notioe, although requests for a
ministerial decision had come from the Territory. (Clearly,
he regarded his own department as culpable):
Although no polioy decision appears to have been 
made by any Minister on the subject, an Ordinance 
has been drafted and adopted by the Executive 
Council of the Territory for presentation to the ^  
Legislative Council#
The Minister made it clear that in hie view a native 
courts system was neither necessary nor wise. This view, he 
said, derived from research which he had done; but there is 
no indication in his memorandum that he was familiar with 
the reasons which have led British colonial administrations
43) a/Admin. to Sec. Terr., 6.1*55. Admin. L.71.
44) Min. P. Hasluck to Sec. Terr., 27.1.55. Terr. A 846/5/27.
in January 1955 the acting Administrator remarked that
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to adopt native courts. Even were he to accept the principle# 
he said - and it was obvious that the possibility of this was 
remote - he would not aooept the submitted Ordinance* He 
favoured one similar to that rejected by Fienberg in 1952# 
which would ’lay down precisely the main provisions in regard 
to the constitution of the courts# their jurisdiction, their 
powers and their procedures ... Officers should be aware now 
that I hold very narrow views on the question of law-making 
by regulations*
He suggested that the whole proposal was *an elaborate 
sham*•
Is this in reality a proposal to add some lower courts 
to the existing judicial tribunals or 16 it only pro­
posing something that looks judicial but is in fact 
designed to meet the convenience and to serve the 
purposes of administration of native affairs?
He developed his views on the question at considerable
length. They are the views of someone wholeheartedly dedicated
to one, and only one, system of legal administration, in a
monocultural setting* It is a view that depends ultimately on
the vision of total cultural assimilation and that is the way
in which the Minister applied it. The natives would simply
47
have to be eduoated to accept English law and English oourts;
45l."ibid":----------------------------------------------------------
46) Ibid.
47) Ibid. 'I think that in Papua and New Guinea we have to be 
careful about what we may do to oreate an Impression among 
any group of natives regarding the souroes of justice* It 
is, in historical faot, a gift that we have brought to them. 
In the interests of good administration and the advancement 
of the natives**.I believe there is a great deal to be said 
for presenting the idea that the Queen (someone above govern 
ment) is the fount of justice and the courts are the 
Queen’s courts. ’
As far as native custom was concerned, the Minister 
thought that existing arrangements were adequate and that, 
if necessary, extra protection for native interests could 
be written into the Ordinances.
The entire question of native courts was therefore taken 
back to first principles. Fienberg and Lynoh argued 
cogently and warmly; but in view of the Minister’s pre­
conceptions it was obvious that they had no hope of having 
their views accepted. Fienberg, however, pointed out some 
of the disadvantages of not accepting a native courts 
system* the legislation had been designed to complement the 
Native Local Government Ordinance, and to regularise existing 
native tribunals - making them conform to statutory 
requirements would allow their activities to be controlled. 
These illegal tribunals, he olaimed, and specifically 
amongst the Tolai, dealt with ’anything from marriage, land, 
and native business partnership disputes, to theft, assault,
adultery, non-attendance at church, grievous bodily harm,
48and even manslaughter or murder’. The very existence 
of these tribunals, in his view, showed that they filled a 
need in native society.
Lynch also based his argument on the fact that the 
existing situation was quite unsatisfactory from the native 
viewpoint, and potentially dangerous. He pointed out that
289
48) S . N . A . O .  to Asst. Admin., 9.9.55. DS 14/3/15.
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lawyers had criticised aspects of the administration of 
native courts elsewhere (for example. Dr. A. Phillips* 
analysis of the African courts in Kenya) but that they had 
not advocated the abolition of the courts. As a lawyer,
Lynch stated that the Minister’s stand was fundamentally 
wrong*
First of all, he appears to consider the Common 
Law of England as the fount of all justice and, 
secondly, he ignores the fact that the term 
"justice" has a meaning only in relation to a 
specific social and cultural environment.
These arguments possibly gave a misleading interpretation
of the actual functions of native court systems elsewhere,
and particularly of their harmonising functions in a period
of severe social change. In any case, the proposals were
doomed. The Chief Justice was again formally asked for his
views, but only to reinforce the Administration’s stand.
Chief Justice Phillips detailed the steps that had been
taken to introduce a native courts system over his head
and against his advice in 1946, and he repeated the
arguments that he had used then. He was agreeable to having
natives trained as magistrates for the existing courts.
The matter of customary offences was glossed over: he
said that he was happy for the unofficial tribunals to
offer *advice, arbitrement or determination* of civil
disputes. Serious offenoes, he said, always leaked out to
49) C.J. Lynch to S.N.A.O., 17.8.55. DS 14/3/15
the Administration eventually, no matter how the natives
*50
tried to conceal them. (The administrative implications
of these statements were clearly not realized)*
The Administrator administered the ooup de grace to
the native authority concept in January 1956j
I am in full agreement with the views of the Chief 
Justice and do not propose to take any further 
action at all in regard to the proposed Ordinanee^ 
or the establishment of Native Courts.
(vi) Substitutes within the Existing Judicial System.
It had taken ten years for a firm decision to be reaohed 
on the matter. During the whole of that time the New 
Guinea Administration, particularly those concerned with 
local government, had been making plans based on the 
assumption that the policy to have native courts was settled# 
The Administrator, as an alternative, stated his agree­
ment with the principle of training natives as assessors 
and eventually as native magistrates within the existing
5  p
judicial structure.
It will be remembered that native magistrates had 
actually been appointed, though with unsatisfactory results, 
in the Western Division of Papua in the 1890s. . Twenty
50) Chief Justioe to Admin., 24.11.55. Law R.41/451/56. It 
is notable that Phillips applied exclusively English 
ooncepts to the native situation. In practice, »civil 
disputes* migfct cover almost anything, -v. Malinowski*
* Crime and Custom in Savage Society*.
51) Admin, to Sec. Terr. 17.1.56. Admin. L.71.
52) Ibid.
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years later Wilfred Beaver suggested that the experiment 
should be repeated, W.R. Humphries began training three 
native magistrates at Cape Nelson in 1932, but he was trans­
ferred and the plan lapsed. In his 1946 memorandum Humphries 
claimed that natives with elementary schooling could be
K«*
trained as magistrates within two years,
Asystem of non-statutory assessors had been introduced
in Papua in 1929, but it had been applied in different ways
by different officers} unofficial assessors have oontinued
to be widely though spasmodically used. In December 1957 -
now almost two years after the Administrator had stated what
was, presumably, policy - the acting Administrator repeated
that the principle of assessors had been approved, that the
people in local government areas were ready for this
development, but that it was ’necessary to move slowly in
54order to inculcate the proper judicial outlook.*
An ad hoc Interdepartmental Committee was set up - in 
the absence of an adequate secretariat organization the only 
device for ensuring consultation - and it eventually reported 
on 13th April 1959, that is, more than four years after the 
Minister rejected native courts. The Committee recommended 
quite briefly that ’the assessor system should be regularised
cc
and legalised.* The Public Service Commissioner reported
53) See Humphries* memo, of 9.12.46, cit.sup. | V/. Beaver,, 
Unexplored New Guinea, p.30. Also see Appendix A f I.
54) a/Admin. to Sec. Terr., 18.12.57. Admin. L.71.
55). Committee to Asst. Admin., 13.4.59. S 36/5/102.
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Servioe - created in 1955 for natives with low educational
qualifications - could be made available for training as
56assistants to magistrates*
At this point a further difficulty arose. Chief Justice
Phillips had died and been replaoed by Chief Justice Mann,
whose views on the subject proved even less flexible than
those of his predecessor. Mann rejected the Committee's
proposals, claiming that 'the specific question of Assessors
sitting with Magistrates ••• is quite inconsistent with our
57own legal practioe.'
The Secretary for Law, who had led the Committee, was 
justifiably annoyed* He pointed out that Mann was rejecting 
proposals which, from a legal viewpoint, had been accepted 
by Sir Hubert Murray and Sir Beaumont Phillips* He went to 
considerable pains to counter the legal opinions of the 
Chief Justice, quoting precedent» from all parts of the 
British Commonwealth and Empire. He recommended that the 
decisions of the Committee be implemented at once, pointing
out that the commitment to the Trusteeship Council made speed
58essential. By July 1960, however, stalemate appeared to 
have been reached*
56) P.S. Commission Memo*, 28*4*59* T* 3/11/5.
57) C.J. to Sec. Law, 4.5*59. CJ l/59, J l/59| C.J. to 
a/Admin., 19.11.59. LR 2.
58) Sec. Law to Asst. Admin., 27*11.59* S. 36/5A02;
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that graduates from the Auxiliary Division of the Public
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It will have been noted that, with the exception of the 
representations of Fienberg, the actual native situation 
figured little in these discussions. Judgments had been 
made in terms of what was desirable aooording to English 
legal concepts. Meanwhile, a variety of unofficial judicial 
palliatives had functioned in various parts of the Territory 
for many years; many of these in the more sophisticated 
areas have been designed to placate native dissatisfaction 
with the existing judicial system, which in recent years 
they have not been slow to express.
The question of native courts was raised with every
visiting U.N. Mission to the Trust Territory, particularly
by the Tolai and Manus peoples, who came under local
government in the period 1950-1. The 1953 Mission was
given an account of unofficial courts by a District
Magistrate! these, he said, ’consisted of the elders of
the village who met, and were encouraged to do so, when
minor disputes arose. If their opinion satisfied the
individuals concerned, then it was accepted by the
Administration. When an individual was dissatisfied with
the decision of the elders, however, the dispute was handled
through official judicial channels.1 The Mission recommended
59that the system be made statutory._____ ____ _ _______________
(vii) The Perpetuation of Unofficial Tribunals.
59) Report 1953 U.N. Mission. T/1078, paras. 62-5.
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luluai system unofficial courts had been permitted. Now
that they had local government unofficial courts were
forbidden, though many matters affecting native law and
custom were not understood by Administration officials.
The 1956 visiting Mission, led by a distinguished British
colonial official, stated bluntly that the case for native
courts was incontrovertible, and that the attitude of the
Administration was ‘excessively cautious* and even 'timid*:
The Mission feels strongly, moreover, that the 
present situation, in which unofficial tribunals 
act with official knowledge but without official 
recognition or authority, is neither defensible^ 
nor sound.
In Papua, as in New Guinea, tentative approaches to 
native courts were made between the two world wars. Except 
for the war years, the Hanuabada Disputes Committee has 
carried on its functions continuously since the 1920s,.
In its officially recognized form it represents a method 
of bringing the consensus of village opinion to bear on 
offenders against custom and morality, matters outside 
government law. It averages about four cases a week. The
In 1956 the Tolai oomplained that when they had the
60) Report 1956 U,N. Mission. T/1260, para.216. The
Belgian U.N. representative thought it *a matter of 
first importance' - G.A.O.R., 11th Session. A/3170, 
Supp.4, p.305. Lugard (The Dual Mandate in British 
Tropical Africa 1923, pp.{>48-3) listed as one of the 
oFJecTsTTf^iatrve oourts the elimination of unsuper­
vised methods of dealing with offences| part of the 
fostering of local initiative and responsibility.
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in fact enforces its decisions and awards penalties. On
advice from Dr. Murray Groves, Fienberg wrote in 1955 that
the Hanuabada Council conducted secret court sessions and
that the standard of justice was oomparable to that in the
61Administration’s courts* And, as Fienberg picturesquely
described it, this happened within rifle-shot of the main
government offices* Realizing the value of the Dispute«
Committee, the local Administration had tried to preserve
a delicate balance between the demands of the law and the
maximum latitude allowable to the Committee.
The fine distinctions to which this leads vary with
individual officers and are generally incomprehensible to
the natives. In 1956 there was a long correspondence on
the subject, revolving around section 6(2) of the Native
Local Government Ordinance which states that a council
shall have such powers and authority as are 
conferred upon it by native custom, insofar as 
that custom does not conflict with the laws in 
force in the Territory and is not repugnant to 
the general principles of humanity.
In A.D.O. Foster’s interpretation this left the council 
with no power to impose sanctions, as the customary 
sanctions of sorcery and violence were illegal! and under 
custom the elders had not imposed fines or ordered
Administration has a strong suspicion that the Committee
61) Fienberg to Asst. Admin., 9.9.55, DS 14/3/15, para.8.
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imprisonment. It followed that the deoisions of the
Committee were not enforceable. As a result, he said, the
Committee should not make orders. This led to a distinction
between a recommendation by the Committee, and an order.
It was allowable to decide that
The Committee has decided that A's dog killed one 
of B's fowls and considers that A should pay ten 
shillings to B.
He added that the Committee must tell the parties that 
if they disagreed they could take the dispute to the Court 
for Native Matters. At a meeting in January 1960 this was 
not done; although in two cases the Chairman threatened that 
the cases would be taken to a government officer unless the
¿•z
Committee's decisions were heeded. (Clearly the Committee 
has some grasp of subtle distinctions).
The .Administration's dismissal of sorcery as a sanction 
in Hanuabada is a good example of wishful theorising.
Belief in sorcery, to some degree, is still virtually 
universal. In 1959 the most influential figure in Hanuabada, 
Toua Kapena, charged a mixed-race man before the Disputes 
Committee with having made sorcery against him following a 
land dispute. Toua is a senior clerk in the central
64Education Department, and one of the Territory's elite.
62) A.D.O. L.R. Foster to Chairman Hanuabada Council, 23.9.56. 
D.O.P.M. 14/26/6. H.C. 6-2/5 (Minutes).
63) See details, Appendix D. I attended this meeting.
64) Oral information; also Hanuabada 7th Local Disputes 
Meeting, 10.3.59; see M.Groves; Report on Papua and New 
Guinea. The Observer, Sydney, 14.11.60. According to Toua, 
the mixed-race had hired Koiari sorcerers.
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will undoubtedly continue to thrive*
The Hanuabadans were provided with a further buffer
between themselves and the Administration’s courts when, in
1958, John Guise, a prominent member of the mixed-race
community and now an elected member of the Legislative
Council, took up a semi-offioial position as an ’arbitrator*
in the sub-district office. Guise is a dedicated nan who
felt that he had a mission, to persuade the natives to settle
their own disputes and prevent them reaching government
officers, for whose approach and judgment he has little
respect. He regarded the Administration courts as ineffective
in dealing not only with civil disputes but also with such
statutory offences as adultery and the spreading of
malicious rumours, both common in a community suoh as
65Hanuabada. The implications of his attitude are obvious.
In a similar way, and for similar reasons, unofficial 
courts operate.connived at by some officers, deprecated and 
discouraged by others, all over the Territory. Because 
they are outside the surveillance of the Administration they 
generally have no guidance on what they may do. As a
65) Personal information. In 1959 in the Central District 
Advisory Council John Guise urged the wider use of 
assessors - South Paoific Post# 17.3.59.
So long as the councillors have no other sanctions, sorcery
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result, few instances of their exceeding their functions 
seep back to the 4dministration, because the natives, 
acting unsupervised, have little conception of the confines 
of those functions, except where major crimes are involved.
66One case occurred in the Higaturu council area in May 1956.
The natives tend to view changes in personal terms, while 
the administration views them in legal, institutional terms. 
The natives in local government areas feel that, at least 
nominally, their local executive responelbi1ities have been 
increased but that their authority has not been - indeed, 
at the village level there is a regression. It is significant 
that demands for native courts have come particularly from 
the most sophisticated and politically conscious areas, 
where rapid social change is under way, notably Manus and
onthe Tolai areas of New Britain.
The Reimber councillors in 1958 fined natives who failed 
to make exhibits for the Kokopo show, as instructed. When 
the D.O., against the advice of his colleagues, insisted 
that the money be returned, the councillors protested that 
the people did not want the money back, and that if they 
were forced to return it they would lose face completely.
66) See Ch. VII, note 26. Less than two years later in the same area councillors were being officially advised 
that they would soon be able to play a part in settling village disputes - Popondetta P.R. 8/1957-8. NA 23-5-10D.
67) Report 1959 U.N. Mission. T/1486, para. 97-100.
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When the Heimher natives were invited to attend a meeting
68to discuss the matter none did so#
It is a measure of the confusion within the Administration
itself that the D.O. felt compelled to get a policy ruling
from Port Moresby, for the Assistant Administrator (he said)
had made a public announcement recognizing the fact that
illegal courts were held and fines inflicted, and indicating
69Administration tolerance of these practices.
In this instance, there was more to the D.O^s objections
than the imposition of fines. He made no secret of his
belief that the Reiraber councillors, who were strongly
under the influence of the Catholio mission and constantly
complained of their lack of authority, were untrustworthy
and opposed to oertain aspects of government policy,
including the local government system itself. He saw the
Kokopo show incident as an opportunity to dismiss all the
councillors and elect a new council.
The councillors, he said, are continually requesting 
for court powers to be placed in their hands and 
display a desire to exercise dictatorial oontrol over the lives of the people in the council area.
The E.O. (L.6.), agreed that the money would have to be
returned, and subsequently most of it was; but he rejected
68) a/D.O. Reitano to D.H.A. 19.3.59. Rabaul 14/12.
69) Quoted ibid., para. 8.
70) Ibid., para. 12#
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It is true that the Reimber Councillors are 
generally of a poor standard but the people have elected them. Almost any action that we take on 
this will discredit them, to some extent, in the 
eyes of the people.
This is one example of the results that can follow from
an undefined policy that depends on the discretion of
individual officers who are constantly being moved around;
the policy is therefore quite arbitrary. Both Chief
Justices, Phillips and Mann, have been remarkably lenient
in their attitudes towards the unofficial arbitral functions
of councillors and village officials; but they have rejected
72statutory forms for these practices. It seems clear that
the judiciary have not been concerned with the administrative
ramifioationa of unofficial tribunals as long as these are
kept outside the ambit of the Territory's judicial system.
This is one more reflection of the departmentalisation of
73policy within the New Guinea Administration.
71) Minute, H.t.Plant to W.R. Dishon, 20.4.89. kabaul 14/12.
72) Memos, by Phillips, 24.11.55 and Mann, 19.11.59, cit.sup. f-iann specifically commended the activities of John Guise.
73) There are still, of course, fundamental objections to a native courts system in any form, which their advocates 
regard as overriding. W.A.Lalor of the Crown Law Office, 
although 'a devoted, almost militant advocate for native 
workers' O^ rade Unions Active in New Guinea', Sydney Morning Herald. 10.7.61), is violently opposed t o  native courts on the ground that the recognition of various systems of'customary law poses impossible judicial 
problems, and would be manipulated by cunning, sophisti­
cated natives - personal information. He believes that the sphere of operation of customary law cannot be properly delimited. Cf. A.N.Allott in J.A.A. XI, 2, April
1959, pp.72-83: systems of oustomary law are becoming 
more alike.
the suggestion that the councillors be removed:
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arbitration is only the beginning of the functions of
unofficial tribunals; where there is no official provision
for customary law the unofficial application of sanctions
is inevitable* In Wiagawaga, Milne Bay, probably the most
sophisticated community in eastern Papua, the councillors
and other village leaders freely state that sorcery is used
against those who persistently offend against custom. The
coastal Kiwai take to the Administration only those offences
which they consider serious, uba generally matters d^iich
would eventually leak out. Most offences or disputes will
hot hang fire until the visit of a government offioer. In
each village the councillor, with the advice of the clan
leaders, sentences offenders to short periods of village
work or awards compensation. Thirty years ago F.E. Williams
considered that compensation would be more appropriate,
according to native conceptions, in many cases which are
74still treated as crimes by the Administration.
One other example is worth quoting, because it concerns 
the Roro-Mekeo area where unofficial oourts functioned in 
the 1930s. The Mekeo have a reputation for intransigence 
with the Administration; but in 1948 A.D.O. McLeod, disgusted 
with the system of direct administration, personally
It is hardly neoessary to dilate on the faot that
74) Personal research: Williams to Murray, 1 0 .2 .1 9 3 1 . CPI, 
V, 16/36  A 3 .
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According to McLeod, these courts were at first greeted
with great suspicion by the Catholic missionaries, who
know the natives intimately; but the mission was quickly won
over as the system appeared to work excellently, removing
75constant social irritations. McLeod allowed the
councillors to inflict fines or award compensation, details
of the cases being recorded in a book for the officers*
inspection, on the lines of the system then in use in the
British Solomons. MoLeod left the district, and in 1950 the
system was supposed to have failed and the councillors to
76have been restricted to advising and arbitrating.
In March 1959, however, A.D.O. Brown found that the
courts were still functioning; in one case a man was ordered
to pay £20 as compensation for damage done by his pigs to
gardens. In another case, a man and woman found guilty of
adultery were ordered to compensate in cash the owner of
the house in which the offence took place. (Had the offence
been tried in an Administration court under the Native
Regulations the only sanction would have been gaol)# These
cases came to the A.D.0.*s notice only after the offenders
77refused, or were unable, to pay the sums named.
75) Personal information, A.B.O. J.S.McLeod. For his views 
on the luluals and V.C.*s, see South Pacific* 1952.
76) A.B.O. to B.C. Port Moresby, 21.3.59. Kairaku P.R. 
4/1958-9.
77) Ibid.
authorised councillors to conduct courts in their villages*
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that the Administration had had anything to do with native
courts in the area, and asserted that the natives had
usurped court powers after being asked to settle customary
matters out of court. The Administration thus made the
natives culpable for continuing an institution which they
had been promised in 1946 and which had in fact been promoted
by an Administration officer. The councillors were severely
7 8reprimanded. There is little doubt that this oonfirmed 
the Administration’s assessment of the Mekeo as untrust­
worthy; it is partly because of their reputation that they 
have been denied local government.
(viii) The Continuing Pressure for Reform.
The examples quoted should be sufficient to show that 
existing judicial provisions are unsatisfactory. This has 
remained a major issue amongst the natives, most particularly 
in the Gazelle Peninsula. Demands for reform have oomef 
not from dissident groups or from young maloontents but 
from the older respected native leaders. At the combined 
meeting of the five Tolai oouncils on 18th March, 1959,
Tovin ToBaining, whom the Administration had been anxious to 
recognize as the Tolai leader, ’became emotional' on the 
issue, and demanded that court powers be given to councillors.
The Director of Native Affairs refused to believe
78) Ibid.; D.H.A. to Asst. Admin., 8.7.59. NA 51-1-3.
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Acting D.O. Reitano explained that the government did not
consider the time ripe as the exercise of magisterial
powers ‘required a high standard of eduoation and special
79legal training*• (It must be said that the government 
had shown no inclination to make either the eduoation or 
the training available; the Tolai of course realized this). 
Tovin replied, again with emotion, that he considered that 
the establishment of native courts was a reasonable demand 
to make.
The local Administration immediately urged Port Moresby
to step up propaganda in the Gazelle Peninsula, in order to
80persuade the Tolai that the government knows best.
The Port Moresby reaction to these Tolai demands was
the same as that amongst the Administrâtioni to promote
81assessors, in the first instanoe, as a substitute. The 
Reimber council wanted the question of judicial powers for 
councillors put on the agenda for the Madang conference of 
New Guinea councils in June, 1959. But the eventual agenda, 
worked out with Administration officers, provided only for 
discussion of court assessors (Item 9), The conference
79) Report on meeting, D.O. to D.N.A., £0.3.59. Rabaul 14/lP, 
Item 14.
80) Ibid., ’General*.
81) Ibid., marginal oomment.
adopted the proposal, and resolved that all proposed
assessors should be nominated by councils, that there should
be three for each sitting, two being old men versed in
custom, the third a councillor with some education and
82understanding of modern conditions.
This was a moderate and sensible resolution, and accorded
with the general principle already endorsed by the
Indepartmental Committee. The Administration represented
the assessors to the 1959 U . N .  Visiting Mission as a step
towards Native Courts, ’within the present judicial system
when the time was opportune•; and as there seemed real
prospects of getting assessors functioning the Mission
83appears to have accepted the idea. Nevertheless,
discussion with the natives, as on previous ocoasions, had
revolved around native courts, not assessors.
The Baluan Counoil voted unanimously for the establish«*
ment of native courts when consulted by the Mission; and
the Presidents of the Tolai councils made a similar request.
They ’complained that statutory law did not oover certain
customs and that a man oould not be punished for an offenoe
84unless it was codified in the legal system.' This was
82) Conference Proceedings, p.28. Beitano to D.N.A., 19.3.59, oit•sup*
83) Heport 1959 U.N. Mission. T/1486, para. 98.
84) Ibid., para. 97.
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the cardinal problem which the appointment of assessors 
would do nothing to resolve. Patently# the Mission was 
uneasy on this point:
••• in essence the question seems to be one of
judgements understood by and acceptable to the 
majority, who wish to see justice done in accordance with their own oustoms rather than 
in accordance with European legal judgements 
and procedures, which the indigenous people do 
not readily understand*
Even the introduction of statutory assessors was not 
proceeded with, however, undoubtedly partly because of the 
Chief Justice^ preconceptions, and partly because of the 
notoriously dilatory procedures for converting proposals 
into policy and policy into action. The Native Authority 
concept was abandoned before alternative judicial arrange­
ments had been adopted or prepared for. The machinery for 
the administration of justice has remained unchanged for 
more than sixty years. Since the war the Administration 
has without question heeded the Chief Justioe*s injunction 
of 1946 to spend time formulating policy,but the natives 
still play no part in the Territory’s judicial system,
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85) Ibid., para. 100.
except as offenders. And in maintaining their own customs 
and conceptions they are left largely to their own 
unofficial and often illegal devices.
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Postscript
On 24th October, 1961 the Minister for Territories 
announced in the Federal Parliament that, following an 
investigation by the Professor of Jurisprudence at Melbourne University, the Territory*s judicial system was to be 
overhauled. The professor (the Derham Report) endorsed 
the Minister's 1955 rejection of native courts, and 
recommended the separation of the courts from the executive. Councils and Councillors were to be specifically exoluded 
from any part in the judicial system. Courts for natives 
presided over by patrol officers were to be abolished, and 
both natives and whites would be subject to the same oourts. Provision was to be made for the application of customary 
law, but the manner in which this was to be done was left 
undefined in the Minister’s statement. Natives were to be trained as magistrates* how this was to be done, and how 
long it would take, were again not defined.
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CHAPTER V
THE APPROACH TO NATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
2. Initial Policy and Practice.
(i) Area Organizationa under a Unified Administration
In the period 1946-9 native councils and native courts 
were projected as complementary institutions. During 1949 
the influence of the Department of External Territories in 
Canberra was very ma riced in elaborating the draft Councils 
Ordinance; though the Director of District Servicesvas 
insistent that limitations, supervision and controls should 
be essentially local and flexible rather than legislatively 
delimited.^  As C.S. Belshaw pointed out in 1951, however, 
the eventual legislation implied a crippling laok of flexi­
bility, enforcing continual referenoe to Headquarters on 
every minor issue.2
Prom the Administration's viewpoint a fundamental matter 
was the decision whether councils were to be initially village 
or area organizations. Discussion on this point took place 
during 1949-51; many traditional administrative preconceptions 
were again brought out. A prominent D.O., I.P. Downs, 
argued that counoils should begin with the basio political
1) D.D.B.& N.A. to Sec. Canberra 25.10*48 , 4.4.49; to 
Administrator 5.4.49. DS.14/3/l5i Sec. Canberra to 
D.D.S.& N.A. 20.1.49. CA 6/64.
2) C.S. Belshaw, Native Administration in S.E. Papua. The 
Australian Outlook, June 1951, pp.l06-15; also of. 
critioism by 1953 U.N. Mission, Report T/1078, para.33.
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units, and gradually work up to area organizations; to do 
otherwise, he said, would open the way for unscrupulous 
manipulation by opportunists with abnormal ambition, who 
would promote premature nationalism. Larger councils, he
3felt, would represent merely spectacular window-dressing.
On the other hand, an anthropologist, K.E. Read, doubted 
whether 'the village is the necessary or essential starting 
point', emphasising that although the village was usually 
the basic political unit, cultural and linguistic unity 
generally extended beyond this and involved a range of common
4contacts and activities. He pointed out that under culture 
contact a blurring of traditional boundaries had been 
occurring* 'social, economic and politioal progress demand 
the establishment of wider systems of relationships, of 
broader spheres of interdependence than those which
ercharacterise the indigenous cultural pattern*•
The latter argument was adopted - a pyramidal system of
glocal government had already been projected in Canberra - 
for councils from the beginning have embraced several villages, 
though traditional alliances and linguistio and cultural
3) Letter in South Pacific. July 1950, IV, 8, p.145, This 
aversion to politioal experiment has been a continuing factor.
4) K.E. Read, Notes on Some Problems of Politioal Con­
federation. Souih Pacific, Iil, 12, dot.194§Y pp.¿69-34;
l yrTTTcrr! I^ r pp3 -T07
5 ) Ibid., Nov. 1949, p.9,
6) Speech of acting Minister for External Territories Chambers, 
C'wealth H, of R. Hansard, 15.2.1949, vol.201, pp.253-4.P. Hasluck, Australia's Task in Papua and New Guinea. (Roy 
Lecture, 1956). Milne
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faotors have been powerful deterainants. There were three i 
main pressures towards the adoption of area organizations* I 
firstly, the influence of Mr. D.M. Fienberg - appointed 
Senior Native Authorities Officer in December 1949 - who had
* ^ Q-been sent by ANQAtJ to study local government in Tanganyika;
secondly, the realization that the natives and the looal
Administration could be won over to looal government only by
setting up counoils which could provide significant works and
servioes; and thirdly, the fact that the impulse to looal
government was most marked in those areas whioh had,
7politically, already progressed beyond the parish.
This last point is most important. The pre-war experiments 
with non-statutory native oounoils, at Hanuabada and in Milne 
Bay, will be remembered; but the major testing grounds for 
statutory councils post-war lay in the Gazelle Peninsula and 
Manus, in the Trust Territory. As the administration of the 
two territories was united in 1945-6 it is essential to treat 
the history of native local government as it affects the whole 
Territory. The unified Administration of the two territories 
was made permanent by the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949, 
although each Territory retained its own identity and laws, 
particularly its distinct Native Regulations, and corres­
pondingly its own system of direct village administration. 
Fitting a system of native looal government to the two
7) Parisht the largest traditional politioal unit - see H.I. Hogbin and C. Wedgwood, Local Grouping in Melanesia, 
Oceania. XXXII, 4, 1953, pp.241-74.
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background in the Gazelle Peninsula affeoted the policy that
was applied in Papua.
(An outline of the institutions of native administration
in the present Trust Territory, to the beginning of World Wiar
II, is given in Appendix C, I).
(ii) Initial Establishment; Political Incentives
The Administrator, Colonel Murray, wrote to the Director
of Distriot Services in January, 1950:
I wish to see a village council established at Hanuabada and elsewhere as you may think fit, as 
soon as possible. We have obvious areas in the 
Territory where councils should be in existence at 
the earliest possible moment, and we should not 
get bogged down in trying to make out perfect sets 
of regulations and warrants. Let us get a move on 
and subsequently amend regulations, warrants, eto. Q as experience indicates it necessary.
This determination was also expressed to the 1950 U.N.
Visiting Mission, which was told that oounoils would be
9established in most districts by the end of 1951. Murray 
clearly underestimated opposition to the very principle of 
local government both within the Administration and, in the 
event, amongst certain native groups; and his conception of 
the preparations for local government differed radically 
from that of the Senior Native Authorities Officer, D.M. 
Pienberg.
administrative traditions was in itself inhibiting: the
8) Administrator to D.D.S.& N.A., 16.1.50. NA. 4l/l/5.
9) Report U.K. 1950, T/899, p.4.
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Six councils were established in 1950-1} in every
instance circumstances made their establishment imperative» 
Hanuabada, though economically peri-urban and sooially 
atypical, exemplifies the response to necessity which the 
setting up of its council reflected. Both councils and 
courts had been promised the Hanuabadans sinoe 1946, and 
complaints at the dilatoriness of the Administration had 
been voiced at a District Councillors' conference in 1948,
To arrest dissatisfaction, the counoil was gazetted on 
14.9*50. Nevertheless, Fienberg noted that reaction in 
Hanuabada had been unsatisfactory, for the natives had been 
accustomed to getting free, from Port Moresby, services 
which their council was now being asked to provide and pay 
for.10
Indeed, the general native tax whioh had been applied
before the war was not re-introduced until 1958, so that
those natives who elected to have native looal government
thereby elected to be taxed. This was a major administrative
blunder. A further problem at Hanuabada was the laok of a
permanent supervising officer, for the Native Authorities
Section was based in Rabaul and was itself in the early
stages of organization. The D.C. in Port Moresby in 1950 was
antipathetic to the looal government polioy, and obstructed
11rather than assisted the council's establishment.
10) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S.&N.A., 1.11.1950. NA 39A/0? CP 141,
AQ 840A/3.
11) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S.&N.A., 9.9.1951. HA 39/1/0» Personal Tax Ordinance, 1957-8, operative 1.1.1958. See Appendix Bt Supervision.
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(iii) The Manus Example» Control of the Paliau Movement 
In the Bianus area the establishment of a counoil was 
dictated by a necessity of a different kind, for in 1946 
the natives had petitioned the Commander of the United States 
forces to take over the islands• government, arguing that 
the Australians, like the Germans, had withheld education
I Pfrom them in order to use them as cheap wage-labour. Out 
of the rejection of their petition developed the oult led 
by Paliau; in some respects this was similar in its objects 
and methods to the Marching Rule movement in the British 
Solomons*
A government station had been established in the
Admiralties in 1912, and by 1930 Margaret Mead was able to
state that Manus contact with the white man had been »fairly 
13fortunate*• By 1953 there had been a change as radical
as that in Mead*s own views on the desirability of culture 
14change# As Schwartz remarks, the Paliau cult represented 
an attempt to frame a new culture more at home with itself 
and the world than the cultures of the early contact period.'*'*5 
The first active cult phase began in January 1947, though
12) C.P.141. Y.840/1/1 a Conference, luluais with U.S. 
Commander, 22.8.1946.
13) M.Mead, Growing Up in New Guinea. (Penguin ed.), pp.226,
14) M.Mead, New Lives for Old (1956), pp. 442-6.
15) T. Schwartz, The Paliau Movement (Pennsylvania Ph.D. 
Thesis), p.49.
in the 1930s undirected attempts to raise living levels
had been made, as in the Rabaul area, by the collecting of 
16subscriptions. Paliau himself came from Baluan, a former
centre of ceremonial exchange, and claimed desoent from a
renowned leader. He had been put on trial by the Australians
for alleged collaboration, in May 1945; and although the trial
was abandoned, Paliau was made a martyr in the eyes of his 
17fellow Manus. The movement was unusually well organized 
by Paliau, although it possessed most of the typioal cargo 
cult features of the post-war period. The Administration 
respected his remarkable achievement in welding together the 
traditionally hostile seafaring and land-dwelling Manus 
peoples.'*'8
Despite this, he alienated the Catholic mission as the 
cult spread rapidly to Peri, their headquarters. The 
Administration also became steadily more suspicious as 
Paliau's organization expanded. In fact, Paliau as the 
formulator of a new culture was struggling to preserve the 
movement based on organization against the pressure of the 
cult based on revelation. At the time this was not realized. 
'By December 1947, Paliau was suspected of being ambitious 
and unscrupulous, and it was thought that he might have taken
16) Ibid., pp.47, 99-101.
17) Ibid., pp.107-8| also H.T. Plant, Cargo Cult (typescript 
L.S.14-7-2, p.4 - most of this incorporated in N.G.
Report 1959-1, pp.24-30.
18) Plant, ibid., p.7. There are 3 main peoples (oalled 'ecological types') on Manus: the Manus, numbering 1200| Usiai (6500); and Matankor (4000).
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advantage of his visit to Port Moresby to set himself up 
as a leader*
During 1948 Paliau was setting up village councils; the 
Administration attempted to guide him, and in May 1949 he 
was appointed lulual of Houk/Baluan *20 At a critical time 
in April 1950, however, Paliau was gaoled for six months for 
pretending that he had powers to delegate court functions* 
Shortly afterwards the luluais and other officials protested 
to the U.N. Visiting Mission* The aoting Director of 
District Services replied by promising that statutory
P Ivillage councils would be set up as soon as possible*
Despite the fact that the Baluan district possessed 
almost none of the oriteria which the Senior Native 
Authorities Officer considered dbslrable for a local govern­
ment council, a council was hastily set up for Baluan and 
Hambutjon. This took in many non-Paliau natives on Baluan, 
but excluded many Paliau supporters, particularly those on
opthe south coast of the main island. Broadly, however, the 
creation of the council represented a recognition of the 
political unity which Paliau had forged. The Administration
19) Schwartz, op.oit., pp.214, 555, 607; Plant, ibid., p.9.
20) Plant, ibid. p.11* The Administration conceded that the movement had achieved practical results; and as late as 
Nov. 1949 the loyalty of the population to Government 
was remarked on.
21) Plant, ibid., p*12*
22) Schwartz, op.oit., p.538*
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tried to indocrinate Paliau during his imprisonment; but 
his thinking had always been organi2ational rather than 
cultist.^ ®
The haste with which the council was set upt in the long 
term, had unfortunate oonsequences. Initially it embraced 
only about 1,200 natives. Paliau*s followers were divided 
by the council boundaries roughly on cult/movement lines, So '
that those who were outside the counoil were also beyond 
Paliau*s restraining hand. Moreover, as the principle of 
voluntary participation was applied, the former followers 
outside the council came to regard those within it as traitors 
who had been corrupted. Bringing them together again thus 
clearly presented formidable problems which could probably 
have been avoided by a bolder or more perceptive establishment 
policy#04
Prom the viewpoint of the Native Authorities Section, the 
Baluan council was a misfortune born of necessity; for it 
was too small to provide significant works and servioes, and 
was widely regarded merely as an instrument of oontrol over
23) Ibid., pp.607-10; Mead, op.oit., pp.193-4.
24) This division and delay oaused a Ghost Cult outbreakin 1953-4. Ibid., pp.552-5; Manus PR 9/1953-4, 10.6.1954. 
Cult attitudes in the south coast villages were not 
entirely dissipated by their inclusion in the oouncil; in 1957 two councillors refused to provide workers for 
the Lovengau-Patusi road, apparently believing that 
machines would or should be provided - A.D.O. to D.C. 10.10.1957; D.C. to D.N.A. 9.11.1957. Baluan 14/1.
Paliau*s followers in 1953 numbered 4487 - Mead, op.oit., 
p.411.
the Paliau movement* The council was, therefore, hardly 
designed to convince opponents of native local government 
that councils had a positive and progressive function in 
native administration.
(iv) The Gazelle Peninsula: Testing Ground for Policy
It was the situation in the Gazelle Peninsula, however, 
which contributed most to determining the basic principles 
of council organization. D.M. Pienberg, the Senior Native 
Authorities Officer based in Rabaul, recognized the Tolai 
areas as the testing ground for native local government in 
the Territory; but the very pressures and precedents in 
Tolai society (see Appendix C), which necessitated local 
government also complicated and in places frustrated its 
establishment.
There was also a strong antithesis to native local govern­
ment within the Administration. As Rowley has mentioned, the 
assumption by the European officials that they stood in loco 
parentis to the natives was an important factor; another was
the Ordinance, which represented only *a cautious move away
P5from the authoritarian pattern of local administration*.
The polioy assumption, emanating from Canberra, that ample 
time remained for controlling the direction of social change, 
for preliminary education, and for the gradual extension of 
local government as an antecedent to political development,
25) C.D.Rowley, Local Government in New Guinea. South Pacific. IX ,T 7T9'57t p.W ;------------------  ------
also had an important bearing on the orientation of looal 
administrative institutions.
The S.N.A.O. realized the reserve towards looal government 
in 1949 , not only amongst some officials and within some 
native groups, but also amongst the Catholic missionaries 
and some local European residents.
During 1950-1, however, preliminary arrangements for 
generally establishing local government in the Gazelle Penin­
sula went ahead without serious difficulty. The Tolai seemed 
to welcome the idea, and a meeting of 200 leaders at Reimber 
in August, 1951 agreed on six projeoted council areas, 
roughly based on the Paramountcies (those areas under the 
Paramount Luluais).26 The faot that native courts were not
introduced concurrently with the councils, as the S.N.A.O.
27 %had urged, probably was partly responsible for a change of 
native attitudes. In order to retain native confidence the 
S.N.A.O. had been insistent that the judicial aspeots of
local administration be separated from the central executive
28represented by the D.O.
The introduction of councils without any immediate 
prospect of courts in faot marked a retrogression, for the 
kivungs had, to a large extent, been judioial bodies. Now
26) Pienberg to D.C., 11.8.1951, Rabaul 14/11/6.
27) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S.&N.A., 28.12.1949, Rabaul 14/7/3.
28) Ibid. Pienberg hoped that the two natives generations could thus cooperate, the elders largely being responsible for judicial functions, the younger educated 
men for the council.
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i' •that the councils were made statutory, this informal 
jurisdiction lapsed*
Some native leaders were probably repelled by the obvious 
fact that the councils were to function in accordance with 
Administration tenets, The S.N.A.O, did not simply accept 
council areas based on native agreements! the oouncils had 
to be economically viable, and therefore detailed preparatory 
surveys and censuses were necessary. Direct opposition to 
the local government policy first beoame marked during the 
course of these censuses. The S.N.A.O. reported in 1951 that 
the natives in charge of the unofficial Raluana Section 
Committee (comprising six villages within the Nanga Nanga 
Paramountcy - the other eight villages led by Paramount
29Luluai Nason co-operated) had refused to line for census.
In order to disarm possible suspicion the SLN.A.O. had 
told the Tolai, and the Raluana in particular, that the 
census was not a preliminary to their forcible incorporation 
into councils, and that their right of choice was in no way 
being infringed. It is clear, however, that at this late 
stage no policy decision had been taken on this fundamental 
matter. The S.N.A.O. wrote to the Director of District 
Services s
I have told them, inter alia, that ... it was «ot my own policy (nor I assume yours) to drag any crowd 
into a council if they were unwilling.
29) Pienberg to J.H.Jones, private letter of 26.10*1951. NA
39/1/0.
30) Ibid., my italics*
Within twelve months the S.N.A.O. himself was to oonclude 
that this approach was a mistake; but by that time events 
had moved too far and the precedent had been set. This was 
to have far-reaching consequences for local government 
throughout the Territory.
In order to ensure that local government councils would 
be economically viable the S.N.A.O. considered that the
*
principle of the preliminary census was vital. He therefore 
charged one of the Raluana group with failing to appear for 
a census. The man charged was a luluai who, the S.N.A.O. 
later discovered, was completely subordinate to the nuclear 
kivung in the Committee, led by a Sergeant-Major olerk in 
the Eabaul police station and by two ex-Administration 
schoolteachers. The Baluana Committee hired a European 
lawyer, Mr. Dudley Jones, to appear for the luluai. who was 
acquitted on the ground that the census was not one concerned 
with vital statistics.
The case showed the S.N.A.O. the strength of the 
opposition to native local government, not only amongst the 
natives. He stated categorically that the polioeman,
Tongatia, had been prompted some months before by the Police 
Commissioner to resist the establishment of a council over 
Baluana. Moreover, the A.D.O. at Kokopo had clearly 
indioated his support for the Raluana Section by advising 
the defence in the case, although the S.N.A.O. was prosecuting
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This officer appeared to be opposed to native looal 
government altogether, for the S.N.A.O. could get him to 
take no interest at all in the Vanamami council, already 
established, which represented 4,000 natives within his 
sub-district and which held meetings only ten minutes drive 
from his office. *To avoid futile rows1, said the S.N.A.O.,
’I keep away from him*.32
The S.N.A.O. had foreseen that the attitudes of direot 
administration were so deeply imprinted on the #old guard* 
that some resistance or inertia towards native looal govern­
ment would be shown. With this in mind, in 1950 he had urged 
a propaganda oampaign to convince this element that councils
were *official bodies forming part of the administrative 
33framework*. In Maroh 1951 a meeting of representatives
of the Administration, missions, commerce and the planters
was arranged at Rabaul to discuss native looal government;
and in October 1951 ’Notes on Native Looal Government* were
34sent to the editor of the South Pacific Post.
31) Ibid. Pienberg later (to D.D.S.&N.A., 13.12.51, Rabaul 14/11/6) further aooused the A.D.O. of having coached 
the Raluana leaders to boycott the oensus, and of having 
arranged legal aid, before any oharges had been laid.
32) Ibid.
33) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S.&N.A., 1.11.1950, 29.1.1951, NA 39A/0.
34) Meeting, Rabaul 7.3.1951; *Notes* dated 26.10.51. NA39/1/0.
31as an Administration official.
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opposition. The S.N.A.O.'s  proposal to appeal against the
census verdict revealed the misoonoeptions about local
government within the Administration. After he had initiated
the appeal, the Crowi Law Office refused to oonduct it,
saying that it was ill-advised. The S.N.A.O. then set out
the principle involved«
I am now most interested in the official attitude to this case. Is it considered that I should not 
have initiated an appeal against a ruling given by 
two C.N.A. members which I (and at least one other
C.N.A. member) believe to be in error; a ruling which put an immediate stop to work that is an 
essential preliminary to the task I have been ,5 
authorised ... to carry out?
The S.N.A.Q. had sought a definitive policy statement on 
the implementation of native local government as early as 
November, 1950, in order to avoid an impasse of this kind, 
so that embryonic opposition could be immediately disarmed*
It would appear, however, that even the Department of District 
Services had only a very limited appreciation of the pre­
liminary work whioh he considered essential to make oounoils
36financially viable and executively active. He had patiently 
to explain to his superiors that in order to ensure this, 
and thereby to ensure that the initial councils were
Such remarkable steps testified to the strength of the
35) Authorisation in D.S. memo, of 12.6.1951, Rabaul 14/3/23;C.N.A. Court of Native Matters. The deoision in this 
case appeared to remove the obligation on a native to 
appear at any census if he thought non-vital statistics might be required. No native, probably, had any idea
of the legal connotation of 'vital statistics'.
36) D.S. memo, of 22.1.1952. DS 14/3/35.
of looal government, much more information was necessary
37than was available from the existing Village Books*
The principle at stake, in the Department’s view, was
the voluntary participation by natives in local government.
If the natives refused to •line* for a census whioh they
knew to be part of a looal government survey, they must ipso
facto be opposed to local government. Therefore, their
refusal to be censused was merely an extension of their
right to abstain from local government; natives who were
willing to accept looal government would not need to be
compelled to provide census info mat ion.
The S.N.A.O. admitted the oore of validity in this view,
and conceded that twelve months before he would have fully
agreed with it; but by early 1952 he had come to realize that
the principle of voluntary participation implied previously
unreoognized oomplicationst
... whilst still believing that any attempt to foist 
a local government organization onto an unwilling population would be foolish, I have also learnt that3Q 
it is all not quite so simple as I had imagined.
He enunciated four complications!
(a) Opposition to native local government was being prompted
by non-natives, particularly missionaries, who regarded
councils as a threat to their influence, and who had
been taken unawares by the establishment of the first
38) D.S. memo, of 22.1.1952, cit.sup. -
39) Fienberg to D.D.S., 5.2.1952, cit.sup.
advertisements for rather than deterrents to the extension
three Tolai councils|
(b) as a result, the distinction had to be made between 
•genuine* and ’spurious1 native opposition;
(c) policy needed to be defined relating to those areas 
in which the majority of natives was in favour of 
having local government, but where there was also a 
'small vociferous minority' opposed to it. Could 
the Administration continue to adhere to the idea of 
100$ agreement; and if not, what percentage agreement 
was to be regarded as determinate?
(d) a method would have to be devised (e.g. a referendum)
for assessing percentage agreement in areas where
councils did not already exist, for it was only in I *
such areas that the Administration had any ready
machinery for demonstrating publlo opinion. And if
the natives could not compulsorily be oensuaed, could
4 0they be forced or induced to vote?
Thus, more than two years after the Ordinance had been 
proclaimed, the administrative implications of the volun­
tarily participation approach were for the first time defined. 
The question had become critical, for dissidenoe towards 
native local government was spreading: a section of the 
Navuneram people, led by a native entrepreneur named Manoa 
and probably influenced by the Raluana Section, changed their 
minds about entering the Reimber council; the only one of the
325
40) Ibid.
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Napapar villages which is Seventh Day Adventist deoided to
stay out of the Vunadadir council (predominantly Catholic)|
while some Birar and Toma groups rejected their leaders*
41decision to enter Vunamami council«
As the S.N.A.O* saw it, the Administration now had to 
steer a oourse between the Scylla of undefined voluntary 
participation and the Charybdis of financially impotent 
councils. The following three years in effeot represented 
a period of Territory-wide stagnation, as policy was hammered 
out by the Native Authorities Section and central government# 
The S.N.A.O. feared an emerging patchwork of council and non- 
counoil areas, already developing in the Gazelle Peninsula*
He was reluctant to recommend that isolated villages or 
hamlet-clusters should be forced into oounoils, or be left 
to languish under direct administration. Vacillation on this 
issue gave enonnous encouragement to those opposing native 
local government altogether.
There were three local complicating factors among the 
Tolai at this timei (i) the traditional residential pattern 
is hamlets rather than villages, so that the definition of 
council areas to exclude those groups not unanimously in 
favour of local government presented peculiar problems; (ii) 
the Tolai lacked an overriding leadership, such as Paliau 
provided at Manus; this was lacking even within the Para- 
mountoies; (iii) most importantly, the lack of general native
41) Ibid.
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taxation had a certain inhibiting effect even on those 
natives otherwise disposed to accept local government; for 
by doing so they thereby elected to be taxed. It was easy 
for opposition elements to represent the introduction of 
counoils as an indirect method of inveigling natives into 
paying tax for services which it was the responsibility of 
the government to provide. Ultimately this attitude extended, 
so that resistance to local government became a resistance 
to the paying of tax. When general taxation was re­
introduced in 1958 ugly incidents occurred in the anti­
council areas, oulminating with the riot at Navuneram in
42which two natives were shot by police.
(v) Voluntary Participation
The problems of voluntary participation in local govern­
ment were not faced by the central Administration. The
43matter was due for discussion at the 1952 D.C.’s Conference;
but the inclusion of dissident groups was left to the
discretion of individual D.C.s. The S.N.A.O. pointed out
that the question of ’Pseudo-local government organizations
44operating outside the law' was not discussed.
42) See the findings of Mann, C.J., Navuneram Enquiry Report, 
Vol.VIII, pp.1434-8. He concluded that natives in the 
’dissident* areas had developed an attitude of mind which nullified reasoned argument on the tax question,
as on native local government. The issues had fused.
43) D.S. Radiogram of 14.1.1952. Rabaul 14/11/6. D.S.S. to B.C. Rabaul, 6.11.52. DS 14/3/19.
44) Fienberg to D.D.S., 8.2.1953. Rabaul 14Al/6.
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Meanwhile two further Tolai councils had had to be 
proclaimed, necessarily excluding the anti-council groups, 
Raluana and Manuneram-Taviliu. The S.N.A.O. was acutely 
conscious that precedents were being set which could jeo­
pardise the whole future of the native local government. 
Patently, however the Native Authorities Section was regarded 
by many officers as an excrescence which interfered with 
straightforward native administration. Its problems were 
generally discounted, even by those officers relatively 
sympathetic to its objects. In the Gazelle Peninsula, however,
the local staff began to reoonsider the voluntary
45participation approach, late in 1952.
The view was expressed that it would be disastrous to
extend local government if this approach were maintained.
It was recommended that top-level policy decisions be taken
on areas where local government was necessary, and that the
46 y .policy then be applied without native option. The Director,
however, suggested that dissidents could be induced to join
47by withholding social services from them. Fortunately, 
this was not done. When the Raluana Committee petitioned the 
Prime Minister, in December 1955, complaining of this kind
45) Ibid., para.6.
46) Ibid.
47) D.D.S. to D.C. Rabaul, 6.11.1952. DS 14/3/19. He said 
that the lack of general native taxation made this 
ethically acceptable.
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of coercion, the Administration was able to deny the charge. 
(Inevitably, however, the gap between social services in 
council and non-council areas has widened, roughly proportion­
ately to the tax rates, since 1958, of £4 in council areas
% AQand £2 elsewhere).
The S.N.A.O. warned, in 1953, that the anti-council groups
cnwere out of Administration control altogether; and the D.C.
agreed that kivung activities in these areas came close to
51'organised subversive activity'. The active aspect of 
resistance to local government had before not been fully 
appreciated. Appeals to reason were vitiated by a strong 
emotionalism running through the dissident groups; the younp
men had the luluais thoroughly cowed. Pro-council elements
52were usually Arightened to speak; though in one or two
settlements (e.g. Tinginagalip) brave men were prepared to
53nominate candidates for contiguous councils.
329
48
48) Petition (undated) received Prime Minister's Dept. 8.12.1955. 
PM 194/12; Administrator to Sec. Territories, 20.1.1956.
HA 14/7/9. The Administrator claimed that such a step had never been contemplated - this was obviously inaocurate.Also personal information from Manoaf the Navuneram leader.
49) The non-Council groups (e.g. Navuneram) have countered by collecting their own levies, professedly to provide schools, etc. - Information, Manoa.
50) Fienberg to D.D.S. , 8.2.53, Rabaul 14/11/6.
51) D.C. to D.D.S., 23.2.53. Ibid.
52) Ibid. An ex-Seventh Day Adventist teacher from Napapar No.l 
village was, and has remained, staunchly pro-counoil and has regularly attended meetings of the Vunadadir Council.
53) Ibid. The D.C. asked for the right to nominate councillors 
for those villages *hich refused to elect their own - a right which the Administrator could include in an amended 
proclamation under powers conferred on him by Section 5(1)(b) of the Ordinance.
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had arisen, in 1953 the D.C. asked permission to incorporate
all the dissident areas into councils. The S.N.A.O. hoped
that this would destroy the precedent, and thereby voluntary
54participation altogether.
The dissident elements timed and executed active 
opposition superbly, however. In May, 1953, the D.C. was 
assaulted at Raluana. The official Inquiry showed that field 
staff could not count on central government backing to abandon 
voluntary participation. The Enquiry's Conclusions were vague; 
it blamed 'inherent characteristics' in the dissident groups, 
and an incorrect relationship between the D.C. and the 
S.N.A.O.55
In December, 1953 the Administrator personally conferred
with Raluana leaders, to re-assure them; and in February, 1954
the acting Administrator actually proclaimed all the dissident
groups within the councils their leaders had originally agreed
to join in 1951. Three weeks, later however, after public
protests by the kivung*s leaders, the acting Administrator
57revoked the proclamations. This Administration vacillation
54) Ibid.
55) Statement by the Administrator, D.M.Cleland, Legislative 
Council 30.7.1953. T.P.N.G. Debates, 2nd session, 4th meeting, pp.24—6. Cleland stated that the Native 
Authorities Section interfered with 'pure and simple' 
administration. See Appendix B, II.
56) Govt. Gazette, 4.2.1954 (3000 people = oa. 8# Tolai population).
57) Govt. Gazette, 25.2.1954. Summary of the action given In 
undated D.S. memo., 'Request of the Rakunai People to 
leave Reimber Village Council». PS 14/7/54À.
Purely because of the bad administrative situation which
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emboldened the dissidents and, it was said, those missionaries
who opposed the local government system# The Navuneram group
began to influence the Rakunai group, which had voluntarily
58joined the Reimber council in 1952, to withdraw. This group
then refused to pay tax, and used tactics similar to those of 
59the dissidents. The D.C. commentedt
I fear that this attitude will continue in the Gazelle 
Peninsula whilst some communities are permitted to 
remain outside the Local Government Organisations. I am convinced that any such scheme must embrace a com­
plete geographic or ethnic group, and not merely a part~0 
thereof, as is the case here in the Gazelle Peninsula.
Local conclusions did not make central policy, which still
remained undefined. Certain Catholic missionaries in the
Gazelle Peninsula had long been known to be opposed to local
government. A mission publication, Talaigu. of September,
611951, had attacked the principle of council taxation.
Prom being largely individual and private, however, 
Catholic opposition beoame general and public. The Church's 
spokesman on the Legislative Council suggested in 1954 that
58) Ibid. Ties between Navuneram and Rakunai are strong - the Govt. Anthropologist believes that muoh of the land now 
worked by Manoa is customarily owned by Rakunai natives. 
They may originally have entered the Council because of personal antipathy for Manoa, who is claiming this land 
for his sons in defiance of matrilineal inheritance; 
because of his continued possession of the land and his 
success in staying out of the Council they may have been influenced to withdraw, having found no aid to repossession 
through local government.
59) A.D.O. (H.A.A.) to D.O. 23.7.55, Eabaul 14/11/6/10; a/
D.N.A. to Aast. Admin. 7.9.55, NA 14/7/9.
60) D.C. to D.N.A., 30.6.55, Rabaul 14/2/4.
61) Fienberg to J.H. Jones, private letter, 26.10.1951« Memo. 
'Certain Salient Problems of the K.D.G. System'. 3.12.54:
NA 39/1/0.
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non-natives be appointed to the councils, in order to 'curb
g pthe Administration in their sponsorship of the system'.
The mission had the misconception that the councils were a
form of ’self-government* - a belief it seemed to share with
63the Minister for Territories; and it felt that councils*
functions should be similar to those of Australian municipal
64authorities - that is, in the native context, minimal.
The former New Britain B.C. charged, however, that the
mission opposed native local government fundamentally because
it gave the natives some say in their own affairs :
They are no longer feudal subjects to boss around (sic) by some other organisation. I rather think65 
that is the true answer.
The S.N.A.O. claimed that the missions generally were 
opposed to local government, and that this constituted a major 
problem.**® In his view, only the inter-denominational 
character of the established councils had saved them from 
complete mission control; though some ’emancipated* natives 
within the councils were beginning to doubt the value and 
wisdom of mission influence. He accused the missions of 
having waged *a constant little cold war* against local
62) T.P.i^ G. Leg. Council Debates, 3,11.1954, p.40.
63) Ibid; also letter by Minister Hasluck, Sydney Morning Herald, 20.4,1956, stated: ’devoted public servants ... 
Save extended native local self-government’.
64) T.P.N.G, Leg. Council Debates, 1.6.1956, p.87. In 
particular, said Pr. Dwyer, the councils should play no 
direct role in economic and educational development.
65) Ibid., 1.6.1956, p.89: J.K. McCarthy.
66) Minute: ’Certain Salient Problems of the N.L.G. System’, cit.sup.
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government, by a variety of means: disparaging references 
during services; articles in vernacular publications; smear 
campaigns against councillors; interference with council 
elections (Kuraip village, Reimber, was alleged to have been 
threatened with excommunication); pressures against council 
schools and schooling; belittling councils* legislative and 
policing functions (*the councils* laws are not the Govern­
ment's laws*); influencing council natives not to complain
and non-council natives not to accept local government* The
67S.N.A.O. anticipated similar mission opposition everywhere.
This conviction, perhaps distorted or exaggerated, was
nonetheless an important deterrent to local government
extension. (The D.O. New Britain agreed with the local assess- 
68ment, however; there were reports that natives organised
on 'Catholic Action* lines had taken over councils (Vunadadir,
\691955) , and that independent Catholic kivungs were being
7 0organised (e.g. Vuvu, 10.8.1955).
(vi) The Implications of Voluntary Participation
When the S.N.A.O. was acting Assistant Director of Native
67) Ibid. Some missionaries clearly tried to remain neutral, 
particularly on the question of council/non-oouncil splits. The Methodist mission apparently attempted to adopt such
a position; in 1961, when the first natives were to be 
elected to the Legislative Council, Rev. Wesley Lutton of Rabaul protested against the exclusion of the dissi­
dents from the elections - C.J. Lynch, A New Constitution 
for Papua and New Guinea. J.P.S.f June 1961, Vol. 76, 
p.24^ .
68) a/D.O. to D.N.A., 19.11.1955. NA 14/7/9.
69) a/D.N.A. (written by Fienberg) to Asst. Administrator, 
7.9.1955. NA 14/7/9.
70) Catholic newsletter, translated from Gunantuna, NA 40/l/l0.
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Affairs in 1955 he attempted once again to hare voluntary 
participation abandoned. It was important that the small 
numbers of natives already within councils should retain 
confidence in the Administration and be shielded from intimi­
dation; this was impossible as long as contiguous groups were
71able to choose their system of administration. More im­
portant was the hiatus in council extension:
In other districts we cannot even make a start on
Progressive Native Administration until tlie Gazelle eninsula sltuailon is resolved ... until ihia 
Gazelle Peninsula situation is resolved I cannot see 
my way clear to formulate and submit concrete proposals for several other areas where more intensive 
native administration is urgently needed - portions 
of the Sepikf New Ireland, Bougainville, Manus,Northern,Gulf and Central Districts all involve issues 
whose handling is dependent on what we do in the 
Gazelle Peninsula.
A further submission to the Administrator for forcible
incorporation was met, however - by a remarkable coincidence
- by a Raluana petition, alleging coercion and the destruction
73of their traditional allegiances. The Administrator branded
71) a/D.N.A. to Asst. Administrator, 7.9.1955. NA 14/7/9. This was given added significance when the Rakunai group renewed its efforts to leave the Reimber Council: on
1.11.1955 sixty-seven defaulters appeared before the 
Rabaul magistrate for failing to pay council tax. (N.A. memo, to Asst. Admin. 16.7.1956. NA 14/7/34/1). On
30.6.1956 the Rakunai group petitioned the Administrator 
to withdraw from the council (ibid.).
72) a/D.N.A. (written by Pienberg) to Asst.Admin. 7.9.1955. NA 14/7/9.
73) Petition received P.M. Dept., Canberra, 8.12.1955. eit. sup. It was undoubtedly framed and phrased with European assistance, in view of the level of education 
of the Raluana leaders. It was sent while the Adminis­
trator was still considering the request from the D.N.A. 
in Port Moresby.
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these Raluana arguments as 'spurious*; yet he claimed that
everything possible had been done - 'the situation remain»
74 75difficult'. Voluntary participation was re-affirmed.
Complications of this policy needed examination and
definition, however. It was not known what percentage
agreement was necessary for a group's inclusion, nor how it
could validly be assessed. This became important as splits
developed within the anti-council groups: for example,
Sergeant-Major Tongatia defected from the Raluana Conmittee
in mid-1957; and about 100 natives broke with the Navuneram
76leadership. The pro-council section of Raluana village
steadily grew, reaching 56# in 1959; but the D.N.A. considered
this insufficient to justify a firm recommendation for
77inclusion to the Administrator.
74) Administrator to Sec. Territories, 20.1.1956. NA 14A/9*
75) Again the hope was that the widening gap between works and services in council and non-council areas would 
overcome resistance to local government in the latter.
But Fienberg had continually emphasised that this approach might lead to councils incapable of adequate works and services. However, as early as 1954 the D.C. 
Rabaul claimed that the different rates of progress in 
council and non-council areas were already apparent (D.C. to D.N.A., 6.10.1954, Rabaul 14/ll/6). This widening gap, 
it later became clear, only strengthened the determination 
of the leadership in the non-council areas - hence one basis for the remarkable emotionalism.
76) A.D.O. to D.N.A., 10.7.1957. NA 23/18/22; D.N.A. to 
Administrator, 26.11.1957. NA 42/2/1, with handwritten comments by Administrator and Asst. Admin., dated 27.11. 1957; A.D.O. Habaul to D.O. 26.7.1957, Rabaul 14/11/6.
The school-teacher Tuvi joined Tongatia in favouring 
entry to a council,
77) A.D.O. Kokopo to D.O. Rabaul 30.7.1959. KPO 14/4/3A; 
29.9.59, ibid; A.D.O. Collins (Nat.Aff.) to D.N.A. 27.2.
1960. NA 42/2/i; D.N.A. to D.O. Rabaul 1.3.1960. NA42/2/1.
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Correspondingly, however, emotionalism increased within
these groups, creating a difficult administrative situation
and further emphasising the disadvantages of voluntary
participation. The introduction of general native taxation
in 1958 brought matters to a head; as mentioned above, the
Navuneram group led by Manoa refused to pay and resisted
78arrest; two natives were shot dead by police. The official
report by Chief Justice Mann was, however, anything but
favourable to a firm approach. It claimed that Native Affairs
officers had ignored genuine anxieties, because local govern-
79ment had caused them to lose touch with the natives.
80This was resented by local officers and, more
78) Administrator to Sec. Territories, Deathst Nayuneram 
Village. 5.8.1958* AD 85/4/7. Resistance io iax spread 
to Buka Passage and to the Duke of York Islands. This refusal had been preceded by the refusal of the people of Tinginalip village, in 1957, to pay council tax. In 
May 1956 they had been included in the Vunadadir Council 
after a plebiscite appeared to show 65.4# agreement to enter a council. This tax refusal was attributed to 
dissident influence. Cf. L. Gray Cowan, Local Government 
in West Africa, p.vii: #... the reluctance of many Africans io accept the local representation organs Is often a reflection of their desire to retain son» element 
of stability based on tribal authority, in a world which 
in other ways is disintegrating before their eyes*.
79) Navuneram Enquiry, Report, Vol. VIII, especially pp. 
1430-65.
80) A.D.O. Emmanuel, the officer primarily responsible at Navuneram, suggested to the Administrator in a private 
memorandum (18.12.1958) the abandonment of voluntary 
participation, a system of native courts, compulsory and secondary education, the elucidation of land tenure policy, the removal of police duties from administrative 
staff, better training of field staff, regular conferences 
of D.O.s, the appointment of a full-time welfare officer, 
and annual meetings of representatives of the Territory's 
councils. The final two of these steps have since been taken.
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a combined councils1 meeting rejected Mann's conclusions and
81John Vuia, M.L.C., described the Report as 'all rubbish'.
In view of the maintenance of voluntary participation, 
and of its known repercussions among the Tolai, it is not 
surprising that the extension of local government did not 
really begin until 1956, and that it remained hesitant, 
insisting on unanimous agreement. The existing councils 
recognized this. The combined New Guinea councils, at Madang 
in June, 1959, expressed 'very strong feelings' on the subject, 
and resolved that the Administration should abandon voluntary 
participation now that the advantages of local government as 
a progressive form of administration had been amply
ondemonstrated. The Administration rejected the resolution.
(vii) Consequent Tardiness of Extension. 1950-56.
Viewed in perspective, it may seem ludicrous that the 
resistance offered to local government by 2-3,000 natives 
should have held up extension of the system for five years; 
but the S.N.A.O. realized that fundamental principles of 
extension were involved, and he was determined not to set up
81) a/D.O. to D.N.A., 20.3.59 (reporting combined meetingof 18.3.59), Rabaul 14/12; Item 2. The Dec. 1957 census showed the total mainland Tolai population to be 39,279; 
of this, the Raluana group numbered 1790, and the 
Navuneram/Taviliu group 1341.
82) Report of Proceedings, Resolutions 26 and 27. Comments 
by D.N.A., 20.6.1960. NA 44/4/1. It thus took twelve 
months for the Conference to be given answers to its 
Resolutions.
significantly, by the majority of the Tolai within councils:
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councils on a chance basis which would court failure.
Because he had to convince all sections of the community of 
the soundness of native local government as a progressive 
administrative technique, the success of the early councils 
was vital.
This could hardly have been known to the 1956 U.N.
Visiting Mission, led by a distinguished Britifeh adminis­
trator, which severely criticised the tardiness of the New 
Guinea Administration in not living up to its promise of 1950, 
The Mission accused the Administration of adopting fa con­
servative and even timid approach* and said that its in­
sistence on 'considerable preparation* and ’extremely 
favourable conditions* was delaying the establishment of 
local government in areas which were ripe for it.
The Mission strongly uiged a speeding up of the
programme, even if it meant taking some risks ,,,
In the period to 1956, in fact, the Administration was 
not looking for ’extremely favourable conditions* in which 
to set up councils? all the councils which were set up were 
virtually forced on the Administration, as has been pointed 
out, by past promises or local conditions. The only councils, 
other than those already mentioned, to have been set up, 
were those in Milne Bay, The Ealeba council on the south 
side of the Bay was established on the express instructions
83) 1956 Report, U.H. T/1260, pp.77-9} also T/899, Henort 
1950, p,4. The former mission was led by Sir John 
Macpherson, the latter by Sir Alan Burns,
84) G.A.O.R., 11th Session, June-July 1956, A/3170, supp.4, p,297.
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of the Administrator, Col. J.K. Murray, and without the 
Knowledge of the Senior Native Authorities Officer.8  ^ The 
reasons for this decision extended a long way into the area’s 
history, and were pressing. Among them were factors which
Q/»are discussed else^ fliere. They included the cultist back­
ground in the area; the extensive alienation of land for 
European plantations; the influence in the villages of a partly 
dissociated elite, produced by the Kwato Mission; the strong
impact of the Oxford Group (M.R.A.) movement before the war;
87the prolonged contact with American troops during the war;
and the fact that large sums of money were paid out without
any practical lead being given after the war. The
Administration feared that the area was on the knife edge of
a cultist reaction* Until 1949 there was no permanent
Administration representation in the area, and the way was
88open for some form of charismatic leadership* Kwato had 
been opposed to much that was traditional; but until 1949 the 
Milne Bay natives had had no effective lead in their ambition 
to adopt a European way and standard of living. This produced
85) Govt. Gazette No.66, 19.11*1951; S.N.A.O. to D.C.
Samarai 22.12*52, Rabaul 14/11/6/26.
86) See Ch. Ill, 2*
87) For the military aspects see D. McCarthy, Australia In 
the War. 1939-45 - South-West Pacific Area. Mrst fear: Eo'koda to tiiaTTIgror: (TFri' ir 'ms'sS:-------- '---------------
88) Lengthy summary of events by H.T. Plant, N.A*0., to D*C. 
Samarai, 3.1.53, (Gehua). Plant pointed out that in the 
period 1946-52 there had been at least 11 different
D.C.s in Samarai and at least 11 different officers 
dealing in the field with the Milne Bay peoples.
a malaise, a sense of failure and frustration*
This developmental/leadership vacuum was eventually
filled by Mr. Cecil Abel of the Kwato mission, who promoted
two main activities of the village industry types a factory
at Wagawaga and a farm at Wamakikiwana. At least in the
period 1949-51 these drew extensive support from villages
90around the Bay, and created a new sense of purpose.
The Administration by 1951 was regarding these develop­
ments with some alarm, partly because of the poor business 
organization behind them, but primarily because it regarded 
the Milne Bay Development Co. and its attempts to provide 
welfare services, as a triumph for the Kwato mission over 
the Administration. The Patrol Officer stationed at Wagawaga 
in 1951 wrotei
At Wagawaga .*. the lead has passed from the Admini­
stration to Kwato Mission in the person of Mr. CeoilQ1 Abel*
The real leaders in the area were mission leaders. The 
unofficial council which functioned at Wagawaga had only once 
referred a query to the Administration, and this was a 
request for the acceleration of War Damage payments; other­
wise, it looked to the mission.
89) Ibid*
90) See C.S.Belshaw: In Search of Wealth (1955) ; also Wagawaga: 
An Experiment in Oceanic Development7 Corona, June 1951 f pp.64-6; A.M.Healy, Wagawaga: n^e kd of an Experiment. 
Corona, March 1961, pp.104-7; A.M.Healy, frew Guinea, L 
Past or Slow? J.P.S,. 1961, LXX# 4, pp.48&-90.
91) P.O. Plant to D.D.S., 1.2.51, DS 14/3/30.
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It would appear that the Government does not 
count for very much in the life of these people 
the Mission is dominant ...
The Administration knew that the extension of its functions 
by the Milne Bay Development Co. was ill-advised and badly 
organized* and it had legitimate fears of the local reper­
cussions when these ventures should fail. It felt the need
to channel the enthusiasm into properly administered projects
93for 'economic and political development•; but because of 
the established mission hold it regarded Abel and the Company 
as rivals for the natives' allegiance in planning for these 
objects.
In October 1950 the D.C. recommended that statutory
councils be established for each of the Milne Bay villages,
for Rogea island, Wari island, Suau and Wedau. This was done
quite independently of the Native Authorities Section, and
it would appear that the D.C. regarded the councils rather
in the light of the powerless, non-statutory councils which
94existed in the area before the war.
The S.N.A.O. was violently opposed to this oonoept. It 
was oentral to his promoting of native local government that 
the councils should be area organizations embracing sub­
stantial populations in relation to the traditional parishes. 
Fortunately the Patrol Officer in Milne Bay at the time was
92) Ibid.
93) Plant memo, of 3.1.53, cit.sup.
94) D.C. to D.D.S., 31.10.50, Samarai 14/2/3/428.
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H.T. Plant (to become Executive Officer, Local Government in 
Port Moresby in 1956). He realized that if the counoils 
were effectively to carry out even minimal works and services, 
units larger than the village were essential. He realized, 
too, the implications of the financial restrictions which had 
been written in to the Ordinances See Chapter VII. Plant 
independently estimated that, in view of these factors, a 
viable council unit should embrace a minimum population of 
about 2,000, of whom fewer than 600 would be likely to be 
eligible for tax. Initially, however, he recommended for the 
south side of Milne Bay a council comprising the villagee of 
Wagawaga, Daio, Gwawili, Gamadoudou and Gibara, with a 
population of only about 1,100 people. This took acoount of 
language factors, social cohesion and transport difficulties; 
it also brought in a Catholic element, and natives not 
directly involved in the Kwato enterprises. Plant envisaged 
that, once established and acoepted, the council would expand 
and eventually amalgamate with a council for the north side 
of the Bay.^^
Belshaw, who was working in Milne Bay at this time, 
thought that three councils should be set up, one for each of 
the major language groups. He was anxious that the severe 
form of direct administration which was patently unsuitable 
for the area, should be mitigated; but he had serious 
reservations about the type of local government which the
95) Plant, memo, of 1.2.51, cit.sup.
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Ordinance permitted. It was admittedly designed for the 
more advanced areas; but the desirable flexibility to take 
in local variations was absent. He favoured legislation 
on established British lines which made broad provisions, 
modifiable by individual instruments. The demands of the 
New Guinea legislation, he felt, were much too involved and 
back-breaking supervision would be required.
The councils are thus clearly recognized as a
step in the existing structure of administration.
In a sense, Belshaw's emphasis on language groupings a0 
council units was a peg on which to hang his belief that, In 
view of the legislative demands, the technical difficulties 
of organizing and running a oounoll made it imperative to 
have the initial units small. Plant felt that in the
97beginning some socio-linguistic homogeneity was necessary.
Thus the Ealeba council was proclaimed over the five 
villages suggested by Plant; though it was advooated that the 
other Bay counoils be set up and amalgamated with the Ealetoa
96) C.S.Belshaw. Native Administration in S.E. Papua. The 
Australian Ouilo^TmeT^lSI^ 3oufli facljjc. Aug.1^ 51. pp.107-8 and Deo.1951, p.220. Belshaw regarded the British Solomons Regulation No.2/1947 as 
better. Fienberg replied with the Administration case 
for ’close supervision* in South Pacific. Nov.1951, p.184. R.Wraith, Local Government, p.48, commends the broad type 
of legislation, permitting local flexibility.
97) Ibid., a/N.A.O. Plant to D.C. Samarai, 20.10.51 (Wagawaga). 
The linguistic argument was pexfeaps overemphasised in 
Milne Bay as, with the exception of the Methodlet villages 
near East Cape (educated in the d *Entrecasteaux), Suau is widely understood. Suau is now the council language for Milne Bay. Three languages were already represented In the council.
oounoil as quickly as possible.
The Kwato mission and the Milne Bay Development Co* in 
no way opposed the establishment of the council* Bather» 
Abel welcomed the idea and suggested that the Maivara and 
Buhutu (Sagarai valley) peoples should be Included beoause 
of traditional ties. According to Abelf the prospect of 
'training in self-government1 had boosted morale in the
goBay. The Company even lent the money to establish the
council *^^
This in no way mitigated the attitude of the 
Administration towards the Company, whioh was described in 
1952 as the major obstacle to systematic native adminis­
tration; in particular its attempts to provide services such
as water supplies and eleotrio ligit were seen as outtlng
101across the functions of local government. * Plant*s
submission for a council» however» had partly been based on
10 pthe economic development being promoted by the Company.
The S.N.A.O. had perhaps an unduly rigid attitude towards 
the functions of the council» which took little account of 
the activities of non-oouncll organizations* He blamed Absl
98) Ibid.
99) C. Abel to H.T. Plant, private letter 18.5.1951; also 
personal Information C. Abel to H.T. Plant.
100) Pienberg to D.C. Samara!» 22.12.52» Rab&ul 14/11/6/26.
101) Ibid.
102) Plant memo, of 20.10.51.
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and the Company largely for the antipathetic attitude of 
the Milne Bay people, as he interpreted it, towards the 
Administration. He recommended that unless the local Natire 
Authorities Officer, Plant, could be given •strong support'# 
he should be withdrawn and the council abolished.10®
The issue was complicated by the lack of any planning 
or co-ordination within the Administration which would have 
permitted economic development to take the place of the 
Company* Co-operatives in the area were Instituted at the 
same time as the council, but they concentrated almost ex­
clusively on the running of trade stores in order to absorb 
as muoh as possible of the War Damage compensation* It was 
remarked in 1954 that 'there is little indication that they 
have attempted or intend to attempt to foster a develop­
mental programme*#104 The Administration, in fact, (Fienberg 
personally excluded), lacked community development concepts 
equivalent to those which Abel was attempting to apply 
privately through the Company. The role of councils in 
economic development - for which, in Fienberg*s view, they 
were primarily oreated - was undefined#
103) Memo., Affairs of the M.B. D.Co#« 22.1S.52. NA 39 A/2# 
Plant (memo. oi 2#i# ,  oit • sup.) denied that the Company’s social services interfered with those of the council# Plant suggested supervisory control ovsr the 
Co., but doubted the Administration's legal right to 
insist on this.
104) A.D.O. Gehua to D.C* Samara! 6.8.54. 14/30 Gehua. Fien­
berg, like Camilla Wedgwood (Monthly Notes, It 7, pp.l-5)t 
had suggested as far back as 1947 that compensation bs paid into trust funds, with native consent, to finance
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The Ealeba council produoed few tangible results during 
its years of existence; its absorption of the poor Buhutu 
people, numbering about 770, in 1953, added a burden to it*
In the same year some assistance was given to the Gwawill 
school. The councillors themselves were conscious of ths 
need to expand their economic base, and in the same year 
suggested crops other than copra be tried. But the basie
i . V - ,vtrouble was lack of funds to do much more than keep the
council in existence. Moreover, the council itself suffered
internal dissension. Henry Lekl of the Company had been the
first Chairman; but after 1951 he was under attack for
alleged adultery. In addition, the existence and decline
of the Company had serious effects on the council, for it
dominated the attention of most councillors. Plant believed
that the Oxford Group philosophy, noticeable in the Company,
10Bsapped the councillors of any power to make decisions.
(viii) Problems in Milne Bay.
Nevertheless, the problems which this council posed - as 
happened in the Gazelle Peninsula - Impelled the Native
Authorities Section to raise basie points of polioy for
t
the extension of the system. The problem in Milne Bay was 
that a unique combination of pressures had compelled the
105) Plant memo, of 2.1.53, clt.sup. The Ealeba councillors 
themselves suggested the incorporation of the Buhutu (Minutes, 7.8.52) and Plant supported the proposal as 
one step on the road to a single oounoil for the whole 
Bay. (To D.C. Samaral 11.2.53, Sam. 14/17/2).
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establishment of the Ealeba counoil# which was patently
non-viable as a developmental agency providing additional
social services. It oould become viable only by extension
to take in the rest of Milne Bay; this implied the prior
creation of more non-viable units, per se unacceptable*
The S.N.A.O. believed that one stsp towards the
amalgamation would be the setting up of joint treasuries
under Section 8 of the Ordinance (already in operation between
Reimber and Llvuan councils in the Gazelle Peninsula), which
he believed might be the solution elsewhere also*10® He
noted, however, that such an arrangement, while admlnlst-»
ratively and psychologically preparing for amalgamation,
financially made relatively little difference to council
overheads* This presented an added difficulty In Milne Bay,
for distances were so great and communications so poor that
there was little immediate prospect ofamalgamation. Even
the total population of the Bay, 5-6,000, barely amounted
107to a council unit of workable size, in Fienberg’s view.
A second council (Tavara) taking in the north side of 
the Bay, was eventually set up on 11th September, 1954. The 
delay had been oaused largely by the dispersal of the 
population which necessitated a ratio of 31 councillors for
106) Fienberg to D.D.S., 2.3.53, Rabaul 14/1 1/6/26.
107) Ibid. He described the joint treasury approach as 'a 
compromise between long range aims and the Immediate 
hard facts of geography and native situation'• S.N.A#0. 
to D.C. Samarai, 20.5.53, Rabaul 14/11/6/1*
3,337 population. The practicability of amalgamation
with the Ealeba council was, as Fienberg had said, limited
by poor communications, but essentially poor communications
within the context of the Ordinance: for Regulation 17 fixed
meetings at monthly intervals. This Regulation was amended
only in 1957, to permit meetings at two-monthly intervals
at the Director’s discretion. The two councils unanimously
resolved for amalgamation, although even within their own
areas councillors living at the extremities took five days 
109over a meeting. The Administration claimed that the two 
councils had realised their non-viability, and that this had 
broken down traditional antagonisms between the north and 
south sides, to make unanimous agreement possible.110
During the period to 1956 native looal government was 
still in the experimental stage. Nine councils were set up, 
but five of these in the Gazelle Peninsula were being used 
as *a testing ground for polioy*, while the other four
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108) Native income was very low here, so that the two councils originally projected were joined. The 
implication was that a certain balance between income 
and population dispersal was essential for a council.
109) A.D.O. to D.C. Samarai 9.5.57. Gehua 14/5* Amending 
Reg. 3 of 1957| Minutes, joint meeting, 17.7.57, 
Sinaeada; A.D.O. to D.C. 14.9.57, Gehua 14/41.
110) a/D.N.A. to Asst. Admin. 14.10.57, NA 42/4. This was 
the first amalgamation. Amalgamation was one of the 
few contingencies for which the Ordinance did not provide. Under Seotion 4 separate proclamations had to abolish the existing councils, and a third pro­
clamation set up the new Milne Bay Council - all to bs synchronised on 31.12.57. Regulations in the British 
Solomons insist on meetings only at 6-monthly intervals; 
this has made pan-island counoils practicable - B.S.I.P., N.A.R. 10/1953. Section 16. See Appendix C, II.
represented responses to urgent local pressures. In 1956
expansion of local government began, in accordance with a
new general policy of changing over from village to area
organization* This was emphasised by the disbandment of the
specialist Native Authorities Section, and the incorporation
of local government officers into general field staff*111
The officers attending the first Local Government Training
Course affirmed that the policy had proved itself in the
Gazelle Peninsula 9 and that it should be applied in all areas
112where the acknowledged preconditions existed.
Postscript: Supervision,
This chapter has incidentally drawn attention to problems 
of local government deriving from central government 
organization and supervision. These problems had wide 
ramifications, but are peripheral to the main theme and are 
analysed in Appendix B*
It is enough to say here that until 1956 councils were 
supervised by the specialist Native Authorities Section; 
however, this tended to confuse district organization and t© 
perpetuate the idea amongst general field staff that local 
government was an exotic growth and its cultivation an 
esoteric activity. To remove this idea, in 1955 (operative
1956) Native Authorities Officers were incorporated in Nat lire
1U) L,G, Bulletin No. 2, March 1957, p*2*
112) Report, 'The Stage at which Local Government should 
replace t'Ee Single Village Administration System 
BaEauI^loy/Jlei r m i ; 1,' £751".-------S----------- 4-------
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Affairs staff - this synchronised with the final abandonment
V
of the Native Authority concept.
It was hoped that supervision of councils could than 
devolve on field staff generally, but this was slow in 
happening because of (i) the continuation of 'direct* adminis­
trative attitudes, and (ii) the complex nature of council 
accounting. The former was by far the more important! in 
1960 the non-cooperation of many Native Affairs staff was
described as being still the major obstacle to the proper
113functioning and extension of local government.
113) See C.R. Lambert (Sec.Terr.) in South Pacific. IX, 1, 1956, p.470i *The Relationship of tfative Local Govern­
ment Councils to the D.O. is a matter of thejutmost 
importance *. '
Administration Organization
affecting Local Government, 
1949-55
Admini strator __________________
Government 
Secretary's 
D epar tme nt
* The Raluana Enquiry, 1953, 
pointed out undefined 
relationship here (S.N.A.O. 
based in Rabaul).
A d m i nistration Organization
affecting Local G overnment,  
1 9 5 5 -
CHAPTER VI
PRINCIPIAS POR THE ESTABLISHMENT M P J m S i S L S L  
NATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(i) Polioy 1950-55,
During the period 1950-56 Fienberg, the S,N,A,0.# was 
re-defining poll>y in relation to the establishment of 
counoils, and to their proposed functions - the two being 
interdependent. Although he favoured the oonoomitant 
establishment of native courts, to give a system analogous 
to British Native Authorities, in no sense did he regard the 
councils as quasi-traditional institutions which natives 
everywhere in the Territory, and under all conditions, were 
entitled to have.1 In the emphasis on specific pre­
conditions, on carefully delimited functions, and on close
supervision, his views reflected a continuing paternalism.
In February 1952 he wrote the first polioy memorandum on 
local government. This emphasised that councils were integral 
parts of the administrative structure, and that their 
establishment did not imply a sudden leap into local autonomy. 
Councils were not to be forced on natives, but the idea was 
to be mooted. (As has been shown, he later tried to reject
1) This formed the core of the argument with Belshawt see
■U.w
v, !V, 10, 1951, pp.220-1.
D.M
c~~ ¡C sr-t^z>
mthe principle of voluntary participation). As the provision 
of works and services, linked with economic development, was 
the object of the councils, the policy could not work 
effectively below a minimum population. A figure under 4,000 
was to be avoided; but he saw no upper limit, and thought the 
bigger councils were the better they would function. (This 
clearly would depend on the density of population, the state 
of communications, and a willingness to oo-operate).3
In January 1953 the practicability of instituting local 
government in the relatively backward and desolate areas of 
the Seplk raised further policy Issues. Fienberg rejected the 
idea that any degree of literacy should be a precondition; nor
)
was it necessary that the people already be on a cash economy; 
though as central government had made no reply to his sub­
missions for initial finance for oounoils this clearly had to i
be locally obtainable. The major preconditions he defined as
4an adequate population density and an eoonomic potential.
The implication here is that, although the natives would 
have some (carefully controlled) voice in their own affaire
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2) It is interesting to see that the first officers’ training 
course also did so - Report, N.L.G. Training Course, Vunadadir, 1956, pp. 28-30.
3) N.L.G. Memo. No.l. Ciro. Instruction 141, 4.2.1952. NA 7,9/xA 
He emphasised that supervising officers held it in their hands to enoourage local initiative; they had to find a •golden mean* between complete direction and the achievement 
of the councils’ objects.
4) Fienberg to D.N.A., 27.1.53, Native I'Qcal Government in the Sepik Dietriot. NA 39/1/0. These conditions, he said, 
existed in large areas of the Sepik.
after the establishment of a oouncil^ prior political pressure 
to set up councils should be resisted« In May 1953 he wrote 
that the councils must not become international window- 
dressing, not be set up as sops to 'a few politically 
conscious native individuals1 • The whole object of the 
policy was to face the native with the hard facts of lifet 
»if he wants to advance in a discreetly western direction, we 
can show him how, but he must learn to pay his way as he
Bgoes*.
At the same time, he conoeded that where a native leader, 
such as Paliau, might rally support outside a legally 
regulated framework, it seemed 'highly desirable to attempt 
to forestall these developments'. Native local government 
was the only means of doing so, and might be applicable as 
a control meohanism in areas where the pre-conditions were 
not present.®
In fact, as will be shown below, the Administration's 
approach to politically oonsoious groups has been erratic. 
This has resulted from the emphasis, promoted by Pienberg, 
on councils as media for economic and social development, 
with political functions subordinated to the inculcation of
5) S.N,A.O. to D.C. Samarai, 20,5.53. Rabaul 14/11/6/1.
6) Sepik memo., NA 39/1/0, oit,sup. The question had arisen because of the aspirations of the Sepik leader, Simogun 
Peta, a man with a notable war record and extensive local 
influence.
7) This refers particularly to the Kerema area, economically 
unpromising but politically effervescent.
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excluded many groups in mountain, swamp or island areas;
but he hoped that a system of partial amalgamation through
joint treasuries (as in the Reimber-Livuan example in the
Gazelle Peninsula) could be worked out for contiguous small
councils. He saw this in 1952-3 as the probable mode of
oexpansion of native local government. Later, however, a 
number of complications arose through deficiencies In the 
Ordinance: there was no specific statutory provision for 
amalgamations? joint committees of councils, suoh as those 
at Reimber-Livuan and Ealeba-Tavera, were not corporate bodies 
in their own right, and thus could not borrow money as could 
a council; joint committees could not exeroise rule-making 
powers (Regulations 30-4), and councils could not therefore 
surrender the annual declaration of tax rates by rule to a 
joint committee.10 Apart from the legal obstaoles, however, 
the policy for council establishment precluded gradual 
federation as a mode of counoil expansion, for the initial 
criteria prevented the setting up of small non-viable 
councils and their subsequent amalgamation, or incorporation
8) Reiterated, Fienberg to D.C, Manus, 3.11.52. NA 42-3-5.
9) Sepik memo., NA 39/1/0, oit.sup.
10) D.M. Fienberg, gotee re Paper on Native Local. Goyernaent, 
5.11.57, pp. 2-0. He felt that the inability of a joint 
committee of the Tolai councils to borrow money had im­
paired the flexibility of allocation of bank loan funds 
in the ooooa scheme.
pa sense of responsibility.
Fienberg recognized that the criteria he laid down
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by larger counoils on their periphery, A number of 
examples will illustrate how the principles of local govern­
ment extension have been applied and have developed slnoo 
1953.
(ii) Applications of Policy,
As has been remarked, in Milne Bay and at Manus, small
councils had been set up for political reasons on the direct
instructions of the Administrator. The problem of the
Native Authorities Section was to make them viable. In
Milne Bay the Ealeba councillors themselves requested
extension to the Sagarai valley, and to the western and
11
eastern extremities of the southern shore. Flenberg
supported this, for the Sagarai valley, population 778, had
considerable economic potential; but the Inhabitants had no
means of marketing their produce, and by 1960, because of
the lack of a road, they still represented a neglected pocket.
Their membership of the council, however, had enabled their
predicament to be brought forcibly to the notice of the
Administrât ion.12 As Fienberg saw it, these small extensions
represented only the first step towards one council for the
whole Bay (population 5,000) which alone would be financially
13
capable of supporting overheads and promoting development.
11) Minutes, Ealeba council, 7.8.52.
12) Their tax rate is still the lowest in the council area; 
see my comments on their predioament in Journal of African 
Administration» XIII, 3, July 1961, p. 171; N.I. 0, IPlant
to t.d. ëamaral, 11.2,53, Samarai 14/17/2.
13) Hienberg to D.D,S., 2.3.53, Babaul 14/11/6/26.
It has already been noted that this came about in 1957. *
At this point the extension of the council appears to 
have reached its practicable limit in relation to communl- 
cations and two-monthly meetings. The people of the north­
east coastt beyond East Capev who are socially compatible 
and linguistically allied, had for some years been anxious 
to join the Milne Bay peoples} and in 1957 they pleaded to be 
allowed to Join the new council. The Port Moresby leader,
Mr. John Guise, who visited the area with the Exeoutlve 
Officer (Local Government), supported them. The Exeoutlve 
Officer, however, pointed out the difficulties of communi­
cation, and noted that it was Impossible to make the mandatory
1*5
detailed preliminary survey because of a shortage of staff.
In 1959 the same pleas were being made and the same 
difficulties raised. It will be remembered that these 
people Include some of the most institutionally advanced 
natives in Papua j only a little to the west the Anglican 
mission had councils functioning in the early 1900s. The 
Administration proposed (not, be it noted, the natives) that 
the north-east coast peoples, numbering about 4,000, have 
their own separate council; but the Milne Bay oounoil, 
contrary to expectations, required the full-time supervision 
of a local government officer (in fact, as Belshaw had
14) Amending Reg. 8/1957, allowed meetings every two months. 
See Ch. V, 2, supra.
15) A.D.O. Gehua to D.C., 14.9.57. Gehua 14/41.
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administration and agenoy functions)» so that by May 1960
a survey had not been made. The north-east coast peoples
16 #
were still excluded from local government* (The rapid 
extension of the Village Agricultural Committee® provided 
the real incentive, about this time, for the Native Affaire 
Department to reconsider accelerated extension of local 
government in the District - see Appendix B f I)*
Similar local difficulties, and a similar rigidity of 
polioy, caused serious delays in setting up local government 
in the eastern Gulf. This was peculiarly frustrating to the 
Elema peoples east of Kerema, who have a high literacy rate 
(estimated in 1953 at 60# for the Morlpi group), a capacity 
for skilled work and reservoir of skilled workers, and a 
demonstrated ability to organize and combines in 1946 a 
notable leader, Posa Semesevlta, campaigned amongst the 
eastern Elema, urging them to forget their sub-tribal divisions 
and to combine in eoonomio endeavour - this led to the f o n a ­
tion of the Toaripl Association and ultimately to the suooess^
- ------- ------  - -------------- - - — ..................................>
16) D.O. to D.N.A., 2 .1 2 .5 9 ,  Samarai 1 4 / l ? A ?  Impatient 
comment by E.O.L.G., 1 4 .1 2 .5 9 ,  NA 4 2 /4 .  The A.D.O.
(L.G.) stationed in Milne Bay doubted whether, if local 
government were extended to this area, the Administration 
could provide irained native staff for council 
installations (a stand-still had already been ordered 
on counoil schools). This wae seen as a serious 
deterrent to extension.
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predicted in 1951, he spent most of his time in routine
of the co-operative movement. These very capacities, 
however, as in Sir Hubert Murray's time, may have produced 
a certain reserve within the Administration#
In May, 1953 the B.C. on a visit to the Morlpi-Toaripi 
areas found that the natives m n t e d  councils (the Mori pi 
already came under one L.M.S. mission council) and promised
to ask Headquarters to establish local government in the
18
area. Twelve months later the Moripi submitted a formal
19
petition to the Administrator, requesting local government.
In 1955 nothing further had been done; a rough survey had
been made in 1954, but the S.N.A.O. insisted on an adequate
survey because of the implications of the voluntary
20
participation approach. This was not completed until 1957, 
when P.O. Hoes noted that the natives had been rather dis­
illusioned by the delay and doubted the Administration's
intent. Indeed, the Moripi felt that the promise given them
21
had been broken.
17) H.A. Brown, The Eastern Elema. p.197. He is now regarded 
with posthumous respect both by the Administration and 
by the natives - speech by B.C. Jackson to Toaripl-Moripi 
councils, Lalaplpi, 22.6.1960. The Co-operatives 
Association has run successfully with uniquely little 
European assistance? annual turnover 1959 about £50,000 - 
information from E.O. Graham, a/Registrar of Co-operatives, 
Co-operatives officer McShernr. P.O. Kuklpl to B.C.
Kerema, 10.5.57, Kerema PR 4/1952-3j literacy 62.1# Oiapu 
to Lese, population 4473. Also see Ch. IX, 2 on their 
Port Moresby influence*
18) D.C. to D.D.S., 20.5.53, Kikori 14/3 A8 9 .
19) »olio 3, NA 23/2/2.
20) Pienberg (a/D.N.A.) to D.C., 23.7.55, DS 14/7/8.
21) P.O. Rose to B.C. Kikori, 10.5.57, Kukipi.
358
17
359
The Executive Offloer (Local Government), however, etill 
had serious reservations about implementing looal government 
in the area. Politically he saw no alternative, but he felt 
that it would involve risks because of doubtful economic 
potential:
They will be in a position of having a statutory body 
with defined powers and functions, but incapable of 
serving them as it should because it lacks the necessary 
finance. Nothing oould be more dangerous than political 
development proceeding without comparable advancement 
in the sooial and economic fields*
The real fear was that if the councils proved incapable 
of carrying out adequate economlo and social tasks, the 
resulting frustration would turn them into primarily polltloal 
bodies* One approach, but It was a tedious one, was the 
indoctrination of the population, so that they would be 
prepared in advance for a relatively low soale of works and 
services.
This kind of propaganda has, since 1957, become a regular
part of extension; the Director of Native Affairs wrote -
I am convinced that skilled propaganda work by 
offioers oan do much to overoome some of the diffi*« 
oulties of the voluntary participation approaoh* d
Por eight further months the establishment of councils
was delayed* A later difficulty was ensuring oompetent and
regular supervision* If the D.C. oould not guarantee this,
22) D.N.A. to D.C. Kikori, 6.8.57, NA 23-2-2.
23) Ibid. But the Elema were anxious to participate, so 
that the argument here appears to savour of rationalism.
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said Headquarters, - implying the full time services of an
officer for the two councils - *it would not be in the best
interests of the people or the native situation in general
24
to attempt to institute local government*.
The general inference to be drawn from this case is
that the desire by natives for local government was a
relatively minor factor in the Administration*s decision.
The Administrator finally approved the establishment of the
Moveave-Toaripi and Moripi councils on 18.4.1958, five years
after the original submission had been made.
It is debatable ¥?h ether expressed doubts about economic
potential were not subconscious rationalisations of political
fears, for the Initial recommended tax rate was £4 for adult
males, which was twice the Administration Personal tax and
about three times the tax rate of the Highland councils
25
instituted in the same year.
(ill) Acceleration. 1956-60.
As has been remarked previously, it was only during 1956 
that the extension of local government went beyond the
24) a/D.N.A. to D.C. Kikori, 5.3.58, NA 23-2-2. D.N.A. to 
Administrator, 28.9.1956, (NA 42-7) said that where a 
community was able to make a eo-ordinated demand for 
economic development this should be an indioation that 
it was sufficiently cohesive for local government - but 
this clearly did not imply that It would get local 
government j other factors supervened.
25) a/D.N.A. to Sec. Law, 23.4.58, ibid*
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established; but the establishment of seven councils during
1956 marked the beginning of a campaign of acceleration»
It was announced that the change to area administration was
to become general policy, rather than simply an eclectic
experiment* This change was linked with the departmental
reorganization nhich removed the impression that local g o v e m -
26
ment establishment was a specialist activity*
Correspondingly, as Is mentioned elsewhere, meetings of 
senior officers and of local government trainees considered 
the problems in implementing native local government» Its 
desirable prerequisites» powers and functions. The resulting 
reports broadly endorsed what had previously been laid down# 
Councils were to remain Administration instrumentalities 
facilitating the carrying out of central policy for sooial
P7
and economic development# These and other conferences, in
commitments of 1950-1. During 1955 no new councils were
26) Summarised in L.G. Bulletin No.2, March 1957, p*2, see
Appendix B, II#
27) Senior Officers* Course, A.S.O.P.A., 1957» and the Local 
Government Training Course» Nov-Deo. 1956 (L.G. Section 
14-7-18) generally agreed with the established principles, 
except that of voluntary participation; the Senior 
Officers* Course specifically rejected a more flexible 
policy» especially for areas of dispersed population and 
low economic potential, which would have permitted 
smaller councils of which less could be expected exeou<~ 
tively. D.O. John J. Murphy (significantly, from the 
Western District, where the population density is only
1 per eq. mile), submitted a minority dissent on this 
point. This is roughly the same point made by the 1956 
U.N. Mission (led by Sir John Macpherson) that ’district 
commissioners should be given wide powers to set up 
councils, not necessarily on a rigid pattern* - G.A.O.R., 
11th Session; 355e=J5Ty T O W T 'A / S f r O V s u ppT* , p. 297.
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effect, not only impressed on general field staff that area 
administration was the desideratum, but also obtained their 
sanction of the principles on which area administration was 
already being applied*
Central endorsement, however, brought about some abrupt 
changes of policy at the district level* For example, 
relations between Administration and natives had been poor In 
the Northern District ever since the war; the Administration 
never forgot wartime •treachery*; while the natives clung to 
tradition and when they needed advice, even on eoonoalo 
development, looked to the Anglican mission rather than to 
officials.28
Little effort was made by the Administration to Improve 
relations; the methods and outlook of paternal administration 
were hardly conducive to an improvement* A meeting of native 
officials held at Higaturu in July, 1950, illustrates this 
and contrasts with the aotive policy of co-operation after 
the introduction of native local government, 317 offioials 
attended this meeting; 115 of these called themselves 'hygiene' 
or ’co-operatives* offioials, to D.O* Cowley*s disgust - he 
was unable to see what functions they perfozmed which could 
not be equally well carried out by the native village 
constables and unofficial councillors. He had been trained 
by Murray, and preferred administration ’pure and simple*•
28) C.Sc Belshaw, Social Consequences of the Mt» Laaington 
Eruption« Oceania. 4, 1951» p.P42*
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councillors to hold their Tillages together (village® were
an Administration innovation! the normal habitation pattern
was hamlets); he told them not to be alarmed about report®
of the Korean war; he invited the medical officer to talk to
them, and also the Anglican Bishop, who chanced to be passing
while the meeting was in progress. The meeting broke up with
29
the issue of tobacco to the councillors*
Many senior officers believed that occasional gatherings 
of this type, in which the native officials received paternal 
injunctions, and issues of tobacco, constituted progressive 
administration.
The aocident of the Mt. Lamington eruption in 1951 gav® 
the natives a better impression of the Administration, which 
poured in assistance in money and personnel on a previously 
unknown scale. According to Belshaw, the Orokalva case to 
regard the calamity as a punishment for their previous attitude 
of withdrawal and non-cooperation. They now willingly accepted
the village pattern, and showed ’a general desire for new
30
things*• Unfortunately, another of Murray’s officers was
29) D.O. C.P. Cowley, Meeting of Native Officials. Higaturu. 
K o r t h e m  Division. IV.9.50. f e e o n l y  discussion by tke 
natives arose out of a complaint by one councillor that 
a native recently operated on in hospital had died. The 
D.O. re-assured him by remarking that his sergeant-major 
of police usually missed about 3 pigs in 100 when out 
huntings 'The gathering saw fit to accept this as 
logical*.
30) Belshaw, loc.clt., p.245.
The purpose of the meeting is obscure. Cowley exhorted the
the natives reverted to the old stereotypes* In 1954 D*C.
Bramell described the Orokaiva as ‘truculent, arrogant and
31
uncooperative*, again citing their war record* He had
become alarmed to discover that a native named Timaeus,
possessing some education, had been organising councils in the
district* The D.C. told the natives that they were not ready
for councils, but acceded to their request that the
Administration give them theoretical instruction in law and
32
government*
Port Moresby interpreted the movement amongst the natives 
as *rational and potentially formidable incipient nationalism*. 
Fienberg urged the D.C, to begin organizing statutory councils 
before *the movement* reached the stage at which the natives 
would regard local government only as a form of administrative 
control*33
D.C. Bramell, however, had some experience of councils in 
the Gazelle Peninsula, and he reacted antipathetioally to the 
suggestion that he promote them amongst the Orokaiva. He 
attributed the desire for a council merely to *a chosen few 
with a smattering of education', and he used the already
31) D.C. to D.D.S. , 5 .7 .5 4 ,  Popondetta 1 4 / l A / l 5 »
32) Ibid. Timaeus had been sent to Cairns to gain experience 
during the Queen's visit in 1954*
33) Ibid., manu. comments, dated 8.7.54, DS 14/7/8 oopys 
D.D.S. to D.C. Northern, 14.7.54, DS 14-7-8*
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posted to the area, so that Administration attitudes towards
365
excuse for avoiding local government t
It is not Intended that native looal government 
should be brought into operation (let alone forced 
upon the people in the area under consideration) 
at this date or in the near future. Thie point *4 
cannot be over-emphasised#
He denied that their request for instruction In law and 
government meant that they wished to play an aotive part In 
administration (whloh he envisaged as looal 'self-government'), 
and he asserted that It was merely an indication of their wish 
to demonstrate the change from their former attitude of 
truculence#35
At this period, when the natives were themselves unfamiliar 
with local government, personalities amongst government 
offloers played a large part in its extension. Early in 1956 
looal hesitations amongst the Orokaiva were overcome by the 
energy of an enligitened Patrol Officer, C.J. Normoyle, who 
saw that by all objective criteria the Hlgaturu area is 
ideally suited to development through local governments it has 
excellent well-watered soil, a concentrated population 
speaking a common language, and a good system of communications. 
Some economic development had already taken plaoes in 1956
20 tons of coffee beans and some rubber were produced by
34) D.C. to D.D.S., 3B.7.54, Pop. 14/l/l/l35#
35) Ibid. The oonoepts of the Murray period are unmistakable 
heres the complete retention of control in the hand* of 
government officers, with the expectation that 'ultimately1 
the natives would be sufficiently well versed to carry out 
minor administrative functions#
established principle of voluntary participation as an
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natives. The council was seen as an Administration medium
for promoting economic development in the first instance,
rather than as a body providing services. As originally
proclaimed, it embraced 9,554 people, for some years the
36
largest counoll in the Territory.
Although native local government, by and large, was
vigorously promoted from Port Moresby after 1956, it did not
extend very quickly in the Northern District. The only valid
explanation can again be that of personalities, for the
station had a local government officer continuously, except
for a period in 1957. Two minor extensions of the counoll
37
were made, but little else was done. A.D.O. (L.G.) Norton 
reported in February 1960 that preliminary investigations with 
an eye to local government extension had been carried out in 
the Alga, Buna, Oro Bay, Gona and Collfngwood Bay census 
divisions, but that there was no area in which councils were 
•urgently required*, or even ufoere the need for them had been 
established. Norton clearly was looking for two preconditionsi 
firstly, significant economic development, and seoondly, 
social ooheslon sufficient to define a potential council 
area. In these areas he felt that three years of economic 
development might make it *desirable to introduce council»*, 
and that, with the exception of Collingwood Bay, »political
36) D.if.A. to Asst. Admin., 5.4.56, 1.5.66, NA 41/3/1.
Council proclaimed.Gazette 22, 10.5.56.
37) Extensions of 16.7.58, 19.5.59, NA 41/3/1. See Lord Hiailey 
on the fundamental importance of personalities at th% 
local level, ¿»jiuiA«, XI, 3, 1959, p. 117.
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cohesion* might be adequate also in three years. He felt
that the rapid extension of coffee-growing in the Binandere
area might produce similar essential preconditions for looal
government; and that the Managalase area might achieve a
degree of *cohesion* with the establishment of an airstrip
38
and a patrol post, but *not in the foreseeable future*.
(iv) Local Interpretation of Establishment Criteria,
These two matters of economic potential and social cohesion, 
which are dependent on the estimation of looal officer« and 
are therefore peculiarly subject to personal interpretation, 
presented major difficulties in the extension of looal 
government. The concept of aggressive propaganda to produce 
*social oohesion* adequate for a council (in view of voluntary 
participation) developed only gradually in the period 1956-60, 
as younger officers of post-1949 training joined the Local
<ZQ
Government Section. To define the type of cohesion required
is not easy: in 195? the Senior Offioers substituted
•community of interest1 for ♦ social homogeneity*, but both
40
terms are vague and offer little guidance. Headquarters 
proved reluctant to give detailed directions on the point, in 
order not to discourage extension, beyond expressing opposition
38) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O., 9.2.60, Popondetta 14/8. Norton 
was unusually conservative.
39) The Training Course, 1956, recognized that for a time 
junior officers engaged in local government extension 
might find themselves subordinate to senior officers 
opposed to the system or uninterested in it - Report, p.18.
40) Senior Officers* Course, 1957, Report, p.7a.
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to the idea of making councils 'artificial' creations by
41
puehing together antagonistic native groups«
Because of the small traditional political and linguistic 
groups in Papua-New Guinea, councils inevitably have to embrace 
numbers of parishes and languages; though within the council 
areas there has generally been long contact and often economic 
co-operation, giving a perception of oertaln common goals and 
problems. The Milne Bay counoll ultimately comprised at least 
three separate language groups; but traditionally there had 
been long contaot (e.g. between Divinai on the north and 
Gwawili on the south) which out aoross the linguistic groups.
At the same time, as was stressed above, the Administration 
insisted that it was only the perception of common ends 
through the aotual operation of the councils whioh brought 
the entire north and south sides of the Bay together.
In the Gulf distriot, the Moveave-Toaripi and Moripi 
councils originally represented separate sub-tribes of the 
eastern Elema. These were not traditional political units« 
which were represented by the village settlementst indeed, 
Toaripi and Moveave had been strongly separatist. But at 
both the sub-tribal and tribal levels there existed concepts 
of oommon origins and a common oulture. Economic co­
operation, self-sponsored and later taken up by the 
Administration, welded the sub-tribes into functional units
41) E.O. (L.G.) memo., 14.12.59, NA 14-2-4. The danger now 
is that traditional antagonisms are liable to be 
instituted and perpetuated.
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themselves were preparing to unite through looal government#
Thus, given a lead, native groups do combine beyond the
boundaries within which social and political activities
normally function in traditional life* but it might be
objected that the Administration lead is not vigorous enough,
that it is still beset by too many doubts on the soore of
confederation, that there is too little consciousness of
the widening circles of oo-operatlon between native communities,
and that Administration policy is therefore too timid and 
44
cautious.
When all these reservations are transferred to an 
administrative service lacking a tradition of delegation, the 
results are likely to be restrictive. The 1956 U.K. Mission, 
led by Sir John Maopherson, was too sanguine about delegating 
the task of extension to general field staff |*5 with rare 
exceptions it has in practice remained a specialist aotivity.
In 1958 it was regarded as 'somewhat unusual' when a non­
specialist officer stationed at Misima proposed the establish­
ment of a council therej although the people number 6167,
42) Brown, op.cit., pp. 24-39.
43) See Ch. V, 2.
44) The words used by the 1956 U.N. Visiting Mission, Report, 
T/1260, pp.77-8.
45) Ibid., p.79.
vrtiich later became the councils! and in 1960 the sub-tribes
40
fthey apeak a common language, they are relatively wealthy 
from shell-fishing, and they are served by adequate 
communications. Without the personal interest of this 
officer their being given local government might have been 
long delayed#*®
(Elsewhere is detailed an example from Manus, where 
obstruction or ignorance by local officers seems to have 
prevented council extension: see Appendix B, II)#
Attitudes of this kind amongst field staff would appear 
to have been particularly marked in those areas where the 
natives, rightly or wrongly, acquired a reputation for 
truculence* The Mekeo area, which is dealt with below, is 
a notable example* Elsewhere, the fear that oults night 
appear or that other native organizations might assume 
political functions impelled both Headquarters and the looal 
field staff to hasten local government#
The Highlands afford a notable example# For a con­
siderable time the Administration has been apprehensive about 
the belief which has taken root amongst the concentrated 
Highland populations that it is possible for them to aohleve 
a dramatic rise in living levels in a matter of years (whereas 
in fact their economio prospects are poor compared to the 
progressive ooastal areas whence Highland natives dexkre 
their ideas)# The enthusiasm which this belief arouses
46) A.D.O. Mlslma to B.C. Samarai, 6.2#58, Miaima 14/15|
a/E.O. (L.G.) to Div. Off., 28.4.58, NA 23-4-2. Council 
proclaimed 29*5#58#
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clearly needs channelling and controlling; otherwise, it is
feared, large oultist movements will result* In 1956 it
was suggested that councils not be restricted to areas which
had had long contacts even rudimentary councils could bring
native leaders together and both prevent feuding and allow
47
progressive administration.
Early in 1957 it was announced that ’the earlier approach, 
that local government is necessarily applicable to the most 
advanced sections of the native population is being somewhat 
modified* **®
This revised polioy was rapidly taken up in the Eastern 
Highlands, where two councils were proclaimed in December, 
1958. Indeed, from the point of view of soolo-polltioal 
criteria, many of the Highland areas are more suited to native 
local government than most of the coast; Highland clans tend 
to occupy consolidated areas, and several clans are allied 
into tribes of 1,000-4,OCX) people, whioh were formerly 
military units*
Moreover, direct administration had already brought about 
changes in the leadership system favourable to local govern­
ment ) the natives had learned to look outside the traditional 
criteria for progressive leadership* A notable Chimbu named
47) If.A. memo., The Extension of Native Local Government* 
27*1*56, NA ¡59-Ï-2* The idea of a more rudimentary type 
of council was, however, rejected by the Senior Offioers*
48) L.G. Bulletin, No.2, March 1957, p . 2.
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Administration, had extended his authority a long way beyond
his tribal boundaries* The Chimbu, therefore, had learned
to look for a new leadership focus, particularly to promote
economic development, and it was this which local government
was designed to provide. Thus it was not difficult for the
council to bring together four tribes, comprising about 9,800
people« That cultist attitudes might show through the oounoil
is still feared, particularly if its developmental function«
flag; but it is felt, after the experience at Baluan, that
the oounoil at least affords a measure of control through
49
rational pursuits*
In the Milne Bay and Gulf Distriots local government waa
urged as an alternative to the assumption of political
functions by other bodiess in Milne Bay the Agricultural
so
Associations,find in the Gulf the Co-operatives. Despite 
the apprehension that the Gulf natives were ready for local 
government and were not getting it (the area has long been 
subject to sporadio oargo oult outbreaks), a lack of staff 
and the need for detailed surverys were blamed for dilatory 
extension« The Kerema Bay survey was completed only in 
February, 1960, and the D.O. noted a number of limiting
49) P* Brown, From Anarchy to Satrapy (to be published). The 
Highland councils have teen constituted under the N.L.G. 
Ordinance, but their male tax rates are only 30/- p.a. 
Kondam had been a member of the District Advisory Council, 
an observer at the Legislative Council and a delegate to 
the South Paoifio Conference. The unbridled enthusiasm 
for communal work, is the most remarkable feature of these 
c o u n d l T s  activities.
50) N.A. memo, of 27.1.56, cit.sup.
Kondam, who had been given strong support by the “
factorsi a lack of traditional homogeneity (it was proposed 
to include some inland Kukukukus9 a unique step); little 
’civic spirit*; a poor economy; and a paucity of skills 
(skilled natives emigrated to the towns). At the same time 
it was felt that the introduction of the oounoil could not 
wisely be postponed.
In such areas native attitudes foroed local government to 
be set up. In other areas, native attitudes inhibited the 
establishment of looal government; though as these attitudes 
are filtered through local field staff, it is often difficult 
to determine whether it is native antagonism to looal govern­
ment which is responsible, or the interpretation by offioers 
of native attitudes which they deem would make the 
institution of looal government unwise,
(v) The Mekeo - An Example of Administration Ambivalence,
The area of Papua-New Guinea from which looaL government 
has been most conspicuously withheld is that inhabited by the 
Mekeo peoples inland from Kairuku. The pre-war history of 
these people has been adumbrated elsewhere; it resulted in a
lack of trust and oonfldenoe between the Administration and the 
52
natives. At the same time the Mekeo occupy a potentially
51) D,0. Kerema to D*N.A., 17,2,60, Kerema 40-1-1, The E.O. 
(L.G.) held the view that in the unpromising Gulf and 
Western Districts the establishment of counoils would draw 
back a proportion of skilled workers (to D,N.A., 11,6,5è,
E5"T4-7-5) •
52) See J.McAuley. Economic Development among the Mekeo, South
Pacific. VIll; T 0 7 T a n - ? el>..p p ^ ^ r ^ Y r e - w ^
ïorced cultivation of rice was particularly unfortunate
in the long tern, For pre-war see Appendix A, II,
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productive area in considerable concentration! these factors 
continued after the war to tempt the Administration to 
economic experiment, which required local co-operation.
It is important to look at the trend of Administration 
experiment, and at current social conditions, in order to 
realize the reluctance of officers to institute looal govern­
ment •
A history of oargo cult in the period 1941-5 signalised, 
inter alia, economic frustration. The Co-operatives Ordinance 
which the Administration introduced in 1948 was ludicrously 
inappropriate for native sooletles. In the same year, there­
fore, Mr. W. Cottrell-Dormer resigned as Director of 
Agriculture in order to devote himself to economic development 
in the Mekeo area through the Rural Progress Sooletles which 
he created for the purpose. One of the objeots of these 
societies was to change the attitudes of the Mekeo towards 
the Administration. The Mekeo had no wish to persevere with
agriculture using the digging stick and the mortar and pestle, 
54
as they put it. Cottrell-Dormer saw the Rural Progress 
Sooletles as agencies for promoting soolo-polltloal changes
53) W. Cottrell-Dormer, address to District Officers' 
Conference, Sept. 1949s The Native Rural Progress Society 
An Experiment in Sooial and Economic Development , ffhe 
title is significant , bn the (3o-operatives Ordinance see 
South Pacific Law Review. I, 5, 1948, pp.33-6.
54) M.J. White, Rural Progress Societies as an Extension Tool, 
D.A.S.P., ^
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#•# the Society must encourage them towards self- 
reliance in a changing world in which their native 
concepts are gradually being replaoed# to a greater 
or less extent, by those of the West ... It must 
provide them with opportunity for the useful employ­
ment of the increased leisure which improved tech­
niques may be expected to give them.*# Above all it 
must help and encourage the people on the road to gf5 
self-government # 00
It might be stated bluntly in retrospect that the approaoh
amongst the Mekeo failed largely because, in the absence of
other institutional guides and with policy still rigidly
departmentalised, the Rural Progress Societies were too
amorphous to oope with this broad and Idealistic conception
of agricultural extension# The actual failure of the rico-
growing scheme was due to a number of factors y among them
eg
management factors, bad seasons, and social conflicts: for
example9 many of the lopia« who control and allocate the
communally owned land t sat in the background and took no
active part in the scheme, while the younger men found that
the schemete demands cut across their traditional activities
57
and obligations#
Many of the inadequacies of the Rural Progress Societies
55) Cottrell-Dormer, cit.sup.
56) White9 op.cit.9 »Although recognized as undesirable, 
practical difficulties led the organizers into arranging 
for payment to growers for produce at a later date to that 
of consignment*• Communal gardens with proceeds earmarked 
for capital accumulation were also not adapted to Mekeo 
society. These important mistakes were eliminated in the 
later scheme - see McAuley, loc.olt.
57) Belshaw, loc.cit., p.15? of. Cottrell-Dormer's later 
approach in Milne Bay* involve all departments, llalss 
with local government! also a/A.D.0. Tomasetti to S.N.A.O., 
18.12.52, NA 40-2-1.
among the Mekeo were realized at the time* and the
Administration over several years has not been insensitive
to the need for looal government* But the social factors
which obstructed the Societies, and perhaps were enhanced by
their failures, were seen as obstacles to local government.
It is extremely difficult to decide, however, the extent to
which these attitudes are those of the Administration rather
than those of the Mekeo* The Mekeo have long had a reputation
for truculence - a disinclination to take heed of any con«
stituted authority, particularly government* In 1952 the
A.D.O. at Kairuku characterised them as ♦quick-tempered,
parochial, independent, and proud*. He expressed surprise
at the negligible deoay in the traditional oulture, despite
the close contact with the Catholic mission over three
generationst the leadership struoture seemed to have remained
relatively Intact, magical and religious beliefs remained
strong, polygamy was still openly praotlsed* There appeared
to be few incentives to change, even economic change,
resulting from contact; paradoxically, their area was so
productive that they oould satisfy their needs and even raise
money without damaging their time-honoured social and
58
agricultural round*
---------------- ------------------ .-----------n---------  ----- 1—|----------^ ^ ---------------^ -----f|T1. ------------- 1—r  - -i - ---------- 1------ r - r  - —r------ m---------- — n ——^-i—•--------------------- -—‘- n T m r ~ ^ MM‘
58) Tomasetti, ibid., repeated by McAuley, loc.cit., p.217.
In 1956 McAuley believed that an *economlo ferment * was 
beginning to produce adequate motivation to change. Bee 
also J. McAuley» The Distance between the Government and 
the Governed. Soig E E T Sgg l o . T i r r i 7 T ^ T --------------
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number of observers, is their intense intra-group morality
and loyalty, which in a reflex way loads them to regard other
groups - in widening circles beyond the family, clan, and
village - as 'fair game1- Ikupu (clan) groups are likely to
be unpredictably hostile to one another, but these feelings
g o
fluctuate and die down| however, with foreigners they have
an extremely bad reputation for stealing, extortion, and
profiteering. These offenoes are rare amongst themselves,
and therefore locally would seem to present little difficulty
in the way of local government; but they make the Adminis-
60
tration reluctant to relax the reins of direct control*
Yet these very difficulties reduce the effectiveness of direct 
administrations in 1952 three of the 14 V«C*e held lopla rank; 
but even they regarded theirfirst loyalty as belonging to 
their people, not to the government. Most V.C.s were suspected 
of concealing offences, and it was stated that only 'oonstant 
and rigid supervision1 could make the V.C. system work at all*®1 
A  type of local government involving a recognition of 
traditional concepts and authority might have been germane;
59) Belshaw, loe.oit., pp.15, 22—3*
60) Tomasetti, loc.cit. The meeting of the Hanuabada Council, 
20.1*60, sought to control the Mekeo betel-nut sellers 
within Hanuabada, because they 'took down' the local 
natives; the Mekeo corner the market to maintain Inflated 
prices. Both D.A.O. Kleokhsm and a/Co-operatives Registrar 
Graham (a foimer Kairuku P.O.) confirmed the oonviction 
that the Mekeo have aoant respect individually for govern­
ment officers, and collectively for government exhortation 
and advice.
61) Tomasetti, Ibid.
Another major difficulty with the Mekeo, agreed on by a
3'78
but the Administration was promoting councils as government 
agencies| so that the same problems were involved as under 
the direct system. A.D.O. Tomasetti summed up the diffic­
ulties in the way of native government in 1952 (and they 
have sinoe been raised a number of times) as (i) a lack of 
the concept of self-help towards economic ohangef (ii) internal 
disunity and rivalries; and (iii) the status of the lopia. 
whose office still tended to be hereditary, although they 
exercised authority by consent. The A.D.O. believed that 
representation on any council would have to have regard *to 
their dominant position1, otherwise they would intrigue
g o
against the council. Nevertheless, he concluded that the 
format Ion of a council amongst the Mekso was both ’feasible 
and desirable*; implying that the difficulties which he had 
outlined oould be overcome if looal government were set u p .
The failure of Cottrell-Dormer’s experiment shortly after­
wards made the time unpropitious to attempt to set up looal 
government; moreover, experience in the Gazelle Peninsula had 
made the Administration extremely reluctant to go ahead except 
at the unanimous behest of a group in close oonoord. Prior 
consent was thus a prime difficulty. In June, 1959 the D.O., 
Central District, held a  meeting at Kairuku of *1200 Village 
Constables, Councillors, group ohiefs and other important
62) Ibid. Under the stimulus of oargo cult, they have shown 
the capacity to oomblne - more than 2,00 assembled at 
Inawaia in 1941, and worked in oonoert with the oult 
leaders - see Appendix A, II.
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people1 from the sub-district* The looal government system 
was explained to them, and eventually they expressed support 
for its introduction and, according to D*0. Marsh, on their 
own initiative ’achieved a series of very logical combinations', 
which happened to be roughly the prescribed size for looal 
government units» One of these 'combinations* was East and 
West Mekeo9 plus two bush Mekeo villages (4#900 people)*
Marsh believed that agreement on these combinations would make 
council establishment and adminis tarât ion 'comparatively 
simple* *®3
Officers of the Local Government Section, however, wore
not so sanguine; they regarded the arrangement to whioh the
Mekeo had agreed under Marsh's aegis a« temporary* They felt
that an officer steeped in the tradition of dlreot
administration often believed that he oould talk natives out
of looal host lilt less these groups at a large gathering might
close rankst but their agreement would mean little onoe they
64
were again on home ground* Thus, the very willingness of 
some non-specialist officers to promote looal government 
raises obstacles to their doing so, as the 1956 U*N* Mission 
urged; for Looal Government officers are trained to be muoh 
more circumspect in their approach*
Amongst the Mekeo the Administration Is therefore waiting
63) D.O. Marsh to D.N.A., 8*7*59, HA 40-2-1*
64) Discussion of the issues with B*0* (L.G.) Plant and 
A*D*0* Collins « 8*2*60*
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for a fundamental change of attitude to be brought about by 
competitive pressure from their advancing neighbours i they 
must come to realize that they will beoome a backward group 
unless they work, through local government, to remain on 
level terms, instead of relying on what they regard as innate 
superiority: at present their eontempt for neighbouring peoples 
is notorious* In this sense voluntary participation applied 
to the Mekeo is interpreted as a willingness to make a counoil 
funotlon effectively, rather than - as Marsh possibly assumed - 
a mere acceptance of the machinery of looal government# In 
view of the past history of compulsion and of abortive co­
operation in this area, the Administration feels that it must 
assess that willingness oarefully, before attempting to set
/•e
up a council*
(vi) Social Obstacles to Extension
Despite the difficulties that arose in the Gazelle 
Peninsula, it has thus on occasions been the Administration 
perception of social difficulties in native societies, rather 
than direct native opposition, which has inhibited the extensicn 
of local government. An exception mi£it be the New Ireland/ 
Bougainville areas, where the entrepreneurial class is said 
to be opposed to looal government; but this may have had its 
origins in the period before general native taxation was
65) Dbid. There is an interesting comparison with the
situation of the Masai in East Africa - though District 
Councils were not withheld from the Masai, but have been 
used to change their attitudes, through an educated elite.
was introduced, when the acceptance of councils meant the
66
acceptance of council tax. On Bougainville, by the end
of 1959, only one council, embracing 3,300 natives, had been 
67
established. Here the elders felt that there was no place
for them within the current pattern of local government (and
in view of the non-traditional, centralizing approach there
is some justification for this). Rifts were so serious in
the Teop-Tinputz council area that the matter was discussed
68
at the Madang Conference.
In one or two areas, as in the Gazelle Peninsula, it 
would appear that the fundamental resistance by natives to 
the extension of local government has derived from the know­
ledge that councils are Administration instrumentalities. In 
such a situation, increased Administration propaganda only 
hardens native resistance. This seems to have been so in 
the Port Moresby sub-district. Hanuabada council, because 
of its executive/financial incapacity, represented a challenge 
to extension, in view of the criterion that councils should 
be capable of providing significant works and services• In 
1955 the suggestion was made that, as the Hanuabadans are urban
66) Information, L.Ge section, Port Moresby; D.N.A. memo., 
27.1.56, NA 39-1-2.
67) L.G. Bulletin No. 6, Jan. 1960, p.3.
68) Minutes, Item 25, NA 44-4-1. The Conference felt that 
it was a difficulty peculiar to the area, and that care­
ful election propaganda oould overcome it. Nevertheless, 
it is a complaint that has some general applications the 
abrupt removal of the old offioials is partly responsible. 
There is a potential source of of resistance to oounoil 
extension here.
j
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extended to take in the settlements of 'foreign* immigrants*
About 25# of Hanuabada*s taxpayers were said to be already
’foreigners*, and the so-called Toaripi settlement behind
69
Konedobu was already within the Hanuabada council area*
Complications which might arise from voluntary partici­
pation were discounted in a remarkable argument:
The voluntary participation approach which has 
hampered the extension of local government In tribal 
areas is not a major factor in the Port Moresby 
situation, i.e. most of the people vikio will be 
affected are migrants who can return home if they„n 
wish.
Subsequently, discussion arising out of the W i n d o w  Report
71
clouded this extension prospeot. In 1957 the Administration, 
therefore, changed its approach to that of a Greater Area 
Counoil which would associate the (generally Motuan) west 
coast villages to Lealea (the border of Kairuku sub-district) 
with Hanuabada. P.O. Kennedy went further, and saw the 
council as an amalgamation of Motu, Koita and Koiari groups* 
through the council they could resolve their differences, 
instead of surreptitiously bickering. Eaoh of the three 
groups was by itself too small to foro a viable council. At
in outlook and mode of life, their council should be
69) a/D.N.A. to D.O. Port Moresby, 1.8.55, NA 14-7-8; 
Hanuabada Minutes, 27.7.55; Survey of Port Moresby 1959, 
M.C. Groves.
70) a/D.N.A. to D.O. Port Moresby, loo.oit. The a/D.N.A. was 
J.K.McCarthy, who had been D.C. in Rabaul and was anxious 
to circumvent voluntary participation; but this argument 
is quite unrealistic*
71) See Ch. on The Approach to Local Government.
J
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the same time he was not blind to the disadvantages of the
proposals such a council could be dominated (or so the other
groups might believe) by the Motuansf differential tax rates
according to locality would be needed? current land disputes
might disrupt council meetings; and monthly meetings would
involve transport problems. According to established criteria,
these are all familiar problems; but he felt that the conoopt
72
of an expanded council should be persevered with. This 
represented a plea for a more flexible policy; eounoil» 
otherwise constituted merely perpetuated differences and 
reduced executive effectiveness*
A semi-offioial report by the influential mlxed-blood,
John Guise, revealed, however, that the people were suspicious 
of oounoils that were intended to be Administration instru­
mentalities* The natives in this area had been in close 
contact with Europeans since 1872, but their attitude towards 
the Administration seemed to be primarily distrust* This, 
he felt, would take a long time to break down. The 
Administration would have to learn to regard the natives
• •• as men and women having dignity, respect and 
feelings as people, however simple and perhaps», 
primitive they might prove to be*
Moreover, Internal suspicions were strong. The Porebadans
72) P.O. to D.O., 26.3.57, P.M. 14-25-1.
73) Repcrt J. Guise to A.D.O. Lang, Feb. 1957. Guise was 
elected by the eastern Papuan natives to the Legislative 
Council, March 1961*
had fallen out with the neighbouring Hanuabadane in 1954-5,
when the Hanuabada council asked numbers of Porebadans living
in its area during the working week to pay tax* When the
council issue was raised, the Porebadans suspected that the
Hanuabadane were anxious to bring in other groups simply to
shore up their finances. This attitude spread to other 
74
villages.
There were also other obstaoles, rather similar to those
in the Gazelle Peninsula. Porebada, for example, had an
unofficial Tillage council (analogous to the ktrungs) t it was
suspected that the activities of this oounoil were already
well integrated with those of the L.M.S. througi the influence
of Heatau-Mea, President of the Papuan Churoh Assembly* The
75
counoil thus was not anxious to be absorbed by Hanuabada*
Over the following three years initiative for a Greater 
Area Council continued to come from the Hanuabadansj though 
the Administration waTered in the faot of native coolness.
The Hanuabadans eTentually could get a faTOurable response 
from only one of the 14 villages they wished to incorporate.
In May 1960 the Hanuabada council invited the Administrator 
to discuss the matter with respresentativos from the oounoil, 
Tatana, Baruni and Rouki; but the Administrator continued 
to place the onus on the villages themselves to reach
74) Chairman, Porebada village counoil to B.C., 20*5*55; B.C. 
to Chairman» P.M. 14-25-3*
75) Guise memo»» cit.sup.; Discussion with Hanuabadans, 
A.D.O. Lang*
agreement. Meanwhile, one group has ineffective local 
government, the others, none.
(vii) 3?he Standardisation of Establishment Procedure.
The implications of voluntary participation therefore
continue to provide problems in council extension, beyond
those created by personal interpretations of looal situations
and establishment criteria. These factors together have
impelled the Administration to devise a standardised procedure
for preliminary propaganda and for surveys of projeoted
council areas. This appears further to reduce local
flexibility? on the other hand, in the light of staffing
difficulties, such a procedure enables experienced Headquarters
officers to assess local situations more aoourately and to
insist on progressive administration unless there are grave
77
and insuperable obstacles.
Originally surveys were concerned essentially with taxa­
bility and economic potential; then they had to concern them­
selves with the attitude of the natives towards one another 
and towards looal government. Out of this developed oombined
76) South Paoifio Post. 20.5.60. Aooording to the Hanuabadans, 
had the Àdminist rati on not been associated with the idea 
originally, they oould have reached agreement. Indeed, 
despite differences, it was discussed with the Porebadans 
In 1955, and they seemed agreeable. On the other hand, 
the Porebadans and others know that the Hanuabadans have 
been frustrated in local government by limited powers and 
government overrule - see my New Guinea - Past or Slow?.
f Vol. 70, 4, Dec. 196l"jf"l,""p*''ÏÔé>
77) The system is defective only in the inability of many 
offioers to conduct surveys together with council super­
vision and an increasing load of routine administration. 
More elaborate surveys sire more time-consuming«
à
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campaigns to acquaint natives with the purpose and responsi­
bilities of local government (with particular regard to 
taxation)» and to evaluate proposed council areas« This more 
aggressive policy was necessary particularly in the period 
1956-8, when few natives knew anything of loeal government«
In 1959 a formal sohedule was drawn up, so that surveys were
78
conducted and analysed according to a fixed pattern«
Officers were particularly warned that they had to tread the
razor's edge between assessing the practicability of a council
and proselytizing on behalf of looal government, and at the
same time not committing central government to sotting up a
79
council in an area which might be pronounced unsuitable#
The information demanded by this sohedule is lengthy and 
detailed, and is given in the Appendix; but it might be 
mentioned that the 'degree of social cohesion' has to be listed, 
together with itemised acoounts of economic production and 
potential, all existing social and politioal institutions, 
and the attitude of the people towards local government (with 
this last, the methods and statistics h e r e b y  this was 
ascertained). Such surveys usually entail at least two trips 
to the area, and several months of investigation.
It can be argued that, although this procedure was 
designed to allow greater control, in the period since 1958 
when local government has, in effect, begun to be self-
78) Ciro. Instruction 304, 18.9.59,
79) Ibid.
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propagating, it has been restrictive; for many groups seeking 
councils have to wait long periods to be surveyed in the 
detail required. The process of establishment, in fact, may 
be coming full circle from 1950 - for delays are so frust­
rating that in certain areas there are signs that looal
government will be instituted in response to political and
80
potentially cultist pressures. Before the end of 1960
requests for local government were coming in from native
groups far more quickly than surveys could be conducted.
To this extent the praotioal achievements of the earlier
councils would appear, as was intended, to have been the best
propaganda for looal government. On the other hand, the
Administration is still highly selective about the areas in
which councils should be set up, and as late as December,
1961, the Administration was still recommending to field
staff explanations and propaganda for natives based on short
courses in English constitutional government, beginning with
the Anglo-Saxon moot. Almost invariably this has to be done
81
through semi-literate native interpreters. This is in 
accord with the overall approach, that natives must grasp 
concepts before being given the institutions which embody them.
(80) This seems to be the case on the north-east coast,
eastern Papua. It was stated that an extra officer for 
surveys would not be stationed at Baniara before 1963 
•unless the political situation forces earlier action* - 
Memo. E.O. (L.G.), 14.12.1959 (attached instruction by 
D.N.A., 22.1.60), NA 40-2-4.
81) L.Gr. Bulletin No. 6, Jan. 1960, pp. 6-9? Digest of 
L.G. Bulletins, Dec. 1961, pp.13-7.
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Conference, whereby natives from projected counoil areas
g o
visit established councils for training. This was 
recommended to field staff in 1959« By that date it was 
growing in popularity; indeed, because of the difficulties 
of moving parties of natives in New Guinea with reasonable 
expense, it was a method which had to wait on the establish­
ment of a sprinkling of councils in readily accessible areas. 
For example, in February, 1960 a party of a dozen natives 
from the Milne Bay district was able to visit the Hlgaturu 
council area, where more progressive agricultural development 
was under way*
By the beginning of 1956 there were 9 oouncils in Papua- 
New Guinea, with a total population of about 50,000; by the 
end of 1958 this had grown to 28 councils with a total 
population of 160,000; and by June 1960 to 40 councils 
embracing 288,000 people. (A further 12 oouncils were set 
up in the following 18 months, to December 1961). There has 
therefore been a period of rapidly accelerating extension, 
tapering off since 1958 on the high plateau of 8 new councils 
a year, comprising perhaps 50,000 people. Within the demands 
of the looal government system, with Its emphasis on 
financial viability and close supervision, this is an im­
pressive record. At the same time, loss than one-fifth of
82) Development of Looal Government in the Colonies (R.I.P.A., 
Cambridge, 1955), pp. 26-7.
83) Circ. memo. No.238, 6.10.59.
A better eyetem is that endorsed by the 1955 Cambridge
twelve years of endeavour. The natives themselves have shown
every indication that they want even more rapid extension
(the Madang Conference of June, 1959 recommended compulsory
84 \
incorporation in councils ); but the Administration interprets 
pressure towards an accelerated programme as a dilution of 
the concept of counoils as government agencies training 
natives in looal responsibility. This oonoept of councils 
has been regularly re-affirmed, and the existing methods and
OR
oriteria of counoil extension are taken to be integral to it.
(viii) The Liberalising of Establishment.
Despite the restrictions on extension which still result 
from this concept of looal government, and on the variation« 
caused by the attitudes of individual officers, there are 
indications of a growing liberalism in extending oounolls to 
backward areas with dispersed populations, and in using 
councils as outlets for ambitious natives. The Western 
District affords an example. Looal government was not extended
%
to the Kiwai people until 1957 - officers were unaware of 
the previous history of organisational and economic endeavour* 
whereby the Kiwai had consistently anticipated administrative 
innovations. After the war one observer reported that the 
people of Mabaduan still retained a keen oonsnerolal sense and
84) Madang Minutes, Items 26-7. HA 44-4-1«
85) Circ. memo 5/59, Asst. Admin.
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Territory’s population was under looal gorernment after
j
had purchased a lugger. But Administration neglect
continued* the natives tried to operate unofficial co-*
operatives, which failed. By 1956 large numbers of Kiwai
natives were again absent at work in other parts of the
Territory; in the largest village, Parama, only 10 effective
87
adult males were left out of 145. Hot until 1956 was it at
last realised that beoause of this situation, and because the
Kiwai had for long compared their condition with that of the
Torres Straits islanders under Queensland administration,
88
local government was urgently needed. There was a perception
that the Kiwai could have usefully had looal government thirty
years before; and this was taken as a prime incentive to
setting up a council, In the face of the abysmally poor
89
living conditions and economic prospect«.
Social cohesion was important in establishing the oounoll. 
Initially the statutory insistence on monthly meetings foroed 
the Administration to divide the Kiwai into separate coastal 
and estuary councils sharing a joint treasury; but this 
involved duplication of staff and wasteful overheads, and
390
86) C.H. We^wood in Monthly Notes, March 1947, p.3, n.4| p.4, 
n.5, cf. Appendix^ A, I,
87) E.O. (L.Gr.) to D.N.A., 11.6.56, DS 14-7-5. By 1960 there 
were still no offioial co-operatives in the area. See 
Ch. on Western Papua. C.I.3(1949-50) supposedly limited 
recruitment to l/3 of adult mal««.
88) Ibid.
89) Ibid. 1... there has been little encouragement from the 
Administration to help them develop and ... they recognise 
this.* The E.O. noted that Torre« Straits lugger« had 
collected £30,000 of pearl-shell near Daru; but since the 
Kiwai have been forbidden to enter the Torres Straits the 
art of diving has been lost«
neither council was financially viable* In 1958 they were
90
united at their own Insistence. Other groups then requested
to join in? the Kiwai on the north bank of the Ply joined
the council based on Daru although they are much closer to
Balimo, headquarters of the Gogodala council. Conversely,
Gogodala natives on the south bank of the Ply, beyond Madirl
91
plantation» requested to join the Gogodala council. Social 
sentiment in this way was eroding the criteria of eoonomlo 
potential and of communications imposed by central govern­
ment} and this was welcomed by looal field-staff.
Pield-staff during 1959 were actively canvassing the 
extension of local government even further afield in the 
District, to the Trans Ply and Morehead Patrol Post areas*
It was acknowledged that oash crops were essential In these 
areas to provide an economic base for oounoil operation} but, 
said A.D.O. McCabe,
The writer feels that if the people are enthusiastic 
and willing to work to an economic plan, the intro­
duction of councils should not be postponed to suoh 
areas. The D.N.A. officers posted in these parts oan 
carry out administration of the area through their 
councils, and will get the active support and co­
operation of the people. They will find their work 
more rewarding and the formulation of a developmental 
plan in collaboration with the group will put advance­
ment on a firm basis, ensuring that staff changes will gp 
not upset work in the area.
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90) D.N.A. to Admin., 29.1*57, NA 23-3-2? Joint meeting 
Daru, 10.6.58. In 1957 the statutory limit on meetings 
was relaxed to bi-monthly*
91) Daru sub-district Report, 1958-9? Half-yearly Report, 
1.4.59-30.9.59, Daru 23-3-1.
92) Ibid. His italics*
progressive technique, was gaining roots, in the face of
the required or desirable preconditions. There are
indications that the same might be happenir^j with the
channelling of the energies of ambitious men. There was at
one time a fear that such men were seeking to use local
government only to further their own end® and to dominate
their fellows (violating the Administration's idealistioally
democratic conceptions)*®3 In the Orokolo area, in 1959,
however, the Administration welcomed pressure led by an
ambitious young man for local government, and looked forward
to his leadership of the projected council. Experience had
shown that the earlier fears of natives1 promoting councils
for primarily political ends in areas without adequate soolal
94
cohesion or eoonomic potential were unfounded*
In brief, the natives themselves now have a much stronger 
voloe in local government extension than central government 
has admitted or perhaps even realised*
93) For example, there were fears on this ground, later 
overcome, of admitting Sigabadu to the Kiwai Council, 
because it was felt that a man named Bone was merely 
seeking a 'political outlet1 for his energies - Rouku 
P.R.2/1957-9f D.N.A. memo., Aug. 1958, NA 23-3-10*
94) Survey, Nov. 1959, Orokolo? Recommendations, A.D.O. 
Collins, 17.12.59, NA 40-2-2. This area, however, had 
promising economic potential and was linguistically and 
socially homogeneous. Cf. attitude towards Toaripi,
1957 (note 22 supra).
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Thus, the concept of area administration, per se. as a
j
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CHAPTER VII 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECT
it
(i) Legal and Historical Limitations*
One of the prime functions c£ councils under the 
Ordinance (Section 10, b) is to maintain ’peace, order and 
good government amongst the natives residing in or being 
in the area in and for which the Counoil is established1• 
Councils were given the responsibility of preventing the 
commission of offences in their areas (Section 10, o).^
To assist in maintaining order, councils are empowered to 
employ council constables; but Council constables are 
specifically council employees, although appointed by the 
D.O., and derive all their powers from assisting in ‘the
p
enforcement of the rules and authority of the Council'•
Their police powers are in fact extremely circumscribed: 
under Section 15(4) and Regulation 45(a) they oan make 
arrests without warrant only under those rules, powers, and 
functions of the oounoil which so provide. Even here, the
£ See Appendix B.
1) The .Administration lists this function first - see Local 
Government in New Guinea. South Pacific. VIII, 5, p #92.
2) Section 21 of the N.L.G. Ordinance.
The Law and Order Functions of Native Local Government*
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Police Force or by a Council Constable. These provisions
appear in theory to be inadequate, and in practice they
have proved restrictive and confusing. The former S.N.A.O.
remarked in 1957 that
No aspects of local government funotions are 
currently more obscure than the administrative 
organisation required to give effect to the 
responsibilities for maintaining law and order ~ 
imposed on councils by the Ordinance*
In practice, the council constables are primarily
messengers for the council and for individual councillors?
moreover, it would appear that the reporting of offences to
administrative officers falls on the councillors, although
4
the council constables have the actual power of arrest.
At the village level, therefore, the executive and law-and- 
order functions of the former luluais are both reduoed and 
shared. Beoause of these provisions of the Ordinance it is - 
or has been considered - essential that the luluais or 
village constables are replaced as soon as a council is 
instituted? it is a significant comment on the supposed 
standing of these officials under direct administration 
that this should be so.
3) Memo, by Fienberg, 5.11.1957, NA 39-1-0, p.15; also 
undated paper by C.J. Lynch, The N.L.G. Councils* 
Ordinance, typescript, pp. lO-ll. ’***' ~
4) See C.D. Rowley, Local Government in New Guinea, South 
Pacific. July-AugT~1957, IX, 7, p.441.
Ordinance provides for arrest either by a member of the
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There is no doubt that the anomalies and inadequacies 
embodied in the Ordinance and revealed in practice result 
from the un thought-out borrowing of African legislation, 
and its application in a situation where there had been no 
development of the structure of direct administration such 
as can be found in the British Solomons or in Kenya* In 
these dependencies the law-and-order responsibilities of 
local authorities have been dovetailed with those of the 
existing agents of central government* In some dependencies, 
for example parts of Tanganyika, this happens in a customary 
way through the traditional functions of the Native 
Authorities (defined and supervised). In Kenya the appointed 
Government Chief (non-traditional, the executive agent of 
central government in the looations), the oentral police, 
and the tribal police (generally the exeoutive arm of the 
provincial administration, especially the Native Authority), 
work in conjunction*5 In the British Solomons the powers
5) Kenya Handbook: The Work of an African Chief (Nairobi, 
1959), p p •21-31, ospecially p ,Zi on ihe functions of the 
tribal police vis-a-vis the Kenya police. Thus the 
District Council is not, either in theory or praotioe, 
solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order 
in its area - see Kenya African District Counoila 
Ordinance. 1960, SecVion ¿3• Tn view of its experience 
during the Emergenoy, the Kenya Government has resisted 
nationalist demands to do away with appointed chiefs? 
though even the more rabid nationalists have asked for 
reform, (usually by election of chiefs - in practice 
already informally done in many areas) rather than for 
abolition - see Kenya Leg.Co. Debates, 1958, 2nd Session, 
M T V ,  20.2.1958, pp.285-294 (Minister for African 
Affairs, Jofcnstone, Messrs. Mboya and Muliro).
of the Headmen are not so extensive, but in the sphere of 
law-and-order and law enforcement, linked with the native 
courts, they are extremely important* There they are
g
gradually becoming subordinate to the councils*
In these dependencies central government to some degree 
created substitutes on an area basis for the tribal 
authorities which did not exist. In Papua-New Guinea, 
however, the transition to local government means a leap 
from village to area administration, while the counoils 
must simultaneously assume all the functions which elsewhere 
are shared by councils and the agents of central government*
The law-and-order functions of native local government 
can thus be considered under three main heads« (i) the 
immediate replacement of the appointed village officials by 
councils; (ii) the relatively inadequate powers and functions 
of counoils and oouncil constables with respect to the Native 
Regulations; and (iii) the relations of oounoils with the 
central constabulary*
(ii) Initial Problems*
When the Ordinance came into foroe in September 1950,
6) B.S.I.P. Native Admin. Ordinance No. 10/1953, Sections 5-10* 
Initially appointed Headman formed a large element of the 
membership of both councils and courts; this proportion 
is gradually being reduced, with the acknowledged purpose 
that eventually the Councils will employ offioers 
exercising the powers of the present headmen in law 
enforcement. See Appendix C*
 ^ f r J. p w ] C. O-7-cy{ - V l-^ rr~ciL.  ^^  ?
‘ - ' " " ' Z
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Part I11(e) dealing with the appointment and powers of
7
council constables was specifically excluded. The Senior 
Native Authorities Officer had no idea why this had been 
done - this was a matter of immediate concern, as three 
councils were immediately proclaimed, that at Hanuabada and
8
the Vunamami and Reimber councils in the Gazelle Peninsula.
The D.C., New Britain felt that the Crown Law Office might 
have delayed the operation of this Part until a Native Courts 
Ordinance had been proclaimed - then still considered
Q
certain. It seems more probable that the relevant
?
departments in Port Moresby were simply concerned about the 
administrative implications of the unresolved problems cited 
above*
In the Gazelle Peninsula it was considered most important 
that the changeover to local government be emphasised by 
the immediate removal of the village officials; but this 
left a lacuna in law enforcement, more particularly as the 
councils were entirely inexperienced, and neither they nor 
the supervising offioer were sure of their law-and-order 
prerogatives. The S.N.A.O. concentrated on educating them 
in their general law-and-order responsibilities.
7) Gazette No. 31, 7.9.1950.
8) a/A.D.O. Fienberg to D.D.S. 22.12.50, Rabaul 2l/2;
Gazette No. 32, 14.9.1950.
9
Regs
refer only to a ’court*, connoting any lower court 
(Reg. 46).
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I have repeatedly impressed on both the Reimber 
and Vunamami Councils that all administrative 
acts have a basis of law and that one of their 
prime duties under the Council Ordinance is the 
maintenance of law and order within their areas*
I have also warned them that unless they prove 
themselves capable of handling this task, even 
though it may mean temporarily jeopardising their^Q 
popularity, the Councils must fail.
The Reimber councillors in particular responded enthusi­
astically to this, closing gambling schools, seizing liquor, 
launching prosecutions, and reporting disturbances. This 
was hopeful, though it was (and is) doubtful how long
councillors can continue to court unpopularity in this fashion
11 ^  and still stay in office. The real vaouum in the policing
functions of councils was shown up, however, when in December
1950 the Rabaul police invaded the Reimber area looking for
stolen property; they searched houses in Kuraip, and seized
a number of articles, including some from the house of the
c o u n c i l ^  vice-president. This aroused considerable
antagonism; the relatives of a native accused of stealing
made history by briefing a JSuropean lawyer to defend him.
The antagonism turned, not so much on the charges or on
the seizure of property, as on the police invasion of a
council area - though in law the police were within their
rights. From the following council meeting it was clear
that the very emphasis which the supervising officer had
10) Fienberg to D.D.S., 22*12.50, cit.sup*
11) Ibid.
fox. £  ~Ky£rr»~-tr^ /o
f *
heightened their indignation at the 'intrusion* of the
police* Councillor Touraiu stated that 'if the town police
did this sort of thing the council must collapse *•
Councillor Topue said that the police in future should
first come to the Council House:
We (the councillors) are not wild men who would^p 
run away. W© too understand the law.
The council wished to send a message to the Administrator
13
protesting against the action of the police* The Tolai 
were particularly inoensed because in the pre-local 
government period they had largely excluded the police by
14
being allowed to exercise their own informal Jurisdiction*
But the S.N.A.O. stressed that suoh relics of the direot 
approach were anomalous in local government areas; he 
pointed out that provisions of the Police Offences Ordinance 
and the Native Regulations had been designed for uncontrolled 
or semi-controlled areas, and that these should be modified 
for more advanced areas:
12) Reimber Council minute, 19*12.1950.
13) Ibid. The Council wanted form a rule compelling the 
police to call first at the Counoil House, but the 
supervising offioer stated that this was both ultra 
vires and contravened existing law.
14) Rowley, loc.cit. This was the complaint made by the 
Vunadadir councillors to Rowley*
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placed on councillors' law-and-order responsibilities
Unfortunately there still seems to exist a type 
of official outlook which regards all natives 
as remaining permanently at the lowest primitive,~ 
denominator in all things legal.
The S.N.A.O., who had experience of Tanganyika, contrasted
the system there, where the D.O. intervened with Territorial
16
police only under exceptional circumstances. He asked for
an arrangement at headquarters level between the central
constabulary and District Servioes, which would allow the
police to carry out their duties in liaison with local
government councils; and he asked that Part Ill(e) of the
17
Regulations be implemented.
The Administrator, however, instructed the New Britain 
D.C. and the Rabaul Senior Police Inspector to come to a 
local agreement, which was notified in January 1951. Under 
this, members of the police force would not enter villages 
outside the Rabaul police district boundary without the 
prior approval of the D.C,; they would not search houses 
without getting warrants issued by offioers of the Distriot
15) Memo, of 22.12.1950, oit.sup. At the Reimber meeting 
(19.12.1950) councillors expressed the view that the 
police invaded their areas simply to lay charges and 
get cheap domestic labour. Mutual attitudes were 
obviously poor.
16) Ibid. The position was oomplioatod in New Guinea (as 
distinct from Papua) in that the police constituted a 
separate branch of the service, and were not regularly 
subordinate to administrative field staff - Seo. L. Mair, 
Australia in New Guinea, pp. 40-1.
17) Memo, of 22.12.1950, oit.sup.
C-
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Services Department? and the D.C. also asked that Part 111(e)
be made operative#^®
Part I11(e) providing for the appointment of council
constables (until 1952 given the confusing title of 'village
constables') came into operation on 21st June, 1951, The
only council area in Papua, that at Hanuabada, had continued
to be served by the village constables of direct
administration? this arrangement went on until 25th August,
19
1951, when they were replaced by council constables.
(iii) Inadequacies of Council Constables.
Prom the inception of the counoil oonstable system, 
however, councils have expressed dissatisfaction with it.
This is d e a r l y  linked with the scrupulous restriction of 
councillors to their statutory funotions by moat supervising 
officere, and the failure to introduce a native oourts 
system. The Vunamami and Vunadadir councillors complained 
to Rowley that before local government, when the luluai was 
considered to have some standing, offenders whom he brought 
to the Patrol Officer were punished? but under looal 
government the powers of the council constables were
18) D.C. to D.D.S., 23.1.51, Rabaul 21/2-35. Because this 
was a local argument it had no general application? 
it was clearly intended by the Administration as an 
experiment.
19) Exec.Co. Minute Paper No.4/17/51, dated 18.6.51. This 
confusion in titles (rectified only by amending reg.
No.37/1952,v.6) was a blunder.
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inadequate and the Officer did not necessarily punish on
20
the report of the councillors.
Councillors have continued to press for what they regard
as the return of authority which was exercised under the
luluai or V.C. system; but those officers who would like to
p i
restrict councils to Australian-type municipal functions , 
or who favour strong central control rather than a real 
decentralisation of authority, see merits in the present 
system and regard the problem as one of liaison with the
op
constabulary*
The Ilanuabada council found the problem baffling; it 
complained that the 'smart bodgie type* disregarded the 
council constables' orders because they realized that he was 
only an employee and a man of little authority - a fact of 
which the council constables themselves appear to be 
painfully conscious* They are statutorily subordinate to 
the councillors, but at the same time the councillors them­
selves are not invested with police powers, nor has the 
Administration been anxious that they should be invested
20) Rowley, loo.cit. The Hanuabadans also complained of 
restricted powers - John Guise (Exec.off#) to D.O.
Port Moresby, 12.1.56, D.O.P.M. 14-26-6.
21) Por example, the attitude of J.McAuley, Problems 
Affecting the N.L.G. Policy. South Pacific, May-June
TSEST" TS7T3 7 PpTg63-"7g7 ----------------------
22) By and large, on this issue this is Pienberg's view - 
memo, of 5.11.57, cit.sup. This view**aeems to ignore 
the fact that councillors will never invite the 
intrusion of the constabulary, if they can avoid it.
-*■« /Y £. u ¿I  * 1  * fc &  C ^ r ^ c
J  ^
Moreover, a council constable who is disposed to be 
conscientious is subject to similar pressures(e.g. eorcery) 
as was the village constable; but because of the higher 
wages he is tempted to stay on and temporise when things 
become difficult, where before he might have resigned or 
been forced out. For precisely this reason the senior 
constable at Hanuabada has stayed on, though since 1954 the 
fear of sorcery has reduced him to a state of inactivity
pA
as far as polioe action is concerned.
In most instances it is plain that the lacuna which 
exists in the village with the removal of the old officials 
must be filled somehow in irregular ways, usually through 
unofficial courts conduoted by councillors. As the super­
vising officer of the Kiwai council remarked in 1959, *it is 
obvious that the majority of court proceedings are conduoted 
by the Villagers themselves*. Whereas the village 
constable or lulual had an executive responsibility, in 
practice, for seeing that the Regulations were carried out, 
he could almost always sustain a charge before the Patrol
23) Minutes, Hanuabada Council 11*1*1956; E.O. Hanuabada 
to D.O. Port Moresby 12.1*1956. D.O.P.M. 14-26-6.
24) Personal infomation. For comparison, in the Higaturu 
council area the more prominent V.C.s were paid a 
maximum of £3 p.a.; now the Council Constables
£30 p.a. plus rations. Hanuabada is atypical; but the 
T960 Estimates provided £460 as wages for the two 
constables.
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23with such powers*
Officer; but the councillor has no such function or 
responsibility, and is therefore tempted to conduct the 
whole process unofficially. When the Higaturu council was 
first set up, councillor Lucian of Hamdarituru was charged 
in court and dismissed from office for having ordered 
village women to clean the roads. Village constables 
regularly did this under the old system, for they were 
held responsible for seeing that the Native Regulations
p g
were adhered to,
(iv) Pressures for Reform,
It is hardly surprising that councillors have continued
to press reform, according to their concepts, on the
Administration. The Madang Conference representing New
Guinea councils considered that the Native Regulations
should be amended to provide that councils and oounoil
constables take over the powers and functions of village
27
officials. Field staff were also continually made aware 
of the anomalies in law enforcement in local government 
areas. In October 1959 the D.O., Gulf District, pointed out
26) C.N,M. Case No. 341/1955-6, Popondetta; D.C. to D.N.A., 
29,6,1956, Pop. 14-7-4/1159, At this time the Council 
had been in operation only a week or two: the V.C.s 
ceased to hold office from 30,6.56. The councillor 
clearly saw a vacuum in authority looming. In most 
Orokaiva areas this problem would hardly arise, as the 
elders retain considerable authority. No one would dare 
complain to the Government.
27) Items 7-8(b). D.N.A. memo, of 20.6.1960, NA 44-4-1,
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to the Director of Native Affairs that oouncil constables 
could police council rules, but that councils oould not 
pass rules on matters already covered by the Native 
Regulations; the lack of V.C.s however, made many of the 
Regulations unenforceable in council areas. The Director 
conceded that this was so, and suggested that until the 
Ordinance was amended councils could do no more than pass 
rules for which pro forma had been published, and which were
eg
so phrased that they did not out aoross the Regulations,
po
Late in 1959 the Ordinance was finally amended ; but the
inadequacy of the amending Regulations was shown by complaints
in the Milne Bay area as late as August 1961, that council
constables had no authority under the Native Regulations
30
Ordinance similar to that of the village oonotables.
These have been the law-and-order difficulties primarily 
from the native viewpoint# The Administration has concerned 
itself more with the question of laison with the oentral 
constabulary operating in council areas. There has been 
fairly general agreement that in the more advanced areas -
28) D.O. Kerema to D,N.A,, 30*9,59; Kerema 14-3/151; D.N.A. 
to D.O, Kerema 7,10.59: NA 39-8-1.
29) New Guinea Reg. No. 47/1959; Papua No. 48/1959. This was 
at the District Development Conference, consisting of 
both natives and departmental offioers. This Conference 
also resolved that recruits be sent to the Police 
Training School in Port Moresby before ooming back as 
Council Constables.
30) V.A,C, No. 35, Aug. 1961, p.3,
j
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Native Affairs officers should be divested of police
31
responsibilities. Fienberg urged this in 1957* It was
advocated by the A.D.O. Rabaul after the Navuneram incident,
32
in which he was the responsible administrative officer.
33
It was also a proposal endorsed by the Mad an g Conference.
That nothing has been done along these lines is due to the 
failure to find an adequate substitute. The natives have 
asked for a substitute in terms of their own courts and 
adequately empowered oouncil constables; but at the same 
time they have recognized the rights of the regular polioe 
to enter council areas, provided they observed formalitie®
34
such as informing the council and its supervising officer.
But the police have not been so ready to compromise.
Between 1955 and 1959 the Polioe Superintendent, Rabaul, 
took the view that there should be only one police force 
eligible to operate in oouncil areas, that the counoil 
constables were hopelessly inadequate and inefficient, and
ve
that their functions should be taken over by regular polioe.
31) Memo, of 5.11.57, cit.sup.
32) Letter A.D.O. Emmanuel to Administrator, 28.12.1958, 
semi-official (private aooess).
33) Item 6(c), cit.sup.
34) Item 6(atb),ibid.
35) Superintendent to Commissioner of Polioe, 22.3.55.
Police 8229, 20/1/55, NA 39-8-1; Counoil Constables by 
A.G. Rackeraann, South Pacific Post, 25.4.1959.
that is, by and large, council or potential council areas -
his criticisms applied equally to luluais or to village
constables; he regarded the vexy employment of counoil
constables by councils as a safeguard which the old system
did not possess*
The Counoil Constable is required to report hie 
activities to the Counoil. This alone is sufficient 
to show that the system is an improved method of 
native administration and should not be regarded,- 
solely as a police organisational problem.
The Director claimed further that some council oonstables
were former members of the regular polioe, that they had a
♦reasonable education* in relation to the communities they
served, and that the restraint of their own communities was
37
the best safeguard against corruption.
(v) Liaison with Central Government.
The Superintendent in Rabaul was probably moved to 
complain by the restrictions on general polioe movements in 
the Tolai area under the 1951 district agreement. The 
problem of liaison with the central constabulary was, of
The Director of Native Affairs pointed out that many of
36) D.N.A. to Polioe Commissioner, 29.3.1955, NA 39-8-1.
37) Ibid. This may have been so in the Rabaul area; but it 
is probably not so in the less advanced areas. In 1960, 
for example, the Higaturu Counoil had six oonstables, 
none of whom had more than a smattering of English, 
and none of whom had served in the Constabulary. Their 
only formal instruction in police duties came fro* one 
morning's instruction at Popondetta District Office.
As they are oounoil employees they are not subject to 
the personal attention some of the village con stables 
used to get from government offioers.
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received some attention on that ground. Sub-committees
of District Commissioners and of departmental
representatives had considered the matter, but without any
38
definite arrangements having been made* Negotiations at
the district level between the D.C. Eabaul and the Police
Superintendent continued. In November 1952 the D.C. drew
up a more comprehensive agreement, in which the Superintendent
agreed not to take police action until councillors had been
notified, exoept in the most urgent situations. In return,
the D.C. undertook to insist that councillors fulfilled
their law-and-order responsibilities, and that if they
failed to do so action would be taken *to displace members
of proved ineptitude*. He urged on the Director of District
Services that, in view of the projected extension of
councils, a general policy statement be framed along the
39
lines of the Rabaul agreement.
The Director of District Services showed proper concern 
that central government was being presented with a fait accompli 
which was likely to determine general polioy? he recommended
38) D.D.S. to Gov. Sec. 22.11.1952, DS ^4-3-32.
39) D.C. New Britain to Superintendent of Polioe, 10.11.52, 
Rabaul 14/11/6? Copy to D.D.S.(para.6). D.C. MoCarthy 
said that the Gazelle Peninsula situation was good, but 
only because his personal relations with the polioe 
were good - another example of administration, in lieu 
of polioy, depending on personalities.
course, a general one? and in the period 1951-2 it
409
district level cease, and that the Administrator be asked
for a policy definition, in the light of the Territory’s
overall policing requirements. In particular, he wanted
the constabulary excluded from council areas ’except where
40
special recommendations have defined that necessity'.
It is clear that no such policy definition was given*
After Superintendent Kaokemann took the remarkable step of
airing his complaints in the prese, in 1959, the Administrator
was asked for an explanation by the Department of
Territories. He repeated to the Department, in explanation,
the deficiencies in legislation, liaison and policy, which
Fienberg had pointed out in 1957i
The idea (of council constable) is good and it is 
only on the side of administrative organisation 
that it falls down. Full use of Counoil Constables 
as a law-enforcement body had probably never been 
made in any counoil area because of this administ­
rative obscurity, and until an administrative 
arrangement is reached with the Territorial Police 
Force, Counoils will be unable to fully carry out-, 
these functions.
Again following Fienberg, he suggested a solution through 
a linkage between the council and Territorial police, on 
the lines of the relationships with councils already defined
40) D.D.S. to Gov. Sec. 22.11.52, DS 14-3-32.
41) Sec. Territories to Administrator 26.6.59, Terr. 57/95f 
Administrator to Sec. Territories, 7.7.59, NA 39-8-1.
to the Government Seoretary that arrangements at the
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by the Health and Education departments. Under this, 
council constables would be trained by the Territorial 
police, paid rates decided by the Commissioner, and become 
a branch of the police although paid by the oo uno ils. The 
advantages would be those outlined by Fienberg: that 
relations with the police would be improved, standards of 
council law enforcement would rise, and Native Affaire 
officers would be freed from police duties in the more 
advanced areas, notably in the vioinity of towns where the 
problem was most pressing - for example, Rabaul oounoil 
area, Lei-Wompa (Lae) and Hanuabada (within the Port Moresby 
town boundaries).
The linkage could quite simply be done by amending,p
legislation and administrative instruction.
It would appear that, presumably because of the need to 
amend the Ordinance, the Administrator had to seek approval 
from Canberra, Whatever the reason, twelve months later 
no further action had been taken; and as late as August ( 
1961 it was left to a District conference again to urge on \ 
central government reforms similar to those which the 1
Administrator had suggested to Canberra more than two years 
before.*^
42) Ibid.
43) Milne Bay District Development Conference, loo.cit.,
V.A.C. Aug, 1961,
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Clearly the law and order complicatione in council 
areas derive from the refusal of the Administration to 
regard councils as bodies analogous to the British Native 
Authorities, as the natives themselves have asked. But 
if central control is insisted on, the councils ( and 
distriot field staff) have a right to expeot that local 
problems deriving from such an approaoh be ironed out by a 
clear central polioy. The failure to produce such a polioy 
perpetuated the problems and therefore agitation by the 
natives for the solution they had already suggested.**
44) There was one minor element of decentralisation when, 
in 1954, the appointment of oounoil constables was 
transferred from the Direotor of Distriot Services to 
the D.O., as the D.C. New Britain had recommended 
(23.1.51, Rabaul 14/11/6). Between 1951-4 thie had 
led to absurdly complicated prooedure - D.C. Central 
District to D.D.S., 25.7.52 NA. 41-1-5.
fTHE ECONOMIC ASPECT
I. Receipts and Expenditure#
(i) Revenue: Taxes and gees*
Essentially the sources of a council’s revenue are f e w t 
simple and sure. Under the general supervision of the 
District Officer (Reg. 101), oounoils may levy taxes and 
rates, and impose fees. The tax is a capitation tax on all 
resident males over the age of seventeen, and on those 
females over seventeen who voluntarily enter their names on 
the Tax Register. The tax rate is defined by oounoil rule 
for each financial year, January to December, - usually in 
the preceding September - and may be fixed in up to three 
grades. The tax rate is fixed in consultation with the 
supervising officer, who sometimes uses as a model the ratio
I
of tax to the Australian basio wage: this is about 10%»
But the ultimate decision rests with the council: the Kiwai 
council, for example, set a rate of £3#10*0 which has been 
maintained, although on available figures of local income
©
this seems to represent about 25%.
1) Recommended Senior Officers* Course, A.S.O.P.A., 1957; 
memo. D.M. Fienberg, 5.11.57, p.18; Local Govt. Bulletin 
no.4, July 1958, p.11. N.L.G. Councils Ordinance, Sects. 
19-20; Regulations, Pt.4, 76-103. Tax must function as
*an economic incentive* - of. Lugard. It may induce a 
w ee k’s copra making.
2) District Report, 1957-8, App. B. Daru 29-1-2.
CHAPTER VIII
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The system of grading initially allowed the Hanuabada 
council to accommodate semi-employed immigrants and young 
men just beginning work; the older men paid £3. The Milne 
Bay council through this device was able to incorporate the 
relatively backward Buhutu area (paying £2 as against the 
standard £4); but there is a natural antagonism to group 
concessions of this kind, for the backward areas share
similar services and usually make greater demands on
2
development expenses and works.
Taxes are collected according to a fixed schedule 
(enforced from Port Moresby) by council appointees, in the 
company of at least one councillor and a counoil constable. 
Council tax tiokets are issued, and the Regulations speoify 
that a different colour must be used eaoh year for five
A
years. Defaulters are fined by European magistrates for a 
breach of council rules. Exemptions from tax are granted on 
the grounds of *impeounious old age, infirmity or unavoidable 
hardship*; oases for exemption are heard by a council Tax 
Tribunal, which generally has a rotating membership of three 
or four councillors to ensure that none hears cases from 
his own village. The Administration has consistently
3) HA 41-1-3, 42-2-3. In Papua in 1960 adult male rate® 
ranged from £4 (Milne Bay; to 30/- (Higaturu and Ilimo).
It was felt that, without a system of instalment payments, 
native improvidence made it difficult to raise rates 
further.
4) Reg. 98.
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insisted that no pre-Tribunal exemptions be granted by 
central government officers, even, for example, to alien 
native mission pastors and teachers.®
It will be seen from the Tables that as local government, 
since 1956, has extended into the less favoured areas, tax 
rates - and generally therefore, revenue per head - have 
steadily fallen* On the other hand, two main mitigating 
circumstances might be postulated in these areas:
(i) free labour is generally more readily available*
The enthusiasm of the Highlanders to work for 
nothing to forward the councils* programme is 
evident everywhere; while the urban Hanuabadans, 
on the other hand, expeot to pay or be paid - 
the Elevala sea-wall took only a few days to 
complete in 1959, but organizing the free labour 
took six years. In 1952 the Native Authorities 
Section stated that, for public installations, 
a council should always employ paid skilled 
workers to do the aotual building; but it 
believed that sensible propaganda oould convince 
even the sophistioated groups that communal 
labour saved money: that is, amounted to an 
invisible contribution to oounoil funds, and
5) Case pleaded by A.D.O., Daru, Election P,R, June 1956; 
refused by E,0. (L.G.) - marginal comment. NA 41-4-2,
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hence to works and services. Social conditions
g
have often frustrated this hope, however.
(ii) the backward areas often have greater undeveloped
potential, and therefore can look forward to more
rapidly increasing revenues. This hope, to I960,
had not been demonstrably realized: in the rich
Higaturu area, for example, in four years the
tax rate rose only from 30/- to 35/-, and then
7only for some villages.
Indeed, because of the 50# depreciation in money values 
in the period 1950-60, the real per capita revenues of the 
older councils actually declined. This will be apparent 
from the Tables.
In view of the large shifts of labour in Papua, one of 
the most intraotable finanoial problems that oounoils have 
faced is collecting tax from absentees. Unless natives 
reside in their counoil areas for at least four months of 
the year they are not liable to council tax; but this is 
most unsatisfactory for councils suoh as that at Daru, where
Qrecruitment from some villages in 1956 reached 80#. One
6) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S., 23.1.1952, NA 42-3-5. Reimber 
(rural) used to have excellent communal oo-operation, 
but socio-political faotors reduced this to the stage 
where the councillors pleaded for powers of compulsion - 
A.D.O. memo., 20.3.1959. Rabaul 14/12.
7) A.D.O. to D.O., 9.7.1959, Pop. 14-8-22/8? but in 1956 
the D.U.A. had pointed out (7.5.1956, ibid.) that coffee 
plantings would take 3-5 years to bear. Delays in the 
coffee scheme (see below) pushed this back further.
8) Daru P.R. 2/1956-7: Oriomo.
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result was a more rigorous attempt to restriot reoruiting
to one-third of adult males: the largest employer of Kiwai
natives, the Australian Petroleum Company, agreed to send
natives back to Daru for paying off - thereby giving an
opportunity for tax collection; and it was also agreeable
9to collecting council tax from absentee labourers. Moreover, 
community spirit was still sufficiently strong amongst the 
Kiwai for many of them voluntarily to offer their tax.1  ^
Elsewhere - for example in Milne Bay - most absentees 
remitted no tax.1^  By 1580 no adequate solution to this 
problem, whioh rouses strong feeling in oounoil areas, had 
been proposed; though it was hoped that as local government 
spread, reciprocal arrangements between oounoils would 
become more practicable.
Other souroes of revenue are generally of minor 
importance. Some oounoils oharge fees, for example, for 
market or dog licences; but the Administration has felt
that *the revenue gained does not compensate for the ill-will
IPthat is promoted*. The hiring of transport or tractors 
is rarely profitable; many natives resent having to pay fees
9) D.O. to D.N.A., 10.9.1959, Daru 23-3-1. In 1960 the 
absentee tax was reduced from £3.10.0 to £2 (the same 
as the general personal tax) in order to induce payment 
to the oounoil rather than to the Administration - Daru 
23—5—4.
10) a/D.O. to D.N.A., 6.3.1959, Daru 23-5-6/1. These men 
are best able to pay tax; waiting on their return upsets 
tax collecting and thereby works programmes.
11) A.D.O. to D.O., 21.9.1959. Sinaeada 14-40-4.
12) Pienberg memo., 5.11.1957, oit.sup., p.20.
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cash crops to markets or processing oentres is often
undertaken by councils on a publio utility basis, to
stimulate economic development; but the immediate results
13are a drain on revenues. The Hanuabada council alone 
levies rates (£2 p.a.), for the extension of Port Moresby's 
services.
Until the Native Loans Fund was established in 1955
there was no regular means for the initial financing of
councils. Nevertheless immediate finanoe was necessary,
for both propaganda and statutory requirements! Regulation
1 1  states that a council must have a council house of a
design approved by the D,0, A olerk must be paid, equipment
bought, and the councillors granted expenses. The Ealeba
oounoil in Milne Bay obtained its initial finanoe by a loan
from the Milne Bay Development Co,; while the Tavara oounoil
14in 1954 borrowed money from Tolai council®. The expansion 
of local government in following years would have been 
impossible without the Native Loans Fund, if existing 
statutory reserves had been enforced. Under the Fund,
13) Higaturu Estimates, I960, Maintaining a Land-Rover 
cost £400 in one year. Coffee growers often carried 
beans to market, rather than pay Id. lb. for carriage 
by council traotor. (Pop. 14-8-22/2128,9.1959). An 
exception was the launch operated by the Kiwai oounoil, 
estimated to earn £600 in 1960. The Kiwai generally 
had no alternative transport for oopra. A.DD. to D.O.,
13,11.1959. Daru 23-5-4.
14) S.N.A.O. to D.D.S., 22.4.1954, NA 39-1-0; a/D.N.A. to 
D.O. Samarai, 20.8.1955, DS 14-7-41.
for the use of their council'a vehicles. The carrying of
councils as corporations may borrow up to £5,000*
(ii) The Pressure for Central Assistance,
The pressure for Administration loans or grants-in-aid
originated largely from the need for initial finanoe. In
1954, when the Tavara council was being established, the
D.C. pointed out that there was a strong case not simply for
an Administration loan, but for a grant-in-aidi
The value of the Council to the Administration as 
an administrative technique as well as the benefit 
it offers in terms of hard cash, certainly warranty 
this assistance.
The argument thus was that counoils, as Administration
instrumentalities, were entitled to Administration assistancej
but the Treasury,it was said, refused to accept councils as
17part of the administrative struoture. There was, moreover, 
a certain reluctance on the part of local government officers 
to assooiate the Treasury with oounoil finance, for they 
felt that counoils should learn to stand on their own feet, 
and the independent financing of councils made available to 
a D.C. 'money which he can utilise freely without the delays 
and frustrations associated with Treasury
15) Until 1956 no initial finanoe loans were made; though 
the Hanuabada council had borrowed £150 from the 
Administration (J. McAuley, Looal Government Among the 
Tolai, South Paoifio. VII, li, 1954, p.882 n.4) and
rour Tolai councils had borrowed altogether £6,310 (K.
W. Williamson, The Tolai Cocoa Projeot, South Pacific.
IX, 13, 1958, p7B9Bj.
16) D.C. to D.D.S., 11.8.1954, Samarai 14-17-8/174. The
Ordinance contains no specific provision for grants,
17) Fienberg memo., 5.11.1957, oit.sup., p.21*
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i c
control. ,18
The result to a large degree has been that the Treasury, 
and occasionally technical departments, have regarded the 
setting up of a council as freeing them from finanoial 
responsibilities, at the very time when developmental demand» 
are being channelled through the council# In May, 1958, for 
the first time a department other than Native Affaire 
suggested a grant-in-aid to a councils the Public Works 
Department, after a detailed survey, proposed that £750 be 
granted the Mine Bay council to maintain roads and bridges 
around the bay# The Executive Officer (Looal Government) 
pointed out that this could be made the opportunity for a 
general policy deoision on grants-in-aid. This was supported 
by the Director of Native Affairs, who emphasised that 
without suoh basic developmental expenditure inoomeo and 
therefore revenues oould not be raised in oounoil areas* 
but the Assistant Administrator saw drawbaoks, particularly 
in a demand by the Administrator’s Department to approve 
counoil estimatest
419
18) D.N.A# to D.C#, Central, 19.1.1955, D.O# Port Moresby
14-26-7. Initially the Administration seemed not to 
grasp the concept of grants-in-aidi when in 1953 the 
D.C. Central applied for a grant-in-aid for Hanuabada 
to tide it over a period of high overheads, the D.D.S. 
replied that the council itself should make a grant-in- 
aid for the purpose - D.D.S. to D.C., 16.6.53, NA 
41-1-5. Again the educational argument was raised)
’The Hanuabadane must be made to realize that the 
choice lies between keeping overhead down ... or being 
satisfied with a Council whose slender income la eaten 
up by its own internal administration’ - S.N.A.O# to 
D.D.S., 26.6.1953, ibid.
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Commonwealth Treasury’s dictation to us is^g 
gemiaine (sio).
20This was the end of the proposal*
The Native Loans Board was set up specifically to
provide finance to native corporations and to selected
individuals on little or no security f but many oounoils
have sought loans only for realisable assetss for example,
21a boat in Mine Bay, and a Land-Rover at Higaturu. These 
have certain developmental functions; but communications are 
basic. Moreover, because of the statutory and policy 
controls on councils’ reserve funds - under Regulation 58 
one-tenth of the estimated recurrent revenue must be set 
aside - supervising officers have been reluctant to borrow 
from this source. The Kiwai oounoil borrowed £400 from its 
reserves in 1960 to buy a film projector; but it promised
19) Dir. of Works to D.N.A., 5.5.1958 (comments E.0. (L.G.) 
attached); D.N.A. to Asst. Admin., 19.5.1958 (attaohed 
comments Asst. Admin. 23.5.1958), NA 23-4-10. The 
oounoil also pressed for a grant to build a road to the 
Sagarai valley, without which development is impossible. 
D.N.A. pointed out that the Health and Educ. Depts. 
already gave ’hidden' assistanoe in salaries, drugs, etc.
Other fozms of 'hidden' assistanoe have been suggested, 
particularly making counoils' purchases free of duty, in 
view of their being Administration instrumentalities.
This was rejected as impracticable. But in the B.S.I.P., 
1954-60, councils obtained stores through government at 
government rates - Honiara F.101/29/14.
20) By 1961 agreement had virtually been reached by the D.P.H. 
and Treasury on aid on a £-for-£ basis to oounoils 
(information E.0. (L.G.)) - the needed precedent. This 
matter is, of course, quite separate from the often 
vociferous demands (e.g. combined Tolai meeting,
18.3.1959, Rabaul 14/12) made by councils for financial 
assistance to natives individually.
21) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O., 21.9.1959, Sinaeada 14-40-4.
A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O., 28.9.1959, Pop. 14-8-22.
TAiiLÌS A
i u l .G . CJEJ.JCI-.S1 TATI oil A^D TAX M ù S , 1959
LÏLmM
District Name of 
Council
No. of 
Villages
Approx.
Pop.
No. of 
Members
Date
Proclaimed M
17-18
M
17-21
M
21 yrs.
F
Central Hanuabada 4 2900 17 1. 9*50 60/- 6o/- 20/-
Rigo ¿9 10256 38 4. 8.59 40/- 40/- 10/-
Marshall
Lagoon 31 9340 34 4. 8.59 60/- 60/- 10/-
Northern Rigatura 56 11443 54 30. 4.56 30/- 30/- 10/-
Il imo 33 3357 24 10. 7.58 30/- 30/- 10/-
Milne Bay Milne Bay 30 5500 40 2.12.57 40/- 80/- 20/-
Mis ima 33 6167 33 20. 5.58 20/- 40/- 10/-
Gulf Moveave- 13 7174 24 1. 5.58 40/- 40/- 20/-
Toaripi
Moripi 15 5047 17 1. 5.58 40/- 40/- 20/-
Western Kiwai 31 6485 30 9.10.58 40/- 40/- 20/-Gogodala 34 6725 28 26. 3.59 To be fixed.
TOTAL: 329 74,394 382
Special
Rates
Lower rates Buhutu, 
Ahioma.
Average representation: 1 : 195 
(Councillor : Electorate Pop.)
YAaÜi A (Contó.)
ÜD «Lfe<tá
District i'iame of ¡to. of Approx. No* of Date
Council Villages Pop. ^eabors Proclaimed M
17-13
M
17-21
H
21 yrs.
F Special
Rates
Bougainville Teop-¡Inputs 33 3356 25 1. 5.58 40/- 40/- 10/-
New Ireland Tirana 61 6 2 10 23 30.30.56
20/.
10/-
60/- 60/- 20/-
New Britain Vunataami 27 6512 23 7. 9.50 80/-
40/-
20/-
10/-
Mioko
liuallm, Palpal
Relmber 22 5031 15 7. 9.90 20/- 30/- 20/- (Adult rates 
New Britain
.
20/- 80/- 20/-
18 years.)
Rabaul 18 8147 21 24. 5.51 - . ■
VunadadiivTaoa-.
20/- 30/- 20/-)Nanga Nanga 33 &&4 31 28.il.52 iialabaoga
20/- 40/- 10/-)
Tlvuan 18 3850 20 21. 1.53 20/- 80/- 20/-
Bola IS 2000 9 16.12.58 20/-
60/-
40/- lü/-
Madang Ainbenob 86 9410 48 13. 9.56 40/-
60/- W -
Vaskia 31 5250 25 20. 9.57 40/- 40/- 10/-
Takia 29 6140 26 20. 9.57 40/- 40/- 20/-
Sepik But-Boiken 39 5514 25 13. 9.56 40/- 40/- 10/-tfaprik 54 9976 25 IB. 4.53 30/- 30/- 5/-Horobe Isi-wo-.apa 20 4455 12 11.12.57 40/- 40/- 10/-
Yabin-Kotto 37 9472 32 6.12.57 40/-
30/-
50/-
50/-
labim
Kotte
Eastern Agulizakivi- 79 9800 36 3.12.58 30/- 10/- Gosayufu
Highlands Gwivahani
30/-
10/- Arikiyufa
Waiye 51 9809 37 19.12.58 30/-
30/-
2/-
Manus Baluan 41 5716 37 H. 9.50 ao/- 20/-
TOTAL! 697 119» 532 470 OKA
(Councillor t electorate Pop.)
TABLE B 
ESTIMATED EEVKKUES. 1952-60
(*> M W *
(Hot* par oap. deolina as Local Ocnrerranent extends into l*a* developed areas)
Tear
Humber
of
Council»
Estimated. 
Total Total 
Population Revenue
Carried Average Revenue 
forward from per head of 
previoue year total 
(including population 
Beeerveel
1952 2 3,600
£
3,220 790
1
.89
1953 2 4,640 4,110 2,260 .881954 2 4,660 3,990 1,620 •861955 3 8,130 4,350* 3,120* •931956 4 16,300 14,590 5,180 •7919571958 6 24,090 24,900 6,260 1.039 55,270 23,970+ 15,560 + •771959 10 67,890 43,750* 20,060 « •71I960 16 97,450 49,500 X 24,800 X «64
• Pop. 
. Pop.
Sim
4c Fop*
X Po]?*
4,660 t Tavara eetiaatee not glim. 
31,010 t Eetiaatee 3 Counoile not given. 61,660 t Gogodala eetiaatee not given* 
76,640 t Estimates 5 Counoile not glvin.
>
►
TABUS B (Contd.)
(1 1) amr ouctba
(Affords a better base-line)
Tear
Hunber
of
Counoile
Total
Population
Estimated
Total
Revenue
Carried 
forward from 
previous year 
(including 
Reserves)
Average Re1 
per bead 
total 
populate
£ m* s
1952 4 15,400 18,500 7,600 1.2
1953 6 24,800 31,300 10,800 1.26
1955 6 30,000 39,500 19,100 1.32
1956 6 30,100 40,100 21,000 1.33
1957 10 52,600 57,000 20,200 1.09
1958 15 91,100 84,200 28,100 0.92
1959 18 112,700 85,800 40,500 0.76
PER CAPITA. REVENUES OF REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS. 1952-60. 
REVENUES OF HABAPL COUNCIL (established 24.5.1951)
TABLE C
Estimated Estimated Estimated Tax Revenue per
Year Population Total Revenue Tax Revenue head of total population.
£ £
1952 6000 4585 ♦ balance 4500 #75
2515
I960 7940 8250 ♦ balance 7300 > .92
5740
REVENUES OF rfUig ^AY COUNCIL
(established 2.12.1957, incorporating Ealeba Council, established 1951)
1952 1100 1275 ♦ balance 1260 1.15
(Ealeba) nil
I960 5500 4580 ♦ balance 4200 .76
(Milne Bay) 2420
Differences s Rabaul Council embraces relatively stable numbers of peri-urban
population - but small opportunities for basic economic development. 
Milne Bay has rapidly absorbed relatively backward rural populations - 
figures to I960 show time-lag in agricultural development.
Hanuabada 
Rigo 
Marshall Lagoon 
!1ilne Bay 
Misima 
Moveave-Toaripi 
Moripi 
Kivai 
Gogodala 
Higaturu 
Ilimo 
TOTAL: 
Per capita !!!!• 
{excepting Rigo) 
Percentage over-
all expenditure 
>O ! ~§ bo 
~~ 
c+ 
~ 
c+ 
.... 
0 
t:s 
£ 
12.33 
2:>4 
2416 
1027 
1.35.3 
1753 
1504 
2658 
.3.39 
1179 
551 
14217 
4/3.6 
.35.7 
Cll:;:: 
f 
txl 
~ g, g-
........ 0 
c+ 0 pl 
~~ c+ .... 
.... g g ~ 
p.. 
1129 5 
- -
1120 1595 
482 663 
875 458 
- -
-
125 
3.316 492 
-
34 
1.37 59 
25 
-
7084 3431 
2/1.7 1/0.5 
17.8 8.6 
' 
!; I ~ S' ~ ~ '1 Pl Pl .... ~ .?' CD 2 '1 
._. tD tD ~ [ '1 .... 'O p.. ~ ~ 
<D 
'< CD 
.. 
-
52:> 129 
- - -
-
796 
-
238 84 
-
-
48 464 
- -
1143 
- -
599 
305 
-
2JIJ 
15 
-
34 
285 22) 
-
9 36 -
852 1704 26::>9 
-/3.1 -/6.2 -/9.6 
2.1 4.3 6.6 
~ ';/ 0 3: t-t) Pl c ~ [~ ~ tD 'O ~Cl) p.. 0 ii a '1 c+ 
<D QI 
'1 
4&J 10 257 
112 51 
-
539 256 
-
19.3 1211 143 
11 
- -
131 531 
-
78 28 
-
229 689 
-
12 
- -
180 1994 
-
. 28 1836 
-
1973 6&J6 J.oo 
-/7.2 2/- -/1.4 
5.0 16.6 1.0 
> Cll ~ 0 0 .... 
c+ 0 tD 
......... 0 
;i~ CD ~ c+ 
.... ~ CD 
CD <D 
2 
CD 
2) 
-
- -
.329 86 
- -
-
224 
-
134 l 
I 
- -
- -
- -
.31 
-
-
68 
380 512 
-/1.4 -/1.9 
1.0 1 • .3 
t-3 
0 
c+ 
~ 
376.3 
367 
7137 
4041 
3433 
3692 
2.334 
7929 
434 
4085 
2553 
39768 
12/0.7 
100 
* 
TABLE D 
ACTUAL EXPBNDITUPE 
PAPUA ~ATIVE LOCAL 
GOVERlf:·iENT COUNCILS 1959 
Cf. Estimates, Papua Report 
1958-9, pp • .31-2. Principal 
discrepancy : 
Estimated Balance c/r £10 ,88.3 
(excepting Gogodala}. 
Actual Balance c/r £24,802 
{Council Administration 
includes establishment expenses, 
Council House} • 
* Expenditure for all Councils 
in 1958 was est~d at 
22/-. New Guinea Councils 
are wealthier. 
COUiiCI.'- EXPENDITURES, PAPUA-NEW GUINEA
TABJJS fi
4=Actual. 1957 Estimated. 1958
Per Cent of Total Expenditure Per Cent of Total Expenditure
Council Administration* 37*2 27.9
Medical 15.2 16.8
Education 13.5 12.6
Agriculture 3*4 6.5
Roads and Bridges 1.8 1.6
Water 4.0 6.2
Law and Order 3.6 2.6
Maintenance 0.6 2.4
Transport 19.0 22.6
Social Activities 0.5 0.2
* This head includes the Construction of buildings not 
otherwise provided for, and establishment expenses.
t An average of one School and two Aid Posts for each 
Council. Percentage of total expenditure by Central 
Government on education, 1957-58, was 6%.
INSTALLATIONS BY ^ S-.. GUINEA COUNCILS TO 1956 (6 Councils) 
(Buildings generally of European materials)
TABLE F
Total
Council chambers 6
Village higher schools 17
Aid posts 37
Staff quarters 28
Cacao fermentaries and driers 12
Workshops and stores 6
Garages 4
Water tanks and wells 58
Agricultural projects 1
School dormitories 1
Rice machine sheds and huilers 1
Sawmills 2
Council office 1
Navigation markers 1
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to repay it in toto in 1961. It can be argued that the 
concept of council reserves has become a fetish; the un­
certainty of capital requirements in relation to revenues 
for any particular year has led the Administration into a 
state of perpetual financial anxiety. The accumulating of 
reserves begins in the first year, and ceases (theoretically)
when the fund reaches half of the council*s average revenue,
23calculated over a five year period. Thus, when & council 
most needs money, it is busy saving. A glance at the table 
showing expenditures for 1959 reveals that the level of 
reserves plus unexpended balances sometimes reached in­
ordinate proportions.
(iii) Expenditurei Substantial Works.
Analyses of oouncil expenditure show the results of 
close supervision, and of the direct and enforced responsi­
bility of 1).0.8. A strict sohedule is laid down by Port
24Moresby for revenue collection, expenditure and accounting. 
This, together with elaborate accounting procedures - the 
Regulations alone give seventeen pro forma, and a draft ^  
Handbook of Council Finance runs to several hundred pages - 
undoubtedly tend to throw the whole burden on district 
staff, but from the practioal viewpoint of works and services
22) A.D.O. to D«0., 16.2.1960, Daru 23-6-1.
23) Reg. 59. The fund must be maintained | the consent of 
the D.N.A. is required to use it.
24) Regs. 54-7, 63, 104-8; Circ. Memo. 235, 1.10.1959. ^  r ]
22
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#f) .counoils usually achieve impressive results. Councils
are forbidden to spend more than half of their estimated -
recurrent revenue on emoluments, so that the bulk of
26expenditure is devoted to capital works* In 1958 the 
Daru counoil provided for an expenditure of 86.1# on works 5 
it was realized that recurrent expenditure would rise as 
council servioes extended, but it was felt most important 
that in the early years a council provide tangible evidence 
of its activities.^
In 1958 the sixteen oouncils then functioning provided 
for the payment of councillors, clerks, drivers, boat crews, 
works supervisors, constables, Aid Post orderlies, 
agricultural and forestry assistants, nurses, labourers, 
and sawmill employees; also for allowances for rations, 
insurance stationery, lighting, fuel, school prizes, 
magazine subscriptions, radio maintenance, uniforms and 
sports materials. In addition, they estimated for the 
construction of 18 school buildings, 33 aid posts, 4 council 
houses, 1 market building,5 underground tanks, 3 wells, 3 
motor vehicles, 1 work boat, 4 copra driers, 3 inseot 
fogging machines, 10 staff quarters, 4 stores, 4 power
25) This contrasts with the record of some West African 
Authorities.
26) Reg. 35. Councillors receive expense reimbursements 
rather than salaries*
27) D.N.A. to D.C. Western, 10.2.1958, NA 23-3-10. Hanuabada 
has always been regarded as weak because it spends to 
the statutory limit on emoluments; because the natives 
are reluctant to part with land, it finds the siting of buildings difficult, with consequent heavy annual 
carry-overs — D.O. Port Moresby 14—26—7.
mowers, 1 filia projector, 7 staff bicycles, 1 windmill,
281 motor-cycle, and 2 shotguns.
II. Economic Development.
I
Although councils were set up in areas with economic 
potential« largely in order to provide the Administration 
with an instrument for co-ordinated area development, the 
ways in which the Administration was to do this remained 
undefined and confused. It was stated in 1949 that the 
concomitant setting up of oo-operatives would make it
COunnecessary for councils to engage in ‘business*. The 
Ordinance, however, included the provision that councils 
could organize, finance or engage in any business or enter­
prise and carry out any works for the benefit of their 
30communities. The S.N.A.O. quickly realized that the 
promotion of economic development could not be left simply 
to co-operatives or to other Departments, for this would 
leave the major factors making for social change *to evolve 
in a completely uncontrolled and haphazard way*. This applied 
particularly to the regulation of native land usage and to 
the initial organization of production, where a council 
could act as the *eoonomie mouthpieoe* of the community*
In these functions he envisaged local government as playing
28) E*0. (L.Gr*), 6.5.1958, MA 23-16-5: all buildingjsof 
European materials.
29) D . D . S .  to Sec. Terr., 4.4.1949, DS 14-3-15*
30) Sect. 11 (a,b).
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a key role: activity would have to co-ordinate with that
of other Departments, especially Agriculture, and the co-
*•31operatives would take over once production had begun*
In practice this key role for oouncils has been only
partially accepted. Those opposing the channelling of
economic development primarily through councils have taken
exception to *a monopoly of local power by a local political
3?body’, subjecting natives to a 'monolithic pressure'*
Local government officers favouring the primary role of 
councils in economic development have pointed out, in effect, 
that this argument assumes a social analogy which does not 
exist between native and Western societies, and henoe 
between their systems of local government. The S*N*A*0. 
pointed out the fallacy of assuming a non-existent 
individualism \ the E.O. (L.G.), while conceding that it 
was policy ultimately to merge the natives in a common 
political, economic and judioial system with Australians, 
argued that it was unrealistic to assume such a situation
31) S.N.A.O. to D.C. Manus, 3*11*1952, NA 42-3-5.
32) J. McAuley, Economic and Financial Aspects of Local 
government. South £aoiflo. IX* 13» July p.£61. 
This argument assumed a functional analogy with Austra­
lian local government. This was precisely the view of 
the Catholic mission, which supported private, not 
oouncil, operation of economic ventures (Rev. J. Dwyer, 
Leg.Co. Debates, 1.6*1956, p.87). In 1957 the Ramalmal 
Advancement Sooiety (Catholic Division) began a coooa 
fermentery in opposition to the Pelegir (council) one* 
The mission disclaimed any connection! though Fr. Dwyer 
commended the ’vision of the people' at the offioial 
opening (Rabaul Times. 13.2*1959); the combined Tolai 
councils, 26*&*1957# protested against mission 
'intrusion*. Rabaul 14/11/6/38.
33) S.N.A.O., Manus memo, cit.sup.
native representative institutions would have to concern
themselves with the regulation of customary usages and
35with the promotion of dependent area development.
The opposing view recognized that, although economic
development should be promoted through a plurality of local
agencies, councils might be the only suitable or active ones,
and that then by default they would have to be made
36principally responsible. In fact, the co-operatives 
limited themselves largely to collecting and marketing 
produce, so that a promotional lacuna existed in many 
council areas. In 1958, the Director of Native Affairs 
noted, in effect, that this had led to a policy hiatusi 
the role of councils in economic development had never been 
defined, *but generally a Council enters this field only
when there is a need which cannot be adequately satisfied
37by any other agency. 1
So far, he said, we have no better agenoy for 
organizing land development or re-settlement 38 
schemes.
Policy allowing for this needed to be laid down; but
34) H.T. Plant, The Potential Role of Native Local Government 
Councils in Native feoonomlc i)eveiopmenfc (Agrlc. Conf.. 
Goroka, 1956J.
35) Ibid«
36) McAuley, 1958, loc.cit.
37) a/D.N.A. to 0.1.C. Kukipi, 12.8.1958, NA 23-16-1.
38) Ibid.
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34in advance. Councils as both Administration agencies and
1by default had led to procrastination on the policy
*59 *  *issues. The S.N.A.O. complained at length about the
undefined role of councils in land tenure regulation, and
particularly about inadequate co-ordination with other
Departments (which did not accept the promotional function
of councils)* *the frustrating task of endeavouring to push
basic policy issues up from the bottom consumed an inordinate
amount of Field Officers* time, hampered the organisation
of area activities, and tended to promote inconsistencies
in emphasis.^
By 1960 basic policy decisions on matters such as rural
credit, oouncils* regulation of land tenure, and the
precise developmental functions of oouncils were still
caught between these two conceptions. The following
examples will illustrate.
(i) The Yudal Scheme
This is a re-settlement scheme initiated by the fiabaul
council in 1953, after title investigation work in the
Matupi area had shown land to be short. The council leased
1,000 acres of land some 35 miles from Rabaulj half was
39) Senior Officers Course, 1957, cit.sup., para. 40t 
re-affirmed *the danger that Counoils may become too 
deeply involved in economic ventures*.
40) D.M. Fienberg, Land Tenure in Relation to Native Economic 
Development. 20.8.1956, In effect, there was a policy
of centralizing without a centralizing of polioy.
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the very fact that this function of councils came about
the other 500 acres were divided into blocks of 4.9 acre a
41each, on individual sublease.
There was a number of complications in the early stages 
of this scheme, which is of particular importance because 
it was regarded throughout the Territory as an experiments 
the council Itself did not seem sure that the objeot was 
re-settlement, rather than simply individual cultivation 
by lessees going out from the oounoll area periodically; 
communal labour organized by the oounoll for initial clearing 
fluctuated (non-participants had little inducement); control 
to a very real extent was left to the council, but there 
was no road to the site, and the Forestry Department there­
fore failed to remove felled tress; some of the oleared blocks 
were found to belong to a European company (the result of a 
poor survey) .* 2
Administration interest in the scheme was really aroussd 
only when it had become apparent that it was collapsing. It 
was publicly branded by a settler as a failure In 1957; and
investigations by the Agrieulture and Native Affairs Departments 
43followed. The A.D.O. made the remarkable assessment that -
41) MoAuley, 1954, loo.olt., p.885; a/Admin. to Seo. Terr., 
20.7.56, NA 34-8-104.
42) Ibid. Senior Ag. 0. to D.A.S.F., 17.5.1957, DASF L/12-1-32. 
N.A. Reg. 77 made it impossible for natives to make a will 
respecting land - a major difficulty in council plans; but 
here the council had the right to re-allott the land on a 
tenant's death, being guided by his nomination of a 
successor.
43) D. Barrett, M.L.C., in Rabaul Times. 5.4.1957.
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made available for communal subsistence gardens, while
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• •• as an experiment« the project has been success- 
ful,in that it has revealed pitfalls of which we ** 
were not hitherto aware.
It was quite clear that the scheme was beyond the council
unaided. Policy decisions were sought from Port Moresby,
particularly on finance: settlers needed to be tided over
for 3-5 years, until ooooa came into bearing; it was
estimated that the council would eventually be indebted to
the tune of £25,000 if it remained unassisted*4®
Pleas for policy directives, particularly on financial
46assistance, went unanswered in Port Moresby* In desperation, 
in 1959 the Rabaul council threw the area open to settlers 
from other Tolai oounoil areas - many of the original 
lessees lost their rights - but the response was very poor.
The Land Development Board seemed to stand out against the 
rest of the Administration in refusing loans to settlers
47under the scheme; admittedly, lessees could offer no security •
Because of the division of opinion in Port Moresby, local
field staff, and the council, suffered extraordinary delays
48in their applications*
44) A.D.O. to D.C., 4.12.1957, NA 45-4. My italics.
45) Chief Field Officer, Lands Dept., memo. 25.3.1958, NA 
45-4. By 1956 the council had spent £2,209 on the scheme; 
this was deprecated by the Administration, for the scheme 
benefited only a few natives in the council area.
46) A.D.O. to D.O., 30.7.1958; D.O. to D.N.A., 28.4.1958 - 
Rabaul 14/11/6/40. Details, NA 35-11-18.
47) D.O; to D.N.A., 17.11.1959, appended comments by E.O.
(L.G.), NA 45-4.
48) Ten months delay in 1959: D.N.A. to D.O., 22.1.1960, NA 
35-11-19. The question of rural credit became a major issue with the Tolai, carrying politioal overtoiaes - 
Rabaul 14/12.
In 1960 the Assistant Administrator publicly stated
• 49that the scheme was *a failure1 •
(ii) Laloki
There was a strong feeling amongst some officers that 
the failure of the Vudal scheme oould not be ascribed entirely 
to the council's ineptitude or to the Administration^ 
dissociation. They believed that it involved a group of 
peri-urban natives who were socially not adapted to re- 
settlement. This is even more true of the Hanuabada 
council area. Yet for thirty years attempts have been made 
to induce Hanuabadans to revert to agriculture on reserve 
land near the Laloki river.
In 1953 the Hanuabada council obtained a lease of Laloki 
land, to be divided into 5 acre blocks on individual sub­
lease. The object was to provide employment and also cheap 
vegetables in the council area. The re-settlement aspect 
was never clear, as at Vudali many participants, who paid 
subscriptions for buildings and clearing, had no intention
49) South Pacific Post, 12.1.1960. The only successes 
among the original lessees were those who had other 
resources - E.O. (L.G. ), 8,10.1957, NA 45-4. The 
Vunamami council profited in the later Warangoi schemej
15 acre blocks were leased to individuals. This ensured 
(a) competition; (b) only responsible men were 
allooated blocks; (c) lessees had to be resident; (d) 
credit was essential (no communal labour).
50) E.O. (L.G.), 8.10.1957, HA 45-4. Locality attachments 
are strong - T.S. Epstein, Personal Capital Formation 
Amongst the Tolai. pp.9-10. ¿.1Î.A.0. warned of this 
in 1953 - 20.1.1953, NA, 40-1-10.
of living permanently at the site.
The Administration initially gave advice on the projeot;
but it refused to make old building materials available to
the council, it sent the council a bill for £168 for ploughing9
it made no surveyor available for delimiting the blocks, and
it refused to sanction a loan to the counoil (because the
52scheme concerned only a small minority of villagers).
The basic difficulties were therefore (i) social - the 
Iianuabadans had in fact almost abandoned gardening; (ii) 
financial - subscription capital for initiating the scheme 
was inadequate, and the negligible prospects of getting 
assistance caused many subscribers to out their losses; and
(iii) administrative - the Administration left the oounoil 
to its own devices at a time when active co-operation was 
needed
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51) Hanuabada council file 15-3; Clerk to D.C., 30.7.1953, 
23.8.1954. Infonnation, Rima Gavera, Sinaka Goava.
D.C. to D.D.S., 2.3.1953, NA 41-1-5.
52) Ibid. Council allocated £100 in 1956; the D.O. refused 
to sanction payment of half development cost out of 
counoil's Agrio, Development Fund - memo. 9.8.1956, H.C.
15-3-.
53) The early backers of the scheme were most influential men« 
e.g. Toua Kapena, who withdrew from the council in 1957.
The Ambenob council (Madang) sought a compromise in re­
settlement. Subsistence continued traditionally; but 
land in large blocks was sold to the Administration for 
lease to the council, and sub-lease in 3 acre blocks for 
cash propping alone. Serious divisions appeared within 
the Adminisiration on the principles of this scheme -
D.A.S.F. favoured consolidated subsistence + cash 
cropping, henoe objected. Delays on a decision continued 
for three years: on 8.10.1959 the council president 
radioed the Administrator to expedite a decision and 
warned of waning native enthusiasm. Agreement had to be reached by D .1 J .A . ,  D . A . S . F .  and Lands Dept. The D.C._ . appeared to regard the scheme as only an experimental pilot project - unsatisfactory to the council. HA 42-7. _____
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The faults of these schemes held out no high prospects 
for the encouragement of other re-settlement schemes 
through councilsj but schemes of other types were tried«
( ill) The Tolai Cocoa Project
The Tolai project is the best known and most successful 
of the economic development schemes in whloh counoils have 
been engaged, and it is widely looked to, in theory, as a
54possible precedent for other council areas. In fact, its 
operation has revealed a number of continuing policy and 
administrative difficulties, which could well be deterrents 
elsewhere.
= The central object of the soheme has been the control of 
cocoa production and processing to ensure uniform high 
quality, and thus maintain markets and confidence. Initially 
relatively small loans were made to Tolai oouncils for the 
building of fermentarles. In 1955 it became apparent that 
a great deal of independent finance was needed. The Native 
Loans Fund set a limit of £5,000; organization through the 
co-operatives was not favoured because the Administration 
lacked adequate control. Therefore Administration-guaranteed 
bank loans were made to the councils; by March 1960 the
BEamount guaranteed was £227,000*
54) Williamson, loo.cit., pp*593-600; Local Govt. Bulletin 
No.2, March 1957, pp*4-5* —
55) E.O. (Admin*) to Asst. Admin., 31.5*1960, Admin 66-6-1* 
Most Tolai co-operatives failed, 1955-8*
An ad hoc committee representing the Departments of 
Native Affairs and Agriculture was set up in Port Moresby 
to exercise overall control. At the district level the 
scheme was initially well-directed entirely because of good 
personal relations between Native Affairs and Agriculture.
But in the period 1957-8 the unresolved confliot over the 
control of native agricultural projects broke out at Rabaul, 
with the result that a Management Board was set up in 1958,
representing the two Departments, the oounoils, and the
57growers. A European Field Manager and a European Accountant 
were appointed. Trained native clerks look after fermentary 
payments and accounts and liaise with fermentary committees, 
under the inanediate supervision of Native Affairs officers. 
Council cocoa committees handle the disbursement of loan 
funds, under the guidance of supervising officers and, 
indirectly, of the Management Board. The S.N.A.O. and looal 
officers long pressed for a native 'managerial cadre' for 
native economic projects, using the Tolai example as a lever; 
but nothing was done. The result was that the projeot
remained, in effect, entirely Administration controlled and
58managed# This aooorded with the conoept of oounoils as
56) Fienberg memo., 20.8.1956, oit.sup.
57) a/D.O. New Britain to D.N.A., 15.7.1957; Chief of Agrio. 
Extension to Asst. Admin., 18.7.1957, NA 45-1-1« first 
meeting of Board, 23.4.1958.
58) Fienberg memo., 5.11.1957, cit.sup.i D.C. New Britain, 
Oct. 1955, NA 45-1-6.
raised further policy issues. For, if the projeot was
regarded as a public utility, did it have to maintain sub-
59stantial independent depreciation reserves, and should it
60be permitted by law to enforce a monopoly of processing?
A tendency developed for the ad hoc committee in Port
Moresby to arrogate more detailed control; but here these
policy divisions intruded, with resulting long delays in the
61approval of new loan applications from the district. This 
ad hoo arrangement was cumbersome, and highlighted the laok 
of clear and definite general policy and co-ordination.
From the local government viewpoint, the Tolai project 
was an exceptional venture by counoils into a public utility- 
cum-business enterprise. As the only native corporations to 
which bank loans could be made, the oouncils became 
involved, in a sense, accidentally. Policy frowned on suoh 
ventures by councils as general practice, so that the project 
could hardly be taken as a precedent• (This was reflected in
Administration instrumentalities; but this very concept
59) Objection raised Chief of Agric. Ext., 12.12.1958, NA 
45-1-112.
60) Chief, Govt. & Research, to D.N.A., 15.6.1960, NA 45-1-5. 
in 1956-7 the councils had rules compelling growers to 
take beans to approved fermenteries; these rules were 
abandoned in favour of central government legislation.
But Chinese and others running private fermenteries 
brought them up to standard, with a consequent sharp 
drift of beans to them instead of to the project ones -
E.O. (Admin.)memo., 31.5.1960, oit.sup. Chief of Govt, 
and Research insisted on no legislative protection, 
partly to produce native commercial leaders; Asst.Admin, 
also supported this view (comments, 7.6.1960, Admin 66-6-1).
61) Ibid. A.D.O. (L.G.) to Chief. Dev. & Welfare, 17.2.1959,HA 3-5-10(7); NA 45-1-1:2, ff. 135-41. Delays Aug-Dee.
1959.
the Higaturu scheme, see below).
Some offioers believed that the principal failure of 
the Administration, and of local government, in the Gazelle 
Peninsula lay in not dealing with indigenous land tenure.
The S.N.A*0. continually insisted that oouncils were ideal
62media for the reform of tenure to cope with cash-cropping; 
and 'land usage control' through oounoils was stated to be 
one of the objeots of the projeot. On the other hand# 
central government has been equally insistent in reserving 
the control of native land tenure to itself; under the 
Native Lands Registration Ordinance, 1961, only the Native 
Lands Commissioners - all Europeans - may survey and register 
existing native holdings; but this tends to fossilize 
holdings at a time when oash-cropping is creating irreBis­
table pressures towards change. Moreover, it is painfully 
slow. Nevertheless the Administration has stood firm on the
anachronistic principle of protection, which in the Gazelle
64Peninsula is rapidly rebounding on the local staff*
62) e*g* memo, of 20.8.1956, cit.sup., paras. 32-5. He 
stated that this was the basic problem facing the cocoa 
project; administrative failure could lead to native 
disillusionment - South Pacific Post, 30.4.1958.
63) Williamson, loc.oit., pp. 595-6.
64) One-third of all land is already alienated - A.L. 
Epstein, New Guinea - Past or Slow?. J.P.S., LXXX, 4, 
1961, p.492l The Administration rejected councils' 
pleas to be allowed to regulate tenure - Madang 
Conference, Item li a/D.N.A., 20.6.1960, NA 44-4-1*
At the peak period, to 30.10.1958, growers received an 
average of £A30.5.8 each for six months. Cf. Swynnerton 
Plan, Kenya: my Agriculture in Kenya and New Guinea. 
Aust. Quarterly. June 1961* p*74*
Among the Tolai the problem has added complexity, for
inheritance is gradually changing from the traditional
matrilineal to patrilineal form. As the population and
cash-cropping both inorease, it is realized that the problem
will become more intractable, with deolining individual
incomes and resultant resentment. The Administration
rejected the potential role of the councils in land
regulation, without really finding a workable substitute.
(iv) The Higaturu Coffee Scheme
Enthusiasm for cash-cropping was spread in the Higaturu
area, economically one of the most favoured parts of Papua-
New Guinea, by trainees returning from the Looal Government
Training Centre at Vunadadir. Among the Orokaiva the land
tenure question had been complicated by the consequences of
the Mt. Lamington explosion. This made it essential to
regularise tenure for cash crops. Moreover, excessive
European alienation in the Sangara area, and reoent
acquisitions for further European settlement, had made natives
66in some areas extremely land-oonscious.
The area had great economic potential but little native 
development. At the time cash-cropping gained in favour 
the Higaturu council had just been established; its
65) P.O. to D.C., 23.5.1956, NA 14-7-17; C.S. Belshaw,
Social Consequences of the Mt. Lamington Eruption, 
Oceania, Xil, l95l, pp. 241- 2^.
66) Report P.O. McGrath, 2.4.1959, Pop. 34-1-2; note 
Information Pamphlet for prospective settlers, issued 
by Agric. As an. of Northern Papua, 1959.
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enlightened supervising officer realized that the regulation 
of tenure and of coffee planting could best be done through 
the council.
As long before as 1928 F.E. Williams had looked forward
to a transition from temporary individual usufruct to
permanent private ownership? this, he believed, was an
essential pre-condition to social advances. Traditionally
the land-holding unit is the patrilineal clan, usually
localised and often coincident with the single village;
within this area the elementary family gardens on the wasteful
bush-fallow system, and has considerable freedom in choosing
67its sites for the season.
In 1956 neither the Higaturu councillors nor their
supervising officer believed that this system presented any
serious difficulties to individualisation for cash orops.
Accordingly the officer went ahead with a scheme hereby
natives requiring individual oash orop land applied to him;
he made a|survey in the presenoe of the clan heads concerned,
the councillor, the interpreter and any others involved.
They then witnessed a declaration allocating the applicant
the land, and agreeing that he had the right to transfer it
68and name inheritors*
67) F.E. Williams, Qrokaiva Marie. pp. 150-60; Orokalva 
Society, pp.116, 528.
68) P.O. to D. 0., 13.11.1956, Pop. 14-7-42/2* the minimum 
block was set at 2 acres.
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Such a title cut across existing statutory controls 
by central government, and had no legal validity; but, in 
that the Orokaiva accepted it, it had considerable social
validity. This argument was initially accepted in Port
7 0Moresby. But in July, 1957 the acting D.C. stopped the
scheme on the ground that field staff had Inadequate know-
71ledge of the bases of customary tenure. After an inspection 
in November, 1958, however, the acting Secretary for Law 
expressed the opinion that the Administration's whole 
approach to native land tenure might have been 'far too 
legalistic*
In addition, between May and July, 1957 the surveying 
of land had been turned over to a Cadet, who registered 
blocks as small as 0.7 aore; the survey plans he issued were 
mere geometrical figures with no distances, features, or 
oritentation points marked. During the three years that the 
scheme was subsequently under review in Port Moresby the 
Orokaiva allocated individual blocks amongst themselves on 
this uneconomic scale; the delay thus led to fragmentation 
and frustrated one of the objeots of the scheme. Meanwhile,
69) See Papua Report, 1951-2, p.32.
70) D.N.A. to D.O., 8.3.1957, NA 23-5-10E.
71) Quoted a/Sec. Law to Asst. Admin., Land Tenure - 
Higaturu Council Scheme. Nov. 1958, L2S/¿-11-16; D.C. 
to P.0., ¿ 0 . 7 . ,  Pop. 14-8-22/2. H .T .  Plant, Re- 
Establishment of Isivita Villages. 24.3.1951 (Pop.
has an appendix on lana ownership.
72) Ibid.
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at the District Office.
Discussion in Port Moresby revealed the policy vacuum
that existed on the issue; worse, it revealed that son»
senior officers had little appreciation of the need for
regulating tenure. In order to circumvent administrative
obstructions the council attempted to pass a rule requiring
natives under its jurisdiction to plant cash crops on no
land other than that fozmally recognized by representatives
73of all the clans concerned. The Chief Lands Commissioner, 
however, rejected the right of councils to change native
custom!
I cannot see any reason for your proposal. Surely 
natives in the Counoil area have land by native 
customary rights on which they can plant oash „a 
crops.
The acting Secretary for Law remained sympathetic to the
council’s proposal; and in 1959 he proposed a new tenure
75conversion rule which overcame the legal difficulties. But
it was not until early in 1960 that the local offioers were
76able to re-oommenoe registration. The Department of Native
73) Higaturu Buie 4/58, 27.6.1958.
74) Chief Commissioner to D.N.A., 13.10.1958, N.L.C. 3-5. 
D.A.S.F. also objected to the rule on technical grounds 
(27.10.1958, HASP 23-3-11E).
75) This became Rule 2/1959 of the council; it omitted 
provisions for transfer and inheritance.
76) Address A.D.O. Norton to Higaturu oounoil, 25.2.1960.
the natives continued to lodge applications for registration
promoted it because it could be applied in most areas, and
77was better than no regulation at all#
The Higaturu council faced a further problem in organ­
izing the processing of coffee. This derived from the 
continuing confliot between the Native Affairs and Agrioulture 
Departments over the control of native agricultural production. 
The Tolai arrangement was considered as a specific solution, 
not as a precedent. It was originally suggested that the 
council build a factory for machinery which had already been 
purchased out of a trust fund, and that after an initial
period of council control the factory be handed over to a
78growers* co-operative. Without reference to Native
Affairs officers, however, the Department of iigrioulture in
1958-9 sponsored proposals in Port Moresby that processing
should be done (a) by a commercial firm, and (b), when this
was objected to, by the Department itself controlling the
79council's faotory. The council*s mood changed from
80enthusiasm, in 1956, to anger and resentment, in 1959.
In June, 1959, anxious about native reaetion, the Chief of 
Agricultural Extension conferred at Popondetta with local
77) Draft Rule included Digest of Local Govt. Bulletins#
Dec. 1961, p.43#
78) D.N.A. to D.O. Pop., 11.5.1956, 21.6.1956, NA 45-2.
79) D.O. to D.N.A., 6.3.1959, Pop. 14-8-22/6t »This seoret 
attitude of D.A.S.F. ... is rather deplorable*.
80) Minutes, Higaturu council, March-April, 1959#
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Affairs realized the deficiencies of this approach, but
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officers; but in the same month his Department actually 
began operating the coffee factory, *somewhat arbitrarily* 
in the D.O.’s view.®^
A further conference produced a scheme for a Faetory 
Committee on lines almost identical with the Tolai Cocoa 
Management Board; but functionally an important difference 
was that the technical operation of the factory was to be 
controlled by the Department of Agriculture* A later state­
ment showed that the basic dissension had only been glossed 
over* for the Department of Agriculture treated the Committee 
purely as a medium for disseminating information» rather
than as a medium through which the council could participate
8 Pin the affairs of its own factory*
In general, it might be said that the objeot of using 
local government to harness native leadership to central 
government policy objectives had largely been defeated, in 
the sphere of economic development, by the lack of any 
olearly defined policy* As the aoting Secretary for Law
81) D.O. to D.N.A., 19*10*1959, NA 41-3-8.
82) D.N.A. to D.C., 31*8*1959, NA 45-2; D.O. to D. N.A*, 
12*5*1960, Pop. 14-8-22/6.
wrote of the Higaturu scheme, it was 'yet another temporary
and interim measure of a type which is becoming notorious.*83
83) H.T. Plant, Goroka address, cit.sup.j a/Sec. Law memo, 
of Nov. 1958, cit.sup.
Programmes of economic development will have political 
side-effects, still largely unrecognized within the 
Administration; of. V.B. Zimmerman, Philippine Clues to 
the Future of Local Government in S.fe. Asia. J.A'.A.Y 
X I I ,  1 , 1960, p.41i ’ A s  the ordinary individual in 
rural areas ... becomes more productive and Independent 
economically, he is better able to assert his political 
and legal rights, and to demand additional ones*.
THE POLITICAL ASPECT
1 « Legislative Powers and the Practice of Rule-making«
(i) Provisions and Limitations
Under Section 12 of the Ordinance a council may make 
rules for the 'peace, order and welfare' of the natives 
within the oounoil area, and in particular for a range of 
matters from prohibiting games in whioh natives are likely 
to be defrauded, to prohibiting or regulating any matter 
which the council could by native custom prohibit or 
regulate. As was pointed out by Belshaw in 1951, these 
provisions are more closely defined than in the oomparable 
British Solomons legislation, and at the same time sixteen 
out of the seventeen provisions concern matters whioh are 
already covered in some respects by the Native Regulations, 
with which council rules must not conflict«^ The failure 
to go ahead with a native courts system, and the inadequate 
powers of the council constables, have imposed added strains 
on councils in their rule-making oapaoity.
The limitations on rule-making increased after 1955, 
when local government began to expand rapidly, and when the 
Law Department and other specialist departments realized 
the wide implications of oounoil rule-making in their own
l) C.S. Belshaw: Native Administration in South-Eastern
Papua« The Australian Óutlook, June 195Í, 2, pp«l0§-15«
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spheres* Even in August 1954» however, MoAuley wrote of
the Tolai councils that the rules they had passed had been
•uniform in content and few in number*, and that, although
the oounoils wanted to pass rules aimed at, ’social
regulation*, the Native Authorities Officers had been too
ocautious to sanction them*
This is not surprising in view of the fact that it was 
the original intention of the Ordinance that the sanctioning 
of counoil rules be left to the District Officer (Section 
12,2)* This was designed to allow local flexibility? but 
in the absenoe of native courts the field staff were 
responsible for adjudicating in oases arising from the breach 
of counoil rules, the implications of which in oustomary 
matters clearly they could not know* This was a restriction 
at the local level* It was after 1955 that restrictions at 
the oentral government level became most Important, with 
the result that the approval of oounoil rules in fact passed 
out of the hands of looal officers altogether*
In view of the non-traditional approach of the 
Administration to native looal government, and of the 
necessity to make everything that oounoils did conform to 
uniform standards and concepts, it beoame dlffioult at an 
early stage for looal officers to sanction counoil rules*
2) J* MoAuley, Local Government Amongst the Tolai* South
Pacific * VI17 11# p. ¿82. He mentioned specifically rales 
aimed at vagrancy, the limitation of bride-price, intra­
moiety marriage and fomloation*
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rule compelling natives with disputes to attend before the
Council's Disputes Committee, a unique institution of long
standing in the village. The D.O. felt that he could not
approve the rule because of the Administration's anomalous
attitude to native adjudication!
The Council has no statutory authority for settling 
disputes but it is part of its normal functions to 
act in an advisory capacity and attempt to settle 4 
minor disputes out of Court*
Again, the Ordinance itself sometimes forced reference 
to central government even on routine matters, despite the 
willingness of looal officers to encourage initiative in 
the councils* Hanuabada tax rules offer an example. Under 
Regulations 79-87, ancillary to the Ordinance, councils 
must fix a tax rate annually? this has to be framed in 
close consultation with the supervising officer (acting for 
the D.O.), who has to bear in mind three faotors: (i) that 
the rate should represent a reasonable contribution from 
the average native inoome (allowing for the concept of tax 
as an economic incentive) 5 (ii) the purposes for which the 
tax is to be levied? and (iii) that the tax is revisable 
annually.
3) Hanuabada Council Meeting, Clerk to D.O., 19.12.51.
Port Moresby D.Off. 14-26-5. C.S. Belshaw, the Great 
Village. pp. 211-16: 'The system works most satis­
factorily. •
In 1951, for example, the Hanuabada oounoil put forward a
4) D.C. to Clerk, 22.1.52. P.M.D. Off. 14-26-5.
In 1951 the N.A.O. in Port Moresby stated that *at this
stage I do not think that approval of a Tax Rule should be
withheld because an officer does not agree with its every
detail**5 In 1952, however, this was put to the test*
Regulation 79 specifies that a oounoil may lay down not
more than three grades of tax; but the Finance Committee of
the council felt that four grades were desirable. The N.A.O.
believed that this would be a good opportunity for the
Administration to express its confidence In the ability of
the counoil to reason out a tax system for itself: the
6four grades had rational bases. The Director of District 
Services proposed to approve this, but the S.N.A.O., based 
in Rabaul, wired a blunt’No* when asked for his concurrence - 
in his view socio-economic conditions in Hanuabada did not
7warrant an extra grade of tax. The Director disagreed with 
the S.N.A.O.'s assessment, but, because of his opposition he
5) N.A.O. to D.C., 3.5.51. NA 41-1-3,
6) N.A.O. to D.N.A., 31.10.52, ibid.
7) S.N.A.O. to D.N.A., 7.11.52. Rabaul 14Al/6. His argu­
ment was based on the fact that the Counoil proposed a 
special rate for unemployed natlvesi the S.N.A.O. 
objected that the tax was to serve as an economic in­
centive (i.e. to force natives to work, a view which had 
been held by Murray) and that there was no cause for any 
native to be out of work in Port Moresby. A speoial tax 
rate would encourage the immigration into Hanuabada of
* every young hoodlum from the South Papuan coast'. This 
was patently fallacious, as at that time only oouncil 
areas imposed any tax at all - the rest of the town was 
tax-free.
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(ii) The Failure of Local Flexibility
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turned down the council's proposal. Thus, by implication 
the council was told that it was not competent to assess 
its own tax rates.
At this time, however, there was little legal sur­
veillance over oounoil rules. In 1952 the Hanuabada oouncil 
passed a rule entitled Canoes or anything on the Beach whioh, 
as approved, bore obvious marks of having been drafted by
9the councillors themselves. Its imprecise phrasing, whioh 
in the post-1955 period would never have been approved by 
the Law officers, on oocasions proved extremely useful»^
By 1955 the supervising officer of the Hanuabada council 
was referring to his Director and to the Law Department, 
through the D.C., any rules which he felt might infringe 
Administration polioy or Territory law - that i«, every 
rule other than those on purely routine matters for whioh 
clear precedents already existed. Rules were therefore 
subject to scrutiny on the basis of their reconcilability 
with European legal and social concepts. In January 1955 
the Hanuabada council proposed a rule (no.12) whioh sought 
to restrict the attendance of children at night sessions of
8) D.N.A. to S.N.A.O., 18.11.52. NA.41-1-3.
9) Rule 4/1952, approved D.C., 17.12.52. NA. 41-1-3.
10) At the meeting of Hanuabada Counoil, 20.1.1960, the 
Council used this rule to insist that firewood not be 
stacked on the beach. The supervising officer pointed 
out that legal difficulties in interpretation might 
arise if a oharge was laid before a Magistrate. This 
inevitably imposes a pressure on councillors to deal 
with offenders outside the Administration's courts.
o
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on the need for suoh a rule. The D.C. sought the opinion
of his Director only because he felt that the proposed
penalty was too harsh? the latter sent it to the Crown Law
Office, which pronounced it ultra vires because it Infringed
the liberty of the suttfsot.^1 The Director advised the D.C.
that the subject matter of the rule really fell within the
province of parental discipline, and that the council could
1 2not take over the role of the parents in family life.
That the concepts of 'liberty of the subject* and 'parental 
discipline* have different social connotations in Papuan 
society was given no consideration. This is in accord with 
the principle of a unified legal system administering 
essentially uniform laws.
By 1956 it had become very clear that the rule-making 
provisions embodied in the Ordinance were only nominal, and 
that on virtually every matter there were liable to be legal, 
technical or administrative objections. In the first Local 
Government Bulletin, issued in that year, it was admitted 
that the powers of councils in relation to rule-making were 
not clear* Until these powers could be clarified, all D.O.s, 
before approving any rules except tax rules - for which a 
model had already been drawn up - had to submit them to Head-
11) D.N.A. to C.L.O., 25.1.55. NA. 41-1-3? C.L.O. to D.N.A., 
14.2.55, ibid.
12) D.N.A. to D.C., 15.2.55, ibid.
the Hanuabada Picture Theatre# The oouncil was unanimous
/•y . 'xi-
quarters so that they oould be approved by the Secretary
for Law and by the technical departments.
It is intended to have a set of draft rules, 
dealing with various subjects, drawn up so that 
they may serve as a guide to officers responsible 
for framing rules. The first of these has been
done and this is a Tax Buie.
In practice this was interpreted by all but the boldest
supervising officers as advice to wait on the models framed
by central government before accepting counoil rules. The
Port Moresby D.O. was agitated because several of the Hanua-
bada rules, framed during the period of fewer restrictions,
would not stand up to legal scrutiny. He suggested that a
Law officer, in consultation with the N.A.O., should survey
them and if possible frame substitute rules ’which oould be
14expected to stand up in the Supreme Court’.
The overall result with new councils has been extremely 
restrictive: most have framed few rules beyond those 
appearing in model form in the Local Government Bulletins.
In effect, therefore, the initiative in the framing of rules 
has, in the main, passed to central government. Even routine 
matters such as the framing of the annual tax rule are subject 
to detailed consideration in advance by the Local Government
13) Local Govt. Bulletin No. 1, Oct. 1956, p.9. The Tax Rule 
had Veen drawn up by "'the Seoretary for Law. On technical 
grounds it withdrew the right of women who had previously 
registered to pay tax - and to vote - to remove their 
names from the Register. This had been incorporated in 
some previous tax rules. This decision was entirely based 
on law; its administrative repercussions were not considered.
14) D.O. to D.N.A., 28.12.56. Port Moresby D.O. 14-26-5.
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Section in the Department of Native Affairs.
(iii) Legal Surveillance
The fact that oouncil rules - inevitably, as Belshaw 
pointed out - often overlap existing legislation, together 
with the fact that legal scrutiny is so thorough, has made 
it extremely difficult for councils to pass rules on matter» 
over vshich they appear to have legislative authority. In 
December 1956, for example, the Hanu&bada council tried to 
pass a rule (No. 16) forcing householders to keep their 
premises clean. This was pronounced ultra vires because 
points of the rule were provided for under the Health 
Ordinance; though under this Ordinanoe charges must be laid 
in Courts for Petty Sessions, not in the Courts for Native 
iviatters.^
By 1958 the Crown Law Office was dealing in detail with 
oounoil rules, to see that they did not confliot in spirit 
or substanoe with Territory law. The fact that local govern­
ment replaced the old system of administration through 
luluais and village constables proved to some extent to be 
an advantage, for the enforcement of many of the Native 
Regulations depended upon the Luluais. who were specifically 
given the responsibility. The Law Office therefore took the 
view that the councils could duplicate those Regulations 
which were unenforceable, so long as there was no conflict in
15) D.N.A. to D.O., 18.1.57, NA.41-1-3. This in effect 
withdrew the authority from the Council to enforoe 
cleanliness. Prosecutions are generally laid by theAdministration's Health Inspector.
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able to pass a rule for village sanitation #iich overlapped
Regulations 112A-D (New Guinea). Further modifications to
the model draft had to be made for its adoption by Papuan
councils, for the Papuan Regulations (101-8) have slightly
16different provisions.
The extent of supervision by central government may be
gauged from these comments on a proposed agricultural rule
by a Papuan councili
With regard to the second proposed rule, it is agreed 
that paragraph (b) is unnecessarily onerous and should 
be omitted. The Plant Disease and Control Ordinance. 
1953, Plant Disease Regulations 1Ô56 and Mative 
Regulations 1939 (Papua) also deal with the clearing 
of cultivated land and the prevention of disease, 
whilst the Copra Ordinance 1952 provides a severe 
penalty for tne drying of immature nuts. The remainder 
of the rule does not appear to conflict with those 
provisions mentioned except the reference to germinated 
nuts. The Copra Inspection Regulations 1953 provide 
that export grades of copra should be free from an 
unreasonable admixture of copra from genninated nuts.
It would seem unreasonable, therefore, that looal 
standards should be higher than export standards and 
I would recommend that that portion of the rule be 
omitted.
Although in specific instances such as those quoted above 
it had been possible for oouncils to duplicate provisions of 
the Native Regulations, yet in general the existence of the 
Regulations has proved a deterrent. 3h 1959 the D.C., Gulf
substance or intent* On this ground the Tikana council was
16) Local Govt. Bulletin No.4, July 1958, p.8.
17) Ibid. Opinions by Sec. for Law. The rule attempted to 
regulate the cultivation of coconuts and the drying of 
copra.
District, pointed out that oounoils and council constables 
could not police the Native Regulations, covering most 
aspects of native administration; and that at the same time 
councils could not legislate on matters already covered by
the Regulations (or beoause of teohnioal involvements felt
18that they could not). The Administration admitted the
anomalies, and could offer no suggestion exoept that the
council overcome the inoperability of some of the Native
Regulations by passing those rules for which models had
19appeared in the Local Government Bulletins.
(iv) The Regulation of Custom
The whole principle of Administration surveillance over 
council rules, beyond matters of legal and policy oonfliot, 
was raised by the A.D.O. supervising the Baluan oounoil in 
1958. The Baluan oounoil wished to inolude in a rule on oopra 
driers provision for arrest without warrant and for a maximum
penalty less than that prescribed in the Ordinance for
20counoil rules generally. The Administration rejected both
21provisions; although the A.D.O. pointed out that there was 
a number of precedents in previous Baluan rules, that in fact 
the Administration in 1955 had asked the council to inolude a
18) D.C. Kerema to D.N.A., 30.9.59, Kerema 14-3/151. The D.C. 
wanted all Council Constables also appointed V.C.s under 
Native Reg.155; but this would have made them both 
Administration and Council employees.
19) D.N.A. to D.C. Kerema, 7.10.59, NA 39-8-1.
20) A.D.O. to D.O. Lorengau, 18.6.58, Lorengau 14/4/3-LG4.
21) D.N.A. to D.O., 27.6.58. NA 23-12-10B.
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constables appear to have powers to police only those rules
providing for arrest without warrant - and that because of
difficulties of communication, arrest without warrant was
essential. He objected, however, even more strongly to the
general than to the particular restrictions imposed by the
Administrations
Subject to legality and general policy, the final 
decision on the provisions incorporated in or ex­
cluded from a rule should rest with the Council, «« 
the lawmaking body.
Section 15,4(a) of the Native Local Government Ordinance, 
he said, inferentially conferred upon a council the right to 
provide for arrest without warrant, and on this it was not 
subject to direction.^
In commenting, the Director of Native Affairs thought it 
'worthwhile and desirable to clarify in general teims the 
usual relationship between central government and local 
government'. His statement, then, is most important because 
of its generality. He said that 'except in a sense so narrow 
as to be negligible, local authorities are not legislative 
bodies. They are executive bodies ...' He went on that '...
22) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O. Lorengau, 24.7.58, Lorengau 14/4/3— 
LulO. By memo. D.N.A. to D.C. Manus, 7.5.55, DS 14-7-25* 
all Baluan rules at that time had been redrafted to 
provide for arrest without warrant. Eleven Council rules 
of the period 1951-5 provided maximum penalties less than 
those in the Ordinance. Essentially, the A.D.O.'s 
argument was based on the need for local flexibility.
23) Ibid.
provision for arrest without warrant - indeed the oouncil
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in the Territory by area and activity oentral government
control and direction will increase rather than lessen. 1 He
claimed, further, that the restraints imposed by oentral
government ‘encouraged an active local authority working
for the general good*, and, clearly making native councils
analogous to municipal bodies in Australia, he spoke of the
impossibility of changing ’the whole concept of central
government/local government relationships developed over
24hundreds of years.*
It was thereby affirmed that the supposed customary
constitution and powers of councils - as had long been
P5believed within the Administration - were of negligible 
consequence in relation to the duties imposed on oouncils 
by central government.
In view of this conception of the powers of local 
government, it is hardly surprising that there have been few 
attempts to modify oustom by rules. Aooording to Dudley 
Jones, native institutions or customs are part of the 
Territory’s legal system unless inconsistent with Ordinances
Pgor repugnant to the principles of humanity. In the British
»
24) D.N.A. to D.O. Lorengau, 13.8.58, NA 23-12-10B. %  italics.
25) See memo, by D.M. Pienberg, 5.11.57s Sections 5, 2;
6, 2; 10,a of the N.L.G.C. Ordinanoe.
26) D. Jones, Native Custom and New Guinea Law. Monthly 
Notes. May 1&4V, t ,  9 ,  P * l .
it can be expected that with the expansion of local government
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Solomon Islands, a blanket Regulation gives native courts 
jurisdiction over custom. But as no native courts system 
exists in New Guinea, there has been little scope for the 
application of custom or for its modification by oase-law.
Therefore, the institution of looal government gives 
the one opportunity for the legal adaptation and enforcement 
of custom according to local culture change. But overall 
administrative conceptions have largely prevented this, 
McAuley noted this in 19581 but at the same time he favoured 
the current conception of councils as bodies whose responsi­
bilities were tied to works and services. He felt - and it 
is now Administration policy - that changes in land-tenure 
should be uniform throughout the Territory, and that there­
fore the modification of land-holding customs should be a
07central rather than a local government responsibility.
27) J.McAuley, Problems Affecting the N.L.G. Policy. South 
Pacific. May-TC^ T BBS, Tx , ppTBWT BSTT"'TlcSSeg 
on theother hand, favoured local government partici­
pation in the regulation of land tenure - see his Land 
Tenure in Relation to Eoonomio Development. Aug. 1956, 
iJA 39-6. Native opinion is also tending1 in this direction 
see V*A.C. (Milne Bay), Aug.1961, p.3, Res.5. The 
Government appears to have been deterred by the oonfusion 
within its ranks over the land tenure scheme adapted by 
the Higaturu Council (see Ch. on ’Economic Development *)• 
The Madang Conference of New Guinea Councils paid parti­
cular attention to the registration of cash-orop holdings 
(Minutes, items 1-3; D.N.A. memo, of 20.6.60, NA.44-4-1). 
Largely owing to the influence of C.J.Lynoh of the Law 
Office a rule providing for individual registration of 
tenure by natives was published in July 1959 (L.G. Bull. 
No.5, pp. 14-16); this derived from the Higaturu rule. But 
in commenting on the Madang Conference (D.N.A. memo, of 
20.6.60, cit.sup), the Administration broadly reserved 
the subject to central government. The question of the 
capacity of natives to make wills - a key question - was 
still under discussion at that date. See Ch. VIII, II.
Other reasons have been put forward for a reluotanoe on 
the part of central government to allow oounoils to modify 
other aspects of custom» In the Tolai areas the Administration 
refused to allow councils to legislate for a change from 
matri- to patri-lineal inheritance, on the ground that there 
was no assurance that *a large majority* of Tolai supported 
it*^® Bride-price has presented notable difficulties9 for 
with a change-over to a money economy it tends to become 
exorbitant - at least one instance has been reported from
OQRanuabada of a bride-price of almost £1,000# Similar con­
ditions prevailed in the eastern Gulf, which supplied a good 
deal of the better-paid labour in other districts* In 1959
the Moveave-Toaripi oounoil proposed to make a rule restricting
30bride-price to a maximum of £50# A difference of opinion on 
the matter developed between the Local Government Officers 
and the Crown Law Officer assigned to it. This revolved 
around the competence of a council to legislate on bride-price 
at all#
In the legal view, the only section which could validate 
the rule was 12(1 ), making general provision for the ’peace*
28) Ibidj Personal Information.
29) Personal information, Rima Gavera, Gavera Baru. ’Bride- 
price* is a terminological mistake, but is generally used 
in the Territory* *£ride-wealth* is better*
30) Before the spread of local government, the natives were 
forced to look to central government for the control ot 
bride-price - see Minutes of the 1954 meeting, Central 
District Councillors (i.e. Village Councillors), convened 
by Willie Gavera, who later raised the matter in the 
District Advisory Council.
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It was felt that the D.C.'s covering argument that high
bride-price prevented marriage, caused sooial distress and
damaged the social structure put it within this sections
I am assuming the reality of these evils and that 
it is demonstrable in a Court that they are caused, 
or aggravated and markedly encouraged, by the high«, 
level of bride-price.
This placed it within the definition of 'welfare'.
The next problem (and one to which at this stage no 
definitive answer can be given) is whether there is 
an implied limitation on the powers of Counoils 
which would prevent the enactment of a rule*
In other words, was the nature of a oounoil such that it
had the right to legislate on what, in European terms, was
essentially a private matter.
In Australia, of course, no Munioipal Council could 
ever enact such a provision under a general power, 
and the question is whether the fundamental oharaoter 
of a Native Local Government Council is akin to that,, 
of a southern Munioipal or Shire Council*
It seems ourious that, although the Ordinanoe had been 
in force for almost ten years, this matter had still not 
been resolved. The Law officer thought that the title 'Native 
Local Government' in the Ordinanoe lent some weight to the 
view that the councils were akin to Australian local govern­
ment bodies; on the other hand, he had doubts whether the 
change in nomenclature in 1954 from 'Native Village Councils'
order and welfare1 of the natives within the oounoil area.
31) C.L.O. to D.N.A., 8.7.59, CLO N.21-6-4; reply to D.N.A. 
to C.L.O., 28.11.58, NA.23-2-11B.
32) Ibid.
33) Ibid.
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be replacements for presumed 'tribal' authorities. Ultimately
he put forward the tentative conclusion that Native Local
Government Councils are not analogous to Australian
municipal authorities.
While the picture is not dear, therefore, I cannot,- 
advise that the proposed Rule is ultra vires.
The council was fortunate that in this instance the Law
officer was C.J. Lynch, the only member of his Department
favouring a native courts system and a oritic of the
Administration's legalistic attitude to administrative
problems.**5
(v) Technioal Surveillance
In the years since 1956 oounoil rules have also been
had fundamentally altered the intent that oounoils should
34) Ibid. It should be noted that the Administration assume* 
that Section 12, l(p) gives the oounoil theoretically
the right to regulate custon? see Fienberg memo. oit.sup., 
p.8. But the wording does not say sos it gives the 
counoil the right to regulate matters which by native 
custom it would have the right to regulate; ‘but it is 
not a oustomary body.
35) There is a notable oontrast with a case quoted by Mayer 
from Kenya (P.Mayer, Two Studies in Applied Anthropology 
in Kenya. H.M.S.O. 19Si, dol. Research Studies No. 3, 
pp. W-3l). The limitation of bride-wealth was seen as 
the main remedy for a number of social evils; but Gusii 
society lacked traditional central authorities, or even 
clan authorities. In the past limitation had been applied 
through public barazas called by the Government Chiefs 
and the Local Native Council. But with social ohange
the question of enforcement became paramount. Therefore 
a Law Panel consisting half of official Gusii appointees 
and half of elders with no official position made 
recommendations to the Council, vshich passed a by-law.
This was arranged by the D.C. and the Government Socio­
logist. Social needs were the governing faotor; the 
whole matter was arranged at the looal level. Similarly 
in the British Solomons the Malaita Council without difficulty fixed the value of tafuli'ae (strings of shell- money). ~  •
subjected to stringent scrutiny at headquarters level from 
Officers of technical departments, as foreshadowed in the 
Instruction of October, 1956, cited above. In 1952 Fienberg 
as Senior Native Authorities Officer had believed co­
ordination to be practicable at district levels
... as a matter of working practice, no rule affecting 
technical Department activities or polioy should be 
debated by a Counoil without oonsultation with the 
relevant technical Department representative# This 
surely is common sense#
But a great deal depended on the co-operation of
personalities, and on the practicability of consultation with
overworked officers who were often on patrol# These officers,
again, have often been either uncertain of policy involving
local government matters, or involved in clashes of outlook
or polioy devolving from headquarters (an example is the
37 \Higaturu coffee scheme ) # The laok of an adequate seoretariat 
organization to seoure policy and planning co-ordination has 
been a prime difficulty, and this has oarried over to 
councils' rule-making.
The mundane but important matter of the penning of pigs 
in council areas provides a notable example. Cash crops and 
pigs do not mix. The Tolai have rapidly reduced the number 
of their pigs to save their cocoa, but, in view of the socio­
economic value of pigs, this is a drastic solution. Councils 
have been set up in areas where cash-cropping is being
36) a/S.N.A.O. to Director, D.P.H. 20 . 2.52. Babaul 14/11/6/7-34.
37) See Ch. VIII, 2.
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as well. Before the advent of cash crops, depredation by
pigs was cause for the seeking of compensation through the
Courts for Native Matters or for Native Affairs. The problem
was more serious in Papua, where the Native Regulations, as
distinct from those in the Trust territory, place the onus
on the owner of a garden, who cannot claim compensation unless
his garden is fenced. Nevertheless, it is a sufficient
problem in New Guinea for it to have been the subjeot of a
resolution at the Madang Conference of New Guinea oouncils
in June 1959. In effect, the oouncils asked the Administration
to authorise the penning of pigs, with the Department of
38Agriculture advising on technical problems. In Papua the 
social repercussions had by 1958 beoome seriouss in the 
Higaturu area, for example, almost half the oases coming
before Courts for Native Matters were said to ooncern damags
39by pigs. In the Milne Bay area draft rules authorising
garden owners to kill trespassing pigs had been rejected
40because they clashed with the Native Regulations.
The Higaturu councillors, in 1958, submitted a draft rule 
providing for the compulsory penning of pigs. At headquarters
38) Resolution 8(c).
39) Information by A.D. 0. F.V. Esdale, C.N.M. sitting, 
Higaturu, 20.2.1960. Esdale tried to satisfy both the 
law and social justice by placing some responsibility 
on the owners of pigs; if gardsn-owners killed pigs 
destroying their gardens, he regarded them as acting 
under extj^e provocation, and tried to reaoh a com­
promise settlement#
40) There were complaints about this by the Divinai councillor (Mine Bay) at the Higaturu Council meeting, 25.2.1960.
promoted; but most native societies seek to keep their pigs
the rule was admitted to fall within the powers of the 
council, but it was rejected by the Chief of Division of 
Animal Industry on the ground that it was not his policy to 
encourage the perming of pigs because of the probable high 
incidence of anthrax. The Secretary for Law advised that 
the Native Regulations and the Animal Trespass Ordinanoe 
already dealt with the subject of pig trespass, and, *as 
the question of inconsistency may arise in relation thereto*, 
that the rule should be rejected.4"*’
Many supervising officers of councils objected, as they 
have on similar occasions, that technical departments tended 
to make decisions on purely technical grounds, without 
reference to their social, administrative or even eoonomio 
ramifications. Only after repeated representations and the 
discussions at the Madang Conference was action taken to 
bring the departments together in Port Moresby to work out 
a solution? at this stage the Department of Agriculture (of 
which the Division of Animal Industry is part) was itself 
feeling the effects of depredations by pigs on cash crops 
it was promoting. A conference of departmental heads with 
the Assistant Administrator on 13th May, 1960 agreed on a 
draft council rule for the penning of pigs, which was sent 
to councils as a model. Beoause of its technical content it 
was essential that oounoils adhere to it to the letter? this
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41) L.G. Bull. no.4, July 1958, p.6*
was emphasised by the Director of Native Affairs.
Even here adequate co-ordination was lacking; for in the
same month the Milne Bay council, on the advice of the
Agriculture officer that his department was prepared to
sanction a rule on the penning of pigs, spent most of a two-
day sitting framing its own rule, rôiich differed substantially
43from that framed in Port Moresby.
The rule eventually framed provided for penning, as the
natives had continually requested; but it had taken more than
three years to aohieve a satisfactory policy decision in Port
Moresby. The Madang Conference had considerable oause for
44complaint at the delays in approving oouncil rules. The 
Conference asked for a special legal officer, within the 
Department of Native Affairs, to deal full-time with oouncil 
rules. The Administration rejected this request on the grounds 
that the quantity of work was not voluminous (the 
restrictions on council rule-making account for this) and 
that all legal matters must be handled by the Department of 
Law.45
(vi) Councils as Non-Customary Institutions
It will be olear from the few examples oited that the
42) D.N.A. to District staff. Counoil Rules Aimed at Enclosing 
Pigs. 1.6.60. NA 39-11-3.
43) Meeting of Milne Bay Council, May 1960, whioh I attended. 
The D.O. had clearly not been told of the Conference in 
Port Moresby.
44) Madang Conference, Item 8(a).
45) D.N.A. memo, of 20.6.60, NA 44-4-1, p.4.
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instrumentality has had particularly restricting effects in
the sphere of rule-making; this conflicts with that
conception of councils, as bodies with traditional duties
and prerogatives, which would be needed if they were to play
an adequate part in the regulation of looal affairs according
46to local needs and the paoe of looal culture change.
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conception of a looal government council as an Administration
46) This account agrees with the assessment of the E.O.
(Admin.), 31.5.1960, Admin. 66-6-1; he stated that the 
original aim of flexibility had been frustrated by the 
centralist bias in administrative thinking, and that 
councils and their supervising officers had been confused 
and perplexed by the difficulty of passing rules, which 
almost invariably overlapped central legislation. *1 do 
not know of any single factor which has been more 
detrimental to Council prestige*.
In 1958-9 a new Ordinance was under consideration, whioh 
was planned to overcome the difficulties by particula­
rizing the rules provisions minutely; how custom was to 
be fitted within this framework was not clear. NA 23-16-1i 
Asst. Admin., 17.9.1958.
CHAPTER IX 
THE POLITICAL ASPECT
V
(i) The Influence of Australian Ideals«
The political difficulties which have, over the years, 
beset native local government, derive from the struggle 
between traditional paternalism and the theoretical 
recognition of the need to deoentralise to promote native 
initiative and responsibility. The central insistence on 
a large range of ideals, made practicable by the absenoe 
of traditional native authorities, pulls against the 
deoentralist idea. Indeed, the absenoe of traditional 
authorities is the justification for the imposition of 
those ideals necessary to bring about social and 
institutional integration, first at the local, then at the 
regional, and ultimately at the central level.
This oonflict is apparent in the policy statements of 
the Minister for Territories. 1 It represents, in effect, 
a long-term striving towards oultural assimilation and 
uniformity. In Australian policy, this reflects a lengthy
1) See P. Ilasluoki Australia's Task in Papua and New &ulnea 
(1956); Australian frolicy in Papy and New Guinea (19ff&) i 
Present Tasks and Policies in A.T.t.S., New Guinea and 
Australia"."" p ~  737119 ’ (B?e). -------------
II* The Political Functions of Native Local Government *
163
464
history of fears over the possession of Hew Guinea by 
hostile elements. In 1954-5 both the Minister for 
Territories and the Secretary of his Department publicly 
related political policy in the Territory to these fears 
and hopes. It was recognised that the New Guinea peoples 
had the right eventually to choose their own relationship 
with Australia; in order to ensure that this would be a 
'close and permanent association with Australia* - the 
Minister at that time envisaged Papua and New Guinea as a 
part of the Commonwealth - the New Guinea peoples would 
have to be taught to share the same ideals, values and
©conceptions as Australians.
The functions of native local government, and particularly 
its political functions, exist within the framework of 
these ideals. Councils are one of the 'integrative foci' 
at the local level (in the term quoted by MoAuley ), but 
in order to ensure 'social oontrol' they must function as 
media for the impression of central ideals and policies.
2) Statement by Minister for Territories to Highland 
Farmers' and Settlers' Association, South Pacific, 
Sept-Oct. 1954, p.907. To ensure this close 
association he said, 'we have to be extremely careful 
in the present generation to keep a balance between 
the development of the country and the advancement of 
the natives'. C.R. Lambert, The Challenge of New 
Guinea. South Pacific, VIII,lf «fan-^ eb. 19¿5» p.S# The 
I3ea of *close association' is always the key qualifi­
cation to the altruistic ideal. Also quoted J.McAuley, 
Problems Affecting the Native Local Government Policy, 
South Pacific. ÏX. 12. 1958, p.fe69.
3) McAuley, loo.cit., p.572#
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In spite of the fact that MoAuley, an intelligent and 
knowledgeable observer, believed that the oouncils should 
be local bodies in the Australian tradition, confining 
themselves to works and services, he yet believed that the 
keynote of the looal government polioy should be decentrali- 
4sation. But this would appear to be only limited executive 
decentralisation, policies and ideals ooming from central 
government*
In view of the educational backwardness of the New 
Guinea peoples, this separation though generally aimed at, 
has proved extremely difficult to observe* Fienberg was 
publioly emphasizing as early as 1951 that local government 
councils were 'integral parts of the administrative
5structure' - in the later phrase, 'Administration 
instrumentalities' - and at the same time as MoAuley was 
writing (1958) the Director of Native Affairs was predicting 
that central government control over oounoils would increase
4) McAuley, ibid., pp.573,587. MoAuley believed (p.572) 
that Australia upheld a liberal view of society, not 
seeking to impose an idealogy - clearly this is an 
opinion which depends on one's concept of an idealogy. 
McAuley regards a 'totalitarian' one as the control by 
central government of all social, political and economic 
institutions; but his whole argument presupposes the 
creation of these in New Guinea by the government, with 
the natives ultimately 'doing the job for themselves'. 
The distinction appears to be one of time, final 
objects rather than current means*
5) D.M. Fienberg, Native Village Counoils, South Pacific*
V, 9, 1951, p.iS!r;
rather than lessen as time went on* This principle has 
been pre-eminent.
The political functions which native looal government 
councils might be expeoted to assume have taken on a 
special significance in view of the failure to provide 
other political avenues. It has been often stated sinoe 
1949 that these councils were intended to form the base of 
an institutional pyramid - the Act of 1949 provided for 
regional Advisory Councils for Native Matters, to include 
•at least a majority* of worthy nominees from the looal
7
government councils* The principle, elaborated by the
Minister in 1956, is worth repeating!
A ••• prinoiple to guide us in government might 
be described as the representative principle ..• 
that a people should be able to choose those who 
will serve them in government and that those who 
are ohosen should be answerable for their actions 
to the people. The representative prinoiple leads 
eventually to responsible government ... Though we 
start with local government oounoils, in time there 
will be a transition to larger representative 
bodies, perhaps to federations of looal government 
councils! or to regional councils and then to
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6) See Ch. IX, 1, note 24. McAuley was disappointed with 
the Administration's attitude towards oounoils1 
regulation of oustom, the one sphere in which they 
might be regarded as immediately oompetent. Cf. 
statement of Cambridge Conference of R.I.P.A. on looal 
authorities (1955)! ’To call them into being simply to 
act as agents would be to pervert their purpose. Still 
less should they be mere tools or instruments of the 
central government*. - E.I.P.A., Development of Local
Government in the Colonies, p*24.
7) C.D. Rowley, Local Government in New Guinea, South 
Pacific, IX,
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(ii) Political Growth without Politioal Institutions»
By 1960 no steps had been taken in this direction? but 
at the same time, as Rowley pointed out, the powers even 
of the local government councils as defined in the 
Ordinance involved issues of political significance. 
Moreover,
apart from the officially blessed objectives of 
the Council experiment, one might reasonably expect 
that as the Councillors gain in oonfidenoe and 
articulateness, they will formulate views and 
policies which reflect the highest common factor 
in the sum of local village reactions to the Q 
Government*
Rowley in fact quoted issues, in 1957, on which the
Vunadadir and Vunamami councillors expressed opinions for
hours on such topics as the alienation of land, the demand
for their own courts, and the need for education.
What was clear enough was that the Councils are 
providing a forum for the discussion of matters 
which to New Guineans appear to be of general 
concern* that views are being formulated which may 
or may not be in conformity with the policy of 
the Administration.
In view of the failure to provide condign ohannels for 
political expression by natives, this development was
o
federations of regional councils.
8 ) P.Hasluck, Australia’s Task in Papua and New Guinea» 
pp.11-13. This ideal would appear to have been much 
modified by late 1960, when the tier above the local 
government councils was described as ’mounting degrees 
of representative government through election of 
members to the Legislative Council •••* (Papua and New 
Guinea - Some Recent Statements of Australian Policy on 
Political Advancement) Dept. Territories, 1960, p»4»
9) Rowley, loc»cit., p.442.
10) Ibid., p.441.
inevitable, despite the Administration emphasis on the 
councils, fundamentally, as training institutions, vfaere 
ideals and values could be inculcated and vtfiere the natives 
could be impressed with the lesson that works and services 
have to be paid for. 11 Tensions were bound to arise.
Between 1951 and 1960 all native opinion, by and large, 
reached the Administrator or the Minister after being 
filtered through the Department of Native Affairs. During 
that period three natives represented their peoples on the 
Legislative Council; but they were appointed, and, on 
average, two of the three were semi-literate and spoke little 
or no English. After 1956 two or three natives were 
appointed to each of the District Advisory Councils, but 
these Councils primarily represented European settler, 
business or mission interests (the last, it was thought, 
standing for the natives).1S
Within the framework of native local government, no 
provision was made for political expression. In the British 
Solomons, Resolutions of councils become hy-laws when 
approved by the High Commissioner; concurrently with the 
Resolutions, Recommendations are submitted by councils on
11) In the terras of Local Government Memorandum No.l of 
4.1.1952.
12) By April 1960, 31 natives were serving on District and 
Town Advisory Councils in the Territory - South Pacific 
Post. 22.4.1960. (Ministerial statement).
matters over which they do not generally have legislative 
authority. There is no such provision in New Guinea, 
however. Political expression has necessarily had to be 
informal. In the past social fragmentation has inhibited 
political activity. No tribal associations have emerged 
suoh as are found at an early stage in some African territories. 
Economic backwardness has deferred the formation of craft 
or trade unions. The towns are still very small: Port Moresby, 
by far the largest, has a native population of only about 
20,000. Hence the sheer difficulty of group association 
has suppressed organized political activity. The Rabaul 
strike of 1929 was an isolated inoident ^hich may be said
to have had political repercussions but no political intent;
13
it resulted from ad hoc combination. Social disturbance 
and economic frustration resulted in cultist rather than 
rational political reaction, largely because of the lack of 
institutional channels. It has been noted elsewhere that 
the initial local government counoils, particularly that at 
Baluan, had what might be described as politioal motives, in 
that they were meant to sublimate actual or potential oultist 
discontent. But once the councils were established, the 
hope was that native energies would be directed to those 
local tasks which would induce a sense of responsibility.
469
13) J.K. McCarthy, The Habaul Strike. Quadrant. X, 1959, 
pp.55-65; see Appendix C, I.
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In the more advanced areas of the Territory, the in­
adequacy of this policy has steadily become more and more 
apparent, though native local government has not thereby 
become recognized as an inadequate political instrument.
At least until 1958 the Administration continued to throw 
its weight behind the councils as instruments of social 
control and political education; the Administration olearly 
made a distinction between laying the foundations of 
political development, and permitting them the exercise of 
political functions - through councils natives were to learn 
the mechanics of government, particularly minor decision­
making and the assessment of tasks in relation to taxes*
As Rowley remarked, it was the great bulk of matters 
outside the province of native local government, whioh 
councils as local representative bodies rather than as statutory 
institutions were bound to discuss, which did not fit within 
the Administration pattern. The Tolai councils regularly 
complained to Visiting United Nations Missions about the 
lack of a native courts system; and the examples already 
quoted by Rowley show that their discussions covered a wide 
and significant range. A similar situation developed in 
Hanuabada, though the council in its early years was riven 
by an internal struggle for supremaoy provoked by Gavera Arua.
In 1954 his son, Willie Gavera, equally ambitious, was 
responsible for the convening of councillors from all parts 
of the Central Division. This meeting, arranged with the
delegates from 32 villages, the first gathering of its kind
in Papua. The Administration was clearly worried about the
political implications: senior officers from various
departments outlined government policy to the conference,
whilst Willie was warned in advance that the resolutions
could be treated by the Administration only as recommendationa
to be given consideration. Willie’s opening address,
nevertheless, touched a political note*
Europeans came to this country around 1877 - it is 
now 1954. It is time we were helping ourselves 
more. Papuans stand up - you must help yourselves.
We must not depend upon the Government to do every­
thing for us and that is why we are meeting today - 
we must talk of how we can help ourselves and talk 
of the things we can ask the Government to do « the 
laws we oan ask the Government to pass.
The resolutions which the conference eventually passed
were quite innocuous politically; the Administration was asked
to limit bride-price, by law, to certain specified sums in
specific areas; there was also a resolution asking the
Administration to control the prices of foodstuffs at the
native markets; and one asking that the Administration be
approached regarding the establishment of a Town Advisory
15Council for Papuans in Port Moresby.
co-operation of the Administration, brought together 108
14) D.C. Central to D.N.A. , 13.4.1954, NA 39-1-2. The 
meeting lasted 8th-12th April.
15) Ibid. Minutes. The bride-prioe limit was to be £300 in 
Port Moresby,
Nothing seems to have oome of these resolutions. The 
Conference resolved that a further similar conference 
be convened in 1955; but this did not take plaoe*
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Hanuabadans, its resolutions represented the consensus of
opinion within the Central District. In 1955 the Hanuabadans
took advantage of the visit of the Minister for Territories
to place before him a number of grievances whioh did not
come within the province of native local government* These
covered a wide compass * a request for an increase in native
wage scales because of the high cost of living in Hanuabada;
the need for Administration assistance in housing; a request
to extend the Hanuabada council to take in the other Motu
people; complaints of the acquisition of land by Europeans,
which the original ssllers had had no customary right to make
over in perpetuity; a request by the council for a statutory
court to snforcs deoisions of its disputes committee;
expressed dissatisfaction with the Papuan representative on
the Legislative Council, Merari Diokson, a Kwato man; and
complaints about the liquor laws - the chairman was frank
and stated that he and nearly all other councillors drank
beer and spirits, and that responsible natives should be
16
allowed to drink.
A direct approach to the Minister was one of the few 
avenues whereby councillors could bring non-council affairs 
to the notice of the authorities; but none of this reached
Although this conference was convened and led by
16) D.C. Central to Offioial Seoretary, 14.3.1955. 
D.O.P.M. 14/25/1*
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the Minister as a spontaneous expression of disagreement, 
for the D.C. obtained an advance list of the issues which 
the council intended to raise and he sent this, together 
with his comments and policy reminders, to the Minister's 
Official Secretary.1^
As Rowley has noted, there are probably other issues 
whioh the more advanced native groups are still averse to
18
bringing into the openi in particular, racial discrimination. 
There is little doubt that the limited powers of looal 
government oounoils, together with the restrictive policy 
of the Administration, disillusioned many of the more 
sophisticated Hanuabadans. The Hanuabada council executively 
and financially has been notoriously weak? but this has not 
indicated "to the Administration that a more flexible approach 
might be tried and the functions of the oounoil modified or 
expanded. On the contrary, the Hanuabadane have been 
aooused by the Administration on occasion of being lazy and 
shiftless. The faot is that the Hanuabadans have the 
interests and outlook of urban dwellers - whioh they are • 
and in their minds these interests take precedence over the 
largely stereotyped funotions whioh oounoils perform among 
rural communities. For this reason prominent Hanuabadans,
17) Ibid.
18) Rowley, loo.oit., p.442. Social and other fonns of 
discrimination are very muoh live topios in Hanuabada.
long-term members paid steadily less attention to council
19business.
In the election of 1957 no fewer than five of the 
seventeen places on the council went to women osndidates -
an index to the extent to which interest had sagged amongst
20
the men. It was only in I960, after Ministerial statements
had indicated that native representation was to be increased
on the Legislative Council, and that this representation was
to be connected with native looal government, that Toua
Kapena and other prominent Hanuabadans developed a renewed
21interest in the council.
(iii) Councils as Pressure Groups.
If the councils can be regarded in any sense as political 
pressure groups - and in their rule-making oapaoity they may 
corporately so appear - they are still so small numerically, 
even in relation to Distriot populations, that it has been 
easy in the past for the Administration to disoount the 
generality of their several opinions. For this reason native
19) See M.C. Groves, Politics in Port Moresby (Senior 
Officers Course, Uo.5, AsopA, 19 ¿0/, mimeo. Willie 
Gavera became involved in a trucking business, and in 
Jan.1960 was considering withdrawal from the Council.
20) At that time there were only four other women councillors 
in the entire Territory (two on the Higaturu Council, 
which had a total membership of 60).
21) Ministerial statements of 20.4.1960, 27.6,1960. Toua 
Kapena was eleoted Counoil President. All the women 
were defeated in 1960.
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such as Toua Kapena, withdrew from the council, while other
through the quarterly oombined meetings of the Tolai
councils and through the Madang Conference of New Guinea
counoils, took the Administration by surprise. It was
the natives' growing frustration with the restrictions of
local government, rather than their command of local
machinery and procedure, whioh made this political
development apparent.
It was sparked within the Tolai oounoils by the Navuneram
incident of 1958, referred to elsewhere. As is remarked
there, this inoident also Jolted the Administration to a new
awareness of the tensions within the more advanced native
societies. The Administrator gave the Minister a detailed
history of the Navuneram group, and of Administration
attempts to deal with it; in his view, its leaders were
22insincere in their arguments and professed beliefs. On 
the other hand, the official report by Chief Justios Mann 
indicated that the fault lay with the Administration's being 
out of touch with native opinion whioh, without outlet or
response, went from unwarranted assumptions to irrational
23conclusions. This represented a serious difference in 
evaluation at the highest level in the Territory. Shortly
22) Administrator to Sec. Territories, 5.8.1958, AD 85/4/7; 
see Ch. V, 2.
23) Enquiry by Chief Justice A.H. Mann into the Navuneram 
incident of 4th Aug. 1958, Findings, Vol. VIII.
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political development in the years 1958-60, expressed
afterwards the Administrator initiated the monthly District
intelligence reports on ’native thought*. At the same time
the Minister began giving serious consideration to the
setting up of the Advisory Counoils for Native Matters,
P4
provided for in the 1949 Aot,
As the Navuneram incident showed the Administration that 
it would have to keep more closely cognizant of native 
reaction, it also showed those Tolai within native looal 
government that it was imperative for them to put their 
views to central government as emphatically as the anti- 
counoil groups. This determination was probably strengthened 
by the attitude of the then A.D.O. (Looal Government) in 
Rabaul, who had shown himself anxious to restrict councils 
to their statutory functions. The political bias of the 
combined Tolai meetings increased, reaching a peak with 
that of March, 1959#
At this meeting the Navunersm Enquiry report was discussed. 
Other topics covered a wide range. A resolution was passed 
demanding a Native Bank, The meeting also objected to the 
Administration’s policy of assimilating mixed-blocds with 
Europeans, whereby many of them live as or with natives but 
have European privileges (this is a policy whioh is also 
hotly debated by the mixed-bloods themselves). The Reimber
24) Information from Senior Departmental Officers, The 
Minister later clearly abandoned the idea of the 
Advisory Councils in favour of an enlargement of native 
representation on the Legislative Council by indirect 
election.
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judicial powers for councillors. The increasing influence
of the Chinese aroused heated discussion, and a demand
25
was made that all Chinese be deported to China.
In brief, about half the topics discussed did not fall 
within the province of native looal government at all (as 
conceived by the Administration) 5 the officers attending 
found themselves defending Administration polioy at ^hat 
was in fact an emotional politioal meeting. The A.D.O. 
(Local Government) wrote that it was the liveliest meeting 
he had ever attended.**6
The D.C. expressed the view that the natives who had 
been attending the District Advisory Council meetings were 
learning from the Europeans to ’demand things of ths 
Government * s
We are dealing with an ignorant mass of people and 
in matters involving concepts which are very diffi­
cult to explain in Pidgin, and even more difficult 
for ignorant undeveloped minds to understand. Every 
opportunity was taken to explain to the best of the 
individual officers’ abilities, every matter that 
was raised for disoussion, but there is obviously a 
vast gap which as the people’s minds enquire into 
things alien to them, is becoming wider.
An administrative attitude Tidiich attributed ’ignorant
councillors found support when they repeated demands for
25) Meeting 18.3.1959. Rsuort by a/D.O. Reitano to D.HA., 
20.3.1959 Rabaul 14/12.
26) Ibid.
27) Ibid., quoting discussion with D.C. The last three 
words were underlined in Port Moresby.
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undeveloped minds* to the most sophisticated people in the 
Territory did not promise oloser collaboration. The A.D.O. 
favoured more intensive propaganda to convince the natives 
that the Administration was adequately looking after their 
interests. A campaign to eradicate ’confused thinking* 
about the functions of native local.government, particularly 
in the Reimber area where the natives had long enjoyed a
special reputation for independence, was launched in the
28
second half of 1959. At the same time, in accordance with
the paternalist assumption that *premature* political
development would prejudioe the balanoe of social and
economic development, the Administration remained very chary
of natives who had the qualities for political leadership.
This was particularly noticeable with the election of Stanis
of Toma to the Vunadadir council, which immediately elected
him vice-president. This was regarded by local officers as
the most important event of the year in the sub-district.
It was acknowledged that Stanis*s intellect was •greatly
admired and respected* and that he quickly became *a fooua
29of drive and ambition*. Indeed, so outstanding were Stanis*s 
qualities that he was appointed to the New Britain District 
Advisory Council. At the same time, all this signified to
28) Report on Reimber-Livuan N.L.Gr. Council. 30*9.57, P.O. 
Moorhouse; P.O. Allwood to A.D.O. (L.G.) Rabaul, 10.8.59 
(Visits to Villages, Reimber).
29) A.D.O. to D.O. Rabaul 3.9.59, Vunadadir 14/3/2;
Vunadadir sub-district report, 1959.
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the Administration that Stanis required ’careful watching*, 
and he was regarded as being on trial, to see whether he 
would *act impartially in the interests of the Council as 
established*
The Executive Officer (Local Government) took a more
liberal view of the combined Tolai meeting than the looal
field staff# He regarded as particularly significant the
fact that it revealed that -
... native thinking is at variance with some aspeots^ 
of Administration policy.
He believed that it was an inevitable development, and
one to be weloomed, that after nine years of looal government
the Tolai should be beginning to express opinions and to
state beliefs.
Area administration machinery oan play a very 
valuable role in gauging public opinion and provide 
a democratic way for the debate of matters of looal»p 
concern.
Clearly the debatable phrase here was *of looal concern*. 
Moreover, there *as no indication that the Executive Officer 
appreciated the administrative implications of this view,
30) A.D.O. Rabaul to D.O. 11.3.1960 (Vunadadir P.R. 1/1959- 
60), S.D.O. Rabaul 30/l. My italics. It was believed 
that Stanis was guided by the Catholic mission; but this 
was not the prime reason for the Administration’s 
apprehension. Cf. Rowley, loo.oit., p.443i ’For it is 
axiomatic that Commonwealth polioy demands a responsible 
New Guinea leadership ...* The Administration seeks 
♦responsibility* rather than ’leadership* in councillors 
at this stage. In a oolonial situation what appears to 
be ’responsible* to government and to the natives may 
differ widely. It is to avoid this gap that political 
functions are deprecated.
31) E.O. (L.G.) to D.N.A., 6.4.59, NA 40-1-10.
32) Ibid.
1namely, that the councils would expect some attention to 
be paid their opinions in policy and planning*
In the same liberal spirit however, the Administration
planned the meeting of delegates from all the New Guinea
councils (excluding Papua) at Madang from 1st — 5th June,
1959. The agenda was drawn up by the councils, though in
close consultation with their supervising offioers. Altogether
thirty-three resolutions were passed, dealing with such
matters as the individualization of land tenure, the
appointment of native assessors to lower courts, Mission
pressures in counoil areas, and the principle of voluntary
33participation in native local government.
(iv) The Implications of Councils* Political Role.
Officers attending the conference were surprised at the 
•political maturity*, as it was described, which the 
delegates showed in discussion. This was also shown in 
the moderateness and coherence of the resolutions, many of 
which voiced opinions or requests whioh individual oounoils 
had long been making. Despite the fact that the conference 
clearly represented a political landmark, the first report« 
on it did not reach the Minister until August 13th, more 
than two months after it was held. He immediately realized 
its significance and expressed great annoyanoe at the delay;
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33) Minutes, Madang Conference. L.G. Section 14-7-32.
the conference had apparently not received the close
attention either of the Administrator or of the Secretary
of his Department*
The papers (he said) seem to me to reveal a highly 
important development •. • and should receive 
attention at the highest level*
After reading the report, he acknowledged that the need
for some form of political representation, probably by
indirect election from the base of the local government
councils, was developing much more quickly than he had
anticipated« The reports, he said,
• reveal maturity rather greater than I would 35 
have expected to find at the present stage*
Indeed, this maturity was so far ahead of his expectations
that he suspected that Administration offioers had had a
large say in the nature and recording of decisions at the
conference; he insisted on precise information on the extent
to which this had been done so that he could aocurately
assess the significance of the resolutions*
He pointed out that the political implications were
immediate - a point which, as with the Tolai meetings, had
been underestimated within the Administrations
When we promote such activities ... we have to be 
very careful about two consequences of our actions*
One is that if we promote an expression of opinion 
we have to face the responsibility of paying due
34) Minister to Sec. Territories, 13*8.1959, Terr. 59/3316f 
Native Local Government Council Conference, Madan#.
June 1959“.
35) Ibid.
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he was particularly irritated to find that the reports of
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regard to that expression of opinion* The other 
is that when the native people have been en­
couraged to express their views they will quite 
properly expect some notice to be taken of those 
views • *• consequential action is an unavoidable 
result of the promotion of the Local Government 
Councils Conference, and action has to be taken 
and the native representatives informed of it*
The Minister was particularly worried that if supervising
officers had taken a direct part in the suggestion of an
agenda or the framing of resolutions, the oounoils would be
justified in believing that the Administration was seriously
considering a change of policy. This applied particularly
to the first three resolutions, on the land questions
Have we in these three resolutions permitted or 
promoted an expression of opinion about lands 
policy which we are never likely to carry out? *•• 
resolutions of this kind cannot simply be aocepted*- 
as an interesting indication of native opinion.
(In these resolutions, the oounoils asked that 
councils be allowed to register individual land 
holdings for cash cropping, on the lines of the 
Higaturu scheme ; that native corporate bodies, 
including councils, be empowered to lease land 
direct from natives; and that the Administration 
find the means to consolidate landholdings into 
single blocks)*
A number of the items on the agenda had only a tenuoua 
connection with local government powers and functions, in 
that they were essentially central government responsibilities 
the problems deriving from whioh tended to occur particularly 
in local government areas because of their economic 
potential or relatively sophisticated populations. Examples
36) Ibid*
37) Ibid.
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would be the questions of rural credit and of compulsory 
school attendance, in addition to the land matters cited 
above.
The Minister insisted that prompt decisions be made on
the resolutions of the conference. Decisions were complicated
for the Administration, however, by two factors: firstly,
many of the resolutions touched on matters which were at
the time under policy re-appraisal (rural oredit, for
example, and the principle of grants-in-aid); and secondly,
the Executive Officer (Local Government) admitted that some
of the agenda items may have derived indirectly from
promptings by supervising officers - resolution 24, asking
that the establishment of sub-distriot and district councils
not be considered until looal government had further expanded,
certainly was not of native origin, for the delegates had
38
little understanding of its meaning. The Administration, 
therefore, was caught between its own policy responsibilities 
and an uncertain assessment of what the natives really wanted. 
As a result, a consolidated statement on Administration 
action was not given the councils until June, 1960, a year 
after the conference. (It is worth pointing out at this
38) E.O. (L.G.) to Administrator, 29.9.1959. NA 44-4-1. He 
felt that, irrespective of the phrasing, the resolution» 
represented the opinions expressed. All discussion wa® 
in Pidgin, but the resolutions are in English - an 
admitted difficulty. The resolutions were framed by a 
drafting committee of four natives ( 'remarkable men and 
probably show more awareness than most native people*) 
which met with *at least one officer* at the end of each 
day to frame resolutions, based on the main points of 
discussion, for submitting the following day.
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the New Guinea councils, Administration decisions arising
from it had Territory-wide application).^®
In his reply to the conference, the Director of Native
Affairs remarked that oertain resolutions could not be acted
on by central government ’because of policy considerations1;
however, he felt that the counoils could feel satisfied with
the fact that 'quite a number' of decisions had been taken
40along lines suggested by the conference. In fact, an
analysis of Administration actions show that, although 9i of
the 33 requests of the conference were acceded to by the
Administration, policy on all the major issues remained
unchanged* On the land question the Administration politely
re-affirmed policy, which reserved all land dealings and
registration to the control of the government* A request
for rural credit seemed to founder on the same obstacle, for
the councils were told that this was dependent on title to
land. The request for universal compulsory education in
council areas was also rejected because of central government
policy defined by the Education Advisory Boardt
Evidence before the Board indicated that the major 
need was for more schools and not for legislation^ 
to enforoe attendance at schools.
39) D.N.A. to all D.O.s, A.D.O.s, Councils and Delegates, 
20.6.1960, NA 44-4-1. Such conferences have since been 
held annually.
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
point that, although the Madang conference represented only
council and to non-council areas, and the rejection of
such requests by the Administration was tantamount to a
rejection by the Administration of the concept that the
provision of local government enabled such policy to be
locally modified, or control of it locally delegated* This is
particularly applicable to the matter of land registration,
for which the councils, in size and the manner of
representation appear to be ideal units*
The Administration also re-affirmed that the policy of
voluntary participation in native looal government would be
42continued, against the wishes of the conference*
(v) Separating Looal Problems and Central Politics.
The Administration agreed to the request that further
oonferenoes of native looal government councils should be
held annually; but by the time the ground had been laid for
the next conference, (in December 1960 and embraolng all
the Territory's councils), the Minister had taken steps to
see that the disoussion of policy matters outside the
strict province of local government oould be debated at the
central level* He strongly deprecated interpretations of
4*5the second conference as political* *
The expressions of the Tolai, and of the Madang
42) Ibid., items 26-7.
43) Press statement, Canberra, 21*11.1960*
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Overall government policy, of course, applied both to
conference, were quite outside the normal functions of 
local government counoils» The great majority of council 
meetings, the agenda for which are usually drawn up by the 
councils* executive committees in consultation with super­
vising officers, are closely confined to matters within the 
statutory and policy province of the councils# To take the 
councils of a politically conscious group - for example, the 
Toaripi and Moripi of the Eastern Gulf * the Toaripi monthly 
meeting of February 1960 discussed the training of the 
assistant clerk; additions and improvements to the council 
chambers; the registration of births, deaths and marriages; 
the opening of the market; and news of the council boat.
The Moripi council discussed the building of a council school 
at Miaru; the water supply at Olapu; and the duties and 
training of council staff (constables and clerk) . 44
Meetings elsev&ere follow a similar pattern. In faot, 
the institution of councils, involving as it does the 
immediate removal from office of the old village officials, 
tends for a time to put the Administration out of touch with 
looal native opinion. The fact that almost all councils are 
entirely composed of elected members reinforces this tendencyI 
by contrast, in the British Solomons the councils still 
include a proportion of District Headmen, who provide a
44) Moripi and Toaripi Farl. No.9, 1.3.1960 (one of the 
better publications produced by the councils, in 
association with the sub-district office - monthly? 
carried general sub-district news).
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There seems little doubt that the events of 1958-9
signified to the Minister that the looal government councils
were developing political functions beyond those of training
in local responsibility which policy approves* Moreover,
in Port Moresby there were indications for the first time
in 1958 that the natives were ready, organizationally, to
go beyond the looal government councils in pursuit of
economic and political ends. This signified the beginning
46
of the transition to the political phase. The Motu leaders
had previously pressed for aotion on urban wage rates and
housing through personal contacts and the Public Service
Association. But in late 1958 the so-called Kereme, peoples
resident in Port Moresby formed a kind of mutual aid sooiety
called the Port Moresby Kerema Welfare Society. The stated
aims of this sooiety were to provide ‘places and opportunities'
for a number of functions including 'District Meetings' and
'Special Studies', emergency accommodation for out-of-work
members or for visitors, and plaoes where members might
47'learn good and useful things in their spare time'.
Members were to be drawn from Gulf natives of good standing, 
who were expected to 'contribute regularly' and to exercise
45) The oase of Kenya might also be cited: Local Counolls 
were established as long ago as 1924, but the District 
Councils still include appointed as distinct from 
popularly eleoted members. See Appendix C, II.
46) M.C. Groves, A Report on Papua and New Guinea. 14.11.i960.
47) Port Moresby Kerema Welfare Society. Draft Constitution.
Section 2.
45
continuous link with central government*
village group represented in Port Moresby was to have its
48own committee member, eleoted by the group*
Eural aspirations lacking adequate political outlets
have long existed in the eastern Gulf; the cult movements
led by Tommy Kabu (Purari) and Torea (Moveave) since the war
spring to mind. Torea became a councillor when the
Moveave-Toaripi council was established in 1958; but the
spread of the Kerema Welfare Sooiety to take in most of the
coastal parts of the Gulf and Western districts, during
I960, suggests that wider aspirations do exist in these
49areas, requiring an institutional outlet*
Meanwhile, in Port Moresby in M y ,  1960 the Kerema, Motu 
and other groups joined together, and with the help of an 
Administration lawyer, W.A. Lalor, formed the Papua and New 
Guinea Workers' Association, whioh negotiated with the 
employers a minimum urban wage of £3 per week for Port 
Moresby, Lae and Rabaul. As Groves has remarked, the 
Minister has begun to show himself more responsive to
48) Acoording to Groves, cit.sup., the Society derived 
from the ambition of the best educated of the Kerema 
natives, Albert Maori Kiki (who had had long contact 
with Toua Kapena of Hanuabada), to unite the Kerema 
people with other tribal groups* The organizing of 
his own people was only a beginning.
49) See South PaoifioPost. 17.12.1960.
'discipline' over the members through a committee* Each
pressures from the urban elite. This probably fits into 
the administrative pattern of drawing directly political 
functions away from native local government. The same might 
be said of the reform of the Legislative Council in 1960 
which, in view of the Minister's generally cautious political 
views, was surprisingly liberal, providing for the election 
of six natives through an indirect 'electoral college' 
procedure largely based on the councils, and for a non­
official majority. 51
Fienberg and other officers had hoped for the abandon­
ment of the indirect plan of representation, and for direct 
elections to the Legislative Council. This, it was felt, 
would have brought the electors into more immediate touch 
with central policy. It would also have gone further towards 
separating local government from central politics. On the 
other hand, the system on which the 1961 Legislative Council 
was constituted is designed to make use of the sense of
489
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50) Groves, Politios in Port Moresby, p.8 . The Association 
created strong interest - 500 at a committee meeting.
One of the Hanuabadan leaders, the Secretary Sinaka Goava, 
emphasised that its aims were solely economic (new labour 
legislation has since enforced this) and said that the 
Association 'had no intention of causing any trouble'..
South Pacific Post» 17.12.1960.
51) C.J. Lynch, A New Constitution for Papua and New Guinea« 
Journal of the Polynesian Society. '70» June 1961. pp.
¿4i5-7. As Lynch has remarked, ine possibility of the 
defeat of the government on major issues could result in 
'political dynamite'. Significantly, in October 1960 the 
Territory's first political party, the United Progress 
Party, was formed by two European non-offioials, R, Bunting 
and D. Barnett, and an elected native, Simogun Peta - 
South Pacific Post. 28.10.60.
52) Memo, of 5.11.57, NA 89-1-0.
local government is intended to inculcate.
An almost certain result, however, will be that native
local government councils will become political pressure
groups, and that political leaders at the national level
will use them as a means of enlisting support. According
to Groves this is precisely what happened in Hanuabada in 
531960—1 , and there is every reason to expect that the move­
ment will extend* A certain anxiety, based on analogies 
with African examples, has pervaded the Administration in 
regard to the urban elite; the system of election from local 
government partially represented an attempt to concentrate 
politics in the rural areas; but this is also an excellent 
way to encourage urban political organizations to spread, 
and the result of the system may wsll be to involve local
government more olosely in central politics and the
54
determination of basic policies.
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responsibility and education in political procedures which
53) Groves, Politics in Port Moresby, p.9*
54) Cf* speech of Minister at opening of Legislative Counoil 
session, Port Moresby, 17*10*1960 (Territories booklet, 
p.8 )i fThe lesson of Africa is not that we have to 
gallop madly along a path of political change ,* * The 
welfare of the people comes first#•
CHAPTER X
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
1 « The Constitution of Councils.
(i) The Western Approach
The Administration* s approach to the constitution of 
councils, as to their duties, powers and functions, reflects 
the attempt to overleap the intermediate, traditional - or, 
in British terms, Native Authority - stage, and pass straight 
to local government on English lines«
Section 5 of the Ordinance leaves it to the discretion of 
the Administrator to decide how a council should be constit­
uted j though sub-section (2) states that he should *have 
regard to relevant native oustom*. This is a borrowing from 
African legislation whioh has been taken as having no 
application in New Guineas in no sense are councils regarded 
as customary institutions, and this extends to their 
constitution. Prom the beginning it has been policy that 
councillors should be democratically eleoted, rather than 
that the Administration should by nomination or other
selection methods try to ensure that natives with some
1
traditional standing are represented«
Indeed, the absence of powerful hereditary leaders and 
of appointed headmen has facilitated the use of democratic
1) Papua Report, 1958-9, p.30«
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procedures. The Administration claims that the free election
method of appointment tends to be in full aocord with
customary Melanesian practices, affording natives the ohance
2 t
to choose their own leaders*
Regulations 4-10 specify the conditions for the 
constituting of councils. Provision is universally made for 
election by ballot; those eligible to vote are male natives 
over the age of seventeen who are liable to council tax, and 
those females over seventeen who have applied to have their 
names entered on the Tax Register. (For the initial council 
election, all adult natives resident in the council area are 
eligible to vote). The initial elections are for a period of 
one year; thereafter elections are held biennially, with the 
exception of Hanuabada, where eleotlons are triennial*
The statutory provision for nomination by the Administration 
is regarded as a reserve power only, to be used in exceptional 
circumstances. In Papua the Administration claims it has 
never been used, though in the Trust Territory the presidents 
of the But-Boiken and Ambenob councils have not been subjected 
to the indignity of election, but as outstanding leaders have 
been nominated by the D.O. 'with the full agreement of the
2) N.G. Annual Report, 1958-9, p.31*
3) Natives who are exempted from payment of tax by the 
Council's Tax Tribunal may also vote. Eligible person» 
must have resided in the council area for at least four 
months. Persons residing on alienated land are excluded* 
(Regs. 6, 82-3)*
j
493
people. 4 The Vunamami oounoil constitution is unique in 
providing that its president shall be ohosen by the incoming 
council f0im the residents at large within its area. The 
reason for this was the great prestige of the Paramount Lulual 
at the time local government was introduced in 1950. The
K
tradition has continued with his nephew, Tovln ToBaining.
In Papua, the proclamation for the Marshall Legoon oounoil 
(gazetted 7th November, 1957) provided for the nomination of 
ten members, about one-third of its total. The reason for 
this was that serious divisions between the elders and the 
young men were apparent to the local officers; moreover, the 
young men were well organized in what were ostensibly sports 
clubs, and officers felt that there was a danger that they 
might be able to dominate the elections completely. This 
fear proved to be unfounded, however, and the power of 
nomination was not used.**
The olaim that direct nomination by the Administration has 
never been used in Papua, however, would seem to be not 
absolutely accurate. An unusual situation arose in Daru in 
1958, when the elections to the Daru (coastal Kiwai) oounell 
were held. Previously the semi-permanent residents of Daru 
village, comprising essentially the families of Administration
4) N.G. Report, 1958-9, p.31.
5) Details on NA 42-2-1; Information from E.O. (L.G.). 
Presidents and Vioe-Presidents are elected by the oounolls 
from their own number.
6) NA 41-5-1.
■
and trade-store servants, had eonstituted a separate 
electorate; but for the 1958 election they voted in their 
home-villages, so that Daru village electorally ceased to 
exist. Its representative, however, had been Dau Baera, an 
outstanding leader who for the previous year had been counoll 
president. The Department of Native Affairs approved the 
suggestion that he be nominated direotly to the counoll.
This situation persisted only four months, until the Daru
7
and Kiwai estuary councils were amalgamated.
The very rarity of this occurrence emphasises the extent 
to which the Administration has been dedicated to the 
electoral pxlnoiple. The practicability of it, generally even 
in parts of New Guinea which have long had appointed Paramount 
Luluais, is a measure of the fact that almost everywhere there 
are no natives with any exeoutlve experience or administrative 
standing beyond the exercise of minor police powers at the 
village level. This may facilitate the introduction of 
Western electoral procedures, but it also means that oounclls
O
have little native exeoutlve experience to draw on.
7) P.O.Walsh to D.C., 28.5.58, Daru 23-4-2(4); approved D.N.A.
14.6.58. Because of extensive emigration, all tax 
registers are maintained in villages of origin - hence the 
electoral arrangement: of. statement Papua Report, 1958-9, 
p.30. Daru village had originally been direotly represented 
at the express request of the residents.
8) An unfortunate aspect of this is the devolution of res­
ponsibility to the supervising offloer; in Kenya, for 
example, particularly qualified natives, e.g. Government 
Chiefs, are still nominated to District Councils, and this 
reduces the tendency to turn to the D.O. - a point not con­
sidered in Papua. Local native representatives of the 
electorate and of central government thus automatically 
Join in local planning. Cf. British Solomons - Appendix C,
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(ii) Voting Method»
Democratic expectations have been put so high in Papua 
that the Australian system of preferential voting is 
generally used in counoil elections. An exception is 
Hanuabada where the natives are sufficiently literate to be 
able to vote by simple secret ballot* Field staff have not 
been entirely happy about the use of the preferential system) 
broadly, however, the Administration has tended to insist on 
the advantages of the democratic ideal embodied in the 
preferential system as against its practical disadvantages*
The instructions whioh have been issued on electoral 
procedures reflect both the insistence on Australian con­
ceptions and the pressure towards uniformity by central 
government - two all-pervading faoets of the looal government 
system which often lead to debatable consequences. A 
Circular Memorandum of 6th August, 1958, after disoussing the 
advantages of various eleotoral systems, oame down on the 
side of the preferential system as the prime desideratum, 
though paradoxically it also stated that 'the system should 
be simple, bearing in mind that it must be suoh as to be 
easily understood and effectively used by illiterates'*
Voting by secret ballot was also endorsed as highly desirable> 
but the difficulty arose in combining this with the 
preferential system. Symbols would have to be used almost 
everywhere if secret ballot voting were to be recommended, 
but for practical purposes this would have to be allied with
4 Ö 6
a *first-past-the-post' system, which came in for hsavy 
criticism:
The crude 'first-past-the-post' system *•* has 
an inherent danger, of a candidate in a three 
(or more) cornered contest gaining a seat although 
a majority of the electors are against him, and 
the further possibility of a party supported by a 
minority of the electors obtaining a majority in 
parliament or council* This, combined with an un­
equal distribution of electors has accentuated the9 
tendency to minority government.
On the other hand, the relative complexity of preferential
voting was not regarded as a serious deterrent*
A candidate obtaining an absolute majority of first 
preferences is elected. If one does so, the 
candidate with the fewest first preferences is 
eliminated and the second preferences on the 
relevant papers distributed as first preferences 
among the other candidates, and so on until a stage 
is reached at which some candidate has an absolute 
majority - one half plus one of the valid votes 
cast* 1
It was recognized that if the preferential system was to
become standard, the 'whispering ballot' would have to be
continued also* Both this and the complex counting of
preferential votes had the considerable disadvantage that
allegations of partiality could be made against officers
supervising counoil elections (for this reason two European
9) D.H.A. to all D.O.s, 6*8*58, NA 39-12* This must be a 
perfect example of the cross-cultural application of an
irrelevant argument • There has never been the slightest 
suggestion of 'parties' within N.L.G. councils; nor are 
they likely.
10) Ibid.
officers must be present at all times during the voting) . 11
In practice, preferential voting, despite its attendant 
drawbacks, became mandatory. Field-staff were by no means 
united on the issue, however, the D.O. at Daru, where the 
natives were certainly better able to understand European
institutions than most others, felt that the preferential
12
system was unintelligible to the natives ; at the 1960
elections for the Kiwai counoil the supervising officer noted
that the only difficulty occurred when there were more than
two candidates!
Some of the people just could not understand *hy13 
they had to give two names instead of one*
Similarly, in the Higaturu council elections of 1959 the
supervising officer refused to use the preferential system,
claiming that with the large populations in many villages it
was 'complicated and unwieldy', and that anything but ths
first-past-the-post system with a whispering ballot would have
confused the electors. 14 For this he was roundly rebuked
by his senlorst the D.O. claimed that where the voting was
olose the first-past-the-post system was a 'hit-or-miss'affairs
11) Ibid. The Cambridge Conference (R.I.P.A., Looal Govern­
ment In the Colonies# p.57) opposed the 'whispering ballot' 
because of the involvement of European offloors. An 
additional complication is that natives may fc& that they 
are being asked to choose a councillor acceptable to the 
Administration - hence the perpetuation of non-native 
criteria.
12) Marginal comments, D.N.A. memo«, Daru 23-6-3.
13) C.P.O. To A.D.O., 13.4.60, Daru 23-6-3.
14) A.D.O« (L.G.) to D.O«, 6.7.59, Pop. 14-8-22/4.
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* m  only by the allocation of preferences can the 
backing of the majority of the people for the 15 
elected Councillor be assured.
The use of the preferential system in fact represented 
an attempt by the Administration to assure itself that the 
candidate most natives prefer had been elected. Counter­
balancing this to some extent is the influenoe exerted by 
the Administration in pre-election campaigns. Circular 
Instruction No. 306 told looal government staff that this 
had to be done with discretion to avoid a reversion to direct 
administration. At the same time it acknowledged that until 
the natives developed a political sense they would need 
guidance on 'voting intelligently'* that is, looking for 
certain desirable qualities in candidates^ In practice, 
looal staff are anxious to see that natives with some 
capacity are elected; while they are also anxious to ward off 
'undesirable influences'.
On this latter point, in the Gazelle Peninsula something 
of a contest developed between Catholio missionaries and the 
Administration. In 1951 missionaries in the Reimber area 
were believed to have launched a campaign to oppose the 
election of natives not 'doctrinally reliable'. Before the 
1955 Reimber eleotlons the Administration warned the natives 
of the 'sectarian issue' (while the mission was exhorting
15) D.O. to A.D.O. (L.G.) 24.7.59, ibid; D.N.A. to D.O.,
10.8.59. NA 41-3-2.
16) Local Govt. Memo. No.2, Ref. 39-11-2; Digest of L.G. 
Bulletins, pp. 5-7.
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them to elect *God-fearing men') with the result, the
S.N.A.O. reported, that 'the elections turned out favourably
for the Administration'. Later, the election of a majority
17of Catholics was regarded as a setback. Elsewhere, the
knowledge that certain candidates would be defeated on
preferences has led to a dislike for the systemi in the
Higaturu eleotion cited above, a woman from Dobodura whose
election had been hailed in 1956 would probably have been
18defeated in 1959 had preferences been taken.
(iii) Implications of the Electoral Systemi Social Division» 
and Council fieprésentâtion
Because of the non-traditional emphasis in the con­
stitution of councils, the Administration has been unduly 
worried about the many instanoes of pre-seleotion - that is, 
where villagers have already made up their minds on a suitable 
councillor before nominations are called. It is felt that 
this is a reflection of their lack of political sense, and 
it obstructs democratic training. Officers have therefore 
been advised not to accept this situation without very 
careful enquiryi
The arbitrary selection of a single nominee should 
be avoided .•• You are probably aware that lack of 
opposition may be nothing more than a surface
17) Memo. D.M. Fienberg, 9.9.51. HA 39-1-0| marginal 
comments on memo. a/D.O. Orken to D.N.A., 19.11.55, in 
NA 39-1-2. Fienberg suggested to the mission that 
'controversial matters' not be mentioned from the 
pulpit.
18) Information A.D.O. Norton; P.O. to D.N.A., 2L.5.56. 
Pop. 14-7-42/4.
manifestation ... Even where there is no opposition 
to a candidate, it is advisable, at this stage of 
developmentto conduct an election anyway. It provides 
an opportunity to educate the people in eleotoral and 
democratic procedures and any opportunities to do thisig 
should never be negleoted. *
This can lead to ludicrous results. For example, in the 
Higaturu area, the village of Koipa eventually nominated three 
candidates for the 1959 election. In some respects Koipa 
might be regarded as a village of which a real eleotoral 
contest could be expected, for it was formed of an agglo­
meration of village and olan groups which fled the Mt. 
Lamington explosion. But an outstanding native named Philemon 
(Inambu/Kiouei) had established his authority in the village 
before the council was established, and he was the leading 
personality amongst the five councillors originally elected.
By 1959 many of the immigrants had departed, so that 
relatively Philemon*s standing, if anything, increased.
Thus, although there were three candidates, Philemon polled 
all the votes cast. The candidature of the other two men
POhad clearly been only an Administration-induced formality.
What the Administration appears to mean by inouloating a 
political sense in council areas is that if the natives can 
be taught the most useful qualities (in Administration terms) 
to look for in councillors and if they can be educated in
19) Digest of L.G. Bulletins, p.7# Cf. Daru, 1960i *The 
people were asked to try and nominate more than one 
candidate*. Daru 23-6-3.
20) Higaturu election book, 2.6.59.
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democratic procedures, the result will be a breaking down 
of traditional barriers which at present tend to nullify 
the representation of minority groups. As councils and 
electorates expand the number of parishes represented by 
each councillor increases* Thus, within the Ealeba council 
it was possible in 1951-7 for all the d a n s  in Wagawaga 
village to have their own councillors; but when Ealeba 
amalgamated with Tavara to form the Milne Bay oounoil, this 
was impracticable* Wagawaga was restricted to two councillors. 
In the Higaturu area, as the council expanded and population 
was re-distributed, it also became necessary to enlarge
electorates; but many groups were suspicious of their loss
21of direct representation. This suspicion carried oyer into 
the elections, for voting (for example, in the combined 
electorate Beuru/Ahora/fcendata/Omba) was entirely on a 
village basis, 'so that the candidate of the largest village
* pp
invariably won. This type of situation is the result, not 
only of the high degree of traditional segmentation, but 
also of the failure over a lengthy period of time to achieve 
any form of confederation within the structure of direct 
administration. The Administration is acutely conscious of 
this problem (most serious in those non-Highland areas where 
there has been little cultural breakdown, as here among the 
Orokaiva); but a solution is said to lie only in persistent
21) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O., 10 .4 .59 , Pop. 14-8A076.
22) A.D.O. to D.O., 6 .7 .59 . Pop. 14-8-22/4; Note, Higaturu 
eleotion book, 16.5.59.
propaganda to create a wider socio-political awareness.
(It might be interpolated here that the fear of aggravating
this situation has probably deterred the Administration from
further extending electorates; this puts an upper limit on
the size of a council. In 1956-9 the Higaturu oounoil had
60 members, but this was considered unwieldy; the number was
then reduced to 54 by combining elements of old electorates,
partially with the above results* In order to keep the
number down and at the same time avoid intra-electorate
divisions, the supervising officer was unwilling further to
24
extend the council • The average ratio of councillors to 
their total electorate population was, in 1959, It 195 in 
Papua. In the Higaturu counoil area it was li 212).
The Administration was sporadically oonsoious of the fact 
that its aversion to direct nomination of councillors resulted 
in a lack of oompetent men, or in an unfortunate social 
balance. A notable feature of many councils is the way in 
¥fliich, after the first elections, the older men drop out;
¡>02
23
23) D.N.A. memo, of 6.8.58 (No.306) cit.sup. A recommended 
method of instigating divisions is through electorate 
committees; but the success of these also is dependent 
on an awareness of common goals and problems. Partici­
pation in them oould hasten real combination. In the 
Kiwai area the councillors' committees seemed to function 
well - in Tureture, for example, the young leader of the 
small Kunini immigrant group, who has a negligible chance 
of becoming councillor, often raises his voice strongly 
in the committee. The fact that the Administration is 
anxious for the committees to function effectively gives 
him a lever over the councillor. The Kiwai area, however, 
is exoeptional because of its history.
24) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O., 10.4.59, oit.sup. He regarded 
It200 as the ideal ratio.
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the reason, it is said, is that they lack the education to 
follow the ’complexities' of council business. A further 
reason is that as the councils' functions are directed almost 
exclusively to works and services, with negligible reference 
to customary matters, there is nothing for the elders to do.
At the same time the elders are trying to uphold custom in 
the villages. Councils have even been seen as mechanisms
pg
whereby the young men may gain asoendanoy over the elders.
This division is undoubtedly exaoerbated by the abrupt 
removal from offioe of the village constables (in New Guinea, 
luluais) when councils are instituted# The division possibly 
seldom becomes public for a number of reasons, one being that 
the former village offioials often combined government offlLoe 
successfully with quasi-traditional functions, and that they 
continue to sit in the baokground and exercise authority 
while the younger men, in effeot, represent them on the 
council. This certainly appears to be so amongst the Orokaiva, 
for the young men regularly defer to the elders in the villages# 
In other areas other factors applyt in Milne Bay, for 
example, the Kwato-trained elite have maintained asoendanoy 
beoause of their eduoation and wide experience (reinforced 
particularly by the sprinkling of Kwato-trained women in the 
villages). On the other hand, this is partially a dissociated 
elite - many of them have little knowledge of or interest in 
custom - and in 1960 it could net be discounted that the
25) e.g. in the Reimber area, Pienberg memo, of 9.9#51, oit.sup.
504
council might become the centre of a power struggle between 
the Kwato leaders (President Mahuru Mark of Gwawili and 
Vice-President Eustus of Maivara) and those leaders who had 
achieved influence partly through government favour and 
partly through traditional activities (Tilaka of Kilakilana 
and possibly Dipauli of Wagawaga)*
The issue of the suppression of the slders on Bougainville 
was brought prominently to publio notioe at the Madang 
conference in 1959« The Teop-Tinputz council was established 
in the Buka area in 1958, The village officials in this area 
may have had exceptional influence, for the kukerai (« lulual) 
even in 1930 was beginning to take the place of the 
traditional tsunaun (in many instances the offioes and 
functions were combined), and the tsunaun in turn was a man 
with unusual authority by New Guinea standards, being the 
hereditary leader of a ranked lineage*
In 1960 it was noted that the former luluais still seemed 
to exercise considerable *behind the scenes' influenoe, 
though most of the councillors were comparatively young menj 
but there was little apparent friotion in the villages. The 
question that immediately came to mind, however, was the 
reason for their non-representation on the council. The 
Director of Native Affairs suggested that, as an interim 
measure, the councillors be advised to enlist the active
26) See B. Blackwood, Both Sides of Buka Passage, pp.45-53.
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committees; but for an overall solution he was inclined to
place the responsibility on the supervising officer*
If these men still exercise power, it indicates 
that the situation is a subject for your careful 
consideration* Why were they not elected? Were 
they suspicious enough of the innovation to avoid 
election? Were the older influential conservatives 
fully aware of the aims and objectives of area 
administration? If not, all the provisions of 
Circular Instructions 306 and 141 need to be fullyp7 
implemented* 2
In other words, the solution was, as he saw it, to give
adequate instruction, advice and propaganda before councils
were constituted. There was no suggestion that faults might
lie in the non-customary bias of council's functions, or that
other methods might be used in constituting counoils*
(This case affords a remarkable contrast with one quoted
by the 1955 Cambridge Conference from Eastern Nigeria, where
tribal rulers were likewise laoking, and where the highest
social unit was generally the village. Here after 1928
direct administration through warrant ohiefs changed to
indirect administration throu^i clan councils of elders.
Young literates gradually joined these councils as oho sen
representatives of the elders, when the latter found them-
selves unable to cope with the complexity of counoils *
functions. These councils were then gradually converted into
27) Sohano P.H. 18/1959-60; attached oomments, 4*4*60. The 
D.O. replied that it was not possible to elect every 
man who oommanded influence*
support of the former luluals and tultuls through ylliage
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elected local authorities, after the normal British colonial
n o
pattern*
(iv) The Problems of Confederation and Council Goals
The real problem which central government faces in Papua 
in relation to local government is in oreating an adequate 
local consciousness which will unite all segments and villages 
in the drive to carry out the counoil*s functions# Ultimately 
this alone can get over sectional reserve 9 antagonism, or 
withdrawal. But this degree of central government involve­
ment can defeat its own ends9 for the natives may well 
interpret native local government as another element in the 
paternalistic framework. The facts that there is negligible 
scope for custom, that councils have no direct means of 
transmitting local political opinion to central government, 
that they have very limited control over economic development 
within their areas (in brief, that councils are Administration 
instrumentalities) tend to reinforce this native inteav 
pretation. The very steps which the Administration takes to 
make a population counoil-oonscious may further aocentuate 
this trend; but constant propaganda is the only real solution 
which the Administration sees open to it, and its success is 
held to be justified by the claim that polls can be increased 
by up to 16% by persistent activity on the part of the
28) R.I.P.A., Local.Government in the Colonies# p#39#
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close anthropological analysis« Brown has written some
perceptive comments about the Chlmbu, but this is a Highland
community and perhaps does not really reflect the situation
elsewhere*30 She states, however, that the people seem to
accept the new values,that they are convinced that the
council is the true road to progress* Young men who adopt
the new values as stepping stones to leadership seem to be
accepted, in much the same way as the 'satraps', the luluais
and tultuls* were accepted. But the implication seems to be
that the council is in effect a meohanism for direction from
above, rather than local government from belows
In this society, the introduction of administration 
and native officials has not reduoed the authority 
of the native leaders at all* It has given them 
powers never before held by one Chimbu over another*
• *• When the doubtful rewards of military suooess 
were removed, the goals of the competition shifted 
to favouritism from Europeans, and opportunities to 
gain followers in pursuing peace and progress* The
29
supervising officer*
An analysis of leadership in council areas still awaits
29) Digest of L.G. Bulletins, Deo. 1961, p*6* A very close 
watch is kept on all election returns - to ensure 
efficiency and uniformity in data-collsotlon a standard 
procedure was laid down in Circular instruction No. 315, 
27.6*60*
30) In particular, the stage of direct administration was 
compressed in time here, so that many of the luluais and 
tultuls are still young and active enough to lead the 
council* Moreover, these people are still so backward 
generally that literacy and outside experience ars 
probably less important qualifications than on the coast*
tultuls and luluais are, like satraps, dependent 
upon the colonial administration for their power.
This even holds when an elected council replaces 
appointed officials. The Chimbu hare yet to learn 
the meaning of representative government, and so 
far the councils have no real power.
It is going to be difficult for looal initiative and
responsibility to develop under this mantle. Even the looal
leader Kondam, largely responsible for bringing four tribes
within the council, still leans heavily on government for
70
support. Moreover, there is a fear that, to the extent that 
such leaders have a following independent of government, it 
involves a subliminal cult attitude to local government. Such 
cults temporarily unite large numbers of people under extra­
ordinary leadership in pursuit of novel goals* but in the long 
term their results are unhealthy, for apathy and withdrawal 
follow the failure of anticipated massive achievement#
This situation however would explain the apparently 
harmonious absorption of looal government to date, which seem« 
to confound Pallors* thesis - framed after a study of the 
Uganda Soga - that segmentary societies suffer greater strain
than hierarchical ones when alien institutions of local govern-
33ment are introduced.
31) P. Brown, unpublished paper on Chimbu leadership (pre­
publication title, From Anarchy to Satrapy).
32) Ibid.
33) L.A. Fallers, Bantu Bureauoracy, pp. 238-47| al«o see my 
Native Local Government in New Guinea> Its Functions and
r:rr: m : r :  7urri3STrmTTMPftr.---
At the same timef all societies embody different values 
and beliefs, no matter what temporary or surface reconciliations
'
are made; and one must wonder whether latest conflicts do not
exist - as they do even under colonial governments most
34sensitive to traditional prerogatives. It might be noted 
that the Tolai have long pressed that some independent 
authority be given councilst a rejection of the satrap con­
ventions. Epstein has predioted that 'as present tensions 
build up a younger generation of spokesmen, no longer content
to work within a paternalistic framework, will oome into its
,35 own. *
The danger for local government would appear to be that 
these men will become the real leaders, but at the same time 
abandon the local arena altogether, or use it merely as a 
stepping stone. This has already happened in Hanuabada, where 
the percentage polls fell from 83.5# in 1951, to 66.8# in 1954 
('the election aroused little interest in the village*), to 
34.5# in 1957. The real leaders withdrew, and in the 1957 
elections this allowed five women to be elected, although in 
the largest sub-village, Poreporena, the female poll fell to 
17.9#. The result was that the council languished, despite the
34) See A. Richards, East African Chiefs, and the perceptive 
review in The Times British Colonies Review. 2nd Quarter
1960, p.29.1 This contrasts the oriteria valued funda­
mentally by the lyoro - dignity, politeness, gentle 
strength, generosity and a knowledge of the people, with 
those valued by the government - efficiency, impartiality, 
drive and a bright manner.
35) A.L. Epstein, New Guinea - Past or Slow? J.P.S.. Vol. 70, 
No.4, Dec.1961, p.496.
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fact that it has a greater reserve of education and executive 
experience to draw on than any other council in Papua*
(v) The Reality of Eleotlon
The acceptance of alien criteria need not mean that, 
within these and the traditional confines, there oannot bs 
a real electoral contest. An example from the Higaturu area 
will illustrate* here the parish, clan and electoral boundaries 
still often coincide. Huiavususu is such a simple socio­
political units its males belong to one clan (Seho)* The 
councillor in 1960, Uhembu, is also head of the dan; but until 
1959 his brother's son and probable successor, Akembo, a much 
younger man, bad been councillor. Akembo is a teacher in a 
nearby mission school; the villagers felt originally that, as 
a councillor, he oombined high status within the olan with the 
advantages of education.
After three years, however, many villagers came to the 
conclusion that Akembo was unable to give adequate attention 
to both the oounoil and the mission. Uhembu also felt this, 
and for this reason stood for election against Akembo in 1959* 
Uhembu was not perhaps as alert as Akembo, and certainly lacked 
his education, but he was the clan head, he had more leisure, 
and he was more closely in touoh with village activities.
36) Details, NA 41-1-2. A.D.O. Fleay to D.C., 22.9.54| D.O. 
Marsh to D.N.A., 15.10.57. The Administration could not 
adequately account for the abyssal 1957 poll; one factor 
was certainly the 'direct' attitude of D.O. Marsh*
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Uhembu was elected; but the poll was close, 30 votes to 24.
In other electorates, particularly where several d a n  
groups are represented, there may be a number of young men 
with similar affiliations and qualifications seeking election.
(vi) The Bnphasis on Women's Participation
One corollary of the non-traditional approach to local 
government has been the attention that has been paid to 
participation by women. Speoifio propaganda is aimed at women, 
and elections are watched with close concern for female 
interest. The response varies according to the social con­
ditions: in Milne Bay, nhere Kwato has produced an elite of
women educationally on level terms with the men, one or two
38women have been councillors from the beginning. In the Higa- 
turu area four women were elected in 1957 (out of 60), but 
this fell to one in 1959; the Administration was so concerned 
that it immediately arranged for the visit of a Welfare Officer 
to set up Women's Clubs. This kind of organisation, which the 
men lad; may offset women's social disadvantages. In the 
Higaturu area, however, the men believed that women had proved 
unable to devote their time to their electorates and to ensure
37) M. Reay, Social Control Amongst the Orokalva. Oceania. 
XXIV, 195&, pp.llO-8 : analyses current leadership (in- 
determinate), states that social oontrol is weak, but that 
the embo Kiii (Village head) had a weak hereditary 
lineage status, though lacking sanctions.
38) Sinaeada 14-40-2«
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the observance of rules»
In the Klwai area women have long been organized (In 
Mabadauan, for example) into village committees; and, in 
Mabadauan, Oli Kewere is recognized at. a formidable influence. 
But, although representatives of the women's committees 
regularly attend council meetings, Oli still regards counoil 
activities as men's work. It is enough yet for women to vote, 
and for their oommittees to co-operate with councillors in 
the villages. 40
39
39) D.O. to D.N.A., 18.8.59, Pop. 14-8-22/4. Williams said 
women had a low status amongst the Orokaiva. Council 
activities cut across women's unremitting routine duties; 
in Milne Bay Councillor Rukoi (Wagawaga, ex-Kwato) is 
unmarried*
40) Personal information. The Administration has not been 
concerned here, because women's co-operation to ensure 
the success of councils' social programmes is assured.
See Appendix A, 1*
CHAPTER X 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
II* Education
(i) Councils as Central Government Agents»
As late as October, 1957 the Secretary of the Department 
of Territories stated that Section II(o) of the N.L.G.
Ordinance 'seemed to contemplate' participation by councils, 
as agents of central government, in education. 1 As 
Administration instrumentalities, Councils have had little 
voice in educational polioy. Their participation has been 
governed largely by Section 11(b), tàiich authorises the 
carrying out of works for the benefit of the community in 
their areas.
Under Section 15 of the Education Ordinanoe, 1952,
councils were authorised to conduct schools, but these were
Pto be subject to the control of the Director of Education.
The maintenance of standards has been the overriding aim.
As a result, councils have built and maintained schools 
which the Administration staffs and control»•
This frees councils from the strain of teachers* salaries; 
to maintain standards the Administration would not sanction
1) Local Government in Papua and New Guinea, paper delivered 
by C.k. tambert to No. 2 ¿enior Officers Course, A.S.O.P.A., 
Oct. 1957; South Pacific. IX, 8 1957, p.472.
2) Report Papua, 1958-9, p.78. The prime purpose of this 
Ordinance was to bring all secular education in the 
Territory under the supervision of the Education Department.
513
514
lower scales for teachers in counoil schools. Councils were 
generally happy with this division of responsibilities with 
the Education Department, with one or two notable 
exceptions.
The Nganalaka Rural School at Kokopo (Vunamami council) 
was one of the most notable early experiments. The counoil 
bought the land and built the school, while the Administration 
paid and housed a European teacher. Later, however, the 
Administration went well beyond the original conception of a 
primary boarding school with a strong agricultural bias.
Using its policy prerogatives, the Administration made it a 
central school and a teacher training centre. The 1956 U.K. 
Mission hailed this new conception, combining academic and 
applied education j but a good deal of resentment was left
e
within the council for Native Affairs offioers to mollify.
The fault was not entirely the Education Department's, 
however; by 1957 the educational views of the oounoil were 
described as 'rather incoherent'. Responding to what could 
be described as political stimuli, the council's conception 
of the school's objects was changing: it wanted the 
agricultural bias maintained, but it also wanted natives to
3) Details in NA. 42-2-5, 39-4-1.
4) U.N. Visiting mission Report, 1956, T/1260, pp.22-5, 
esp. para,55. The Council spent £3500 on the project.
5) Memo, of 5.11*57, commenting on Lambert's address, p*13*
gThe Education Department responded to further oouncil 
pressure (Education Committee meeting, January 1959) and 
enlarged the school's age-range and curriculum; but the 
D.E.O. then felt there was a danger that the school would
7
create a precedent for other council areas. The Native 
Affairs staff, however, continued to blame Education for 
changing the original conception; to them this seemed to fit 
into the pattern of technical decisions without regard for
Q
their administrative repercussions. It was said that the 
Education Department had also acted unilaterally in another 
notable example of Administration/council co-operation, the 
Tavui Girls' School.® Here the councils paid about 25% of 
the establishment cost10, while the Administration provided 
the dormitories. 11 The councils maintained a particular 
interest in the school, because they also provided the land 
for it; and land is at a premium in the Gazelle Peninsula.
6) C.D. Rowley, Local Government in New Guinea, South 
Pacific. IX, V, Jxily-Aug. p.44i.
7) D.E.O, Goroka (formerly at Rabaul) to Director of 
Education, 23.6.59, NA.42-2-5: The Trend towards the 
Grandiose Primary School. Those doing local government 
courses at Yunadadir visited the School*
8 ) Ibid., marginal note D.N.A, copy, undated.
9) Fienberg memo, of 5.11*57, cit.sup.
10) South Pacific, VIII, 5, June 1955, p.94.
11) J. McAuley, Local Government amongst the Tolai, South 
Pacific, VII, 11, p .884.
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be educated as Administration field staff.
In 1959 they were still making 'specific grants' to the
1PSchool* It is not uncommon for councils to provide extra
equipment or prizes even to purely Administration schools -
a relationship similar to that of Parents' and Citizens'
Associations in Australia.
The Native Affairs Department took these two examples as
warnings of the tendency of specialist officers to use
councils as convenient media for solving immediate problems,
13without thought to long-term implications ; though in the 
Tolai areas Administration monopoly of policy has been 
mitigated by the deep local knowledge of the D.E.O. , F.N. 
Boisen, who regularly discusses problems with the oombined 
councils. To rely on personalities however, is not regarded 
as sound general policy.
(ii) Relations with the Missions.
The Administration did not directly enter education in 
Papua-New Guinea until post-1945j the missions have long had 
a monopoly, generally untrammelled, of elementary education* 
Mission reactions to council participation in education have 
therefore been most important. Broadly, the council® tried 
to avoid overlap by building Village Higher Schools, to 
complement the work of the missions in the lower primary 
schools.
12) Report New Guinea, 1958-9, pp.31-2*
13) Memo, of 5.11.57, cit.sup.
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Gazelle Peninsula. There the Tolai oounoils had built 17
Village Higher Schools by 1956, although their proportionate
expenditure on education was not as high as that of the
14later councils* The Catholic spokesman had made the views
of his mission clear, in the Territory's Legislative Councils
councils should function similarly to Australian municipal
15organizations, with no active role in education.
In 1955 the Administration decided that councils should
not separately subsidise mission schools, but that they
16
could continue to build their own schools. This brought 
the matter to a head. Bishop Schaxmach claimed that this 
constituted an infringement of the free voting rights of 
councillors} but his solution was that oounoils be debarred
Policy in relation to the missions was framed in the
14) Report New Guinea, 1955-6, p# Overall actual expenditure 
by oounoils on eduoation in 1957 was 13*5#; expenditure 
by Tolai councils in 1953 represented 9.5# of total 
expenditure - see McAuley, loc.cit., p#884. In 1957-8 
the Administration of Papua-New Guinea spent only 6# of 
total expenditure on eduoation - Report Papua 1957-8,
p.129: Report New Guinea 1957-8, p.164. An interesting 
African comparison is Kenya, where in the same year the 
Government was spending 13# of total expenditure on 
education - Kenya Report 1957-8, p.142, The missions 
received aid on a per-capita J>upil basis after the war 
(only 4/- each); before the war the Tolai area was 
exceptional in having a good Administration school at 
Nodup and a technical school at Malaguna.
15) T.P.N.G. Leg. Co. Debates, 1.6.1956 (2nd Council, 3rd 
Session), p.87.
16) Administrator to D.N.A., 30.8.1955, NA.14-7-16*
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from all participation in education. The mission hinted
18that natives in counoil areas might refuse to pay tax ,
19and that they felt an injustice had been done them. The 
missionaries in the Gazelle Peninsula had told Rowley that 
council schools were redundant. (In 1957 Section 16 of the 
N.L.G. Ordinance was amended to provide heavy penalties for 
persons of any raoe who tried to prejudice the 'free and 
effective use* by councils of their powers) . ^ 0
In the so-called Rabaul Agreement of 1955, the 
Administration sought a compromise with the mission; the 
strength of the Catholics in the council areas, and the
teetering future of looal government at that time, made this
21necessary. The general features of the Agreement were 
incorporated in the Education (Council Schools) Regulations, 
1955; these provided for the setting up of Looal Eduoation 
Committees in council areas, representing the Administration,
17
17) Bishop Scharmach to Administrator, 14.9.1955. NA.23-17-7.
18) Ibid.
19) Ibid. The Bishop paraphrased the way in which Tolai 
Catholics looked at the issue* 'I pay tax. Some of that 
tax is used by the Counoil for sohools. My conscience 
does not permit me to use the Council Schools. I get 
nothing. That is not fair.' The mission schools, of 
course, continued to receive central government grants, 
to which no natives at that time contributed anything 
directly. The Bishop said that 'such grants-in-aid are 
outside the Counoil system and not related to the 
people's own tax contributions.'
20) C.D. Rowley, loc.cit., p.442. Amended by Ord. 20/1957, 
s.4 - previously penalties had applied only to natives.
21) Quoted a/E.O. (Policy and Planning) N.A. to Administ­
rator, 10.11.1958. P.35-1, para.6.
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councils and missions according to a set formula* ' Such 
a Committee could recommend where council schools should 
be built, and could also recommend the granting of non­
monetary assistance to non-council registered Higher Schools* 
Under the Rabaul Agreement itself, the Committee could 
recommend that certain work be done or equipment provided 
for mission schools, the value of this to be offset against 
Administration subsidies. Missions could also staff council 
schools, but such teachers were to come under the direct 
control of the D.E.O. 23
The Agreement did not work well in the Gazelle Peninsula; 
the mission appeared to believe that it represented carte
blanche to make finanoial demands* Its requests for aid to
24the councils were preposterous. The Local Education 
Committee gave the mission an ideal medium for exerting 
pressures; while in relation to the native» the Administration 
was in an impossible position - it was felt that sectarianism
22) Reg.47/1955. Gazette No.65, 22.12*55* These committees 
were distinct from the education committees of the 
councils, and also from the Distriot Education Committees 
dealing with both council and non-counoil areas - see 
Papua Report 1958-9, p.80*
23) NA.23-17-7. These Local Education Committees appear to 
have been confined to New Britain. Many offioers 
believed the whole substance of the Rabaul Agreement to 
have general application.
24) A.D.O. to D.N.A. 10.10.56, Rabaul 14/11/6s Report, inter­
view between D.O. Orken and W.R.Dishon of D.N.A.,
29.11.1956, NA.23-17-7. The D.O. claimed that the mission 
demands had not been framed in collaboration with 
councillors or taxpayers at all, but were simply the
work of individual missionaries. A.D.O. to D.O.
28.12.1956, Rabaul 14/11/6B. See Ch. VII.
would increase* Local staff had to be restrained from
accepting the mission point and withdrawing oounoils from
26all participation in education*
At this stage the Direotor of Education saw that a firm
statement was called for; in 1956 he issued a circular
memorandum looking forward to a closer association between
his Department and local government. He emphasised that
the councils presented a unique opportunity to educate
natives in social and economic development. He stated as
policy that oounoils should be enoouraged to vote annually
part of their revenues to education, and particularly to
07
providing and maintaining Village Higher Schools.
The Catholic mission remained a stumbling block, however; 
for the Administration was watching developments in the 
Gazelle Peninsula before involving counoils generally in 
education. To take one example, the D.C. Western District 
refused to sanction the building of sohools by the Kiwai 
council, saying that the Administrator had intimated that
po
council participation in education was to be discouraged.
25) E.O. (L.G.) to Chief of Division, Develoment and 
Welfare (D.N.A.), 16.1.57, NA. 23-17-7.
26) Ibid.
27) Circular Memorandum No.31/1956, 26.5.56. Educ. P.M.E/35—4. 
This offers an interesting comparison with the British 
Solomons, where the councils oontrol the schools and 
teachers for which they pay; but this has led to a 
lowering of standards, as the teachers are paid rates 
below those of central government#
28) D.C. Daru to D.N.A., 8.8.57, Daru 30-2/638, attached 
Daru P.R.4/1957-8.
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This was denied in Port Moresby as inconsistent with the
pg
Education Circular No*31; nevertheless, in 1958 this 
council was still not participating in eduoation, because 
the D.C. felt that the ’propriety* of its doing so had not 
been properly resolved*30
Meanwhile, in the Gazelle Peninsula the Catholic mission 
was testing the principle of council aid to the full*
’Trouble* was threatened at any suggestion that aid be
31withdrawn; while demand® for aid continued to be exorbitant.
By protracted negotiation with one mis®ion the Administrator
had worked himself into a peculiar difficulty, for only a
firm general policy deoiaion could deter the Catholics,
while such a decision would have to involve the other three
missions represented on his Advisory Board. Here it was
felt certain that the Anglicans would support the Catholic
principle, and the L.M.S. and Lutherans oppose it, leaving
32the Administrator with an invidious casting vote.
29) D.N.A. to D.C., 26.11.57, NA.41-4-6.
30) D.O. to D.N.A., 4.11.58. Daru 23-6-1. After the 1955 
reorganization the D.C. was, of course, no longer subject 
to the D.N.A., but directly to the Administrator.
Despite the views of the Director of Education and of 
D.N.A., the D.C. could pursue his own policy until a 
directive arrived from the Administrator. In Feb.1959 
the Administrator officially informed the D.C. that he 
had misinterpreted his remarks of 1955, which applied 
only to the Rabaul situation, and that he should follow 
the proposals of the two directors - Asst. Admin, to 
D.C., 26.2.59, Admin.23-1-5.
31) A.D.O. to D.O. 16.10.58, Rabaul 14/11/6B. Quoting Father 
0*Hanlon. A.D.O. to D.O., 16.9.58. Rabaul 14/11/6B.
These requests had been approved by taxpayer’s meetings. 
Meeting of 11.971^58, Eduoation Committee.
32) Ibid. E.O.’s memo.
In the Peninsula there was further temporising, aid 
being limited (in 1957) to £150 by any oounoil, 'on the
clear understanding that no precedent was being created..*' 
There was also a school of thought within the Administration, 
however, which regarded it as politically vital to avoid
any African-type separatism between missions and native
34bodies in elementary eduoation.
Rather similar mission pressures had built up in other 
areas. In Milne Bay in 1953 some dissatisfaction was 
expressed with the quality of village schooling provided by 
the Kwato mission* It was suggested that if some of the 
village sohools were counoil sponsored they would beooms 
eligible for direct Administration assistanee* To the 
surprise of the N.A.S., however, at a public meeting the 
councillors reversed their stand and refused aid 'because
their way was along Kwato's road with its aooent on
35religious teaching in schools'. It was alleged that this 
was done under the influence of Mrs. Beavis, for long in 
charge of Kwato's schools and opposed to direct participation
•zg
by the Administration in any form . There was clearly 
a division of opinion within the mission, however| for the
33) a/E.O.(Policy and Planning) to Admin. 10.11.58, P.35-1; 
D.N.A. to D.C. Stow Britain, 4.12.58, NA.23-17-7.
34) Ibid.
35) Memo, by H.T. Plant ( N .A .S . )  to D.C. Samarai, 
Confidential. Political Situation in Milne Bay Area, 
31.1.1953, p.6.
36) Ibid. Kwato was in debt at the time and grants from the 
Administration were based on student numbers. Kwato 
education was not free (parents were charged 30/- per
?onth for a boarcTer if not fed by the parents) and their eachers received a pittance.
522
33
523
head of the mission, R. Abel, later instructed mission
37teachers, if necessary, to teach in council schools.
This decision may have been forced by the council's pressing
ahead with its own building programmes by 1959 the Milne Bay
council had built and was maintaining three schools staffed
by Administration teachers.
In the Higaturu council area of the Northern District
the Anglican mission is predominant* Aocording to the
council clerk, the Bishop tried to discourage any council
39participation in education* The mission was quite blunt 
with the Administration about its wishing to keep a monopoly 
of primary education: the Director of Eduoation was told that
A(\
it would not oppose a Village Hi^ier School at Poho. The 
council felt that primary education was weak in some areas; 
this was holding up recruitment of students to a proposed
37) Ibid. Mrs. Beavis successfully objected to a oounoil 
suggestion that a new school at Wagawaga, to be built 
without Mission assistance by the villagers, be sited 
next to the Council House* It was eventually built on 
mission land* (Bisimaka, the mission headquarters in 
the Bay, adjoins Wagawaga).
38) Report Papua 1958-9, p.86; illustration, facing p.80.
A school in permanent materials was being constructed in 
Wagawaga at the time of my visit - May, 1960. Kwato has 
a orowded boarding school at Bisimaka. The Catholic 
mission has also expanded its eduoation activities, with 
a boarding school for boys and girls at Daio.
39) P.O. Normoyle to D.C*, 24.10.56, Popondetta 14-8-7.
40) Letter from Bishop Hand dated 8.3.57, on Popondetta 
14-8-7. My italics. The Administration has a curious 
policy on religion, aimed at the 'voluntary acceptance' 
of Christianity 'in the absence of any indigenous body 
of religious faith founded on indigenous teaching or 
ritual*.
council technical school at Popondetta. But a primary 
school erected by villagers at the Administration's request 
is said to have been taken down again at the Bishop's
40
request. Similarly, in the Ilimo area the Bishop was
alleged to have threatened to 'fight the people' if the
council built a sohool. In June, 1959, the Director accused
43the Anglican mission of using 'religious intimidation'.
As late as August, 1959, at a conference at Agenehambo, the
mission eventually confessed that it could not cope with
44primary eduoation unaided. But the council's technical
45school had been held up for three years.
(iii) Antagonism and Separatism.
It is perhaps hardly surprising that the missions should 
have so vigorously defended an entrenched position, held for 
sixty or more years; but this defence defeated its own 
purpose by alienating both the councils and the Administration.
The Madang conference strongly criticised the attitude 
of the missions, and asked the Administration to guarantee
41) Minutes, Higaturu Council, 22.10.1956.
42) D.E.O. to Director of Eduo. 22.10.59, Pop. Educ. Office.
43) Director of Eduo. to Administrator, inspection 18-20 th 
June 1959. The gist of his report was that the standard 
of mission primary schooling was too low. Pop. 8-1-1.
44) Ibid.
45) A.D.O. (L.G.) to D.O. 20.3.59, Pop. 14-8-13/1. The D.O. 
(ibid.) doubted whether the Eduo. Dept, could provide a 
teacher for the technical school; but 12 students began 
a 2 year course in carpentry in I960.
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parents the right of choice in schooling* Shortly
afterwards, in August 1959, the Departments of Education and
Native Affairs took advantage of the definitive policy
statement in Circular Memorandum 5/59 of the Assistant
Administrator - that councils were to he regarded as part
of the administrative structure by all departments - to
re-open the question of council aid to mission schools*
Such aid was finally forbidden by Native Affairs memorandum
No. 230 of 1st September, 1959
Meanwhile, as a glance at the economic development tables
will show, the councils had pressed ahead with school
building in most areas, especially in 1958-60* The end
result would appear to be the kind of local separatism in
education which some sections of the Administration had feared.
In October, 1959, a general instruction had to be issued to
all oounoils that no new sohools oould be opened in 1960
48because of a chronic shortage of teachers. One mission 
suggested, and the D*E*0. supported it, that the mission staff
46) Madang Conference Proceedings, 1-5 June 1959, p.40| 
item 13. Councillor Dau stated that the Catholio 
mission had told parents in his area not to send 
children to the council school.
47) Dir. Eduo. to D.N.A. , 29 . 7.59, Educ. E/35-1. D.N.A. 
discussion agreed, 19.8*59* D.N.A* to Asst* Admin*
20*8.59, NA.39-4-2.
48) Dir. Eduo. to D.E.O. Goroka, 19.10.59. ED/5254.
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council eohools in the area; but the proposal was ’very
49definitely not approved* in Port Moresby. Thus 
education in council areas suffered from the mutual 
suspicion which largely originated in the Tolai situation.
(iv) Closer Relations with Central Government.
The Education Department continued, however, to try 
to bring about a better working relationship with local 
governments in 1960 a programme of community technical 
training was launched in association with the councils on 
which, said the Direotor, *the final success of the
B A
programme will largely depend*. Had mission difficulties 
not held the stage for so long, there is little doubt that 
more positive co-ordination with counoils would have come 
sooner.
49) Ibid. The Educ. Dept, launched a "crash" programme to 
train as many teachers as possible at *A* Certificate 
level, i.e. the lowest. He admitted he was *not happy' 
about this. The lack of trained staff deterred N.A. 
staff from extending looal government - note discussion 
in Milne Bay Distriot, 1959, Samarai 14-17-1.
All council aid to mission schools ceased on 1st Jan.I960.
50) Dir. Educ. Circular Memorandum No. 30/1960. D.N.A. to 
D.O.*s, 9.5.60, NA.39-4-0.
51) It might be argued that councils have negligible say in 
the development of educational extension in their areas; 
but in fact they exert a constant pressure on their 
local E.O.s for more and better schooling, through their 
education committees. By mid-1959 the Papuan councils 
had built only 5 schools, but most oounoils were still 
in the organizational phase. Councils will have little 
control until they can employ their own teachers, and 
without a grants-in-aid scheme there is no prospect of 
this.
CHAPTER X 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Participation by native local government in the promotion 
of health and hygiene has been one of the most successful 
features of administration in council areas. This has 
resulted partly from the fact that a great deal of pressing 
practical work, particularly the building of aid posts, 
falls within the financial competence of local government 
councils; and partly from the co-operative attitude of the 
Department of Public Health, which from the beginning 
realized the value of councils in seouring a favourable 
social atmosphere, a prime desideratum for medioal extension 
in primitive areas . 1
The problems of achieving teohnioal co-ordination with 
local government have only gradually been solved; but the 
positive approach of D.P.H., an object lesson to other 
departments in the Territory, generally enabled these 
problems to be faced rather than avoided.
(i) Relationship with the Health Department.
Early in 1950, before the first village oouncils - as 
they were then called - were proclaimed, the Director of
1) See the quotation by J.J. Saave, The Village Aid Posts, 
South Pacific. July-Aug. 1954, VIT, 1Ï, p'.aôï. As ne 
remarks (p .892) the aid posts as village health projects 
had a long and unattractive history, beoause their 
importance in village life had not always been understood#
5. Health.
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Public Health put out a circular outlining a plan for making
medical assistance permanently available through the
establishment of Village Aid Posts in charge of trained
Native Medical Assistants (a title later changed to Aid
Post Orderly)• This policy was seen as the medical
analogue of the changeover from village to area administration
through native local government, and of the abandonment of
P
government by patrol*
It was envisaged from the beginning that the Aid Posts 
and their staffs would progressively become the responsi­
bility of the councils. Accordingly oertain principles 
were laid down*
(a) the Orderly had to be acceptable to the village 
people ;
(b) the village people (councils) were to construct 
aid posts;
(c) the Orderly was to be given no powers except to 
report, isolate and treat infeotious disease;
(d) the Orderly was to take an active part in village 
life and by example improve sanitation, personal« 
hygiene and nutrition.
An attempt was made to define the relationship of the 
N.M.A. with the local government council. The D.P.H. 
considered that he could best fulfil the above functions by 
becoming an offioial of the council, though before appoint­
ment he was to be approved by the Health Department, and
2) D.P.H. Circular 117, 6.1.1950; Circular 144, 4.9.1950.
3) D.P.H. Circular 174, 12*7.1951*
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were to be given the N.M.A. by the Health Department,
although the council and its supervising offioer would be
notified. If a N#M.A# proved unsatiBfactory, as a oounoil
employee he would have to be dismissed by the oounoil,
although it was said that the supervising officer would
•prevail upon the council* to do this in the event of
divided views. If a council could not meet the wages of
N.M.A.s, then they would be seconded to the council*s employ
by the Health Department, which would continue to pay them.
Emphasis was placed on the fact that liaison ehould be
maintained between the councils and D.P.H. through both
4
Headquarters and district offioers.
It remained for these principles to be worked out in 
practioe. The control and discipline of the N.M.A.s were, 
in fact,subject to the council, to its supervising officer, 
and to the District Medical Officer. A dispute at Baluan 
quickly showed that each of these was applying different 
criteria. In 1952 the supervising officer of the Baluan 
council gaoled a N.M.A. for failing to take patients to 
hospital; he was also dismissed by the oounoil. That a 
council, not the Health Department, should be dissatisfied 
with the technical rather than the personal aspect of a 
N.M.A. *s work was something ^hioh had not been envisaged in 
the original instructions; the Director of Public Health
he was to be supervised by it in his duties# Directions
4) Ibid.
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protested personally to the Senior Native Authorities 
Officer about the dismissal« In the opinion of the Health 
Department, there was no onus on N«M«A.s to take patients
5
to hospital, as the council expected.
Fortunately, personal relations between these two 
departmental officers were excellent. The S.N.A.O. considered 
that a mistake had been made, and he blamed the supervising 
officer, who had treated the N.M.A. like a Medioal Tultul 
under direct administration and was ’temperamentally unsuited'
g
to the Baluan situation? this officer was transferred. 
Essentially, however, the difficulty was that., although the 
council nominally employed the N.M.A., the Health Department 
as the supervising authority claimed full and exclusive 
disciplinary powers. The council could take no legal action 
under the Native Regulations against a N.M.A.; if it wished 
to pass a rule defining a N.M.A.'s duties it would have to 
seek the approval of the Health Department. The council was 
simply instructed to report such matters to the Department,
7
through the looal Medioal Officer.
In the health sphere this represented an assertion of 
the policy that councils are, in the full sense,
5) D.P.H. to a/S.N.A.O. (personal) 12.2.52, DPH 22/1/G.826. 
Circular 144 (et sup.) stated however, that N.M.A.s 
should 'encourage' patients to go to hospital.
6) a/S.N.A.O. to D.P.H., 3D.5.52, Rabaul 14/11/6/7-34.
7) Ibid.
.....  . . .  . . . .  J
r* o -t
5 o l
Some councils have chafed against the restraints of 
this nominal employer relationship with Orderlies, 
particularly in those areas, generally the initial local 
government areas, where they not only select candidates for 
training and put them on the council strength when trained,
o
but where they also meet the full cost of their wages.
This has been especially true of the Tolai areas, as of 
Baluan.
In 1957 the Tolai councils complained that many 
Orderlies worked extremely short hours. The interchange of 
views on this showed that the councils and the Public Health 
Department assessed the work of the Orderlies in different 
ways. The councils claimed that the Orderlies spent only a 
few hours a day on their work at the aid postsf on the 
other hand, the Senior Medioal Officer claimed that the 
councils were harder task-masters than the Administration, 
that the Orderlies had other work than that at the aid post, 
and that indeed one of the original instructions had 
enjoined them to make suitable gardens in the village, as 
models. The Health Department was clearly throwing greater 
emphasis on the sooial aspeot of the Orderlies* work; itjfelt
8 ) In most areas the candidates are selected by the Councils 5 
Fienberg was able to state as late as Nov.1957 (memo, of
5.11.57,p.11) that Councils paid the wages of Orderlies. 
This was not true everywhere, at that time.
'Administration instrumentalities'.
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that within this context they were probably carrying out 
their duties and that the councils were wrongly assessing
9
their work*
On the other hand, the Director of Native Affairs came 
out on the side of the counoils, asserting that the 
councillors were better placed to know precisely what the 
Orderlies did with their time; the councillors were anxious 
to get value for public expenditure, and this was an 
excellent argument for the retention of Orderlies in oouncil 
employ*10
Patently, as the Director of Native Affairs pointed out,
the complications of divided control were suoh that
Circular 174, which set out the desired relationship between
the Health Department and native local government, needed
11
to be redefined*
It will be noted however, that both the Director of 
Health and the Director of Native Affairs were anxious that 
the employment of Orderlies by councils should continue, 
though for somewhat different reasons* But in view of the 
complications of control there was an element of opinion in
9) Quoted D.N.A. to S.M.O., 28.11.57, NA 23-17-5.
10) Ibid.
11) Ibid. However the argument here revolved around the 
interpretation of Circular 144, which stated as an 
integral part of the duty of N.M.A. to set an example by 
tending to the hygiene of his own family and by making
a good garden. The R.M.0. at Rabaul stated that it had 
become aocepted policy that the Orderlies spend only a 
few hours a day on their job and the rest of the day on 
their 'private affairs'.
533
the Native Affairs Department, which, deriving its ooncepts 
and arguments essentially from the practical efficiency of 
direct administration, wanted Aid Post Orderlies to be 
dissociated from counoils and both employed and oontrolled 
by the Health Department. Sound arguments could be adduced* 
In 1955 the issue was raised at Baluan# Circular 174 had 
stated that if a council were financially unable to meet the 
wages of Orderlies, the Health Department would continue to 
pay them. The terms in whioh this was phrased were too un­
qualified; for every oounoil, in relation to the needs of its 
area, can claim extreme poverty. In addition, a patchwork 
system of payment developed, as in the Baluan council area, 
where two Orderlies were paid by the oounoil, but at least 
six others were paid by the Health Department. The proposal, 
in 1955, that the small Baluan council take over the payment 
of another five Orderlies (at a cost of £330), in addition 
to building another six Aid Posts (cost £900) roused the
IP
A.D.O. supervising the oounoil to protest.
The A.D.O. had suggested that Orderlies paid by the 
Health Department could be seconded to the service of the 
council. The D.C., however, protested on the issue of 
control, rather than payment. He felt that the Health 
Department should take over entire responsibility for the 
Orderlies, thereby separating them from local government and
12) A.D.O. Hioks to D.M.O. Manus, 12*1.55. Lorengau 16/2- 
Bal.9/55.
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the risk of 'interference* according to the play of
T 3
personalities.
The Director of Health rejected this principle; the
councils, he said, would have to learn to manage their staffst
We will retain supervisory control over the 
Orderly and, if it is our opinion that he is not 
performing his duties, we would demand that he 
be dismissed or would withhold all druge, 
dressings etc. If, on the other hand, we were 
of the opinion that the Village Councils were 
mishandling their servant we would, if the servant 
so wished, transfer him to another position at an 
Aid Post where he would be acceptable, or to 14 
hospital staff.
It is perhaps fortunate that no occasion arose for the 
withholding of drugs to council Orderlies as a form of 
coercion; and that the occasions on which action was taken 
on the unsuitability of Orderlies were uncommon - for both 
these measures would have destroyed the good social basis 
for medioal extension, which was the prime object of the 
Health Department's stand.
«
The principal issues from the standpoint oijdepartmental 
liaison with the councils in the extension of medical services
13) D.C, Manus to D.N.A., 8.2*1955, Lorengau 14-9-6/958.
14) D.P.H* to D.N.A. 10.3.55. DPH 30/176/2/M436. The D.P.H. 
reaffirmed, however, that the Department would continue to 
pay Orderlies if Councils were unable to do so - the 
A.D.O. 's point. The difficulty arose in evaluating such
a situation, councils and their supervising officers 
being unlikely to agree with D.P.H.
15) The arrangement has been that the council builds and main­
tains the Aid Post, while the DPH supplies the equipment - 
see J.McAuley, Local Government Among the Tolai, South 
Pacific, VI1 ,1 1 , p.&8§* In a few areas where mission
influence is strong both spiritually and in the medical 
field, councils have taken the opportunity of free supplies 
for their own Aid Posts to offer aid to mission institutions 
e.g. free linen and transport for K.B. hospital (Kwato) 
Milne Bay - Milne Bay Estimated 1960. Sinaeda, 14-40-4.
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have been then, the desirability and the reality of 
council control, both in its administrative and in its 
financial implications. This is plainly the cruoial 
question, for buildings without staff and services are worth­
less.
(ii) Council Building Responsibilities»
At the same time, the provision of buildings, 
particularly Aid Posts, has been one of the most common 
provinces of council expenditure; indeed, the steady increase 
in the number of Aid Posts, particularly as local government 
has extended since 1955, has forced the Health Department to 
train a steadily increasing number of Orderlies to staff 
them. This emphasis on practical undertakings, as McAuley 
has pointed out, is one of the main features of native local 
government; it fits in with the oonoeption of encouraging a 
real sense of responsibility by tying action to positive 
t a s k s . ^
The pattern was set by the detailed survey undertaken 
by the Health Department in the Gazelle Peninsula in the 
period July 1950 - Ootober 1951. This concluded that 35 aid 
posts were needed, or roughly 1 for every 1,000 of population.
16) As MoAuley indicated (loo.cit., p.880) the use of health 
facilities contains its own cumulative impetus, for the 
generally heavy infant mortality rate is dramatically 
reduced with adequate medical servioes, and this boosts 
the population » requiring extended servioes. On early 
staff difficulties, see Saave, loc.cit., p.894.
17) MoAuley, ibid., p.884.
Orderlies, was to be the sole responsibility of the councils.
The cost of an aid post at that time was said to be £180-240,
although the Tolai councils were assisted by large-scale
purchase of materials through their Bulk Store. The Medical
Officer was sanguine that the councils could also take over
the wages of the Orderlies and the Hygiene Assistants, so
that preventive medicine oould be entirely channelled through
local government.
The establishment of five Native Village Councils 
on the Gazelle Peninsula proved to be a valuable 
factor in the expansion of the health work. Any 
matters connected with the health projects are 
discussed with the Native Authorities Seotion of 
the Department of District Services and the Native 
Village Councils at their ordinary meetings. It 
was encouraging to see the inolusion of N.M.A.s in 
the Councils' work, whioh gives them more responsi-,« 
bility in the village social life,
Problems later complicated the staffing aspect; but the
building of aid posts and staff houses went ahead. In nine
months in 1953-4 the Tolai councils built seven aid posts
and three houses for Orderlies, medical expenditures forming
19
11# of total expenditures. Overall, however, the 
situation by 1958 was even better; actual expenditure for 
1957, for the 20 oouncils then in existence, showed an
on
expenditure of 15.2% on medical services and buildings;
18) Saave, loo.cit., p.894.
19) McAuley, loo.cit., p.884.
20) A.M. Healy, Native Local Government in N.G.t Its 
Functions ancT^Problems, J.A.A., Xiii, 3, p.192.
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The construction of these, together with houses for the
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despite the disputes over the payment of Orderlies, the 
bulk of this went towards buildings, for, as inflation has 
raised prices and local government hae extended into the 
lees accessible areas, the ratio between medical wages and 
the capital cost of buildings has become greater. The 
Kiwai council in the Western District, for exampleyin 1959 
completed five aid posts; the cost of an aid post was 
estimated to average £800. The four Orderlies employed by
p;
the Kiwai council at the same period oost a total of £288p.a.
This point does not appear to have been raised, however, 
partly because in the Tolai areas, where agitation on the 
payment of Orderlies was most forceful, the situation was 
atypical, with a large percentage of medioal expenditure 
going in wages.
(iii) Council Area Planning.
In 1958 the Department of Native Affairs launched a 
campaign to impress on the technical departments that looal 
government councils were integral parts of the administ­
rative structuref and that therefore they should co-operate 
with councils in area planning. But in the health sphere 
this implied that the problems of control and finance were 
shifted to the district level. The long-standing liaison 
between the Health and Native Affairs Departments in the
21) Daru Sub-districts Reports, Daru 23-3-1; Estimates 
1960, Daru 23-6-1. All Aid Posts are built of 
European materials.
Gazelle Penineula was suggested as a model for extension
to other oounoil areas; but no re-definition of Circular
174 had taken place as the Direotor of Native Affairs had
urged in 1957.22
The Director suggested to the Health Department that
plans be drawn up at the district level by D.M.O.s working
in consultation with oouncils, and that these plans extend
over *at least five years*. One of the major advantages of
such plans would be the obviating of difficulties caused by
P3
staff transfers. Accordingly, all D.M.O.s were asked to 
submit to their Department *realistio and oarefully costed*
04
plans for the councils in their areas. The Exeoutive 
Officer, (Local Government) commented that this was the
OR
kind of co-operation that was required.
Everything depended, however, on the play of personalities 
at the district level. In most council areas little action 
appears to have been taken. The D.M.O. Milne Bay submitted 
detailed plans, after consultation with the A.D.O. (L.G.) 
and with the counoil; these plans aimed within the five years 
to have the council area fully equipped with aid posta and 
fully responsible for the payment of its Orderlies. The
22) D.N.A. to D.P.H., 6.5.58, NA 23-17-5.
23) Ibid.
24) Ibid. Minute to a/D.P.H., dated 23.5.58, appended 
D.N.A. oopy.
25) Ibid. Marginal note.
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atmosphere for the preparation of such a plan was peouliarly
favourable in Milne Bay, partly because of the integrating
influence of Mr. Cottrell-Dormer (see Appendix B) and partly
because of the emphasis which the Kwato and Catholic missions
had long placed on medical services and improved hygiene.
The Milne Bay council was already spending more heavily on
health than on any other service - the 1959 estimates
provided for an expenditure of £914 on medical services and
buildings, out of a total budget of £4,924 (18*5%)# There
were already 1 1 aid posts or hospitals in the council area
(5,500 people); while three of the seven Orderlies staffing
council aid posts were already paid by the oouncil, in
addition to a grant made to the Kwato post at Wagawaga.
The D.M.O. was sanguine about the constructional needs
of the area. He planned for only another three aid posts,
when coverage would be excellent. Hygiene and sanitation,
he said, *do not present muoh of a problem*. The sting was
in the tail - he proposed that from 1961 the oounoil take
over payment of Orderlies* wages at the rate of *not more
27
than two a year* *
Amongst supervising officers of councils there is 
generally a resistance to the principle of councils* taking 
over the payment of Orderlies, for it oonfliots with the
26) D.M.O. to D.O. Samarai, 23.3.59, KA. Seven of the aid 
posts belonged to the Council*
27) Ibid. He also envisaged the Councils* assisting with 
an anti-malarial programme.
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emphasis on tangible works and additional services as 
council responsibilities. The succeeding officer in Milne 
Bay was highly critical of the transfer to the area of 
formulae worked out in the Gazelle Peninsula, with inadequate 
allowance for the dispersed population and the difficulties
p Q
of communication«
The delegation to district staffs of oo-ordination in 
the development of health plans was apparently designed to 
allow flexibility; but without clearly defined principles 
there was too much scope for the clash of personalities. In the 
Higaturu council area the attempt to evolve a plan 
foundered on the failure by Headquarters to lay down the 
spheres which suoh a plan was intended to cover. Here the 
D.M.O. took as one of his principal functions the improve­
ment of native dieti he suggested to the council that hygiene 
could be improved and protein intake raised if villagers 
established communal pig farms. The oounoil was quick to 
point out, however, that the Department of Agriculture had 
already forbidden the penning of pigs. The D.O. felt that 
the D.M.O. was trespassing outside his province; and on his
28) Personal information, A.D.O. Frew, Sinaeada. The
European sister at the Kwato hospital, K.B., agreed with 
these criticisms of the scheme. Aa the A,D.O. plans the 
estimates with the council, and as in this area the 
D.M.O. is rarely able to attend oounoil meetings, it 
would seem improbable that the plan will be adhered to. 
Some scheme for long-term adoption of plans by counoils 
is required if tkey are to be more than departmental 
suggestions.
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advice the Director of Native Affairs suggested that the 
D.M.O. confine his functions to planning the siting of aid
eg
posts and direoting the anti-malarial campaign# Shortly 
afterwards the D.M.O. was transferred to Bougainville; no 
plan was prepared.
(iv) Payment and Control of Oounoil Medical Staff#
As looal government has extended into the poorer and 
more remote areas, the question of the immediate looal 
payment of medical staff has ceased to be as important as 
in the Tolai and Baluan areas# The principle embodied in 
Circular 174 and applied in Baluan in 1955, that councils 
should pay for Orderlies if they could afford to do so# has 
given the later councils an avenue of escape#
The Hanuabada oounoil, in this as in most aspeots of 
oounoil activity, has proved atypical; it has regularly been 
short of funds for even the most urgent capital works 
(though in recent years it has built a health clinic and 
maternity centre, its major works achievement) and it has 
been happy to have its Orderlies both paid and controlled by 
D.P.H# This has eliminated most of the friction that might 
have arisen from the propinguity of D.P.H. Headquarters#
Only in the matters of the observance of health regulations
29) D#0. to D»N#A., 26.8#58, Popondetta 14-8-llj Minutes 
Higaturu Council 23#8#58. D.N.A. to D.P.H., 26#9#58,
NA 23-17-5. Personal relations had previously been 
poor; district staff conferences were rare at Popondetta. 
In 1959 the D#0. complained that the D.P#H. was not 
working through the Council#
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its own sanitation rules, has it been criticised by the
Health Department - and in these respects it has long been
recognized that direct central government action, or grants-
30
in-aid to the council, are necessary to improve facilities.
It was primarily in the Gazelle Peninsula, therefore, 
that the councils felt that central government had unjustly 
shifted its health responsibilities to them; the payment of 
Orderlies had been accepted in the period 1950-3, but the 
spectacle of later councils using their funds almost 
exclusively on capital works roused resentment. By 1959-60 
large numbers of aid posts had been built - the major works 
acknowledged by the Health Department as essential before 
the full responsibility for the payment of medical staff 
was assumed - but the worTs projects of the Tolai oounoils 
had become more ambitious; they, and the Regional Medical 
Officer, now looked forward to the establishment of Rural 
Health Centres staffed by well-qualified Assistant Medioal 
Practitioners*
Therefore, at the Madang Conference the New Guinea
30) Asst.Registrar of Cooperative Societies complained about 
health services to Council 17.8.56, on behalf of his 
native employees resident there* The Chairman retorted 
that the Orderlies were Administration employees and 
that their control did not lie with the Council 
(rejecting thereby the secondment responsibility), 21.8.56 
(H.C.12-1)* The A.D.O. was inclined to agree with the 
Council (23*8*56, H.C.12-1). In 1957 Hanuabada was 
severely criticised by a Health Inspector (D.P.H. to 
D.O. Port Moresby, 8.8.57; D.O.P.M. 14-26-12).
(it lies within the town boundaries) and the enforcement of
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of Orderlies until all capital works in the health sphere
31
had been completed* Prom the Administration^ viewpoint,
this was a situation that the councils could prolong
indefinitely: but Headquarters was slow in replying, and
the issue continued to simmer* In February, 1960 it was
brought to a head when the Livuan council wished to stop
the wages of an Orderly sent on a three months refresher
course by the D.P.H. The D.O. supported the oounoilf and
asked that the Administration assume the responsibility for
32
the wages of all Orderlies employed by the Tolai counoils.
This was rejected by the Health Department as retrograde; 
for while complete supervision had to remain with the 
Department, as laid down in 1957, the only way to put the 
influence of the oounoils behind medical extension was to 
make them financially responsible for the Orderlies. At the 
same time the Director recognized the problem in the Gazelle 
Peninsula, where the oounoils spent 40% of their budgets on 
wages. The only solutions he could suggest were ad h o p , and 
went no way towards solving the difficulties in the inter­
pretation of financial capacity and administrative control*
He proposed that council budgets be made available for
31) D*N*A* memo. 20.6*60, NA 44-4-1, item 20, p.7.
32) D.O. to D.N.A., 20.3.59, Rabaul 14/12; D.O. to D.N.A., 
22.2*60, Rabaul 14/11/6/43.
councils resolved that councils should not pay the wages
Director of Native Affairs again referred the matter for
3 4
settlement at the local level* The long-delayed reply 
to the Madang Conference resolution simply reaffirmed the 
principle that 'as Council budgets increase, the
7 '
responsibility for salary payments must be assumed. This
can be assessed annually to ensure whether or not a Counoil
9 35
may take over these responsibilities.
By early 1960 it m s  realized in Port Moresby that the 
only practicable solution depended on financial aid from 
central government* If all,,council Orderlies were paid by 
the councils the financial aspect of the problem would be 
close to solution; though from the supervisory viewpoint 
friotion will probably not be entirely eliminated until 
counoils are sufficiently large and wealthy, like some 
African councils, to employ their own fully qualified 
specialist cadre . 3*5
The Director of Native Affairs suggested to the Health 
Department that a grant-in-aid system was needed if oounoils
33) a/D.P.H. to D.N.A., 6.4.60, D.P.H. 16-16-2/^650. In fact, 
New Britain was the one area where the R.M.O. had kept
in close touch with the Councils, primarily through 
their quarterly meetings, to a remarkable degree.
34) e.g. a/D.N.A. to D.O. Rabaul, 30.5.60, NA 42-17-6. Here 
the D.O. was advised to consult with the R.M.O. on the 
payment of Orderlies by Bola Council (proclaimed 16.12.58, 
including a population of only 2000).
35) D.N.A. memo., 20.6.60, M  44-4-1, cit.sup.
36) In practice, exoept in concentrated areas suoh as the 
Gazelle Peninsula, the D.P.H. lacks the staff for 
adequate supervision; friction generally arises from 
Council or D.N.A. dissatisfaction.
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analysis to the R.M.O. and to his Department. The
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desired; but the principle of grants-in-aid had not proved
37
acceptable to the Treasury. In April, 1960, nevertheless, 
a submission for suoh grants was being drawn up by the 
Native Affairs and Health Departments for presentation to 
the Administrator.3®
were to retain the health responsibilities which the D.P.H.
37) D.N.A. to D.P.H., 20.4.60, NA 39-3-0.
38) Ibid. Late in 1961 this submission was approved, 
thereby creating a notable precedent in financial 
arrangements with central government - see Ch. VIII.
CHAPTER XI 
THE APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(i) The Conceptual Divisions European Rights
Councils established under the Native Local Government 
Councils Ordinance remain the sole statutory local govern­
ment bodies in Papua-New Guinea. Between local government 
and native local government a vague conceptual division has 
developed . 1 To some extent, this has been accidental, but 
in the context of a multi-racial state - and Australian 
policy pre-supposes the continued existence of New Guinea as 
a multi-racial state - it has important implications which 
have already agitated residents and commentators.
This conceptual dichotomy had its origin in the differing 
polioy emphases of the Labour Party and of the Liberal- 
Country Party coalition at the time of the 1949 federal
elections. Labour policy in the Territory had thrown emphasis
2
on independent native economic development. The European 
residents felt neglected and powerless, particularly because 
the pre-war local European representation on the Legislative 
councils had not been restored. The policy speech of the 
post-election Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, sketched a plan 
to allow more local initiative in the Territory and to restore
1) See C.D. Rowley, Local Government in New Guinea, J.A.A., 
XI, 3, 1959, pp.139—43.
2) Memorandum on the Policy of the Administration. Re-Issue 
Fo r T  Mo re s byT '^ 4» Fri'94'j^ Tprr^-Er.----------------
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a more pro-European balance in economic policy.
The meeting of the new Cabinet on 9th March, 1950, which 
dealt with Territory affairs, was concerned almost exclusively 
with encouraging private enterprise in economic development; 
this policy was seen as ’not inconsistent with the require­
ments of other aspects such as political, international
4
obligations and defences.’ As a corollary, the enlisting of 
the active support of the European residents was seen to be 
essential to the restoration of economic confidence.
The Papua-New Guinea Act made no specific provision for 
non-native local government, although it did provide for the 
re-establishment of the Legislative Council; but this was to 
happen only when the time was considered ripe, and with an 
official majority. When the incoming Minister for External 
Territories, P.C. Spender, visited Papua and New Guinea in 
March-April, 1950, he received addresses and petitions from 
a number of European organizations, the consensus of which 
was that the government should establish advisory councils 
representative of planting and commercial interests, to give 
the residents an Immediate say In local affairs.
The Madang Planters and Traders Association wanted a 
voice in the framing of a new Labour Ordinance. The Bulolo 
Returned Serviceman’s League suggested that 'local councils 
of residents’ be formed for each local community, to which
3) Policy speech of 10.11.1949, L. - C.P. Booklet.
4) Minute by Sec. Territories, 9.3.1950. Terr. AL 800/1/7.
3'
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necessary changes in Regulations and Ordinancess
This country has been strangled by the apathy of 
its residents, apathy b o m  of frustration*
Formation of local advisory councils will overcome 
this, and provide you with the strong support that 
residents are capable and desirable (sic; of giving 5 
you. • .
The Bougainville Association advocated —
The establishment of Regional Councils, in separate 
Districts, to confer with, and assist, the D.O. in 
matters affecting the welfare of the District. This 
would give Private Enterprise a better chance, morefi 
interest and more prestige.
Port Moresby already had an amorphous township advisory
7
body, constituted on local initiative , and members of this 
wanted a properly constituted organization. The matter of 
elections to looal bodies was discussed by its members with 
the Minister; but the Minister pointed out the ’great dangers*
o
if it became an elected body.
(11) The Advisory Councils
Spender replied to all these representations, in Madang, 
that he was considering the setting up of ’Advisory Com­
mittees’* advising on matters touching the particular areas
the Administration would submit for fconstructive comment’
5) Terr. AO 8 0 0 / l A *  The R.S.L., even more than in Australia, 
constitutes notable political pressure groups, despite 
continual assertions (e*g. by R.F.Bunting, M.L.C., South 
Pacifio Post. 16.12.1960) that it is non-political.
6) Ibid.
7) Terr. X 800/1/5. Sec. Territories to Minister, 5.12.1950, 
said that the township, ’at the instigation of the 
Administrator’, set this up early in 1950, as an experiment. 
It was not rigidly constituted, but consisted generally of
4 officials and 12 residents. Its function, inter alia was
to advisejwhat its constitution and defined functions 
could best be.
8 ) Terr. AO 800/1/7.
This will at least give some contact on a recognised 
basis between the white population in different « 
areas, and the Administration,.
He promised that the idea would be developed. In June,
1950, in a statement to Parliament, the Minister stated that9
pending the establishment of the Legislative Council,
District Advisory Councils would be set up to advise the
District Officers on local matters? members of the Councils
were to be nominated by the Minister from lists of ♦suitable*
local residents. Within the Department of External
Territories consideration was concomitantly being given to
the establishment of •additional bodies to perform functions
of a municipal nature* in the larger urban centres,
10
particularly Port Moresby.
The Administration immediately went ahead with the 
establishment of the District Advisory Councils. By September 
1950 the D.O.s had been asked to submit the names of up to 
six *suitable persons9 who might be nominated. In the same 
month submissions from all the major town were considered by 
the Executive Council and recommendations made for the 
appointment of members to Town Advisory Councils, to advise
9) Ibid. My italics.
10) Statement, H. of R. 2.6.1950; Sec. Territories Minute of
20.5.1950, Terr. AO 800/1A -  At this stage it was briefly 
considered that natives might be directly represented 
(undated pencil note) but this was quickly dropped; it 
was felt the missionaries could adequately represent the 
native viewpoint. Halligan specifically excluded natives 
(memo, of 5.12.1950, cit.sup.).
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where they were established.
in municipal matters«1 1  For the first twelve months these 
councils were to be experimental; they were to advise in 
June 1951 on their future membership and functions* By 
November, 1950, nominations to the District Advisory Councils 
had been received from most D.O.s and were considered by the
IP
Executive Council.
The Department of External Territories developed some
reservations about the policy at about the time that it was
actively being prosecuted* The Secretary» J.R. Halligan,
thought that one council might suffice for all areas except
the Central District of Papua, where the District and the
town were sufficiently large in European population to require
separate advisory bodies* Elsewhere populations tended to
be dispersed and the towns small; in some districts (e.g. the
Gulf) it had proved difficult to nominate even three resident
Europeans able and willing to serre, and in Halligan *s view
this implied that unsuitable people would gain repreeentatlon
13
because they were the only ones available. The Minister,
however, would have none of this, and curtly ordered all
the proposed urban as well as district councils to be
14
established promptly.
The Department was also inclined to be cautious about
11) T.P.N.G. Executive Council, meetings 6.9.1950f 13.9.1950, 
Item 3/28/50.
12) Executive Council, meeting 22-23 Nov. 1950, Item 3/35/50.
13) Sec. Territories to Minister 21.9.1950, 5.12.1950,
12.12.1950. Terr. A0/800/1/7.
14) Attached handwritten comments of 6.12.1950, 12.12.1950.
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'bhe functions of the District Advisory Councils. The
Administrator had submitted that the functions of the
councils should be (1) to assist the D.O. in each District;
and (ii) to advise the Administrator on matters affecting
the Territory. The latter was seen to invite general policy
discussion, perhaps with little local relevances the word
*assist' was objected to as implying executive functions.
The functions of the Councils were ultimately re-phrased thus:
To advise the D.O. in each District on matters 
affecting the administration of the District which 
can be placed before the Council by the D.O. or by,g 
any member notifying the D.O. in writing.
By April 1951 the Administrator was able to report that
Advisory Councils were functioning in all the principal towns v
and in most of the districts; in a few districts, such as
the Sepik, where eligible Europeans were few, the departure
16
of nominees held up the establishment of councils. There­
after, minor matters were strai^itened out from Canberra,
such as extending the tenure of office of District Advisory
17
Council members to two years , and preventing the duplication
15) Sec. Terr, to Minister 5.12.1950, cit.sup. Personal, letter*
9.1.51, Gov.Sec. S.A. Lonergan to Halligan also repeated 
his conviction that the District Councils should advise 
generally on policy. In practice, the distinction may 
appear academic, but it shows a notable liberalism under 
the Administrator, J.K. Murray. Note Sec .Terr, to Ad­
ministrator, 24.4.51, reminding him that the functions 
approved by the Minister were limited to advice on 
district administration.
16) Administrator to Sec.Territories, 6.7.1951.Terr.AO 800/\ft*
17) Sec.Terr, to Minister, 15.5.51, ibid.
18
of membership on Town and District Advisory Councils ; 
but in view of the fact that their functioning was intended 
to serve as a guide to a statutory system, it is remarkable 
that Canberra interest in them quickly waned after their 
establishment* It was only at the prompting of the councils 
themselves that, for example, a set of rules was drawn up 
regularising the appointment of members 5 and the Minister 
appeared happy to leave consultation with the councils 
entirely to the Administrator.1**
This was unfortunate for the development of the system to 
the statutory stage, because the experience on which the 
Department was relying to frame such a system was not trans­
mitted to it in Ganberra; although it was known that the 
residents, particularly in the towns, were anxious to have 
statutoxy councils - in 1951, for example, an R*S*L. 
deputation asked the Minister at Babaul to have the town 
Advisory Council assume the duties and responsibilities of 
a municipal council, and it agreed to pay rates to secure 
this . 20
One reason for the inactivity of the Department in
18) Minister to Sec* Terr* 12*3*1952, ibid*
19) Administrator to Sec*Terr* 12*2*1953; comments by 
Minister, 27*2.53, Terr* 57/3722. The rules provided for 
the creation of wards if the councils so desired (in 
towns), and for a rotating system of membership whereby 
half the council retired each year. Particularly with 
mission representatives, this latter provision proved 
inapplicable *
20) R.S.L* statement, Rabaul 28.7.1951. Terr. AO 800/1/7.
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attempting to convert the system into a statutory one may 
have been a growing perception of the complications, particu­
larly the inter-racial ones in the towns* The D*C. New 
Britain commented on the above representation by the Rabaul 
R.S.L. that elections would present difficulties, to avoid 
which policy would have to be decided in advance by the 
Administration*
This would require careful forethought as if free 
elections were held, it is likely that all members», 
of the Council would be Chinese - or natives*
By 1951 it was taken for granted that central representation 
for the Europeans through the Legislative Council would not 
be a substitute for local representation; but the question of 
statutory local government was postponed until the Legislative 
Council was working smoothly.
A combination of these factors, together with the con­
centration of policy initiative in the hands of the new 
Minister in Canberra (signalised by the removal of J.K* Murray 
as Administrator) meant that the conversion to a statutory 
system was indefinitely postponed. In effect, the system of 
advisory councils was largely ’frozen* in the mould in whioh it 
was cast in 1950 as a temporary expedient* The racial 
division which it embodies, and which is generally regarded as 
undesirable, has thereby been perpetuated*
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21) Ibid. Appended comments*
22) Sec. Terr, to Minister, 22.9*51, ibid*
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(iii) The Problems of Association
It must be recognized, however, that this has not been 
entirely accidental? for different administrative responsi­
bilities are reflected in the two systems. As the Minister 
stated in June 1950, when submitting the plan for advisory 
councils, Australians who lived and worked in New Guinea should 
not lose their democratic privileges; they were therefore en­
titled to institutional rights of advice and criticism on
23
matters of policy affecting them,as they enjoyed in Australia« 
(It might be noted that the re-establishment of the Legislative 
Council, at least in part, vitiated this argument).
On the other hand, the natives had no knowledge or 
anticipation of such political rights* Their political 
education was being channelled through native local govern­
ment, where they were not to criticise policy but to learn 
responsibility through applying their tax revenues to local 
tasks* That the natives might participate in 'sterile debate' 
was considered by the Administration to be not only useless but 
unwise. Thus the ooncepts of local government that were being 
applied were essentially quite different, and were unwittingly 
assumed to be mutually exclusive: local government (even 
without powers or responsibility) involved for Europeans the 
exercise of a political right; but for the natives it re­
presented political training. There was some pressure from
23) Statement of 2.6.1950, cit.sup.
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the United Nations for the setting up of area councils in
24
the more advanced sections of the Territory > but such area
councils were also envisaged by the Australian government in
terras of the separate Advisory Councils for Native Hatters
25
provided for in the Papua-New Guinea Act*
The proposed temporary nature of the Advisory Councils
was an additional deterrent to the appointment of natives to
them; it was this aspect of the system which overrode the
criticism of the 1953 U.N. Visiting Mission, which pointed out
the bi-raoial division in local government but was assured
that this was not Australian policy* The Mission felt, as
Rowley later stated, that the bringing together of the races
in 'political institutions' should be begun as early as
possible; and it suggested that the local Europeans involved
26
in the Advisory Councils were hostile to the idea.
24) Recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, 8th Session,
16.3.51. The Council unfortunately reinforced the 
separatist attitude by linking area extension to the 
extension of native local government. It might be noted 
for comparison that an unfortunate - probably disastrous - 
aspect of the Kenya system was the racial division in 
local government, although this largely resulted from
the consolidated settlement of Europeans; at the same 
time the Kenya government was dilatory in implementing 
the proposed multi-racial County Councils, provided for 
in 1952 - for a brief sketch see Z. Marsh and G. Kings- 
north. An Introduction to the History of East Africa 
(1957) pp. 193, 242-3.
25) Sec. Terr, to Minister, 5.12.1950.
26) Extracts from Report of 1953 U.N. Missionf South Pacific, 
VII, 2, 1953, p.616. Rowley, loc.cit., pp.1 4 2 - 3 . The 
Mission also rejected the common excuse in New Guinea 
that it is impossible to find natives competent to sit 
on the counolls.
and the Administration found it impossible to ignore the
criticism of the Visiting Mission led by Sir John Macpherson*
The Mission stated bluntly that natives should be appointed
to the Advisory Councils, because it was a necessary element
27
of political education to associate them with Europeans« 
Simogun Peta was appointed to the Sepik District Advisory 
Council in January, 1957? and the Trusteeship Council in July 
again urged the Administration to make further appointments
AQ
both to the District and to the Town Councils« By the end 
of the year six natives had been appointed members of District
«Q
Advisory Councils in Papua, and five in the Trust Territory«
It was announced as policy in January 1958 that natives were
to be appointed to all District Advisory Councils*®0
Because of the paucity of native representation, however,
the Administration reaffirmed the argument that the prime
! purpose of their appointment was educational:
Although these Councils deal with matters that are 
at present predominantly of non-indigenous Interest, 
the Administering Authority believes that such 
appointments provide a useful means of training 
indigenous people and will facilitate the progressive
By 1956, however, statutory area councils were no closer,
27) 1956 U.N. Mission Report, T/l2609 p*80.
28) Admin, to Sec. Terr. 14.2.57, Terr. 57/3139? Resolutions 
(para.5) 20th Session Trusteeship Council, May-July 1957, 
ibid*
29) Admin, to Sec. Terr. 7.11*57? Sec. Terr, to Permanent 
Rep., U.N. 19.11*57, Terr. 57/3139.
30) Administration Press Statement No. 67, 1.12.1958. The 
Southern Highlands had no Advisory Council*
expansion of their participation in the political,, 
life of the Territory* ^
The backgrounds of those natives who were appointed, even
in the most backward Districts, show that there had been
little justification for postponement on the ground of native
incapacity* Mr. Leo-Parau, who was appointed in the Central
District, had served the Administration since 1924, and had
been awarded the Loyal Service Medal in 1956; in the Morobe
area the President of the Lei-Wompa Native Local Government
Council was appointed, together with a native schoolteacher
who had been a delegate to the 1953 conference of the South
Pacific Commission in Noumea; in the Western District Mr*
Robert Tabua was a mixed-blood, but he had been closely
associated with the native peoples as treasurer of the
Western Club and an office-holder in mission and school
32
organizations*
The language question was a problem in some areas, but 
prominent natives and resident Europeans almost always speak 
Police Motu or Pidgin, inadequate as these languages are; 
indeed, natives appointed to the Legislative Council some­
times used Pidgin. Moreover, native interpreters were 
available at government stations* As post-1956 experience 
showed, this problem was far from insuperable*
31) Special Representative^ opening Statement, Trusteeship 
Council, 1958. Terr. 57/3139; also Papua Annual Report, 
1956-7, p.29 - this tacitly conceded that the polley 
whereby the Administration safeguarded the natives* 
interests was inadequate.
32) Prees Statement N o .67, clt.sup*
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It was true, of course, that the District Advisory 
Councils were set up to deal primarily with non-indigenous 
matters; but it is difficult to see this as a justification 
for maintaining this orientation indefinitely. Many of the 
matters discussed, such as the native labour supply, 
communications and transport, were also of some concern to 
natives.
A small native representation in relation to Europeans 
(in the ratio of about 1 to 5 in 1959) meant that pre­
dominantly European interests would continue to be discussed. 
It is extremely doubtful whether mere observing, which was 
practically all that native participation amounted to, really 
constituted political training. The powerlessness of 
native representatives sometimes discredited them with their 
own people: in Hanuabada, for example, Willie Gavera lost a 
good deal of popular support over his ineffectiveness on the 
question of native drinking (as the Hanuabadans interpreted 
i t ) . 33
Moreover, on a question such as this, the relative 
strength of mission representation (there were three on the 
Central District Advisory Council) tended to nullify native 
representations. Indeed, on this issue both natives and
33) Personal information, Poreporena, Hanuabada. It neede to 
be pointed out that certain of the functions of Native 
Local Government e.g. building of roads, bridges, wharves 
etc., are also of significance to the settler community* 
Planning liaison and financial sharing could be done 
through an area council - cf. Rowley, loc.cit., p. 142-3.
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interested Europeans have been met simply with statements 
of Administration policy, decided in Canberra and not sus­
ceptible to district or even to more general pressures in 
the Territory.3*
(iv) The Approach to Statutory Bodies
As has been mentioned elsewhere, critics of Australian 
administration in the United Nations have suggested that the 
Advisory Councils should be made statutory, to create real 
local responsibility on a multi-racial basis and to mitigate 
government from above. Significantly, the Australian answer 
has been, not to argue the administrative and political diffi­
culties of dividing and legally defining functions over widely 
varying local conditions, but to say that a statutory system 
would have to wait until the concept of district councils was 
•meaningful* to the natives . 33
Eowley has pointed out the dangers of retaining local 
bodies divided racially on a representational-functional basis, 
to be retained (according to the above argument before the 
United Nations) *until the New Guinean reaches some undefined
level of education and wisdom (automatically assumed by the
36
European)*. He points out that because of the racial
34) e.g. the Council of Social Service of Papua recommended by 
13 votes to 6, in 1960, that the liquor laws for natives 
should be reviewed; but the Adminietratlon took no action - 
South Pacific Post. 26.8.1960, 13.9.1960.
35) A.A.P. - Reuter report of statement by Trueteeship Council 
Representative D.McCarthy (Asst. Sec. in Dept, of 
Territories), Sydney Morning Herald. 9*6.61.
36) Rowley, loc.cit., p.142-3.
bifurcation in local government (which email native re­
presentation on District Advisory Councils has done little to 
mitigate), the system represents a ‘political hothouse*.
This, of course, is particularly inflammatory in the towns, 
where the more sophisticated natives live alongside con­
centrations of Europeans with whom they share certain common 
facilities and services. At the same time, they have either 
no voice, or are organized separately into Native Local Govern­
ment Councils with functions designed for rural areas (the 
Hanuabada council actually covers an area within the Port 
Moresby town limits).®^
The Administration remained persistently unwilling to 
appoint natives to the Town Advisory Councils? the fundamental 
reason was indecision on the question of absorbing natives 
institutionally into the urban populations, or of trying to
38
separate them through their Native Local Government Councils* 
This problem was particularly acute in Port Moresby, where more 
than 20,000 natives live within the town boundaries, about 
5,000 of them on land under customary ownership. Two specific 
competing proposals were that the Hanuabada Council expand to 
become a Greater Port Moresby Area Council, to be linked with 
a Town Council in the provision of works and services? or that 
a unified Town Council be established. Both these proposals
37) Ibid.
38) Administrator to See* Terr., 5.1.1959. Terr. 57/3139. The
N.L.G* Councils are regarded as giving the ideal torsi of
political training?,political apprehension by the 
Administration should not be overlooked.
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The Administration was eventually forced to make some
move towards altering the status quo, patently unsatisfaetoiy
to all parties, by pressure from the European residents of
Port Moresby* The matter of examining the desirability of
local government in the towns, and the machinery for it, had
been discussed by the Administrator with the Minister in
November 1952; but it was local pressure which impelled him
so
in 1955 to ask the Minister for an expert enquiry* He 
suggested that an expert in local government from Queensland 
be asked to report, for the coastal towns there, in his view, 
afforded the nearest comparable conditions to those in New 
Guinea*4 ^
At the beginning of 1956 Mr* J.R. Winders of Queensland was
appointed, on the recommendation of the State's Director of
Local Government, to make a survey which would 'give the
Administration and Territory residents comprehensive information
on which to judge the advisability or otherwise of introducing
41
Local Government in the larger centres* • Winders, however, 
spent only two days in Babaul, three and a half days In Madang
39) Admin, to Sec. Terr., 8.6.1955* Terr. 57/104*
40) Admin, to Minister, 29.7.55. Ibid. This was a numerical 
analogy; he suggested someone with experience of towns 
the size of Port Moresby.
41) Administration Press Statement No*5, 16.1*56. At the time 
Mr* Winders was Secretary of the Queensland Sugar Board, 
but he had previously been Chief Clerk in the Dept, of 
Local Government. Referring the matter to Queensland can 
be questioned, for race attitudes there tend to be still 
dominated by memories of the Kanakas. The situation of the 
drifting,pockets of aborigines is hardly analogous, on 
numerical grounds alone.
were vague and raised many problems*
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and in Lae, and two days in Wau. Pour weeks were spent in
Port Moresby. His total time in the Territory was only about
six weeks, and he had no previous knowledge of conditions
42
there or in other comparable territories.
Winders was given very wide terms of reference? unfortunately
43
on several fundamental points they were lamentably vague.
Winders put his own interpretation on them, and this led to
a very narrow conception of his responsibility:
The limitation of the investigation to the larger 
towns was regarded as an indication that the task 
should be confined to an examination of the need 
for the provision of Local Government chiefly for 
the non-indigenous people who comprise the principal., 
permanent population in town areas.
In effect, he treated the Territory’s towns as European
enclaves. As the Principal of the School of Pacific
Administration pointed out, Winders solved ’the dilemma of
the inarticulate Hew Guinean urban dwellers by rejecting them
45
as electors en bloc*. He accused Winders of having excluded 
the natives on educational grounds without adequate analysis 
or discrimination* What educational test was to be applied? 
Would this apply to the illiterate European? It was, con­
cluded Rowley, purely a racial exclusion.**
42) Ibid.? Admin. Press Statement No.24, 20.3.56.
43) J.R. Winders, Report on the Desirability and Practicability 
of the Institution of Local (ypvernment. Govt. Printer, Port 
Moresby, 1956, p.l.
44) Ibid., para. 2.
45) C.D. lowley, South Pacific. IX, 7, 1957, p.446.
46) Ibid.
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He (Winders) assumes the need for Council revenue 
to be drawn solely from land rates: therefore, with 
Kew Guineans in possession of so much urban land 
they must be subject to rating: and this gets him 
into a further dilemma« For if the Administration 
vetoes the decision to impose rates on particular 
Native lands, the Council fails to operate effectively*
But if it does not interfere, and rates are paid, or 
the owners influenced to sell the land (which would be 
contrary to the Administration’s basic land policy)
Local Government has failed even more grievously to 
operate, for it has deprived residents of its area ràte 
are not represented* That Mr. Winders, râiose expertise 
in Local Government is not in question, is not in 
question, is not very happy may be deduced from his 
own remarks on the matter* If the Hew Guinean owners 
do, under pressure of rates, decide to sell land, he 
says "there is nothing wrong with this ... He (or they) 
is not being forced to sell ••• If he does sell, he 
receives a cash consideration. He is no better off, 
nor no worse off, than any European owner”. The 
position is, of course, even worse than that which Mr* 
Winders here denies, because of the significance of 
clan or village lands in Hew Guinean society*
The major difficulties arose in Port Moresby, and it was 
on these difficulties that the plan to introduce urban local 
government foundered. But Winders also reooinnended the intro­
duction of local government to Lae and Rabaul, where the 
problems, particularly those of native land, were not so 
complex. It would appear that it was partly the Administrâtion*s 
dedication to a uniform pattern of government *hich prevented 
the implementation of local government in the other towns? 
though doubtless Port Moresby's size and pre-eminence con­
vinced everyone that it had the first claim to local govern­
ment. In fact, the smaller towns, particularly L æ  v&ieh
Rowley pointed out further difficulties:
47) Ibid.; Winders Report* pp. 56-8.
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has a eignifleant urban native population, might have served 
as testing grounds; but Port Moresby dominated everyone’s 
attention.
The Winders Report ultimately confused rather than
clarified? but discussion arising from it raised a number
of main issues. An Official Inter-Departmental Committee,
set up to consider the Report, wavered between excluding the
natives from local government in Port Moresby altogether, or
including them but working out a special ’rural rate' to
apply to customarily owned land, or placing all natives
48
separately under a Native Local Government Council* The
Administrator felt that the town boundaries should be altered
to exclude Hanuabada on the west and Korobosela on the east,
and that these areas, together with the coastal villages from
Boera to Gaile, should constitute a Greater Area Council under
49
the N.L.G. Ordinance* The difficulty was, that if native 
local government were to persist in urban and p e D u r b a n  areas, 
the town bound curies for local government purposes would have 
to exclude native local government areas, for ’it was obvious 
that jurisdiction could not be exercised over the one area by
48) Committee (established 12*9*56) consisted of the 
Treasurer, the Director of Lands, and the Accountant from 
the Civil Affairs Dept. Interim Report 17.10.56, Report
7.1.57, Terr. 57/104. It was one of the functions of this 
Committee to gather information, e.g. on rateable and 
customary lana holdings, nhich should have been available 
to Winders during his investigation.
49) Administrator to Sec. Terr. 9.1.57, ibid*
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Some of the local reactions to the Winders Report werm
interesting. It was generally agreed that the proposals were
irrelevant or inadequate, for a variety of reasons. Members
of the Rabaul Town Advisory Council recognised that Winders,
with no experience of plural societies, had been trying to
adapt inapplicable Australian local government concepts.®'*' A
prominent Port Moresby European, a member of the Town Advisory
Council, was most anxious about the inter-racial aspect of
local governments
As an established Port Moresby citizen with a business, 
property, and four children, all of whom give every 
indication of wishing to remain in the Territory, I 
am gravely concerned at the possibility of Local 
Government being established in Port Moresby in an un--« 
satisfactory environment. D7S
On the other hand, John Guise, the prominent member of the
mixed-race community and a notable spokesman for the natives,
believed that a Municipal Council without a separate Native
50separate Councils'.
50) Memo. Sec.Terr., Winders Report, 13.2.57, ibid. Too little 
attention appears to have been given to a suggestion sup­
ported by Fienbeig (5.11.57) and made by the Minister to 
the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce (South Pacific Po st » 
19.6.57) that Hanuabada could be linked with a municipal 
council as a ward, or after the manner of a hospital board. 
The attachment to the N.L.G. principle for Hanuabada was 
thoughtless, for the powers and functions of N.L.G. had 
never satisfied the natives there, and the Administration 
had always regarded it as atypical within the N.L.G. system.
51) Rabaul Times. 5.7.57. Dudley Johes asked pertinently why 
Winders had not consulted precedents in Suva, or in British 
Africa. The same might be asked of the Administration and 
of the Dept, of Territories - presumably the doctrine of 
New Guinea ' 8 uniqueness precluded reference to other 
colonial precedents.
52) S.Pox to P.Hasluck, 5,12.1956; also letter in South Pacific 
Post* same date. He therefore rejected the idea of t w o ~  
councils; but wanted to extend equality into the rating of 
land, clearly impractical, as Winders had shown. _
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Local Government Council would create racial antagonism, for
it would ignore the native areas except as sources of cheap
labour* He pointed out that the two races were culturally
•poles apart* ; and he feared, as many Europeans expected,
that on a unified council the natives would have minority
representation#53
The mixed race community in Itself constituted a further
complicating factor; the Minister warned that some official«
who advocated a separate council for natives wrongly believed
that this would incorporate the mixed bloods -
••• whereas policy is to try as far as possible to 
dissociate the mixed bloods from the indigenous 
people in all oases where the aixed bloods can in- 
cline towards the European side of their parentage.
The Minister welcomed this discussion* Ultimately, he
stated, the establishment of urban local government would be
dependent on the attitudes of those who migjht serve on
statutory councils. The Administrator and many residents
55
wanted specific proposals from Canberra to discuss ; but the 
Minister insisted that no such proposals would be framed
53) J* Guise to P. Hasluck, 4*1.57 (from Lalaina village)* 
Guise is anxious to preserve the native identity, and to 
ally the mixed-bloods with them rather than with the 
European. He advocated two separate councils, with a 
Central Committee to coordinate common activities*
54) Minister to Sec. Terr., 10.12.56. Terr. 57/104. In the 
Port Moresby area the landholdings of many mixed race 
people are under native customary title. Many mixed race 
live with natives and follow their customs. Dissociation 
presents fearful problems.
55) Admin, to Sec. Terr. 9.1.57; Rabaul Times♦ 5*7*57, Terr. 
57/104.
without prior local discussion. All discussions therefore 
had to revolve around the inadequacies of the Winders Report, 
so that it is not surprising that eventually a complete dead­
lock on points of principle was reached. Ultimately everything 
hinged on the attitude of the Port Moresby Town Advisory 
Council, which became steadily more insistent that native 
land-holders would have to pay rates along with Europeans, 
as it became aware of tlie 'excessive c o s t9 of local govsrnment. 
At the same time it rejected the concept of native and non­
native councils in the one area (and indeed from the point of 
view of common facilities and services they cannot be 
entirely separated)*^7
On these principles, in fact, the Administration had al~ 
ready decided to the contrary, being anxious to exempt native 
land from rates and to have a Native Local Government Council 
in 'junior partnership* with the statutory town council.
This had apparently been decided in association with the 
Department of Territories (and presumably unbeknown to the 
Minister) primarily for political reasonst
... from the point of view of goodwill between the 
races, it would be wiser to accept lesser problems 
now than more serious ones later if later antagonism
56
56) Minister to Sec. Terr. 22.2.57, 57/104. Prior dis­
cussion in the Territory had been foreshadowed in the 
terms of reference of Winders’ Enquiry.
57) Port Moresby To*n Advisory Council! Report on the Winders 
Report, July 19#?; Special meeting» P.M.fl.I.C. I.9.195&, 
Report to Administrator 11.9.58. To mitigate the burden 
of local government the Council wanted either (1) all land 
rents passed to a statutory council? or (2) all leaseholds 
converted to freeholds; or (3) drastically reduced rents.
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is given an excuse to develop* Also by liaison 
now and gradually integrating functions after the 
initial problems are solved, the natives will have 
a much more advanced appreciation of self-government gg 
through experience.
These decisions nullified the supposed importance of prior 
discussion by the residents* The resulting impasse lasted 
until I960* The Administrator blamed the intransigence of 
the Port Moresby Advisory Council? but the Minister insisted 
on local concurrence and did not seem anxious to hasten 
matters* In April 1959 he instructed the Administrator to
59
♦make further soundings and report in twelve months timef*
After nine years the Advisory Councils appeared to have
become fixtures, despite the universal recognition of their
shortcomings* During 1959 a beginning was mads with the
appointment of natives to the Town Councils, hops having
apparently been abandoned that statutory urban government
would be soon introduced? two natives were appointed to the
60
Port Moresby council and one to the Kavieng council* 
Inevitably, the Advisory Councils, and particularly those in 
the towns, tend to devote themselves to matters of speoial
58) Dept. Terr* Memo*, 23*4*58? Administration's proposals, 
204/57/104.
59) Admin, to Sec.Terr. 19.3.59. Memo. Minister for Administ­
rator, 2.4.59, Terr. 235/57A 0 4 .  There is a notable 
contrast with the British Solomons* when Sir John Gutch 
arrived as High Commissioner in 1956 he immediately re­
cognized the need for a statutory Town Council in 
Honiara; such a Council was functioning before the end
of 1958. Gutch had served on a Commission investigating 
local government in British Guiana. New Guinea lacks, 
and eschews, comparative precedents.
60) Report Papua, 1958-9, p.32? Report New Guinea 1958-9*p.35#
concern to the Europeans. Because of the paternalist 
tradition in native administration this also tends to be 
the approach of the D.C.s who act as Chairmen of the councils* 
At the meeting of the Rabaul Town Advisory Council of 3rd 
March, I960» for example, Rev. Wesley Lutton, a Methodist 
missionary» urged that residents associate themselves with a 
proposed Council for Social Welfare to deal with native social 
problems in Rabaul; but D.O. West replied that the Administ­
ration already had Welfare Officers dealing with the problem, 
and that it was itself proposing to sst up a Council of 
Social Services, It is therefore difficult for Europeans, 
through the Advisory Councils, even in a paternalist way to 
work with or for the native population* This same meeting of 
the Rabaul council concerned Itself principally with im­
provements to the main streets of the town and to the Rabaul 
High School (70 non-native students and 4 natives); and with 
a proposal for a town swimming-pool.^
Thus, what was intended as a temporary expedient, in 
1950, pending the convening of the Legislative Council and 
later the constituting of statutory bodies, has taken on
61) Rabaul Town Advisory Council, 3.3.60, personal notes of 
discussion,
62) Ibid. Only the missionaries showed any notable concern 
for native problems* This council had 18 members, in­
cluding 3 Asians and 1 Mixed-Race. Ironically, it 
meets in the Rabaul Native Local Government Council 
House,
r: a vi / U
the aspect of permanence, in the face of warnings, both 
inside and outside the Administration, that the problems of 
racial integration in local government increase rather than 
lessen with the passing of time .**3
63) In the period 1958-9 the Administration was actively 
considering the framing of a new Ordinance. The 
intention was that, by including a large range of 
precisely defined provisions, it would be possible to 
establish by proclamation both native and multi-racial 
councils under the one legislative authority. The 
existing centralist bias is plain in these proposals —  
the »complete flexibility* of the existing Ordinance was 
deprecated; though it was felt that a minute definition 
of Local Govt, province and functions would eliminate 
central/local government clashes, and thereby promote 
the independence of the local bodies. - a/D.N.A. , 42'.1958; 
memo. Chief of Div., Development & Welfare, 13.1.1959. 
Detailed proposals, Asst. Admin, to Ssc. Terr.,
17.9.1958, NA 23-16-1.
APPENDIX A
FURTHER CASE STUDIES
I. Western Papua, 1888-19U2.
In Chapter 1(c) reference is made to the attempt in 
the 1890 s to delegate judicial functions to the coastal 
Kiwai of the Western Division. This had been prompted 
partly by the influence on the Kiwai of the more advanced 
Torres Straits institutions.
It is an apparent paradox that this part of the 
Territory is so physically unprepossessing and economically 
unpromising: the coastal Kiwai villages are sandwiched 
between the encroaching sea and the mangrove swamps* These 
conditions, however, compelled the Kiwai to seek employment 
and experience elsewhere, in the Torres Straits fisheries 
and as the most reliable recruits in the Armed Constabulary. 
This explains their administrative sophistication. From 
the Administration^ viewpoint, however, perhaps the most 
important feature of this area was the attempt to control 
sparse populations inhabiting vast deltaic flats.^
(1) The Abandonment of the Indirect Method
MacGregor, like Murray later, lacked the staff to 
extend far from the coastal rivers. After pacification he 
looked to the L.M.S. to consolidate influence and promote 
permanent peace* After his first expedition up the Fly in 
November 1889 he wrote that a *bloodless victory* had made 
the river ripe for missionary endeavour for a distance of 
100 miles from its mouth; but he expressed his disappoint­
ment at finding nothing in the area except one teacher 
abandoned on Kiwai island* He suggested Chalmers for the 
work and hinted to Lawes that if the L*M*S. did not act he 
would consider asking the proposed Anglican mission to take 
over the Fly. (A similar tactic produced action in eastern 
Papua) . 2
R.M. Hely and Chalmers worked in harmony in the coastal 
Kiwai areas; but after Chalmers* departure the quality of
 ^ At present the population density averages about 1 per 
sq. mile.
2 MacGregor to Lawes, Fly River, 22.12.1880. MacGregor*s 
despatch of 9*12.89 (Cmd.6323» pp.73-83) was fully reported 
in The Queenslander. 1.3* 1890. Chalmers set out for the 
Fly on 22.1.90 (letter of this date to Lawes, L.M.S* 
letters).
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L.M.S. work declined and friction developed between the 
teachers and the native officials (especially in Mawatta, 
the headquarters of Native Magistrate Gamia) and between 
Hely and F.W. Walker, Chalmers* r e p l a c e m e n t . 3
Relations improved after the return of Chalmers. His 
murder at Goaribari in 1901, and the burial of himself and 
his wife at Daru, made a lasting impression on the Kiwai.
This waxing mission influence, inter alia, contributed to 
the social levelling amongst the Kiwai noted by Landtman 
in 1 9 12.U
It has already been mentioned that amongst the coastal 
Kiwai in MacGregor's time there was a plethora of native 
officials.5 To some degree this was due to MacGregor's 
initial efforts to introduce a hierarchy of native 
officials (with a separation of functions meaning 
less in the Papuan context). By 1898 MacGregor had 
virtually abandoned the indirect principle, and under Le 
Hunte steps were taken to reduce the number of village 
officials. The A.R.M. responsible, A.C. English, had none 
of Hely's scruples or inhibitions about this.® Le Hunte 
laid down no clear principle, simply declaring that 'if 
there are more than is necessary the number should be 
reduced.'7
There were at least two village constables and one 
government chief to each controlled village at this stage.
The reduction of village constables in the settled areas 
allowed more appointments in the peripheral areas; the
3 Hely to Gov. Sec., 25.2.1894. Station Journals 20/94*
^ Landtman, The Kiwai Papuans, pp.167-70. Even in 1912 the 
dorlomo (long-house) pattern was breaking down. The building 
of a doriomo used to be a communal activity attended with a 
great deal of magic (p.9). The mission violently dis­
approved of the Horiomu (cult of dead) and Moguru (life- 
giving) ceremonies - pp.329* 350. He sub-titled his study 
'A Nature-Born Instance of Rousseau’s Ideal Community"; it 
was not so in the 1890s.
5 In view of MacGregor’s approach to the L.M.S., it is not 
surprising to find that this included mission teachers as 
well. The problem of supervising them was similar to the 
government's in supervising V.C.s. See Ch.1(c).
6 English to Gov. Sec., 15*5*1900. W.D. Journals 32/1900.
^ Ibid., Le Hunte's marginal note dated 22.5.1900.
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number of officials overall, and consequently the expense, 
increased only slowly , 8 The paid government chiefs, who 
survived longest in this Division, were removed b y  1906«
But in recognition of the pre-administration position of 
the ’maraoose’ in the clan and village (Beaver thought he 
had ’a little power1),” selected men continued to be 
recognized to the extent that they were given clothes and 
occasionally consulted, especially in the settlement of 
disputes. Financial stringency was just as important a 
factor as the change in policy,
With the decline in traditional leadership which bound 
separate clan groups together in villages, the village 
constables faced a difficult problem* Beaver noted that 
they would promptly arrest offenders in their own clan- 
houses, but arrests were resented b y  members of other 
elans**'!
(il) Methods in Uncontrolled Areas
An early problem was the incursions of the Tugeri from 
across the Dutch border* MacGregor had envisaged the 
appointment of a Government Agent in the area (Morehead 
river), as well as two on the Fly and one on the Aird 
river. This plan was not completed for fifty y e a r s , 12 
MacGregor had heavily defeated the Tugeri; and in 1893 the 
boundary with the Dutch was delimited as the Bensbach river, 
primarily as a step towards control of raids, 13 But in 1900 
a Government party, accompanied by a Dutch Resident 
investigating Tugeri outrages, was attacked by a strong
° Report 1903-U, p. 22.
Q
W* Beaver: Unexplored New Guinea. p*31*
10 Report 1903-Uj P*22; Also R,M. to Gov, Sec*, 6,2,01,
W.D. Journals 25/1901 (Wabuda Is,)* In 1902 appointment of 
new V.C.s seems to have been dependent on their reduction 
elsewhere. This was given as the reason for the lack of a 
V.C. at Iasa - 11+00 people - where the senility of the old 
chief Mipi made the appointment of a V,C, imperative* R,M. 
to Gov, Sec,, 14«6.02. Journals 77/02.
11
Beaver, op.cit., p*157*
12
Report 1898-9» p.xxv.
^  Royal Geographical Society Journal, 1893» II, pp.270-1: 
’The piratical visits of the Tugeri may now, with the 
facilities which the new boundary offers for checkmating 
them, be considered to be drawing to an end. ’
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force of Tugeri which it beat off only with difficulty# As 
a result the Dutch set up a station near the boundary to 
prevent further incursions*1*+ This alleviated but did not 
solve the problem; from the point of view of the Australian 
authorities the difficulty was that the natives on the 
Australian side had been scattered, and had themselves 
acquired a reputation for savagery almost as formidable as 
the Tugeri*s. «5
Because of lack of staff little could be done* In 
January 1914 a police camp was set up on the Morehead river, 
more to bring the local peoples under control than to 
protect them from the Tugeri* This was manned by members of 
the Armed Constabulary under a native N.C.0.16 Murray 
constantly deprecated allowing natives to work without 
direct European supervision. The setting up of this camp 
emphasises the pressures on his administration which he 
lacked the staff and funds to meet*17
The precedent had been set in 1906 under Barton’s 
administration, when a similar camp had been set up on the 
Bamu river, at that time regarded as ’the crux of the 
Western Division'*18 The Royal Commission sitting that 
year, however, heard evidence from Jiear, R*M. of the 
Western Division, and from Bruce, the Commandant of the 
Armed Constabulary, emphasising the need for close control* 
Jiear admitted the risk in the native police camp, but said 
that there was no alternative* Murray later agreed with 
the need for close control, but apparently had to respond 
to the same pressures in the same w a y * ^
1 ** Report 1901 -2, pp.xxxv, 81-2.
Murray, Papua or British New Guinea, pp*195-6* Judge 
Winter, commenting in 1902 on the defeat of some Tugeri by 
Sanana natives in Australian territory, gave it as his 
opinion that the Tugeri had always been overrated - *forced 
into a prominence not warranted b y  facts’* Winter to Gov. 
Queensland, No*69* 30«7»02. CPI (Col*), p*6*
16 Report 1914-5* p*98*
”  Report 1918-9, p.8* In 1917 a detachment of police from 
this camp, led by N.C.0. Duna with a Tugeri man as guide, 
astonished both the Australians and the Dutch by making a 
patrol to Merauke, the Dutch headquarters - ibid*
18 Report 1907-8, p. 16.
R.C. Report, pp.xl, 109, 1U1-2; Murray, op.cit., pp.2U1-2 
(Period 1912).
J
Murray, by his commitment to a policy of settlement 
was bound to press ahead with pacification to an extent 
that might otherwise have been deemed unwise* In his view, 
consolidation and the labour question were inter-related: 
the extension of government influence made further areas 
available for the supply of labour, and going away to work 
had a ’civilizing* effect on the natives which later further 
consolidated government Influence *20
On the Bamu, the village of Bina, *the last of the 
fighting villages*, was visited in September 1906 and asked 
for a village constable* In order to facilitate extension 
to the Gama and Turama rivers, a village constable was 
appointed at Buniki, on the eastern mouth of the Bamu, the 
following year. Murray and the R.M. both saw this as a 
step towards a better labour supply.2 ** In furthering this, 
the V.C. became an agent of consolidation on the fringes of 
the controlled area. The dangers of the method were amply 
demonstrated on the Bamu in 1909* when the Maipani were 
raided and massacred by the Sisiame, at the instigation of 
Koraria, a V.C. As the R.M. remarked, until they could be 
visited frequently, their behaviour was not to be relied on .22
A great deal depended on the abilities of individual 
officers. The Western Division was fortunate to have, for 
much of this period, Wilfred Beaver as R.M. His attitude 
towards the Bamu was more progressive, in view of the 
impracticability of close control, than his predecessors; 
he tried to rely on personal influence, rather than on the 
mere issuing of orders* In September 1911 when he visited 
the Sisiame he noted an improved attitude, and described 
Koraria, the murderer of only two years before, as *my old 
friend*. Koraria's son had replaced him as V . C . 2 3
Although the majority of natives still rushed for the 
bush at the approach of a patrol *with a coy affectation of 
fright that one might expect from a young ladies school*, 
Beaver, like Murray, placed great faith in the growing 
influence of the young men who had been away to work. This
20 Report 1909-10, p.12; Report 1912-3, p.7.
21 Report 1907-8, p.16; Report 1908-9, pp.16-7«
22
Report 1909-10, p.U7.
23 Beaver to Gov. Sec., W.D. Patrol Reports, covering 
letter of 27.9.1911. 2i+8/l1R.
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induced him to appoint the most promising of these young men 
as village constables.2**
Beaver, of course, realized that a great deal of 
attention would have to be paid the area for consolidation 
to be successful# To assist this a new district office was 
eventually opened at Kikori, under the R.M. Daru, in 
February 1912. Even so, control appears to have been 
ineffective, for a lengthy patrol of the Bamu in April 1915 
disclosed administrative anarchy: the V.C. of Oropai had 
been involved in a bow-and-arrow affray; the V.C. of Bina 
was arrested on a murder charge; the V.C. of Sisiame (the 
third in five years) was said to have no influence; at 
Kuria the V.C. could not be found; at Gaude the V.C. had no 
uniform and said he had not seen a government officer for 
two years; while the V.C. of Samari was in gaol.25
The conclusion seems to be inescapable, that government 
influence had been extended beyond the limits of practicable 
consolidation, in order primarily to maintain a labour 
supply for the rapidly growing plantations in the Territory.
In this Division the labour factor was particularly 
important, for this was traditionally the source of the 
most reliable workers - a reputation acquired b y  the Kiwai 
in the Constabulary.2 ® But at this period pulmonary 
diseases were seriously affecting the coastal villages, at 
a time when the search for labour for the Central and 
Eastern Divisions was acute.27 The R.M. pointed out in 1910 
that new recruiting grounds would have to be opened up; 
while in 1911 the Administration announced that it would 
issue no more work permits for pearling in the Torres
e.g. at Oropai - *very timid people* - on 10.9*1911# 
ibid; Report 1909-10, p*48. R.M. Higginson thought the 
elder men lacked the necessary *bossing ability*#
Report 1911-2, p.6 5: Report 1912-3» P«71; W.D. Patrol 
Reports* Bamu. April 1915«
26 Report 1907-8, pp.16-7.
27
See testimony of R.M. Jiear to Royal Commission, Report, 
p . 143* Pulmonary afflictions are still rampant, more than 
fifty years later* The area under plantations increased 
from 1467 acres in 1907 to 47506 acres in 1916* Of this 
total in 1916, almost 40,000 acres were in the East and 
Central Divisions* Report 1916-7» p*29*
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Straits. The object of this was patent, and the natives 
reacted a n g r i l y . 2 8
(iv) Administrative Innovations by the Kiwai
In view of an administrative attitude which viewed the 
Western natives as potential labourers elsewhere, it is not 
surprising that the relative sophistication of the coastal 
Kiwai, and their innovations, were overlooked. R.M.
Higginson in the period 1908-10 showed an open dislike of 
the ’civilized savage’ in the coastal villages, as well as 
of their ’comic-opera burlesque’.29
The Kiwai, however, consistently sought their own 
salvation: in 1909 the natives of Mawatta subscribed to buy 
a boat for pearl-fishing on a co-operative basis - a step 
much in advance of anything else in the Territory - but the 
only administration comment was chilly: ’It still remains 
to be seen if the native can make a success of a venture of 
this sort. *30 The idea spread; but even an officer of 
Beaver’s calibre was unconcerned at the fact that the two 
ketches operated b y  the Parama natives were being used 
unprofitably; the Government Secretary’s only comment was 
to ask whether the law had been observed in the building 
of the b o a ts .31 Higginson reported in 1910 that the 
— ----- ----
Report 1910-1 , p.56; Report 1911-2 , p.67» They told the 
R.M. that they were organizing a petition for presentation 
to the Minister for External Affairs. In 1902 when a 
Federal Act had temporarily restricted their work in the 
Torres Straits, some Western District natives had worked 
in the Northern Division, but deaths amongst them had been 
heavy; the implication then had been that they were better 
suited pearl-shelling in the Straits - Report 1902-3 , p . 17* 
In 1909 the death rate for Western District labourers in the 
Northern Division was more than double that in the Torres 
Straits (and their wages of course lower) - Report 1909-10,  
P*U9.
Report 1910-1, p.56. ’...there is a lot to be said for 
the raw and uncivilized savage’•
^ Report 1909-10, p.bl*
Beaver to Gov. Sec., 23«11 .1910 . Daru 307/10R. Marginal 
comment by Gov. Sec.
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natives had not taken enough shell to keep them in tobacco, 
’almost needless to say*.32
The aspirations of the Kiwai, both economically and 
administratively were in advance of the Administration’s.
The failure by the Administration to capitalise on these 
aspirations, and on native-promoted innovations, has had 
lasting repercussions. Beaver was sufficiently perceptive 
to realize that the Kiwai might be able to support more 
advanced institutions. He referred to the failure of the 
Native Magistrates in MacGregor’s time; but insisted that 
it had been a failure only because the Kiwai at that time 
had not been ready for it. He went on: ’I personally am 
rather inclined to think that a certain measure of self- 
government on lines such as exist in the Torres Straits is 
not undesirable... with careful supervision and very limited 
powers the experiment might not be so unfortunate at the 
present day. ’ Fifty years after Beaver wrote the experiment 
had still not been revived.33
Beaver also remarked, in 1912, on the facility with 
which the Western natives assimilated European customs and 
ideas; but he felt that this could be too swift and 
u n d e s i r a b l e .34 Clearly, the pace of change would have to 
be controlled by government. The government attitude seems 
throughout to have been that the natives were only adopting 
those concepts which suited their purposes, and that these 
purposes were not to be encouraged, nor their motives 
trusted.35
The best example concerns the introduction of 
'councillors’. When in 1913 the coastal Kiwai borrowed the 
councillor concept from the Torres Straits, the innovation 
was viewed with frank distaste by the Administration. It
Report 1910-1, p.56. Yet at this time the Government was 
considering an Encouragement of Industry Bill, prepared by 
the Government Secretary, Campbell, himself. This provided 
(in draft) inter alia for compulsory labour on government 
plantations (Campbell to Atlee Hunt, 15.9.07# where the idea 
was mooted).
33 Beaver, op.cit., p.30. The book was written before the 
war, in which Beaver was killed.
3^ Beaver, ibid., pp.295-6; Report 1912-3» p.66.
35 When R.M. Lyons introduced the village plantation scheme 
in the Western Division, it was partly as ’a test of their
civilization, and at the same time to make them realize its 
sterner s i d e .’ Report 1914-5» p*99.
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?/as felt that the natives were getting above themselves. 
First the Mawatta people had collected money to buy a 
cutter, then they had begun paying money to bushmen to keep 
the inland road clean, now they had begun appointing their 
own councillors. These events were interpreted b y  the 
Administration as a facade which the Kiwai were erecting, 
behind which they could cultivate indolence and evade the 
kind of work which the Administration thought good for them.
The Mawatta people are developing into a lazy 
crowd. The sole aim of every man in the village 
is to become a ’councillor*. These councillors 
meet in conclave to discuss matters of village 
import. They assume thoughtful airs, and their 
deductions perhaps are in many instances sound.
But the carrying out of the result of their 
deliberations is left to those vsho are not 
’councillors’, who are hard to find in Mawatta.
The consequence is nothing is done. I explained 
to the men that holding councils was alright 
enough, so long as they (the councillors) worked 
and saw to it that the obligations of the village 
were performed. But it will be hard to convince 
the wise men of Mawatta of such a home-truth who 
have such an inflated idea of their own 
importance.36
Murray read all the patrol reports and presumably 
approved of this interpretation; it was, after all, an 
extension of the views which he had expounded to the Royal 
Commission on the virtues of work for the natives and of 
’Australian democratic ideas*. The R.M. claimed that some 
villages had, throu$i their councillors, extended their 
jurisdiction to smaller neighbouring groups. This he had 
stopped. He was prepared to recognize that the councillors 
possibly had a right to exercise judicial functions; but 
this, he believed, was premature, *as the power would be 
much abused*.37
In submitting his report in 1914 the R.M. ignored the 
councillors altogether; but he announced the beginning of 
the village plantation scheme, the first of its kind in the
36 W.D. Patrol Reports, 28.11.1913. Daru RA5/13. The 
councillors were wearing the Torres Straits councillors 
uniform - a black jersey with ’councillor* in red letters 
on the front.
37 Report 1913-U, p.71.
580
Territory. The two were connected, for the scheme was 
introduced in those very villages which, the previous year, 
had boasted councillors. The object of the scheme was 
stated bluntly as a test of the natives* ’civilization*.
They were told that the Government wished them 
to see that it was being done for their own good.
The idea of compulsion was entirely eliminated.
The appeal in every sense was made to the 
civilization in them.3°
In point of fact, natives were convicted the very next 
year for not keeping the plantations clean.39 it seems a 
reasonable inference that the introduction of the scheme 
was aimed at controlling the activities of the councillors 
without officially acknowledging them*
The councillors continued to function* At Iasa in 
1915 the patrol officer was pleased to find them promoting 
the village plantation s c h e m e .  *±0 Simply by reason of their 
continued existence the councillors came to be accepted, if 
not welcomed, by the Administration* They were useful only 
in so far as they assisted the village constables to have 
government instructions carried out*
In 1917 the R.M. ordered the V.C. of Mawatta fto convey 
a message to the councillors to see that the children attend 
school*. Murray commented:
Is not the R.M. going rather too far in telling 
the councillors to ’see that their children 
attend school*? His duty, I think, is to 
encourage them, but not to compel, unless English 
is taught*
The last sentence clearly indicated that Murray felt 
that instructions could be passed on through the councillors; 
this was not in itself objected to* Murray defined the 
status of the councillors only later, when the institution 
was given official sanction*
38 Report 1914-5» P.99*
Report 1915-6, p.91*
DarU Patrol Reports, 27*10.15. R/90/15*
^  W.D. Station Journal 28.2.17. Murray’s comment dated 
20.3*17 attached. The Native Regulation compelled 
attendance only at schools teaching English.
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Generally, however, the councillors were ignored 
altogether; with rare exceptions: in June 1920 when the 
cutter belonging to the Pararaa natives ran aground, the 
'councillors and elders 1 were summoned to decide whether it 
should be abandoned as a total wreck**42
The first official recognition of the councillors 
occurred in August 1921 - eight years after the Kiwai had 
introduced them - when the village of Masingara (non-Kiwai, 
inland of Mawatta) won the £5 prize which had been 
instituted for the best-kept village. As a reward, and 
because the Masingara natives wished to emulate Mawatta 
and Mabadauan, the R*M. decided that one councillor should 
be appointed for each o f  the constituent major clans* This 
was a growing recognition of the fact that the councillors 
might be useful, as influential clan heads, in encouraging 
work on the plantation and model village schemes, as well 
as with tax collection, all of which were statutorily 
introduced only at the end of the war - though instructions 
h the V.C. still took precedence over
(v) Councillors and Village Plantations
The Kiwai, therefore, themselves introduced the 
councillor concept into the Territory; though the 
Administration never later acknowledged this, nor their 
special fitness to be given more advanced institutions* 
Indeed, to some degree it cost them Administration favour* 
Even the L.M.S. missionary at Daru at thiB period, E* Baxter 
Riley, judged them guilty of 'an inordinate self-esteem'.^ 
Sir Hubert Murray gave no recognition to the fact that the 
Kiwai themselves had originated the idea, any more than they 
were given credit for co-operative organization* In 1925 
he wrote that •councils were tried out in the west* but 
that it had been found Impossible to extend the system
W.D. Station Journal 12.6*20; cf* Patrol Report, Daru 
R.234/20, March 1920, where there is no acknowledgement of 
councillors*
^  Daru Patrol Reports 5/1921-3, 15.8*21; also J/2 5, dated 
29*11*21; Report 1922-3, p.40. Like the plantations, the 
'model village* idea was introduced b y  R.M. Lyons, and later 
applied elsewhere in the Territory (see Report 1919-20, 
p . 18). Initially Mabadauan was laid out in neat roads and 
planted with cretons*
^  E.B. Riley, Among Papuan Headhunters, p*76*
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elsewhere - by implication claiming credit for the 
Administration.
The idea quickly spread in the Western Division, ahead 
of Administration promotion* As early as June 1923 the 
R.M. noted that a practice had grown up of the V.C.*s 
bringing along an old man and recommending him as a 
councillor.
This occurred at many places. It appears that 
the appointment of a Councillor raises the 'tone' 
of a village, and when these people hear that 
Councillors have been created - as at the model 
villages - they immediately become desirous of f, 
having the same honour conferred on themselves*^
(vi) The Pull of the Frontier
It was perhaps unfortunate for the prospects of the 
councillor system in the west that, at about the time the 
Kiwai introduced it, the Administration was once again 
turning towards the uncontrolled frontier* This was a 
perennial conflict which inhibited the encouragement of 
more progressive administrative methods on the coast. It 
has already been remarked that the major stimulus to the 
extension of government influence came from the need for an 
adequate labour supply. In 1912 Murray was far from 
sanguine about the prospects of keeping up with demand.4'
In 1913 a definite campaign was launched to bring the 
remainder of the Territory under control: expeditions 
sought sites for further government stations on the upper 
Ply . 48 By 1914 these had shown the populations on the Ply 
and Strickland rivers to be scattered, and insufficient, in 
Murray's view, to justify a further government statical.*9
^  H. Murray, Papua of Today, p. 279*
W  Daru Patrol Heport, 27.6.23. Daru 20/1922-3.
^7 Report 1912-3, p.7. The good influence of returned 
labourers was again emphasised, p. 1 1 .
^  Report 19^2-3* Murray said that the primary object was 
to put an end to native practices that were *a disgrace to 
an Australian Territory.* *Incidentally, it will have the 
effect of extending the area open to recruiting...*.
^9 Report 191U-5, p*9* This decision was too early to have 
been affected b y  the enlistment of one third of the 
Territory’s officers for the World War - see Papua of Today 
(Murray), p.xi; Report 1915-6, pp.9-10* The policy of 
linking stations b y  regular patrolling was intensified 
concurrently - see Ch*II.
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But government influence was spread by pacificatory and 
recruiting patrols, while follow-up action almost everywhere 
was poor*
In 1919 the R.M. complained that government influence 
had spread beyond the practicability of consolidation*
This made a choice necessary between patrolling little- 
known districts and improving 'civilized districts'* He 
chose the latter - hence the extension of the village 
plantation and model village s c h e m e s * 5 0  But withdrawal 
from the frontier could not be accomplished just by issuing 
an instruetion.
It has already been noted that the appointment of V.C*s 
on the fringes of control had been used on occasions as a 
technique for extending government authority. Subsequent 
recessions of government control left these officials to 
their own devices - as has already been pointed out on the 
Bamu - with results prejudicial immediately to law and 
order, and, in the long term, to the prestige of government. 
Choosing the point, at any time, at which extension should 
be stopped was a nice problem; as Murray remarked later of 
the councillor system, much depended on the individual 
R.M.,5* and frequent staff changes tended to imply policy 
changes at district level.
The Gogodala on the north bank of the Ply were easily 
accessible to patrols. Here the V.C. system seemed to work 
reasonably well; it was facilitated b y  the fact that the 
people seemed to have a sense of extra-village community 
generally lacking elsewhere. In June 1921 they jointly met 
a patrol, and, although some of the V.C.s had misinterpreted 
their duties - they had combined to make arrests in other 
villages - 'the meeting terminated in general goodwill1* 
Murderers were voluntarily surrendered.52
On the other hand, a patrol to the Pahoturi river in 
July 1922 found that, although the V.C. of Bunkuklem 
village, for example, had some conception of his duties, 
conditions in the village had retrogressed since the 
previous government visit three years before. It was 
generally recognized that the frequent visits and courts 
were necessary to bolster a V.C.'s authority, particularly
50 Report 1919-20, p.18.
Report 1936-7» p*29#
Daru Patrol Reports, 9*6*21. Daru R.268/21*
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for the enforcement of the more onerous or anti-custom 
Regulations; but this was clearly impossible in areas where 
the government made patrols at such long intervals.53
Yet, after the transfer of R.M. Lyons, in the early 
twenties appointments of V.C.s were continued in fringe 
areas. On a patrol to Lake Murray in February 1923 a whole 
set of V . C .’s clothes was handed to one of a group of 
natives who had never been contacted before, because, ’the 
man who visited us by himself was most anxious to obtain a 
police uniform’.54 The mere appointment of V.C.s seems to 
have been looked on as a talisman of control, with little 
examination of the implications and responsibilities of 
such an appointment, both from the native and from the 
Administration viewpoints.
The Administrator found on a visit to the Gama-Turama 
area in 1923 that little patrolling had been done. Never­
theless a *suitable man* was picked out as V.C. amongst the 
Doriomo: *Such an appointment might do good in this 
district, as there is not a single V.C. in the Gama or W. 
side of the Turama.’ It was also found that one man on an 
unknown patrol previously had been appointed V.C. of two 
’villages or tribes*, Buniki and Pirupiru, which were bitter 
enemies. It was remarked that this seemed *strange*; and a 
note was made for a new V.C. to be appointed amongst the 
Pirupiru when they could be contacted.55
On a subsequent patrol to the Turama in December 1924 
the elusive Pirupiru were at last met; they selected their 
own man as V.C., and he was taken on an orientation trip to 
Daru to *see the government*. On the same patrol the R.M. 
indulged in an orgy of native appointments, V.C.s being 
appointed to all the principal *tribes* on the west bank 
of the river; while at the same time the R.M. Delta Division 
was doing the same amongst the equally elusive Morigio on 
the east bank. On the west bank six new V.C.s were selected 
in thirteen days. The Government Secretary was doubtful, 
minuting to Murray: *Does Your Excellency consider the
Daru Patrol Reports, 16.7»22. Daru 15/1921-2. The 
officer was referring only to material conditions - he 
described the village as ’filthy*.
^  Daru Report 12/1922-3. The uniform seems to have been 
treated almost as a form of ’trade’, like axes and mirrors - 
an inexpensive form of conciliation.
55 Daru Patrol Report 17/1922-3.
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hurried appointment of V.C.s in these villages right?* To 
which Murray replied unequivocally: ’Yes, it was good 
work. *56
The sequel came in 1928, with a revival of fierce 
fighting along the Turama; as a result a police camp had to 
be established on the river, under a European officer, to 
carry out ’arrests and pacification. *57
In 1921+ V.C.s were appointed amongst the semi-control led 
people to the north of the Aramia river, although a warning 
was given that supervision would be difficult, particularly 
in view of the nomadic habits of the Aramia natives. But 
it was felt that the appointments would give the natives 
’confidence*.58 The Administration at this time seems to 
have built up a mystique about the inherent value of having 
V.C.s in remote areas, as constant reminders of government, 
even if the Administration itself ignored their existence.
It was found on the Aramia river in 1929 that the original 
V.C. appointed to the village of Pisi (population 300) had 
not been visited by a government officer since 1920, and 
had succeeded in being paid up to 1925 only by going to Daru 
himself. Murray commented testily that the country should 
be regularly patrolled; but as regards staff and out- 
stations the situation had not improved over the previous 
decade, while the appointment of V.C^s had been steadily 
used to extend government i n f l u e n c e .  59
On the Wassi-Kussa river - a comparable fringe area - 
in July 1925 the A.R.M. found a number of V.C.s who had not 
seen the Administration for four years; they presented 
themselves for recognition and payment, although his 
records showed the name of only one of them. One man 
appointed himself, in place of another who had resigned . ® 0
56 Daru 12/1924-5* Comments hand-written, jacket*
57 Report 1928-9, p.22.
58 Daru patrol Report, November 1 )2U. Daru 8/192U-5: 
Dibiasu people, said to be related to the Oogodala. There 
had already been complaints about supervising V.C.s and 
enforcing Regulations amongst migratory peoples on the Bamu; 
and although the traditional and economic barriers to 
village settlement were recognised, attempts were made to 
induce them to make villages - Daru 10/1923-4» especially 
15.1*1924.
59 Daru 10/1928-9, May 1929; Murray’s comment attached*
60 Daru P.R., 12.7.25. Daru 1/1925-6.
586
Yet in this very area the policy of appointing V.C.s 
continued, because they were said to represent government* 
The native leaders complained that they had little contact with government; consequently the 'chiefs9 of Setavi and 
Kiriwo were appointed V.C.s and told *to extend Government 
influence, to get in touch and establish friendly relations with the Biram and Suki people. *61 It was even recommended that the native police camp on the Morehead river be with­drawn and more V.C.s appointed in lieu*®2
There seems little doubt that natives in the more sophisticated areas, i*e. primarily those which had been recruiting grounds, used the Administration’s anxiety to 
appoint V.C.s as a cover for their own activities* In 
March 1926 ex-plantation labourers of Bell Point applied for appointment as V.C.s and were recommended. Two years later these seem to have been involved in the massacre of a number of Goaribari natives*°3 Similarly, the Bamu peoples 
made head-hunting raids on the bush peoples about the end 
of 1926, but nothing was heard of it by government until 
August 1929* The fact that these people had V.C*s appears to have bgpn taken as a justification for not patrolling 
the area*
In the Western Division an essentially direct method of administration was used as an indirect method of extend­
ing government influence, with the result that control and consolidation went beyond the physical capacity of the Divisional staff*
(vii) The Concentration on Ends Rather than Means*
Towards the end of 1928, therefore, it might be said 
that the policy of opening up areas for recruiting and of 
appointing V.C.s in remote areas had begun to recoil on itself, exerting increasingly greater centrifugal pressure
^  Daru P.R*, August 1926. Daru 3/1926-7* A further 
patrol in September, 1928, felt that the number of V.C.s 
was out of proportion with the population - Daru 2/1928-9*
62 Daru P.R. 3/1926-7*
^  Daru 18/1925-6; Report 1928-9» P*22*
^  Daru P.R., August 1929* Daru 1 and 2/1929-30*
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on the administration at Daru.^ Meanwhile, the ’civilized 
districts', to which R.M. Lyons had intended to devote 
himself, do not seem to have had intensive attention. A surprise patrol to the 'model villages' of Tureture, Masingara, and Mabadauan in October 1923 found that the 
villages were filthy, the plantations neglected, and the V.C.s and other natives had been regularly breaking the Regulations by drinking &amada.66
Moreover, despite native initiation of the idea, 
Administration officers appear to have had as little idea of the true status and functions of the councillors here as 
elsewhere in the Territory. The R.M., on a patrol to the 
Bamu in February 1926, left the choosing of a new V.C. to 
the councillors; but in the same month a Patrol Officer 
visiting the coastal Kiwai villages spoke of the councillors as assistants to the V.C.67 Although the councillors were 
supposed to be representatives of the people, they were 
often appointed directly by officers on patrol, and issued 
with instructions. While patrolling the lower Fly in June 1928 R.M. Oldham found the village of Sapara filthy and all the houses dilapidated.
Told the V.C. and Councillors if they did not 
see that the paople kept the village clean and houses in good repair they would be punished and dismissed.
Although Murray continually insisted that his officers should not issue orders to councillors, the equal insistence
65 Routine patrols were often disrupted by troubles inland -
food description in G.F.W. Ziramer, Papuan Episodes typescript, in my possession) detailing difficulties in 
this Division in the 1920 s. Also note Report 1930-1, p. 5* 
where Murray describes Zimmer’s trek of ’some hundreds of 
miles’ after raiders.
Daru P.R. 5/1923-4. These are the closest villages to Daru; even the furthest, Mabadauan, is no more than eight 
hours sailing by native moto-moto. even at the height of the 
S .S. season. Beaver, op.cit., pp.92-4$ describes gamada and 
the reasons for its prohibition.
7^ Daru P.R., 1.2.1926 (Damirokoromo) 13/1925-6; February 
1926 (Katatai, Parama) 14/1925-6.
68 Daru P.R., 4.6.28. Daru 10/1927-8; cf. Daru 12/1926-7 (May 1927» Buniki village): ’Instructed Meani (V.C.) and the 
councillors to have the Rest House and family houses 
repaired. •. ’
on ends rather than means nullified this* Officers were 
judged on the peace and prosperity of their districts, rather than on the methods used to achieve this*
Councillors were useful principally as propaganda media 
whereby the government could convince the natives that what 
it compelled them to do was in their own interests* Yftien Murray instructed an officer to •influence the Councillors 
to plant more gardens*, the officer understood what was 
implied.69
(viii) Further Klwai Innovations
Meanwhile the Vies tern natives continued to introduce 
new institutions in their villages up to the time of the 
war.
On a visit to Kiwai island in 1926 an officer found 
•committees* of elderly men in all the villages* The V.C. and councillors asked that the names of these men be recorded by government.
On enquiring the reason for this I was informed 
that these elderly men form the ’Committee'* It seems that the ’Committee* are appointed by the 
people and to be eligible for appointment men 
must be over taxable age and must have some 
social standing in the village* It is stated that the duty of the Committee is to support the V.C. and Councillors in keeping law and order in 
the village and they also frame rules governing 
the social life and general routine of the village. I think the idea is a good one and well 
worth encouraging*™
The Kiwai traditionally had a ’council of the influential men*, in Landtman*s phrase*71 This was clearly 
an extension of the idea, and something which the Adminis­
tration could have encouraged the councillors to form or assist elsewhere; but this was not done* The idea spread, however, as far as the lower Barau villages* When the R.M. 
was appointing councillors there, at Buniki and Pirupiru, in 
1927» the old men formed committees to discuss matters with
69 See Daru P.R. 5 /1930 -1 , March 1931 (Kiwai coastline and 
Pahoturi river); Daru 13/1931-2, June 1932 (Kiwai Is. and 
lower Fly)*
7° Daru 18/1925-6, April 1926, p*37; also Report 1926-7# 
P*5U*
71 Landtman, The Kiwai Papuans* p. 169*
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him, but refused appointment as councillors, saying that 
they had no control over the young men* But, as the R.M. 
himself stated at the time that the councillors were being appointed 'to assist the village constables', the reluctance 
of the old men to accept appointment probably went deeper*
In fact, the committees represented councillors in the way in which Murray had originally intended.72
On the lower Bamu elderly men were also being appointed 
'village witness men', to witness payments to next-of-kin 
of deceased labourers, to women receiving the Family Bonus, and so on.73
Plainly there was a facility, even an eagerness, for 
adopting unfamiliar institutions which the Administration could have put to use, but which was never developed.74
After 1929 the Administration did try to use natives as assessors in the Native Courts; but even this seems to have been given only a perfunctory trial in the West. In 
1932 two Oromosapu councillors were co-opted as assessors 
in an adultery case involving an Ipisia councillor; but they disappeared before the hearing was finished. There may have been social reasons for this, but no attempt was made to 
find them. 'The result seemed to confirm Murray *s pessimism. 75
Nevertheless the Kiwai in particular continued to 
introduce their own administrative innovations. On a visit 
to Mabadauan in 1938 an officer was surprised to be greeted 
with well-organized formality and hospitality* This, he
 ^ Report 1927-8, p.32. Yet in 1934 an officer thought the 
appointment of councillors on the Bamu had been premature: 
'their only apparent function as such seems to be to solicit tobacco from Government officers.* Daru 6/1933-4, 
February 1934. Bimarami village.
73 Daru p.k# 12/1926-7» May 1927; e.g. Sagera village.
74 officers liked to have one man in each village, the V.C., 
who could get things done - see the praise of the V.C. 
system on the Morehead and Bensbach rivers in 1928, when 
they were said to be a means of breaking down barriers and 
promoting co-operation. (Daru P.R. 2/1928-9, August- September 1928;. As V.C.s were appointed to individual 
villages this is difficult to understand.
75 Report 1931-2, p«20; Report 1932-3» p.17* Daru P.R. 
13/1931-2, June 1932.
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found, was the work of a women’s committee which made 
regular visits of inspection to see that houses were kept clean and in good repair* Murray appreciated the voluntary 
aspect of this and refused to assist the committees by applying government sanctions:
•••the most unpleasant feature of native 
administration is the continuous procession of village natives going to gaol to suffer imprisonment for neglecting some necessary - work v/hich they might easily have carried out.7°
(After the war the women’s committees spread right 
through the Kiwai villages, without government promotion, 
and they have proved an excellent adjunct to the local government council.)
Again, in 1940-1 the Kiwai people appointed agricul­
tural ’inspectors* in the villages, to report to the 
councillors on the condition of gardens and the repair of fences* The Administration recognized the importance of the 
movement, ’for its extension may easily result in valuable 
improvement in the extent and variety of native food supplies• *77 Perhaps this is an indication that, had the war not Intervened, the attitudes of the Administration 
might have changed; if so, it would have been the result of native persistence in converting officers to the viewpoint that they could sustain their own administration, rather than the reverse. In the light of Divisional history, the 
government comment in 19Ui that ’the native councillors are 
beginning to understand their duties, responsibility, and authority* now appears presumptuous*78
The government consistently concentrated on the ends to be achieved: clean villages, better gardens and plantations, adherence to the law; only just before the war
76 Report '1939-40, p*23. Similar committees were found in the East Central Division the following year - Report 1941- 2, p.22. Through their own courts, natives could themselves 
have applied sanctions - but the idea was anathema to Murray, who feared all manner of corruption* Landtman noted 
that although women were almost the social equals of men, and owned their own property, they were traditionally 
excluded from any part in public affaire - pp*171-3 »
77 Report 1941-2, p*22*
7® Ibid. It is difficult to understand what the term 
’authority* may imply*
did the Y/estern natives impress on the government that the 
means to achieve the ends are equally important. Indeed, 
in the long term, much more important.
APPENDIX A
(1) Social Conditions
There are similarities in the patterns of leadership between the Elema and the Roro and Mekeo peoples of the 
west Central Division, and to a less extent with the Motu and Koita of the central coast, even though all these 
peoples are generally taken as forming a different 
physical type (Papuo-Melanesian) from the Elema (Papuan).
The Roro-speaking peoples had a number of clans (itsubu) running through each village, and each of these had 
a clan chief and secondary chiefs (ovia); these offices were 
heritable patrilineally. There were also specialist 'chiefs' for war and magic, though Seligmann preferred to 
call these ’hereditary office-bearers 1 rather than chiefs. 
The principal chiefs were responsible for the settlement of 
disputes; while the secondary chiefs policed the village. 1
The faa chiefs amongst the Mekeo corresponded roughly 
in status and functions to the ovia amongst the Roro. 
Sometimes the ceremonial and specialist functions (for 
example, war chief) were combined; and on occasions a 
woman could be lopla faa, a principal chief. Adoption, and the assumption by children of their mother's pangua 
(clan) were also not uncommon.
There is no doubt that among the Mekeo clans there was a feeling of affectionate considera­tion for their lopia faa and a ready recognition 
of the pre-eminence of the families to which these chiefs belonged...This naturally fostered a sense of dignity, importance and responsibility 
on the part of the faa chief which is quite 
uncommon among Papuasians...2
The coastal Motu and Koita also had hereditary office­holders with roughly similar functions, thou$i the system 
of leadership was not tied to the clubhouse as amongst the 
Roro. The Koita leaders were the iduhu rohl (clan or clan
1 C.G. Seligmann, The Melanesians of British New Guinea, 
pp.216-22. On p.221 is illustrated the special insignium 
of office which only chiefs could wear.
2 Ibid., pp.3U2-5.
II. Central Papua, 1888-19U2.
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section chief), and the rohl ketaike (village chief)* The 
iduhu rohi acted as peacemaker within the iduhu, and 
arranged feasts, though he could enforce no decisions against the wishes of the old men* The village chief 
particularly adjusted land disputes amongst the iduhu con­
stituting the village. In Hanuabada, which represents a conjunction of the Motu and Koita, it is doubtful if a 
village chief existed in pre-European times. The coming 
of government reduced the influence of the traditional 
leaders, but at the same time allowed one man to emerge, with government backing, as village leader* Previously, a man's attaining leadership had depended on his own force of character.3
Inland from Rigo chieftainship seems to have been much less formalized, though an energetic man was able to acquire 
and maintain extensive support
Inland from Mekeo, amongst the MafUlu people, there is said to have been an hereditary aristocracy# The people 
lived in dispersed clans, the village segments of which 
each had its em'u babe; while the clan itself had a chief, amidl, who presided over the emone (club-house). Williamson regarded the amidi as being the only true chief, because he 
was treated with respect, and led in all matters affecting 
the clan; but he had no power of punishment or control over clan members.5
(il) Transition to Reliance on Village Constables
In the 1890 s the area close to Port Moresby and inland 
to Sogeri was, broadly, under control; but to the east even 
the coastal villages were under limited Influence only; to the west the extension inland of the Catholic Mission (established at Yule Island in 1885) created continuing administrative difficulties. 6
 ^Ibid., pp.53-8; also C.S. Belshaw, The Great Village. 
pp.20-3* This comment treats Hanuabada as one village; 
Seligmann treats it as an association of villages.
i4 C. Northcott, Guinea Gold, p.65.
5 R.w. Williamson, The Mafulu, pp.92-6, 11i^ -5*
 ^A good deal of this was pioneer exploration, in advance 
of the Administration - for example, the 1896-7 expeditions 
to Kuni and the upper St. Joseph - see A. Dupeyrat, Papuan 
Conquest. pp.U5-58.
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In the more settled areas, the trend towards reliance on the village constables has already been mentioned* In Hanuabada, Toua, who was originally village constable, 
later became government chief as well; to enforce his 
authority he leaned heavily on government.7 In Aroma, where 
Koapena had had enormous influence and apparently real authority, by 1898 government was by the 'eight excellent 
village policemen*.8 Those chiefs who co-operated with 
government had their authority extended and strengthened.In the Mekeo area a man of considerable influence named 
Maino-Panau proved himself of inestimable service to the 
Administration. In 1897 the Mekeo people, incensed by the deaths of two carriers, were whipped up to fever pitch by the sorcerers, so that an attack on a government party 
seemed imminent. The R.M. then arrested all the principal 
sorcerers; this would have been impossible without Maino's 
assistance.
Vftiere other chiefs failed throu^ i fear, Maino- 
Panau was informed of such, and in no instance 
did he fail to hand over any native required.9
The sorcerers* charms, together with the arms of the 
fighting men, were publicly burnt. 1° MacGregor, although he 
acknowledged the special problem of sorcery amongst the Mekeo, strongly deprecated the wholesale gaoling of the 
sorcerers *on a purely constructive offence*. Maino, 
however, in recognition of his fzeal and impartial conduct* 
was appointed *senior chief and constable* in the Mekeo district, and he held the confidence of the Administration 
for many years.
The appointing of senior chiefs or senior village constables over areas combining numbers of ’parishes * became 
not uncommon in the Central Division - an example of a local 
administrative tradition.
' Port Moresby Station Journals, returns, March 1899; also 
entry of 9*3*1900, where 8 women were gaoled for disobeying 
Toua.
® Report 1898-9$ p.xxiii.
9 Ibid., p.86*
Ibid., pp.xxil, 87*
He was held in affectionate regard by Administration 
officers, who supplied him with tobacco and food - P.M. 
Station J., 19.6.99. How he was regarded by other Mekeo 
chiefs we do not know.
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At a very early date confusion arose as to the official 
status and functions of the chiefs and village constables, 
similar to the later confusion between the village 
constables and councillors. The chiefs became subject to 
direction, discipline, dismissal and replacement. To some 
extent this was an inevitable result of the trend towards appointing chiefs as village constables and making them dependent on government support. The most notorious 
instance was Monckton's action in the Veipa area in 1897 in 
stripping all the chiefs and village constables but one - 
Maino - of their uniforms.12 In 1897 a chief and V.C. in the Kabadi area was dismissed for 'larceny and his 
propensity for lying*. 3^ He lost government support in 
both capacities. This appears to have been the same man, 
Naime, who the following year was branded as the major sorcerer of the area, threatening the new V.C. and the native mission teacher.14
Instances of officers issuing instructions to both chiefs and village constables are common (for example, in the Tupuseleia-Hula area in December 1 8 9 7 ) and often 
both the chiefs and the village constables were expected to 
make arrests for contraventions of Regulations. In the 
Mekeo area, Government Agent Bramell seems to have insisted 
on the chiefs reporting themselves at regular intervals at the government station.16 This could have opened the way 
to genuine consultation; but as many of the lopia were also 
village constables law enforcement became paramount. The 
official return for 1897-8 shows that, of fifty village constables in the Mekeo area, thirty were also chiefs.17
^  C.W. Monckton, Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident Magistrate, pp.121-2. He gives Maino fs action here as tne 
reason for his promotion; but this is wrong.
3^ Report 1898-9» p.86.
11* P.M. Stat. J., 9.3.1898.
15 P.M. Stat. J., 20.12.1897. 21*.5.1899. Many of these examples concerned the burial Regulation; the chief was clearly involved in role conflict where custom decreed that 
bodies should be buried within the village.
Report 1898-9» p.88. In June 1899 the chief of Inawi was 
reprimanded for being the only chief sho had not reported at 
the stations Stat. J., 20.6.1899*
17 Report 1898-9, p.93.
(Ill) The Place of the Missions
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As everywhere else, the L.M.S. native teachers gave constant trouble by arrogating temporal authority, or 
attempting to do so. This was confined mainly to the Port 
/ Moresby and Rigo areas; in the Mekeo area the Catholic 
mission was able to rely on a large staff of Europeans.
It was the anti-custom bias of the L.M.S. which provoked a good deal of the trouble with the natives and the Divisional 
authorities.18 The European missionaries, because of their continuity of service, were of considerable use to the Administration; conversely, they were sometimes able to 
influence the select!on of village constables to suit their 
own concepts.
In 1903, for example, the Rev. H.P. Schlenker suggested 
to the Government Agent at Rigo that a boy, who was clearly 
a protege of the mission, replace the V.C. (and chief) of Kalikodobu, an inland village. The Government Agent agreed that the V.C. was Incapable, and put forward the remarkable 
compromise that the boy should indeed become V.C., but that 
the deposed man be allowed to keep his uniform without 
pay.19 In September 1912 the Rev. H.M. Dauncey complained of many offences by V.C.s in the west coastal area of the Division: they were, he said, promoting gambling, 
neglecting to maintain order, and one had even forced a 
mission schoolboy to work in his garden - this last was an offence to which mission teachers were more usually p r o n e . 20
The Catholic mission provided an unusual problem 
because of its rapid penetration inland; but it maintained a staff of more than fifty Europeans from the early 1900 s onwards, so that supervision over its native teachers was 
strict. A priori, the Catholic system might have been 
expected to lead to the accretion of temporal authority: 
the method was to evangelise through a troop of 'native auxiliaries’ called the kls» catechists who were carefully
18 Report 1897-8, p.xvi; Report 1898-9» p.xxii; Report 1899-1900, pp.xiii, 67 (one teacher had just been convicted of arson, another had interfered with native dancing),
Report 1901-2, p.xxviii.
Schlenker to A.C. English, 12.1.1903; English to Gov. 
Sec., 15.1.03, Rigo P.R. 1903» file 6. Schlenker was simultaneously refused a blanket request that all natives
be forced to attend school.prt Mekeo Stat. J., September 1912 passim.
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drilled 'to repeat indefinitely and persuasively the 
questions and answers1. The kls wore a special uniform not unlike that of a village constaLle.21 They were, however, 
closely supervised by Europeans, through a system of 
secondary stations for each 'tribal group' around the mainstation.22
Because of the Intensive nature of this system it is 
difficult to estimate the administrative effects it had.The Administration Police Camp was established at Kambisl, 
in the Ononge area, in 1925; but its prime object was to 
pacify the country as far as the border. Meanwhile, in the 
same year the mission already had the Fuyuge country 'in a state of effervescence'.23 As late as 1929 the Mekeo 
A.R.M. interviewed the Bishop about alleged 'courts' which had been held in inland villages both by the Fathers and 
by mission teachers. The Bishop disclaimed all knowledge, but remarked that the Fathers of course often settled village disputes to keep the peace - a practice that the Administration was not in a position to gainsay.24
(iv) Over-estimation of the V.C. System: the Paternal Ideal
In the early years of the century, when routine 
patrolling was necessarily minimal, there was a tendency to 
place altogether too much reliance on the village constable. In 1901 the R.M. wrote that the V.C.s were accepted by the natives; as this was the earliest area in the Territory - outside Port Moresby - to come under government influence, 
he felt that the success of the village constables could be 
regarded as an index to their success elsewhere.25
At this period, however, the village constables were 
much more active outside their own spheres than within them; this seems to have been encouraged, perhaps an unacknowledged 
concession to the role conflict in which a village constable was involved as soon as he accepted appointment. Traditional
2  <4 Dupeyrat, op.cit., p.102 (the uniform is illustrated on 
p.119). There is an extended description of the 
evangelistic method in A. Dupeyrat, Papouasie, pp.434-49.
Kls Is a contraction of Kate Kiste.----------------------
Dupeyrat, Papuan Conquest, p.100.
Ibid., p.102; Report 1926-7» pp. 12-3*
2!+ Kfliruku P.R. 2/1929-30, 25.8.1929.
2* Report 1901-2, p.xxlx.
598
leaders were often anxious to arrest offenders in 
neighbouring parishes. In February 1901 the chief of Kubuli and his two sons brought to Rigo two Lebu prisoners, accused of the murder of a Boka native. They were given 20 
sticks of tobacco, and the chief was presented with a blue uniform, while one of the sons was made a village c o n s t a b l e . 2 ^
In addition, the V.C.s were often used to assist the 
Constabulary on patrol, for their local knowledge was invaluable.2f
This method overcame some of the difficulties caused 
by social segmentation. Indeed, this segmentation was seen 
to have certain administrative advantages. In 1903 Barton, then R.M. of the Central Division, remarked that offences were •seldom* reported by the V.C. of the tribe to which 
the culprit belonged. This characteristic he found 
particularly strong among the bush tribes.
Although the absence of a spirit of co-operation, 
amounting often to actual antagonism, between the 
innumerable tribal communities has in some ways 
been an obstacle from an administrative point of view, the influence which has been gained over 
the natives would have been impossible of 
attainment had the tribes been capable of co­operating: or, at all events, the work of administration could not have been accomplished 
so economically in the face of it.28
This is in line with both MacGregor’s and Murray’s suspicion of actual or potential combination amongst native 
groups.
The belief that, through the V.C.s, the natives could, in effect, control one another, deluded the Administration 
into over-estimating the adequacy of the V.C. system. In the Rigo area in 1901+ they were acting as patrol police on the fringes of government control, bringing refractory
p fl Rigo J., February 1901.
Port Moresby J., 6.10.1906: ’Sent out V.C.s of Lealea, Boera, Boera-bada, Baruni, Eriama, Umani and Elavala, to 
search for Marahare.*po Draft Divisional Report 1902-3» typescript pp.5-6. C.D. Journals. Gov. Sec. Musgrave particularly marked this 
section. Also see Report 1903-U» p.17»
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groups together* The following year it was claimed that the whole district patrolled from Rigo was under control and 
that it was intended, therefore, to move the government station further east*2^
Correspondingly, control through the village constables, 
from the Administration’s standpoint, was reduced to an unreal level of simplicity. To take examples from the Port Moresby district in 1909: in November the R.M. found Boera 
very dirty, though the villagers had previously been given 
warnings. 'After some questions the V.C. very unwillingly 
gave me the names of those who had committed a breach of Native Reg. No.1 of 1905* I told him to bring them - se volteen in all - to Port tomorrow. '30 The same happened 
in other villages. At Tebeaia, finding the road and 
village unclean, the R.M. sent two village constables ’to 
bring in six natives, whose names they gave to me, for a breach of the Native Regulations *.3*
The system of punishment for breaches of the Native Regulations was, in practice, quite arbitrary. When 
offences were committed, the Administration expected the 
V.C.s to put forward people who could be made culpable.
This was hardly a system likely to promote stability, co­operation, or a sense of responsibility in the villages; and the only things that saved the V.C. fs position from being 
intolerable were either his own profitable corruption or the infrequency of government patrols.
As has been noted elsewhere, Murray’s developmental 
policy imposed added strains on the village constables, but 
at the same time Increased the opportunities for corruption. Friction sometimes developed between planters and native officials,32 while at the other end of the scale were the 
cases of two Rigo village constables inducing young men to 
’sign on* against their will.33
2 9 Report 1904-5» P*23; Report 1905-6, p.4. The station remained at Rigo, a further station later being set up at 
Abau. The alienation of land in the Cloudy Bay area 
eventually compelled this - Report 1909-10, p.17.
30 C.D. Stat. J., 23.11.1909.
Ibid., 5.12.09. All the village people had taken to the 
bush.
C.D. Journal, Nov. 1908; Letter R.M. to Gov. Sec., 
12.10.1908.33 Rigo J#, 10.4.1907. Maopa villages.
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Despite these circumstances, a remarkably sanguine 
attitude towards the efficacy of the village constables grew up. In August 1911 the A.R.M. at Rigo wrote:
I do not anticipate any more trouble from the natives of the Maipiko District, ibr now that they are to have a Village Constable there, and 
the one at Makigolo being smartened up, the place 
can, I think, be reckoned as under proper control now.34
This optimism was founded in a remarkable theory 
expressed at length by the Resident Magistrate of the 
period, J.T. O’Malley. This constitutes a definition, in an exaggerated form, of the paternal ideal. According to 
O’Malley the natives unquestion ingly accepted both the 
appointed native officials and the European officers as a 
substitute chieftainship.
There had to be a form of chieftainship and, as 
the native himself was found wanting in this 
respect, then the Government gave them chiefs, by dividing the Territory into Divisions and putting 
in charge of each a Resident Magistrate, and those Caucasian Resident Magistrates are at the present 
day the paramount chiefs who control, guide, and care for the three or four hundred thousands of Papuan natives. It seems almost incredible to 
realize how naturally the people have accepted 
this substitute; how readily they give their 
obedience and respect to this re-incamation of chieftainship, and accept the government, control, 
and leadership of a chief who is not of their own race and colour.35
Why had the natives given this obedience so readily? O'Malley concluded that the reason was that a smouldering 
spark of obedience to authority had lain dormant, waiting 
only for the coming of the white man to re-kindle it.
As a father is to a family, so is the Resident 
Magistrate to the tribes of his Division. They look to him as their final court of appeal...His word to them is law, and is obeyed without
3^ C.D. Journal, 23*8.1911* It was also hopefully believed 
that sorcery - one of the major difficulties in the V.C. 
system -  was declining - see Report 1914-5» P*27*35 Report 1911-2, pp.90-1.
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question*..In fact, he is the pivot on which their tribal life revolves* He is their 
strength, their safety, and their refuge, and 
without him they would be bewildered and lost, and their life chaotic#36
This remarkable belief had important implications for 
the extension of the village constable system; for O’Malley conceded that in practice he and his officers could not control, as 'chiefs’, the area nominally under their authority - for example, one A.R.M. in the Mekeo area dealt 
with an estimated population of 26,000* This was the 
justification for the extension of the V.C. system:
••♦in districts and villages where the Magistrate 
cannot personally come in contact with the 
natives, he (the V.C.) is the mouthpiece of the 
Magistrate and the medium through which the people approach the Magistrate.37
O'Malley, therefore, specifically countenanced the 
appointment of V.C.s in areas which it was impracticable for government officers to visit.
The major administrative problem in the Central Division centred in the western section, embracing the Mekeo peoples and those inland to Mafulu and Ononge. Rapid 
penetration inland by the Catholic Mission, which was 
continually opening up new country, forced the government to follow.38 Initially Murray, imbued with that com­
paratively optimistic elan which characterised his attitude
36 Ibid.
X ~ 7
* Ibid* He concluded that the natives seemed naturally to understand 'this Magisterial or Chief system*, and that it required implicit obedience to authority* The system, he 
said, was 'successful in the highest degree'* The V.C., he 
said (p.93) was 'the acknowledged chief of his village'.
3^ See J. McAuley, The Distance between the Government and 
the Governed♦ South~Pacific* VII, 8, pp.&15-6; cf. A.M. Bottriii» South Pacific, VII, 11, p.901, where he points out 
some commereial Ínterests in the Goilala area. In 1907» Fathers Chabot and Filladeau mapped the course of the St* Joseph and Biaru Rivers (Report 1907-8, p*12 and map); and 
when Murray again visited the area in 1912 he found that the 
head waters of the Vetapu were well known to the mission - 
Report 1913-U, p.8.
602
to native administration before World War I, was confident 
that the maintenance of peace and order would be easy. In November 1907 he secured the names of several men amongst 
the inland Boboi who had murdered the V.C. of Inawauni, one 
of the Mekeo villages. Murray believed that the punishment 
of these murderers would ’almost certainly* secure order in the Boboi area and would ensure government influence 
amongst all the tribes to the north of Mekeo9 from Mt. Yule 
on the one side to Mafulu, the furthest station of the Catholic mission, on the other.39
Sheer ignorance of what was going on in these areas 
promoted unsupported optimism. The R.M. Central Division 
complained of the impracticability of patrolling there in 1911; and in 1912 Murray himself confessed that the distance from Kairuku made it almost impossible to enforce the Regulations in the Mafulu a r e a . 40 The only solution was an 
inland government station; in December 1913 Murray set out 
proposals for a station at Ononge, but no provision had 
been made in the Estimates, and the war then intervened.The Kambisi Police Camp was eventually not established until 
1925.
Meanwhile, Murray learned on his visit in August 1912 that the Mafulu area had threatened trouble, but that the 
Catholic Fathers had arranged peace, and that the tribes 
which had been ’spoiling for a fight* with the government were quiet. The missionaries, he reported, had been careful to point out that the peace they had arranged was the peace of the government, not of the m i s s i o n .  42 i n  the 
second half of 1913» however, spasmodic inter-tribal fighting broke out in the Mafulu and Mondo areas. In September the 
A.R.M., acting on advice from the mission, went to Mafulu 
from Kairuku (a walking distance of 100 miles) and by consultation with the chiefs arranged compacts amongst the tribes, with compensatory payments.43
^  Murray to Ex. Affairs, 21.11.07» No.228/07. CPI, 6.
^  Report 1911-2, p.91; Report 1913-4» p.10.
Report 1913-4» p. 10; also Minute by Murray, No. 1759» Dec. 
1913. CPI, 30, file 28; Report 1926-7» p. 12.42 Summary History of the Mafulu Troubles. C.D. 1915-6, 
Jacket A .cM ; fteport i9^5-4," p.8.
!|3 Ibid.
i
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On the recommendation of the field staff and the R.M., 
most of the chiefs in the area were made village constables - 
a remarkable step in view of the impracticability of supervising them, and all the more so in view of the fact that they could be trusted so little that they were not 
even issued with handcuffs, a general prerogative and indeed 
symbol of V.C.s everywhere.^ Altogether fifteen V.C.s were appointed. The R.M. was optimistic about them; the most 
influential was Aida-Sivu of Palibu, who was stated to have 
previously behaved ’in a passive way* against the government.
It is relevant that on this same patrol village 
constables were also appointed amongst the earlier contacted 
Boboi people* When in 1923 the A.R.M. visited the area after reports of Boboi raids on neighbouring peoples, he found that one village responsible had not been visited 
since 1913» and another not since 1915* Both their V.C.s were dead, and they themselves self-righteously attributed 
the recrudescence of a ’troublesome spirit1 to the lack of government control* 5^
In the Mafulu area likewise, the appointment of V.C.s 
was based on little other than blind trust* Not a great deal had been expected, but it had been hoped that the V.C.s would allow the Administration more easily to get in 
touch with the peoples and to stop further disturbances*
Eight of them were taken to Kairuku to impress them with government strength*^
This philosophy did not allow for the extensive 
influence of Aida-Sivu. In October 191U trouble again developed in the area* The Catholic missionary, in effect acting for the government, persuaded all the chiefs except 
Aida to sign a ’peace paper’; but Aida’s ’almost extra­
ordinary power and influence ’ gave him a formidable following* He was eventually arrested, but not before an A.C. of the patrol had been killed* It was hoped that a
l| J| ———w— '—
Report 191¿H3> P*27* In 1908 V.C.s were forbidden to retain the keys of handcuffs, in order to prevent extortion - 
Report 1908-9,' p*65#
1+5 Report 191 k-5> p.27; Kairuku P.R. 6/1922-3, 2.2.23.
it6 R.M. C.D. to Gov. See., 10.11.1913, 12.12.13, 13.12.13. 
CPI, V, 3a P.28; T/80/13.
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lengthy term of Imprisonment might destroy his influence and 
settle the district* 7^
To a degree the latter hope was realized, as there was no further feuding; but in 1923 Aida was still recognized as the most powerful figure in the area and was even 
considered for appointment as V,C. again, until Murray personally vetoed the suggestion. His district was in excellent order, and he was co-operating with government; 
but it was reported that his influence was founded on his 
reputation as an fImotuf or sacred man, inviolable to attack. This excluded him from government office.
In the early 1920 3 opinions seem to have been divided 
on the appointment of V.C.s in the far inland areas. Two 
were appointed, at Goilala and Kambisi, in 1922; but the A.R.M. hesitated to appoint another one in the Venapa 
valley, although he considered one badly needed, because of 
Circular 391 which counselled more careful selection. The 
realization seems to have come, as in the Western Division, that the V.C. system had been over-extended: the A.R.M. emphasised the need for an inland patrol post; and Leo 
Austen, an exceptionally able officer, declared that the district was too large for one man's control.^9
One method which had been tried, to keep the officer 
at Kairuku In contact with the village constables - an admission to the lack of regular patrolling - was the pay­ment of them in cash instead of trade, which forced them to 
visit the government station. Even this was an adminis­
trative rationalisation of a suggestion made by a deputation of Mekeo V.C.s in October 1912, and approved by the 
Treasurer at that time. This arrangement suited the 
convenience of the coastal V.C.s, but it did not work with 
the inland men who were so terrified of Mekeo sorcery that 
nothing would induce them to travel annually to Kairuku fortheir wages.50
^7 summary History, clt.sup.; Report 1916-7, p*5* Aida had 
been convicted In 1913» but the conviction was quashed by ¿fadge Herbert on the ground of insufficient evidence.
Minute by C.E. Herbert, 5.2*1914. CPI, V, 30*
48 Report 1923-4, p.20.
49 Report 1922, p.56; Kairuku P.R.3/1921-2; P.R.11/1922-3, conclusion.
5° Report 1919-20, p.31; Minute, Treasurer to Gov. Sec*, 7.11.1912, C.D. Stat. J., Oct. 1912; Kairuku P.R.3/1921-2.
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Despite the palpable lack of control over inland 
peoples, there were officers who believed the situation to 
be better there in the 1920 s than in the Roro and Mekeo areas. McAuley has pointed out that the rapid extension of the government line inland caused constant pressure for 
carriers on these peoples, and that this process 'bedevilled 
the relations between these coastal peoples and the govern­ment for decades'.51 The obligation to provide carriers was 
not the only factor; others were a general Administration 
suspicion of the more sophisticated native; the continuing 
aversion to traditional leadership supported by sorcery amongst the Roro and Mekeo; and the often arbitrary 
selection of village constables.
In 1925 A.R.M. Rentoul came to the conclusion that the quality of the V.C.s deteriorated as he neared the coast; like Austen he believed that authority was more easily enforced and more genuinely respected in relatively untouched societies.52 The year before, however, Liston- 
Blyth had attributed the appalling state of the Mekeo villages to the lack of patrolling, of which even the long- suffering mission was complaining. He agreed, however, 
that the natives were more educated and lazier, and claimed 
that the mission gave them a shield behind which to hide; moreover, he said that nobody seemed to have authority, so that constant compulsion was necessary. The missionaries 
complained of the constant changing of officers as a major factor in poor control.53
By the mid-twenties, as administration extended to the 
border, the compulsory recruitment of carriers was 
complicating the work of the V.C.s even as far inland as 
Mafulu, so that this in itself is an inadequate explanation of Mekeo conditions. The pressure to recruit carriers necessitated constant coercion on the natives and support 
by government of the V.C.s. In order that the flow of 
carriers be maintained, it was essential that each village 
have an official responsible; under these circumstances
5^  McAuley, loc.cit., p.818; Bottrlll, loc.cit., points out 
that pack-animals were not an adequate substitute - but mules were used from Kambisi Police Camps Report 1927-8, p.39.
52 Kairuku P.R. 3/1925-6. Upper Mekeo, Biaru river.
53 Kfllruku P.R. 7/1922-3, 20/1923-4.
(v) Problems of Administration Amongst the Mekeo
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the selection of village constables could hardly fail to be arbitrary.5U
Also, traditional leaders could not be expected to 
accept government office willingly. But it fits in with 
that curiously paradoxical aspect of native administration in Papua that in the Mekeo and Roro areas, where a distinc­tive and recognisable form of traditional leadership 
existed, little or no use was made of it, while in the Rigo area there is considerably more reference to so-called chiefs* Seligmann spoke of the intense loyalty of the 
Mekeo to the lopia faa* and of the sense of dignity and 
responsibility of the faa chiefs themselves;55 but the Administration put its own needs and ideals ahead of 
chiefly prerogatives. Even where the faa chiefs were opposed to a girl's marriage, the Magistrate stepped in and ordered them to desist.56 The chiefs, however, slipped 
into the background primarily because they were believed to 
derive their authority from the practice of sorcery, an offence under the Regulations*57
In the face of sorcery, the Administration had no answer but compulsion. The chiefs, correspondingly, were thought of as opponents to be coerced or suppressed, 
rather than as potential allies. The agents of compulsion, 
the village constables, were therefore involved in a complex form of role conflict, which earned them little sympathy.
To take one example, when A.R.M. Little concluded that 
village constables were neglecting the cleaning of roads in order not to offend their communities, he accused them
J Report 1925-6, p.3k; Kairuku P.R. 6/1925-6: Mafulu, 
20.10*25; cf. statement of the Nara villages in 1936, that the only time the V.C. had any authority was at the time 
of government visits - Kairuku P.R. 8/1935-6. A.R.M. 
Thompson - information from a native clerk. In the Kamblsi 
area in 1925, A.R.M. Baker complained of the lack of authority of V.C.s. He forced the local chiefs to co­operate by occupying their gardens and villages - Kairuku 
5/1924-5.55 Seligmann, op.cit., p*3U3*
56 C.D. Stat. J., Inawi, 16-7 December 1910*
57 There is an interesting comparison with the situation in 
Kenya, where until 1925 an escape clause prevented chiefs 
from being charged with sorcery - see J. Nottingham in The 
Journal of African Administration, 1959» XI, 1, p.14*
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of taking the line of least resistance, and gave them blunt orders to get the roads cleaned.-^
In 1928 the A.R.M. reported that the V.C.s appeared to have very little authority, with the result that he had to send the station Constabulary out in order to get orders 
obeyed.59 Despite the introduction of councillors by this 
date, what the Administration Interpreted as a sinister revival of sorcery caused a continuance of government by compulsion. The village constables in the same year were castigated as *a spineless collection* who constantly 
invoked the aid of the A.N.C. when crimes were cormaitted, 
because they were terrified of sorcery.”0 In 1930 the village constables were said to be afraid to keep roads and 
villages in order; and in 1931 the Catholic mission believed 
sorcery to be on the increase, one native having explained that *the sorcerer is stronger than the Government, which can only put us in gaol, where we are well fed and then 
come back to our village, but the sorcerer can kill*.*5'
The Administration lapsed into a form of despair over 
the continuing influence of the Mekeo sorcerers, a negative 
attitude which militated against positive action. In 1935 
it was remarked that in the Mekeo area there were three known chief sorcerers, but that if they were gaoled they 
would be fed sumptuously ’to appease the great men’s wrath* 
and that they would emerge stronger than before. In any 
case, it was admitted that it was virtually impossible to get any evidence against sorcerers of standing.62
(vl) Head V.C.s and Consultative Administration at Rigo
These chronic difficulties do not seem to have arisen 
in the Rigo district. Here, the practice was adhered to of 
appointing Head Village Constables in certain areas. Aroma,
58 Report 1919-20, p.31.
59 Report 1928-9, p.27.
60 Kairuku P.R. 4/1928-9.
61 Kairuku P.R. 16/1929-30, 12/1930-1. Much the same seems to have applied in the Horo-speaking villages, e.g. Waima - 
see P.R. 2/1926-7» Sorcery was not the only difficulty in getting efficient V.C.s - the A.R.M. was also looking for recruits, preferably ex-A.N.C., who had some knowledge of 
English - Kairuku P.R. 5/1925-6.
62 Kairuku P.R. 9/1934-5.
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which had eight village constables, early had one described 
as fHead V.C.* As administration extended into the 
mountains, fspecial V.C.s* were appointed with the 
particular object of enabling the Administration to get into closer touch with neighbouring peoples.°3 Perhaps the 
Administration was simply fortunate in the personalities it selected in this district: the most prominent of these was 
a man named Agevadabia, who in 1918 was spoken of as Head 
V.C. of the Rigo mountain districts, with no fewer than 27 other V.C.s under his supervision.^
There seems little doubt that Agevadabia was a man with 
extensive traditional influence. Independently in 1918 he made a long trip into the Mt. Brown area - at that time outside government control - and he was said to be princi­
pally responsible for bringing these people in touch with 
the government* The generally progressive and co-operative attitude in this district is in remarkable contrast with that in the Mekeo and Mafulu areas - possibly the early relations and firm action with the Aroma in MacGregor's 
time made a lasting and pervasive impression* It is interesting to note that Mokela, the Head V.C. of Aroma, was personally experimenting with the growing of rice, at a 
time when rice-growing was generally experimental.65
Better relations were everywhere evident in the Rigo 
area. The extensive patrolling carried out by Agevadabia, 
for example, enormously simplified the extension and maintenance of government control* It facilitated continuing the appointment of traditional leaders as village 
constables, for there was little chance, with native super­
vision, of their disaffection; and with Agevadabia constantly 
at the side of patrolling officers, there was less induce­ment for them to appoint men as village constables simply 
because they had a knowledge of English or Motu* Moreover, 
Agevadabia*s presence made patrol officers less inclined to 
issue direct orders, and more inclined to discuss government 
policy* The A.R.M. noted in October 1921: *A number of 
District matters to talk over with the Head V.C.
Agevadabia* - an attitude strikingly different from that elsewhere.66
63 Report 1914-5. P.28.
Rigo P.R. 5/1918; Report 1919-20, pp.30-1.
Report 1922-3, p.56; Letter, J.T. Bens ted, South Pacific. 
VII, 11, p.903.
66 Rigo P.R. 2/1921-2, 30.10.1921.
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Agevadabia, for his part, seems to have been anxious 
that the real men of influence be appointed V.C.s, for it 
made his supervision less onerous# He regularly accompanied 
Administration patrols through the mountain villages; in 
1925 he recommended the chief of O’oiva, said to be the 'big man' of the Mt* Brown area, as V.C.67 The influential 
men appeared to respond to this, becoming anxious for 
government appointment, and equally anxious that their sons should succeed them*68
The Administration came to rely on Agevadabia, and, in his old age, possibly also Agevadabia on the Administration. In 1932, annoyed at not being told of the approach of a government patrol, he harangued the assembled V.C.s and 
councillors at Boku: 'Am I not the Head V.C.? Am I not 
responsible to Rigo Government for all villages in these 
hills? ¿Take care that such an oversight does not occur again.*69
The dangers of corruption in working through an individual such as Agevadabia need no elaboration - in the 
Mandated Territory there was the notorious case of Bumbu, 
a Paramount Luluai in the Huon Gulf, the extent of whose jurisdiction might be c o m p a r a b l e . 70 But in that case 
corruption was connived at over a long period by the local 
constabulary, who arrogated extraordinary authority under 
the Mandate Administration* In the case of Agevadabia, the experiment seems to have succeeded; for, one might say, men are bound to respond better to responsibility than to 
coercive direction* The constant changing of officers 
remained a handicap; sometimes they failed to revise their 
attitudes when dealing with men such as Agevadabia in the Rigo area, even after the inauguration of the councillor system.7*1
f Rigo P.R. 2/1925-6*68 e*g* the chief of Imoagolo went to Rigo in 1927, asking 
to be a V.C., as he felt his village was being 'left out of 
the scheme of things' (Rigo P.R. 6/1926-7); while in 1931 the V.C.s of Kemabolu and Kalo asked that their sons 
replace them (Rigo P.R. 1/1931-2, 24.9.31, 26.9.31)*
69 Rigo P.R. 3/1932-3. 19.11.32.
70  See Ch.V, 1.
71 A.R.M. Chance, for example, seemed to ignore Agevadabia 
when on patrol - Rigo P.R. 4/1930-1*
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But in general there seems to have been a mutually 
effective response* To take one example, in 1926 the A.R.M., remarking on the particularly law-abiding state of 
the inland villages, also noted with surprise that the 
village of Durom, through Agevadabia, asked to be allowed 
to begin rice cultivation, despite difficulties both in growing it and in transporting it to market* 72
Under Murrayfs administration the threat or possibility of corruption amongst native officials became almost obsessive - a reflection of the policy of paternal 
assimilation* One aspect of this was the prohibition of 
V.C.s taking extra wives after their appointment. The subtleties of this were not understood, or were certainly not followed, by many officers.73 The unfortunate aspect 
of the policy was that it tended to restrain influential 
men from accepting the position, and reinforced all the other selection criteria - a desirable knowledge of Motu, some experience of the government (preferably in the 
A.N.C.), or an appearance of •intelligence* - which 
militated against the appointment of influential men and 
progressively turned the V.C.s into purely government 
servants.
The repercussions were both unfortunate and inconsis­tent. At Keapara in 19^ 9 the A.R.M. reluctantly recommended the dismissal of the V.G. because he had taken a second wife, 
while conceding that he was the best V.C. in the district*74 
In the Mt* Brown region in 1927 a man concealed his having three wives in order to secure appointment* When the A.R.M. 
discovered this, he wanted to dismiss him, but Murray 
reinstated him on the ground that the man had the wives before his appointment*75 On the other hand, by what seems 
a complete change of front, in 1930 when an officer wished 
to appoint a Koiari man with three wives a V.C., Murray commented: *Has the A.R.M. considered that such a man
Report 1926-7, p.42* Coercion had to be applied else­
where to ’encourage* rice-growing. After the war the 
Administration knew that natives would never really co­
operate on the ’digging stick’ principle of pre-war - see O.H.K. Spate, The Rice Problem in New Guinea, South Pacific*
vii, 6, pp.731^
73 See Ch.II.
7i+ Port Moresby P.R. 7/1919, 12.11.1919. The man's first wife, to whom he had been married for 12 years, had borne 
him no children.
75 Rigo P .R .  1/1927-8, 15.7.27.
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probably has a number of relations-in-law who may hamper 
him in the execution of his duty?*.76 Many officers, and many natives, were convinced that only monogamists could be 
appointed V.C.s. The Government Anthropologist, Williams, 
defended the rule strongly, though admitting that, had it 
been Introduced earlier, Ahuia Ova, the notable V.C. of Hanuabada, could never have been appointed.77
(vil) Tensions: Consultation and Direct Administration
Despite the introduction of the councillor system in 
the 1920 s, there were curious anomalies in the adminis­trative approach. Murray allowed no doubt that it was the business of the government to govern, and that •civilized* 
institutions would ultimately replace those of the natives.7° This view seems increasingly to have been shared by his Government Anthropologist.79 Manifestations 
of social tensions and culture change were, as a result, 
sometimes not handled with the greatest of sympathy. When 
an outbreak similar to the *Vailala Madness’ occurred in 
the Mekeo-Roro region in 1929, A.R.M. Thompson gaoled the native he believed responsible, describing him as *an arch 
imposter with the priceless gift of being able to put 
himself in a trance* and describing the movement as •tomfoolery*.”0 Williams commented that Thompson*s action was exactly to the point, and he added that if the trances became general his previous suggestion of a term in 
•hospital* should be adopted.®*
Rigo p/r. 2/1930-1, Murray*8 comment appended.
77 F.E. Williams, J.B.A.I.. LX1X, 1939, p.39 note 39. Williams shared Murray's v1ew, which inhibited the appoint­ment of men already polygamists, that favouritism in the 
exercise of his duty would result if an official had many 
relations.
7® H. Murray, Papua of Today, p.225.
^  Williams went over to a form of modified functionalism 
which left ample scope for direct action by government - see 
A.P. Bikin, F.S. Williams« Government Anthropologist of 
Papua, 1922-113. Oceania, XIV, pp.91-103«
A.R.M. Kairuku to Gov. Sec., 2.9.29. CPI V, 16/14/12.He likened the man, Here Ikupu, to Mahatma Ghandi - in 
retrospect, unconscious irony.
01 Williams to Gov, Sec,, 17,9.29, ibid.; also his Orokaiva Magic, pp.91-2, The report was sent to Canberra, where the Minister commented that the action appeared to have been 
effective. 19.11.29. A.918/1. CPI.V, 16/14/17.
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Williams, in point of fact, had no more idea of the implications of this action in the Mekeo area than the 
A.R.M. - he was arguing purely from principle and by 
analogy* When, in 1931, Murray raised the question of the possible neglect of traditional leaders, Williams commented that the chiefly system in the Roro-Mekeo areas seemed to 
have potentialities, but that *as I have never been in 
these districts I know nothing of the attitude of the Government towards the "chiefsM.*82
Into this atmosphere of benevolent autocracy, Murray in the mid-twenties Introduced a new Institution, the 
village councillor. By 1927 a council was meeting in Hanuabada, and councillors had been appointed in several of 
the other coastal villages east and west of Port Moresby.83 
In Hanuabada twelve councillors were selected by the people, who had themselves decided to have one council for the 
Elevala-Tanobada-Hohodae-Poreporena group. The R.M. made 
it clear that the prime purpose of the council was to facilitate administration, and it was explained to the councillors that it was their duty to assist the government officers, to bring about better conditions and to maintain 
law and order.84 Murray made something of a testing ground 
of the Hanuabada council, and in 1931 even thought it might be possible later to combine village councils into district councils *with perhaps some real power of administration* - 
of the Hanuabada council *s lack of any such
To the extent that the Hanuabada council was expected 
to be a consultative institution, however, it was out of 
accord with the longstanding attempt to create a village chieftainship, to centre authority in one man. This was a conflict which continued into the nineteen-fifties and
^  Williams to Gov. Sec., 11.2.1931. An.7/31. CPI V 16/36; cf. Williams* statement in 1932 that It was policy to use what chiefs there were, though they could not at that stage 
be entrusted with *local government* - Native Welfare in 
gam ,  P*52.
83 Report 1927-8, p.39.
^  Ibid* The R.M. was W.R. Humphries, who later produced a 
book of Council Notes with a propagandist intent. These were 
translated into 15 languages and distributed throughout 
Papua - see Murray to Canberra, 20.12*32. CPI V, 16/42.
Murray to Canberra, 20.1.31« CP.141, AQ. 0.840/1/5« This memo, accompanied a report of the Hanuabada meeting of 
2.10.30.
disrupted the statutory council. Williams noted that 
Erskine ’s creation of Boe Vagi as chief of the whole village 
(in fact, of much more) wns quite artificial, and that it lapsed with Boe Vagi’s death.”” But as Toua later became 
both V.C. and chief of Hanuabada this is not quite accurate. 
As Hanuabada has, since 1885, been within rifle-shot of the government offices, the Administration was of course familiar with the fact that it comprises an amalgam of 
communities, and that traditional socio-political organi­
zation centred in the iduhu. But this had made little 
difference to the administrative approach, except that the V.C. was paid more than elsewhere: Lohia-Kame, who retired 
in 1924, had been receiving £6 per month in wages. 87
Enterprising men sought official status in order to use it as a step towards extraordinary authority, to formalize 
a village chieftainship (lohla bada) and even to find 
historical precedents for it.88 The most notable of these 
men was Ahuia-Ova, whose term of office as V.C. ended in 1918, but who retained powerful government backing for a 
further thirty years. Williams pointed out in 1940 that he had no real claim to be chief of Hohodae, and that even his claim to be the biggest of the iduhu lhoia was disputable.”9 
The traditional lohla iduhu appeared to yield to the man 
like Ahuia, who manipulated European support to give 
himself extraordinary authority; but in fact a struggle for power was continuously going o n . 90 During the 1920s 
Ahuia’s authority was still dominant; though particularly during the 1930s he met a good deal of opposition. In 1932 Ahuia*s customary pretensions, and village reaction, almost 
led to his being forced out; he was restrained from leaving 
only by the personal intervention of Murray, ’who almost exercised a personal administration over the village.’91 In seeking to give his authority customary validation,
Ahuia also cut across the aims of the mission, which was
^  F.E. Williams, The Reminiscences of Ahuia-Ova. J.R.A,I., 
1939, LXIX, p.43 note $2.
^  Report 1924-5, p. 20.
^  C.S. Belshaw, The Great Village. p.21.
7 Williams, loc.cit., pp.12, 40 note 64; also C.S. Belshaw, 
Man, 1951, LI, 230.qn' Belshaw, op.cit., pp.21-3. The traditional leader in 
1950 wns represented by Peter Vagi.91 Belshaw, Man, loc.cit.
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strongly anti-custom. He therefore swung from being pro­custom to a Puritanical phase, and then back again, alienating both sides.92 After the second World War the 
discontented element in Hanuabada grew, and Ahuia was eventually forced out, despite the backing of the D.0.93 
He was gradually succeeded by Gavera Arua, who also sought personal dominance over the village, but who had more solid traditional pretensions, and who adopted the more flexible 
policy of manipulating new attitudes and institutions, especially the council.94
This is the background against which the introduction 
of the council in Hanuabada must be set* It is not 
surprising that in the 1920 s the Hanuabadans were at a 
loss in interpreting the purpose behind the introduction of councillors* Murray assumed that the Hanuabadans were 
simply satisfied with direct government control and happy to leave everything to government indefinitely. 95 Despite 
its inability to do anything other than discuss and make 
recommendations, the Hanuabada council, by 1930, was 
beginning to function effectively within those limits. Williams seemed to believe, in 1940, that, although custom was still strong, a transfer of orientation in authority 
was taking place towards the councillors as distinct from the lohia iduhu.96
An analysis of a meeting held in October 1930 shows that a considerable range of topics was discussed? the 
council told the R.M. that water-tanks needed repair, and he promised that the P.W.D. would be advised; the councillors 
agreed that they would like to assist in the proscription of gambling; they decided unanimously that they would advise 
villagers to reduce the number of pigs in the village, and they worked out a formula for this; and they also agreed that they should allocate £10 from a forthcoming grant to
Williams, loc.cit., pp.14» 34-6.O'*^ Belshaw, Man, loc.cit.
Q i i  " "Belshaw, The Great Village, pp.22-3, 226-9. Gavera began to flourish duringAhuia1a decline in the 1930 s. Gavera 
was leader of the large Botai iduhu of Boreporena.
95 Murray, Papua of Today, p.279; cf. Murray's other remarks about the Hanu aba clans, tnat they 3howed a 'laudable spirit 
of conservatism* and 'were content to be good Papuans without 
aspiring to be bad white men* - Report 1924^ 5, p*6.
^  Williams, loc.cit., p.11.
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the Institute, whose hall they used, otherwise they would be ’shamed’; and they decided that the government be asked 
to import uniforms for councillors, similar to those worn in the Western Division,97
Murray was encouraged by the activities of the Hanuabada council, though he emphasised that it was intended to be purely advisory.9o He intended it to be experimental, 
for an indefinite period. In 1931 he tested the council by allocating it a grant of £100 (the council of course had no fUnd-ralsing powers): ’It will be interesting to see how 
the councillors rise to the occasion. ’ The councillors 
spent the money after sensible deliberation: for £30 a vessel was chartered to supplement the lakatol fleet on the Hiri expedition; £60 was spent in building a fence around the 
village; and the remaining £10 went to the Institute.
Murray was pleased at this response; but there is no evidence that the gesture was repeated. 99
The council proved useful for other administrative 
experiments. The most notable of these was constituting 
the council into a conciliation committee to intervene in village disputes and reduce the amount of litigation* This 
was the council’s most positive function; and, with the exception of the war years, it has continued ever since.
It is an institution which remains unique in the Territory*It had no power to enforce decisions or inflict penalties; but in marshalling the force of village opinion it played an important part in village life*100 Conceptually, Murray 
here advanced half-way to an acceptance of native courts; 
in Milne Bay he went even further, conniving at the imposing or threat of penalties, and recognizing a distinct native interpretation of the law*101
Again, Murray tried to work through the council in developing an attack on sorcery; gaoling for this offence,
a/R.M. Rentoul to Gov* Sec*, meeting of 2*10.1930.
CP*141. AQ.0.840/1/5* Other items of discussion, mainly dealing with agriculture, are given in Report 1933-4, p«24*It is interesting to note that the councillors expressed 
opposition to the education of girls*
 ^ Murray to Canberra, 10*10*30. CPI V. 16/42*
^  Murray to Canberra, 5*9*31» ibid*
100 BeIshaw, The Great Village« pp.211-6.
101 Report 1933-4, p*25; cf* Report 1938-9, p.21.
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he recognized, was quite inadequate - and during the 1930s sorcery seemed to revive in the long-administered a r e a s . 102 
Murray consulted the council on the subject. Ex-V.C. 
Lohia-Kame implied that the council system to some extent 
was acting as a shield for sorcerers* Ahuia professed 
complete belief in vada, though he denied that he was a practitioner; and Murray found that Ahuia*s belief was 
general* Then followed a challenge by Murray to the 
sorcerers to revive a dead dog, the results of which - as could have been predicted - were inconclusive from the 
native standpoint. The natives viewed the challenge as an 
opportunity to convince the government of the reality ofsorcery. 103
The Hanuabada council continued until the war; but 
Murray did not encourage rapid development in its functions. 
Despite the lack of training and opportunities which Papuans had, Murray gradually became depressed at their apparent lack of capacity. He undoubtedly agreed with 
Williams, that although political progress was being made 
by Papuans, it was *a good job perhaps that progress is necessarily slow*.10** gy 1935 the council, however, had 
dropped into a pattern of triennial elections, councillors being elected by the constituent villages by whatever method 
they thought fit.1°5 Murray still occasionally consulted 
the council. In 1934 he asked them whether juvenile offenders should be made to do a certain amount of work
102 In 1925 Murray said that sorcery did not cause as many 
murders as it used to do - Papua of Today, p.66. But in 
1935 he told Williams (11.11.35, CPI V.16/17/27) that at 
least half the murder cases he tried were connected with sorcery.
Murray's meeting with council, 1.7*31; Murray to 
Canberra, 11.7*31* CPI V.16/17/16. Williams mentions Ahuia's reputation as a sorcerer, loc.cit., p.42 note 87; and Chatterton, the L.M.S. missionary, accused Ahuia of being 
one of the principal practitioners in Poreporena - Chatterton 
to Gov. Sec., 17*6.31* CPI V. 16/17/17* Williams was hopeful that some natives* beliefs might have been shaken (1 5*9*3 1» 
1 6 /1 7 /2 0 ) .  See Belshaw, op.cit., pp*193-4* At a meeting on 1.7*32, vada was blamed for lakatoi wrecks and garden 
failures; though Ahuia insisted also on natural calamities - 
Report 1932-3» P*15*
Native Welfare in Papua, p.52. This article was approved 
by government - Miliamn to Gov. Sec., 5*7*32. CPI V. 16/36,
105 Murray to Prime Minister, 23.5.35. CP.1U1. 16/1+2/22. 
AQ.0.8W1/5.
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instead of being gaoled; the councillors, however, were in 
favour of severe sentences - a phenomenon also noted under the assessor system.*0®
Again, in 1935 Murray persuaded the council to agree to a modification of unhygienic, customary burial practices*He commented: 'This seems to me to be a good instance of 
the changes which can be easily effected by the councillors, 
but which would evoke opposition if an attempt was made to impose them by force* * In previous correspondence with Malinowski he had had to defend the compulsory proscription 
of traditional burial practices*1°7 it was unfortunate 
that this attitude was not transferred more generally to the councillor's functions*
(viii) Mekeo and Rigo Contrasts: Councillors
In 1927-8 the councillor system was extended to the Mekeo and Rigo districts* Here we find the same dichotomy in administrative attitudes as characterised those towards 
chiefs and village constables in the two districts* The Mekeo were regarded by officers as truculent, and there was certainly distrust on one side and possibly opportunism 
on the other* The Mekeo councillors were immediately spoken 
of as 'unsatisfactory** The A.R.M* reported 'nepotism* in the district; several younger councillors regarded themselves as being ex officio exempt from taxation*'Weeding out' was considered n e c e s s a r y * 108
In the Rigo district, on the other hand, expectations 
were more hopeful* 237 iduhu chiefs or close relations of chiefs 'claimed the privilege' of the councillor's office. With V.C.s and chiefs working harmoniously together, said
■*0<5 Murray to Gov# Sec*, 19.10*34; R.M. Minute, C.D* to 
Gov. Sec*, 10*11*34, 740/7. CPI V.16/36. This is analogous to the excessive sentences often awarded by 
inexperienced judges in Western society; though, in a 
period of culture change, the councillors clearly were interested in using the courts to re-enforce authority - 
note Belshaw, The Great Village» p*22: 'dependence upon 
European authority does not pay in Hanuabada.*
Murray to Sec* Canberra, 23.5*35- CPI V.16/42; see B* Malinowski, Crime and Custom, p*87* Murray to Malinowski, 
30.4.29, 4.10.29; Malinowski to Murray, 19«6*29* CPI V* 16/14/10*
108 Report 1928-9, p.27.
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the A.R.M., native affairs would surely benefit* It seems 
to have been conceded at once that appointment as a 
councillor entitled a man to settle disputes, even on matters that would normally come before a magistrate: ’it 
was hard to conceive of rank injustice being done.*109 The 
councillors summoned the villagers to meetings by blowing a 
whistle, and then laid down the law to them. The A.R.M. commented cryptically on this that *on the whole he (the councillor) is heeded, because what the native lacks in 
tradition, he makes up for in his regard for heredity*.
He felt that the *time was not ripe* for bringing councillors of different villages together.
Although the R.M. foresaw the clash with the functions 
of the V.C.s, little could be done to avert it - Murray admitted that this clash resided in the subtle distinctions between the two institutions, which would be lost in the 
village context.m In the Roro and Mekeo areas the A.R.M. made a determined effort to explain to the councillors the distinctions between their functions and those of the V.C.s; they were particularly warned not to *make court*. 
Several courts had, however, already been held. *Third 
degree* methods had allegedly been used, men being questioned unremittingly until they confessed, only then 
being brought to the magistrate for trial.112
With the inauguration of the practice of using 
assessors in the Courts for Native Matters in mid-1929, further confusion resulted: for the assessors were almost 
invariably councillors, and the manner in which they were 
used was left to the discretion of individual magistrates.In 1930, at Hlsiu, all the councillors were dismissed for persistently holding court; but a few months later in the 
same village councillors were being used as arbitrators in 
civil disputes. The A.R.M. described them as assessors, but this was patently inaccurate as they were settling disputes before they reached the court. Only if the parties did not 
agree with the decisions were the disputes taken to the
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p.25; Report 1937-8, p.29.
112 Kairuku P.R. 9/1928-9.
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Court. This was a function similar to that of the Hanuabada council.113
Similarly, the A.R.M. Kairuku in 1932 reported con­siderable success with the Chiria 'assessors*, but went on 
to say that they saved the magistrates from hearing many 
cases of no importance.'^  Clearly, the 'assessors* were much more than that. Moreover, these assessors ?/ere 
functioning with jurisdiction over a number of villages.
The A.R.M. advised the Waima and Kiveri councillors to send 
their local disputes over pigs, land, and debts to two Chiria 'assessors*. If the disputing parties could not 
agree they were to go to the A.R.M. - he reported that none 
did.115 Patently, the officer was going most of the way 
towards promoting a native court; but there was no provision for supervision, for recording decisions, or for training in 
procedure - desiderata of any adequate native courts system.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the natives (in the Administration’s eyes) should have extended 
and abused these judicial privileges. Murray complained 
that the attempt to appoint councillors for a whole district had been premature, and had led to illegal courts.116 in 
fact, the holding of an unofficial court by a group of 
councillors was a logical development of what had been 
promoted - natives could hardly be expected to make the 
fine distinctions which Murray apparently expected, when his own officers failed to make such distinctions, and, indeed, when Murray himself (in the Milne Bay case) connived at the 
threat of penalties by a native council.
The real facts of the illegal ’court* to which Murray referred were that a group of councillors from several 
villages - not councillors appointed for a group of villages- constituted an informal court presided over by Pukari of Inawai, one of the upper Mekeo villages. They convicted a
113 Kairuku P.R. 1/1930-1, 4/1930-1. The A.R.M. clearly did not understand the meaning of assessors, though clear examples had been given in Report 1931-2, App. D, p*26.
114 Murray to Canberra, 30.6.32. C.P.1U1* W 8U0/1/5.Murray remarked that care would be taken not to make the 
pace too rapid.
A 4  C
J Kairuku P.R. 10/1931-2. The councillors met occasionally 
as an unofficial ’council’. Report 1933-4» P«25»
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man of not having repaired his house, and he was given a 
severe sentence, including two months in Kairuku gaol, the 
cutting off of his hair, a caning by the Xnawl V.C., and 
the loss of his armlets. The councillors’ excuse for having ’made court’ was that they had heard that the Chiria assessors, referred to above, had sent people to gaol, and 
that they believed that they were at liberty to do the 
same.^1•
The A.R.M. was still anxious that councillors should 
settle minor disputes out of court; and, though he remarked 
on previous illegal ’courts’ at Pinupaka and Hisiu, he claimed that they were easy to check. He saw the real 
difficulty in the distinctions, confusing both to natives 
and to officers, between the V.C.s and councillors, and the 
fact that the position of councillor gave inadequate scope to the elders:
• ••a position without power or pay does not appeal 
to these old men, many of them dubu chiefs, who see in their badge of office a priceless opportunity to take over the reins of village government from their V.C.118
Nevertheless he was philosophical and inclined to be 
persevering, taking the view that any innovation would have 
its defects, and that only time and education would improve 
the position.
In the Mekeo-Roro areas the deep-rooted suspicion of 
the traditional leaders amongst Administration officers, and 
the officers ’ predilection for direct action, gave the councillors little opportunity to present the viewpoints of 
their communities. In 1933» the A.R.M. claimed that the councillors deliberately misunderstood their position in 
order to cause trouble.^9 However, two examples from Waima (Roro) will Illustrate the difficulties the councillors faced. In 1932 the A.R.M. rejected the 
councillors’ suggestion that the native tax should be
11' Kairuku P.R. 5/1932-3» Oct. 1932, A.R.M. Thompson;Murray said £ months in gaol in his account. The fact that 
the councillors seriously believed that they could sentence 
a man to Kairuku gaol is an index to their genuine mis­
interpretation of their functions.
118 Ibid.
119 Kairuku P.R. 2/1933-4.
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reduced because of a drought, and suggested instead that 
the councillors 'induce the rising generation to take on sustained toil*. When the councillors replied that this 
mi^ it cause difficulties, the A.R.M. bluntly issued orders 
that every able-bodied man was to plant coconuts or go to 
g a o l * 120 a similar attitude was adopted over burial 
customs. In Hanuabada the councillors had been persuaded 
to use their influence to stop unhygienic customs; but at 
Waima the councillors were given an ultimatum by the A.R.M. that the custom was bad and must be stopped through their influence - he remarked that there seemed 'little enthus iasm'.121
In retrospect it is not surprising - thou$i the 
Administration continued to be surprised - that the councillors did not function consultatively as had 
originally been intended. In the Mekeo area - and perhaps 
with some relief - the Administration appeared to become reconciled to this situation. When the V.C. of Rarai village (Mekeo) applied for another councillor as an 
assistant in 1935, the A.R.M. commented that in each village 
there were in effect a V.C. and two assistant V.C.s. But, he said, 'it does not work out boo badly in practice, the V.C.'8 satellites help him in his work and in many cases 
with a young and inexperienced V.C. they are of great assistance'.*22 ^  this atmosphere, occasional 'council* 
meetings in the Mekeo area were useless except for the propagation of government propaganda* At such a meeting 
held at Inawi in June 1935 the A.R.M* invited discussion 
on gardening, health, and village life generally. One or 
two councillors complained of the prevalence of influenza and of the deleterious effects on gardening of the absence 
of the young men; but discussion was so brief and incon­
clusive as to be disregarded. The councillors were said to have listened 'attentively' to a lecture by the governmentM.O.‘23
Paradoxically, the laissez-faire attitude which the 
Administrationbegan to adopt in the mid-1930 s towards the councillors - a resignation to their being 'assistants' to (in some Instances dominating) the V.C.s - may have promoted 
a more active interest by the councillors in government
120 Kairuku P.R. 10/1931-2.
121 Kairuku P.R. 11/1934-5.
122 Kairuku P.R. 9/1934-5.
123 Kairuku P.R. 1/1935-6; Meeting on 21.6.35» Inawi.
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programmes* In 1936 the Roro and Mekeo councillors were 
said to be invaluable in promoting copra and rice production; 
and this was repeated in 1937» when it was stated that the councillors had learned not to be assistant V.C.s* But there seems little doubt that the formation of ’companies * 
to plant coconuts and rice gave the traditional leaders an 
opportunity to organize their peoples with government sanction* This activity probably represented a re-assertion of their authority.124
That severe tensions existed in Mekeo society, of which 
there is no hint in the optimistic reports of the late 1930 s, was demonstrated by a serious outbreak of cargo cult in 1941« This cult united several thousand people, and 
followed the typical pattern: channelled through a young 
girl named Philo, the natives were instructed to stop 
gardening, to kill their pigs, and to pray; they would be provided for by God, who would send food from Heaven. Arms 
would also be sent with which to expel the mission and the government*
The government took firm action, sending a party of 
constabulary by lorry* Philo and her major supporters were 
gaoled for spreading lying reports. Having ’put down* the cult, the A.R.M. concluded that normality had been restored:
Philo’s removal settled the stupid business. But 
with people possessed of such vntstable minds as 
the Mekeos, one must be always on one *s guard against the most amazing happenings. 125
This suspicion, that there was something inherently wrong and potentially dangerous amongst the Roro-Mekeo 
peoples, persisted after the war, and played no small part 
in denying them statutory local government.12°
12i* Kalruku P.R. 9/1935-6; Report 1937-8, p.30.
12-* A.R.M. Thompson, lengthy account In Report 1941-2, p.21. 
The cult began in the important village of Inewal'a, which 
has a Catholic mission station adjoining* ’Direct action* in dealing with cults had replaced detailed investigation by the Government Anthropologist - a radical departure 
from the original purpose of the Anthropologist*
126 See Ch.VI.
APPENDIX A
III. The Southern Highlands - A Modem Example of Initial
Administration.
(i) Initial Penetration
The era of what Murray used to describe as ’peaceful penetration’ into the Southern Highlands has now stretched over more than fifty years. The unfortunate expedition led 
by Staniforth Smith blundered into the southern extremities 
of the area in 1910, when, apparently seeking to examine 
the headwaters of the Turama and Bamu rivers, it penetrated the Sambrigi valley (then so-called) to the north-west of 
Mt. Murray. The relief party headed by Judge Herbert and 
R.M. Beaver also travelled down this valley. For the natives, a route was opened up to Kikori which they used extensively from the nineteen-twenties onwards.1 A Government Station was established on the Kikori in the 
following year.2
Flint and Saunders officially renewed the acquaintance 
with these people in 1922; and in 1929 Faithom and C. 
Champion travelled on further to the east, following the Erave river to its confluence with the Purari.3 Hides and 
O'Malley went much further north in 1935» travelling from the Strickland to the Purari; they crossed the southern 
Tari valley, and reported dense populations of natives 
wearing wigs of human hair.4 in 1937 a further expedition travelled from the Bamu to Lake Kutubu, then to the north­
east along the valley of the Mendi river to the border with 
the Mandated Territory, returning down the Purari as before.5 Most of the central area had therefore by that 
time been roughly explored from the south.
Papua Report 1910-11, pp.5-6; Appendices A, A1, A2, 
pp.165 ff* Murray caustically blamed the failure on(1) deficient organization (ii) underestimating the magni­
tude of the task. Still, the results served to prove just 
how difficult the country was, as was further amply demonstrated when the policy of active penetration was 
begun in the late 1920s.
2 Report 1911-12, p.10.
3 Papua Report 1928-29, p*8.
 ^Papua Report 1934-35» pp*23-24*
5 Papua Report 1937-38, pp.20-22.
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In 1938-39» however, J.L. Taylor pioneered communi­
cations from the north, in the course of his fifteen-months long patrol from Hagen to the Sepik. His party entered 
the Tari basin from the north, stayed for some time in the 
Hoiyevia area at the north of the basin in the vicinity of 
the present Government Station, and constructed an airstrip* Probably more importantly, natives were taken to Wabag and 
to Hagen.° There they were engaged on the construction of 
airstrips before returning home. At least two of these are 
said to have been among the most important in the area, so that the experience was particularly valuable. Many natives are later said to have gone to Wabag, particularly when fleeing from attack.7
In 1938 Murray announced the intention of setting up a Police Camp on Lake Kutubu (after the practicability of 
landing a seaplane had been tested);® this was done shortly 
afterwards, and patrols were active in 1939-40, despite the drain on the Territory's slender resources.° Since the establishment of the camp, administration in the district 
has been entirely dependent on air supply, although Taylor had stated that the natural route was from the north-east, 
when a road could be built. In the period 1937-41 penetra­tion was being stepped up, the Tari area, in particular, 
being visited every year. In 1939 when I. Champion and 
Timperley were patrolling from Kutubu, Timperley had to be left in the care of an elderly native named Ivaia when he became seriously ill.10 Ivaia (now generally written 
Iva-haia) is still alive, and is certainly one of the most 
influential men in the district, with a large number of 
wives and great 3pread of landholdings. He ranges over the whole of the Basin still, and often appears at
New Guinea Report 1938-39, Appendix B, pp.137-149, 
especially pp.143-44«
 ^ Comments by A.D.O. Carey when opening the Station at 
Tari in 1952: Tari patrol reports, May-November 1952, p*37 
(typescript).
® Papua Report 1937-38, p.22.
9 Papua Report 1938-39, PP*19* 21.
Ibid., pp.29-37; also typescript, Tari patrol reports. Iva-haia had previously looked after supplies for Taylor.
On this patrol two young men were persuaded to return to 
Kutubu to train as policemen: a further step in the 
pacificatory process.
fi r -u f-+ o
Administration campe on the fringe of consolidation to lend support.
Peaceful relations were rather set back during the war, 
principally by neglect when the Kutubu base was abandoned 
and patrolling stopped, and also, in the Tari area, by the 
recruiting patrol of D. Leahy in 1943* Leahy noted on his arrival in the Basin, that large areas of garden were 
deserted, and that there was a desolate appearance. Despite this, he filled his quota of 100 recruits.*2
Moreover, further active attempts to extend the *oil- stain* by setting up further Government posts were not made 
until 1949, when Timperley and Corrigan, patrolling from Hagen, picked out an airstrip site on the Mendi Valley.13 
This was later surveyed by S.S. Smith from Kutubu; and in 
fact Kutubu was still the major jump off point until after the establishment of the third post at Tari In 1952.
(il) Geographical and Social Conditions
The topography of the Southern Highlands district 
largely accounts for the slow and arduous extension of con­
trol. The district has always been part of Papua; but the valleys of the main range are separated from the river 
system of the Western Division by the Great Papuan Plateau. Prom the Gulf country around Kikori the area is separated 
by the steep mountains fronting the coast about thirty miles inland.
fl-----------Personal discussion both with Administration officers
and with Iva-haia himself. He is mentioned at some length 
in Colin Simpson: Islands of Men. There is also a coloured illustration of him, p.26i+.
12 Tari patrol reports: report from Rarau, dated 22nd 
October 1943* Only 42 of these recruits from Tari; but even this difficult, as there was a severe food shortage.
It was a bad time to recruit, damaging to good relations; 
nevertheless even enforced conscription must be reckoned a 
factor in pacification - these men had a knowledge of the outside world which was extremely useful during the period of consolidation of Government influence.
^  Personal information from former P.O. B. Corrigan; also 
draft typescript Repbrt, Southern Highlands, 1956-57# p«1«
^  Carey report, May-November 1952, cit.sup.
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Kutubu lies on the shelf separating the coastal 
mountains from the central cordillera, and the country 
consists of forest and grasslands. As one travels to the Mendi area in the north-east, and more strikingly to the 
north-west of Kutubu, the country becomes more broken and 
the mountains close in, with narrow disconnected valleys 
leading in to the range, and many limestone escarpments.Prom the administrative viewpoint foot patrols are 
difficult and relatively unprofitable compared with the 
situation in the more easterly Highlands, as the terrain 
has compelled the segmentation and dispersal of the native population*
The great concentrations of population which are 
immediately apparent in the east, for example in the Chimbu and Wahgi country, hardly exist. The Tari basin which has 
a relatively flat floor of considerable extent is exception­
al, and even there the density has been estimated at only 
about eighty to the sq. mile* compared with perhaps four times this number in Chimbu.*5
Although Tari is perhaps a more obvious site for an 
administrative headquarters, in 19U9 Timperley and Corrigan picked out a possible airstrip in the Mendi valley, while patrolling from Hagen. Although the Tari area had had more contact, a site further east was essential for aerial supply 
and the comparative shortness of lines of communication*The airstrip at Mendi, however, is not even now entirely suitable, and has limited development; Tari is the only 
airstrip capable of taking aircraft of DC3 size.
The native settlement and even cultural pattern shows a strong relation to the topography. Until the war only the 
Kutubu natives were known in any detail. When Williams 
described them, however, the anthropological terminology and 
methods of analysis applicable to this type of society were not as refined as they have since become. Nevertheless it is clear that to the administrative officer the pattern in 
Kutubu presented a relatively simple problem; the devising of suitable administrative expedients becomes progressively more difficult, like the topography, as one moves to the 
north-east and then westerly towards what is now known as the Koroba area. The lack of clearly defined groupings on 
the ground becomes steadily more manifest.
R.M. Glasse, The Hull Descent System, Oceania, XXIX, 3t 
P.173. .... ......... .
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Around the lake there were only five villages with a total population of 400* though these people were closely 
allied to those in the Mubi River area. Functionally, the 
local group centred on the village was of prime impor­tance* 1° The village members united to perform a number of common tasks; within the village the men occupied a common 
long house, with a number of small houses for the women 
facing it. Williams claimed that the clan structure cut 
right across village, tribe, and even people* Descent, he found, was patrilineal. The village per se, however, had 
its own territory although most of the land was said to 
belong to the foundation local group of the clan, amindoba. 
The oldest capable male of the amindoba was the village he adman.17
Williams had considerable difficulty in trying to relate traditional leadership to this structure. The •chief, he said, was probably the largest land-owner in 
the community, a position referred to as kabe-ga; this 
would normally be connected with his right to dispose of 
the clan land. At the same time the older and more 'important* men ygre spoken of jointly as eresabu (literally 
'home-keepers').1° The villagers themselves often seemed to 
be in considerable doubt when asked to name their 'chief* - though they had borrowed a word for ’chief *, apparently from the neighbouring Foi.
Personality and industry were important in pretenders to leadership, but the leader of the foundation clan group had great advantages in the traditional functions he was 
expected to perform, and in his control of land. Williams 
summed up by saying that chieftainship conformed to the common Papuan pattern, ’the notion of an office and its functions being rather vague, but some individual being nevertheless recognized, by right of succession, as leader and spokesman.’19
All wrongs committed within the community, except sorcery, Williams stated were regarded as individual wrongs
F.E. Williams, Natives of Lake Kutubu, Oceania Monograph 
No.6, pp.11-2.
17 Ibid., pp.21, 42-5, 63.
18 Ibid., pp.42-3.
19 . .Ibid., p.44.
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rather than as criminal offences# The wronged party was 
left to look after himself. Compensation, however, for 
which they had a word f u ^ b i , was always turning up, from 
small conciliatory gifis to large payments by way of 
compounding for murder; violent retaliation often anticipa­
ted the payment of fU;.qtbl.20 Only for sorcery, which the 
Kutubu natives loathed, was their collective revenge, 
described by Williams as ’judicial murder’.21
The social and settlement structure in the Mendi area represents what might now be called a typical Highland 
pattern. The pivotal unit is the patrilineal clan (shem), 
which is always clearly defined territorially, usually by 
boundaries which have a particularly military significance. The dance grounds of the clan, with which particular sub­
clans are associated, are permanent, and have clubhouses on 
them. Within the clan the sub-clans are true patril- ineages.22
The gardens of each individual, however, are scattered 
throughout clan territory, and there is a homestead pattern of habitation.23 Men of authority are again difficult to 
define: ’The heads of all the sub-clans seem to be the only 
source of authority in the community, and even they exercise their power indirectly: more by personal prestige than by any formal rank.’24 Although the localised clan is there­
fore the central unit in the structure, between the several 
clans there are degrees of association and almost identity, probably steps on the way to fusion; the Mendi natives have their own terms for these clan linkages.25
Among the Huli of the Tari Basin the central unit of the social structure is essentially smaller; this is described as an ’ambilineage’, 'the fundamental corporate and politico-jural unit in Huli society.*26 Each man is
¿0 Ibid., pp.69-70.
21 Ibid., p.87.
22 D’Arcy Ryan, Clan Organization in the Mendi Valley. 
Oceania, XXVI, 2. pp»fl>»5: see also his Clan Formation in 
the Mendi Valley. Oceania, XXIX, 4, pp.257-89*
23 Ryan, Clan Organization, p.86...........
Ibid.
25 Ibid., pp.86-9 .
26 Glasse, loc.cit., p. 183* There is no agreement on terminology 
in the Highlands - see P. Brown, Chimbu Tribes* Political Organiz­
ation in the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea, Southwestern Journal 
of Anthropology. XVI, I960, pp. 23-5, footnotes.
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potentially a member of sixteen ambilineages; many men 
maintain interests in several parishes at the same time*The more important or ambitious a man is, the more likely 
is he to spread his interests as widely as possible over the 
lineages and their territories.
Correspondingly, the settlement pattern is highly 
dispersed, with nothing recognizable as villages or even 
hamlets, only small homesteads* When a man marries more than one woman, his co-wives frequently maintain separate house­
holds and separate gardens.27 Within these sixteen ambi- 
lineal groups a man can change his affiliations for a number 
of reasons: to acquire land, to get the support of particu­lar kin, and ultimately to achieve high status.
The Huli believe that they are related to neighbouring peoples further west, such as the Duna, through a remote common ancestor. Peoples such as the Duna have been des­
cribed only by amateurs, but they seem, in accordance with 
their more broken country, to maintain an even more dis­persed type of habitation than the Huli.29 Amongst the Huli 
and their neighbours even the ceremonial grounds are 
impermanent, shifting location from one pig ceremony to the 
next. In brief, it is extremely difficult for a hard- pressed administrative officer to locate the important socio-political groups and their leaders.
(ill) The Modem '011-Stain' Technique
The post-war policy which has been followed in the 
Southern Highlands, as distinct from pre-war policy which 
was largely dictated by lack of funds and staff, has revolved around the consolidation of influence from fixed posts, on the true *oil-stainf technique, rather than on extended patrolling. This was clearly defined by the first 
D.C., J.S. McLeod, in 1953:
The policy of *radial occupation' by means of strategically placed stations and posts is 
definitely to be preferred to one of spasmodic 
extended patrols. Patrolling is very necessary, 
but rather in the context of defined areas around
Ibid., pp. 173, 177* 179.
28 Ibid., p. 181*.29 Especially in P. Gaisseau, Visa to a Prehistoric World.
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posts with concentration on repeated visits, as each sector is consolidated and expanded it will 
influence the areas controlled by adjacent posts.30
In accordance with this policy, since the re-opening of 
the Kutubu post in 1949 there has been a steady increase in 
the number of out-stations spread throughout the district in accordance with the topography and population densities.The airstrip and station at Mendi was opened in August of 
1950; when the Southern Highlands became a separate entity 
on the 4th September 1951, Mendi became District Head­
quarters. In 1952 Tari was established; in 1953 two out- stations were opened at Erave and Ialibu. In August 1955 
Koroba Patrol Post was opened from Tari; and the Kagua Post 
in 1957* The most recent was opened from Mendi, at Nipa, 
in 1959.
The radius covered by each 'oil-stain* has therefore 
been steadily contracting; in relation to this, the emphasis has increasingly been on tightening consolidation from these fixed points. Exploratory and pacificatory patrols further afield have been undertaken primarily with a view to the 
setting up of further Administration posts. In 1957 the 
D.C. reported that within expanding circles from each post 
work was swinging towards positive consolidation: the education of the natives in what the Government expected. 
Amongst these people, he claimed optimistically, 'the age- 
old sport of the inter-village fight is but a pleasant 
memory.'31 In 1957 roughly 60$ of the total area of the District was restricted territory, compared with Q5% a year 
before; in 1960 this had come down to less than 50$. The
D.C. remarked that this policy of consolidation had to be paramount, as if initial control were not followed up, lack of attention was interpreted as a lack of interest and a 
licence to revert to old ways, to direct retaliation Instead 
of to arbitration by themselves or by Government. In 
1956-5 7, of a total of 29 patrols in the District, only one was specifically to extend Government i n f l u e n c e . 32
(iv) The Pattern of Pacification
Although the basic policy is thus clear, the methods 
that have been adopted in consolidation have been left
Southern Highlands draft Report, 1952-3«31 Southern Highlands draft Report, 1956-7«
32 Ibid.
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undefined and are largely ad hoc. This applied not only to 
intervention in fighting and the settlement of native disputes, where there must be a great degree of flexibility; but also to the time and manner of appointment of village 
officials, to the use of indigenous institutions, and to the 
rate of change in administrative techniques from one patrol post to another.
This makes the task of the historian peculiarly 
difficult. Within the Administration there has been little 
conscious co-ordination of activity. Principles and the stages of their application are undefined. The historian is in danger of imposing a pattern on what is apparently chaos. 
But each officer, aside from his personal predilections in 
administration, is facing essentially similar problems in the light of an essentially similar administrative tradi­tion; moreover, through the District Office and the Depart­
ment of Native Affairs a type of subconscious control, if 
not co-ordination, is exercised, which promotes uniformity 
and discourages eccentricity. The balance of pressures leads to a rough but recognizable pattern which emerges from 
administration rather than being created for it.
From the first, two distinct stages have been acknow­ledged in the pacification process: in the first, the 
Administration attempts mediation but does not try to enforce the law; in the second, the Administration arbi­
trates in disputes, but the law is also enforced and natives are arrested and gaoled. The second stage 
necessarily depends on the setting up of a conveniently 
placed Government post, and there is some flexibility in its application depending on the number of staff and police available. When firm consolidation is being attempted there can be no room for such flexibility; this might perhaps 
distinguish a third phase.
As D.C. McLeod emphasised in 1 9 5 3 ,  the second stage Is of course the more difficult, as forceful intervention arouses active native r e s e n t m e n t . 3 3  To take one example, in 
the Tari area S.S. Smith’s party had attempted in 1951 to establish a Government station, but had had to withdraw in 
October because of lack of funds; during this period they had tried to mediate in native disputes, but their with­
drawal damaged Administration prestige. (It must be noted, 
too, that although land pressures and therefore disputes and fighting were possibly more common than in other parts of
33 Southern Highlands draft Report, 1952-3*
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the District, except for Tsamberigi-Kutabu in the far south Tari had had considerably more outside contact than other 
areas, in which consolidation of influence has since been undertaken).
When A.D.O. Carey returned in May, 1952 he found that 
this initial mediation, presumably because of the long 
contact with Government, appeared to have been generally 
successful. In July, however, fighting again flared up, so that eventually a population estimated at 10,000 covering 
an area of some 100 square miles was involved. This was a 
problem which, because of its sheer size and repercussions, had to be handled tactfully. In August, however, following the wounding of a labourer the European officers and a 
small force of police - so small that some anxiety was 
felt - intervened directly and arrested twenty-two natives.
Fighting stopped at once, and compensatory payments 
immediately began for those killed on both sides. This 
sparked off a whole series of reciprocal moga payments over 
the whole of the Tari area.34 The D.C. commended Carey’s forbearance during the fighting, but remarked to the Director of Native Affairs that It would not always be 
possible to prevent casualties when the stage had been 
reached at which fighting had to be definitely prohibited 
over a defl at he described as ’the radial
Similarly, in July 1954 the D.C. remarked that warfare was being openly carried on amongst the natives of the Poru 
plateau. It was, he said however, not the intention to 
interfere until the field-staff position improved to allow 
consolidation in the areas already under effective Influence. Extension of controlling administration to the Poru area had to wait on sufficient field-staff being available, in excess 
of consolidation needs in areas already coming under control. 
As he put it, ’undoubtedly there is work for many officers in this and all other newly opened areas, but it would be foolish to neglect the areas now being influenced and in 
need of consolidation to attempt extension.’36
A similar pattern has followed, up to the present, within expanding radii of each newly opened Government post.
Tari P.R.: establishment patrol, A.D.O. Carey, May- 
November 1952.
35 D.C. McLeod to D.N.A., 6.1.1953. Mendl D.O.
3  ^Mendi P.R. 14/1953-4; comment D.C. Cole to D.N.A.,
occupation
19.7.1954
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The Nipa Patrol Post was opened in August 1959 at the northern end of the Nembi River valley. A few months later, 
while patrolling the southern end of the valley, the Patrol 
Officer was a spectator at a fight between several hundred 
Soa and Injip natives, during which a number of men was seriously wounded. He made no attempt to intervene, but waited until fighting had finished for the day. He then 
talked with the natives, and showed them the power of firearms by shooting a pig. He tried to explain that the Administration disapproved of warfare between groups, 
without definitely proscribing it; and urged them 
voluntarily to bring disputes in ibr settlement. Pour young 
men were persuaded to accompany the patrol back to Nipa, and later to visit Mendi* on an 'educational visit '.37
This approach was commended by his superiors. The 
Director of Native Affairs, however, thought that firm action would have to be taken once (a) the Post was properly 
established: and (b) all parties to unrest could be readily contacted.3o The sub-district A.D.O. defined the policy 
much more precisely:
I do not feel that you are obliged to intervene 
in every tribal clash in the area. There will be 
many instances when non-intervention will be impolitic. I am convinced that, at the moment, any attempt to enforce control on the area as a 
whole is premature and ill-advised. I suggest 
that you (to the Patrol Officer) delineate an area which is readily accessible and inform the people that administrative (or legal) action will be 
taken whenever a breach of the peace occurs.This implies a policy of non-intervention in 
clashes which occur in the more remote areas unless the breach is such that you are forced to 
take immediate cognisance of it. In the matter 
of control it is better to hasten slowly than to 
fail in an attempt to institute any rigid compliance 
with the law.
And again:
In extending your control of the area ... you should remember that it is particularly desirable that your line of communication from the area to
Wm Nipa P.R. 1/1959-60, August-December 1959. 
38 D.N.A. to D.O., 12.2.1960, attached ibid.
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Nipa does not pass through hostile groups* This 
can only be achieved by first establishing firm control over the groups nearer the station*39
On the second patrol to the area early in 1960 the natives were warned that action would be taken if the law were broken* This does not seem to have been in accord 
either with previous action, or with the policy as locally 
accepted. It appears to have been an attempt to take action 
in line with what had been suggested from Port Moresby, rather than with what had been agreed on locally* Shortly afterwards the Soa, with Anduwari and Ebil allies, raided 
the In3ip, wounding three of them* This created an 
extremely difficult situation, for in fact the Adminis­
tration lacked the staff to arrest those responsible* The only way in which it could save face was by despatching a 
patrol to move slowly through the area, to impress on the 
natives that it was not going away and that hostilities were 
not to be resumed. Fortunately, this proved successful: compensation was arranged, though no attempt could be made 
to enforce the law by arresting the actual offenders. A 
number of young Ebil men was induced to accompany the patrol 
to the Injip area, and later to Nipa, where they were employed for a time as labourers alongside men from 
traditionally hostile groups. The Patrol Officer never­
theless considered it lucky that trouble had occurred fairly 
close to the Post, rather than at the further end of the area within which fighting had been proscribed; if the 
latter had happened administrative action would have been 
even more difficult.^0
Generally, as the Nipa example shows, the stages of consolidation have been compressed recently. Although the 
Tari station was established in 1952, as late as 1955 ® 
Patrol Officer was forbidden to make arrests for fighting in the Haibuga Marsh area of the Tari Basin; instead, he was instructed to continue the policy of mediating and of 
arranging moga (compensatory payments).^ ' Indeed, on the 
fringes of the Tari Basin this policy continues, though the payments generally concern wrongs in the distant past, 
before Government proscriptions were known.
Despite this recent compression in time of the stages 
of control - which undoubtedly derives from the conception in Port Moresby that this is facilitated by the increasing
A.D.O. Mendi to P.O. Nipa, 4.3.1960. Mendi D.O. 
f*° Nipa P.R.s 2 and 3/1959-60. 
i>1 D.O. to P.O. Esdale, 4.2.1955. Tapi office.
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number of posts - essentially the same pattern emerges at each new patrol post*
After Tari, the Ialibu post was established in 1953* 
Preparatory to this, a series of lengthy patrols had been 
undertaken into the area from Mendi. As a result of these 
patrols the two principal groups in the Ialibu area, which 
had been fighting, were already arranging compensation*
After the establishment of the post all such payments were supervised by the Patrol Officer* The natives were put to 
work together constructing the base camp, so that while they 
worked as a group traditional divisions were forgotten* A 
demonstration of the power of firearms compared with their own bows and arrows was also given*
A further great advantage of Government labour was that 
it enabled the Patrol Officer roughly to assess the influence or authority of individual men, who could then be officially recognized as headmen* On the more positive as 
distinct from proscriptive side of administration native 
intermediaries, even at this stage, are vital. At Ialibu 
the Patrol Officer conducted Schools* or forientation courses’ for headmen, who were kept at the station for two or three weeks, and housed and fed at Government expense. 
They attended the evening parades of the constabulary, to learn something of discipline, and in particular were given simple instruction in the meaning of law and of courts, and of offences under the Native Regulation Ordinance. In this 
particular instance, therefore, the promotional as well as 
the proscriptive side of Government policy was put into effect. Elsewhere the latter has been more often emphasised at this stage of consolidation.^2
To take a further example, in possibly the most difficult area of the District, both topographically and culturally: eighteen months after the establishment of the 
Koroba Patrol Post, in Duna country to the west of Tari, the 
A.D.O. was able to define three main areas of influence.Prom Koroba eastwards to the Tagari River the people, he thought, had a reasonably good appreciation of the law, so 
that the appointment of Village Constables seemed feasible; 
in the Huraburu-Muri areas moga payments were being arranged, 
and three headmen, for the first time, were introduced to the patrol; thirdly, the Mogorofugwa area was the last to 
come under control - in October 1956 a definite order had
42 Mendi P.R. 9/1952-3» 7/1953-4.
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been given that all fighting should cease in this area, bat 
it had not been possible to maintain control, and in 
February 1957 an Administration party attempting to stop fighting had been showered with arrows. The Government party then demanded compensation, as would a native group 
itself; but it also succeeded in arresting the man 
principally responsible, who was later gaoled for 1riotous behaviour*. Two headmen were later selected, and spent some time at the Patrol Post.*+3
The Kagua post owed its establishment immediately to 
fighting, towards the end of 1956, between the Mirupa and Veimu groups along the Kagua River. This was the only 
section of the Kagua area where arrests had not previously 
been made by Government parties from Ialibu. Most of the area was, therefore, at the second stage of pacification. Amongst the Mirupa and Veimu, however, destruction of 
gardens, which would take at least twelve months to restore, 
had been so extensive that these peoples presented a 
potential threat to their neighbours already under Govern­ment influence. The D.C. commented that the only long-term 
solution would be the stationing In their area of a force 
which they would fear and respect: 'this can only be done by establishing a Patrol Post in their area ... We cannot afford to have any more fight-stopping patrols into the 
Kagua unless they remain to consolidate, for the Kaguas 
must now look upon the Administration as being no more than 
a powerful nuisance, bent on interfering with their age-old customs.9bU A large number of arrests was made after the 
fighting, and thirty-five prominent warriors sentenced to 
ten weeks gaol. As in MacGregor*s day, gaol was the principal training school for potential native officials.The Patrol Officer was most anxious that the Patrol Post be 
set up at about the time these men were due for release, so that their instruction and supervision could be continued unbroken. ^5
The events immediately preceding and following the 
setting up of patrol posts, though different in detail and 
in tlme-scale, tend to follow a common pattern up to the point of the recognition and employment of native headmen. Mediation and the payment of compensation at Government
Duna P.R. 5/1956-7.
^  Ialibu P.R. U/1955-6; D.C. to P.O., 15.9.1956. Mendi D.O. 
145 Ibid.
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instigation blend into the stopping of warfare, first by persuasion and then, when the Administration has adequate 
strength, by force* Offenders, if gaoled, are often most 
useful ambassadors of Government after their release* The establishment of a Government Station involves labour which 
brings hostile groups together, and enables the selection of 
men presumed influential. The posts are so sited that they bring the Government to the centre of a troubled, usually 
densely populated area. (Nipa, for example, may have been badly placed from this aspect;* though a further major 
factor in the selection of a site is the practicability of constructing an airstrip). Prom this point, with the major trouble in the area directly controlled, the stages of 
pacification can radiate out, until the limits of physical 
consolidation are reached, or (and this increasingly applies) until the boundries of consolidation from neighbouring Patrol Posts are reached* There are still 
areas, however, which appear to be beyond the present 
physical limits of consolidation, and where further posts are needed and planned; notably the Poru plateau, Mananda, 
and Margarima*
(v) Fluctuation in Consolidation Techniques
Beyond the stage of mere pacification, however, policy 
has varied widely from one out-station to another, and even 
at different periods of time at the same out-station. This 
may become clear from a brief analysis of consolidation at Tari*
Administration intervention in the widespread fighting of July 1952 has already been mentioned* Twenty-two natives were arrested, mopca payments began, and to the east of the 
Tebi river areas which had been devastated and abandoned 
had, within a matter of months, been reoccupied. Moreover, 
large numbers of natives were calling at the Government station, using it as a clearing house for gossip and a trading post* An increasing number of disputes was being 
brought in to the station, and to outlying patrol camps, forsettlement.^6
It does not appear to have been realized until after the 
siting of the post that the bulk of the population is at the 
other end of the Nembi River valley; on the other hand an airstrip site was available at the northern end.
l'6 Tari P.R., May-November 1952, cit.sup.
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By October 1953 it was believed locally that the lower Tari area was sufficiently advanced for Village Constables 
to be appointed. The Patrol Officer insisted, both in 
correspondence and in talks with the natives, that the Village Constables would not replace the indigenous leaders« He explained that the V.C. should be a young man, relatively 
unimportant; by this means the older, influential men would 
be left free to become Councillors at a later date. With this end in view, at Paua, for example, on 2Uth October 
1953» much of the afternoon was spent in explaining the 
relative positions in the community of a Village Constable 
and a Councillor. On the following day the local people 
were summoned to select a suitable candidate for Village Constable. Eventually Gotoma, a Motu-speaking sub-clan 
leader, was chosen as V.C. candidate, after the Patrol 
Officer had once again emphasised the need to choose a 
relatively unimportant man. ’All agreed that the actual headman should not receive Government pay for his services to the community*’^ 7
Fixing on a point in the process of consolidating 
Government influence at which village officials should be appointed was essentially an ad hoc procedure, depending to 
a very large extent on the initiative or judgment of the 
officer on the spot. Although this officer had selected 
V.C. candidates, in fact it was not until two years later, 
in October \955 $ that definite appointments of Village Constables were made in the Tari area.
A patrol of June 195U discloses that, with a change of staff, the Administration was still working through the 
headmen, with the presumptive V.C.s apparently forgotten.
The headmen were, of course, most important in the 
arranging of moga payments, many of which were still out­standing, while the V.C., if an unimportant individual, was 
useless. This patrol discloses further, however, that the 
Administration had no real idea who the influential men 
were, for the Patrol Officer was instructed to record the headmen and to get some idea of social and political grouping within a two mile radius of the Government Station.^
From a further patrol of August-October 195U there 
seems little doubt that the number of outstanding moga pay­
ments, together with the usefulness of the headmen in
57----- ----TTari P.R. (unnumbered) P.O. Terrell, October 1953« 
1+8 C.P.O. G. Brown, Tari, June 1954.
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arranging them, had caused a deferment of V.C. appointments. 
At the same time, in organizing labour for Government projects and in upholding law and order the want of men 
with real authority was being felt. *In most cases an 
average headman would be lucky to collect fifty men to hear and obey his instructions.*h9 Possibly for this reason the 
patrol found few prospective candidates as V.C. A major difficulty was that the Administration wanted by now a man 
who was a traditional leader: he also had to have a sound 
knowledge of the Government (implying experience outside the District), and preferably be able to converse with them 
directly instead of through an interpreter. This was a 
transfer of coastal criteria to the Highlands, criteria 
which it was impossible to fulfil once the appointing of village officials began. The only potential V.C. this 
patrol noted was the son of a Huria River headman, first 
contacted by Taylor in 1933; this man had since worked at Wabag, Mt. Hagen, Lae and Rabaul.*0
Disappointment that was expressed at the authority of 
indigenous leaders emphasises the apparent abandonment of 
the idea of only twelve months before that V.C.s should be 
comparative nonentities; for the Administration was now seeking men of authority. The building of the road from 
Tari to the Haibuga Marsh area gave officers the chance to observe what authority men possessed, with a view to the appointment of village officials.5*
A major cause of the delay in appointing Village 
Constables would seem to have been the continuance of out­
standing disputes, some extending back thirty years or more, and the need for further moga payments. The attitude seems to have been that the heacEmen, who were primarily respon­
sible, should not, as officials, be subjected to the possibly corrupting pressures arising from disputes and their settlement.
When eventually the first appointments of V.C.s were 
made in the Tari Basin in October 1955, all twelve appointees were listed as headmen and influential men in their communities.52 Because of the lack of proper know-
^  P.O. Esdale and C.P.O. Brown, August-October 195U*
Tari P.R.
5° Ibid.
Tari P.R. : P.O. Esdale, February 1955»
Village Constable personal files, Tari; all first twelve 
appointed October 1955*
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ledge, and in the light of the rapid turnover of staff, it 
is clear that the term ’headman* was, and is, constantly 
used in a subjective, liberal, and generally imprecise way* 
The terra was simply applied to those who had given the impression, particularly on Government works projects, of 
being able to exercise some directing influence* This 
criterion is as fallible as information on social structure 
and individual status passed through two or three interpreters - often the only other check an administrative 
officer has*
Between October 1955 and October 1958 thirty-eight Village Constables, in all, were appointed in the Tari area* Their qualifications for the appointment were all given as 
traditional* descriptions of them ranging from Headman to 
Village Headman of the Area, Headman of Group, Headman of Line, Clan Headman, Local Headman, Area Headman, Clan 
Leader, and Patrician Leader, together, occasionally, with 
other qualifications, such as 'Conversant with Adminis­
tration aims* or 'Has assisted all patrols in the area* or 
'An active supporter of law and order** As time went on the care given to the selection of V.C*s appears to have deteriorated, as the description of their qualifications - 
theoretically essential for their confirmation by PQ£t Moresby - became briefer and even more stereotyped*53
In September 1958 eight Village Constables were 
appointed at the one time, in the Tagari River area west of Tari Station. These men were all appointed because they had given assistance in the building of the road towards Koroba* Their only qualification was listed formally as Clan or 
Patrician leader*
At least one thing is clear: that the idea of reserving the later appointment of Councillor for the really influen­
tial men had been completely abandoned* This may have been 
forced on the Administration in the Tari area, it is at 
least arguable, because of the enormous social and political segmentation* But it was emphasised chi a District basis in 
November 1958, when the D.C. asked various sub-district 
officers if, in their opinion, the difficulty of combining the V.C. 's uniform with the traditional dress was deterring the really influential men from becoming Village Constables, the implication being that such a deterrent was undesirable* 
The A.D.O. Tari replied that before making a recommendation 
for appointment he always made very careful enquiries
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(though without stating what form these enquiries took), and 
that although there were doubtless influential men without appointment in some of the communities, *those men holding 
office are all of some influence and significance in their group *•5U
(vl) Roadwork as an Administrative Technique
In the Southern Highlands roadwork has been elevated into an administrative technique* Although several of the 
outstations have no roads, they all have airstrips, in the 
construction of which the same administrative principles 
apply* In the Tari Basin it is noticeable that control has been achieved earlier, more easily and more surely, as well as more extensively, in the areas to the north and west of 
the station, through which runs the road to the Tagari River 
and Koroba* Following from this, there is now also a concentration of village officials in this direction. To 
the south and east control has extended much more slowly; 
significant numbers of moga payments are still being made, 
and the attitude of the natives towards Government is not always to be depended on. This is gradually being rectified by the building of a road in this direction, the rapid 
extension of which, since mid-1958, has become a matter of priority. By March 1960 the road had reached the Huria River, some ten miles distant from Tari; the construction of a bridge over the river made it essential to set up a semi­permanent base camp. The labour in building the bridge 
brought in scores of natives regularly to work; while the lengthy residence of Administration officers amongst them established confidence and induced them to bring in disputes for settlement.55
In the Tari-Duna area in particular, roadwork has proved particularly valuable as an administrative technique, for the people are prodigiously segmented, socially and 
politically. Even in the Mendi area at least the ceremonial 
grounds are fixed; this gives the administrative officer a point of orientation. But in the Tari-Duna area there are no obvious nuclei around which the Administration can build; 
there appears to be little regular co-operation between or
D.G. circular to sub-district offices: V.G. Uniform, 
li.11/1953. A.D.O. Tari to D.C. Mendi, 27.11.1958.
55 Discussion with Administration officers and with natives 
(through interpreters), Huria River camp, April 1960. Moga payments were being arranged continually.
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among lineages - hence the particular importance of roadwork 
in bringing the lineages together in a collective task* The completed road constitutes a permanent link between the lineages; as it is built and used by the Administration it 
tends to become a safe area, a channel of peace through the country*
The D.C. commented in 1957s
Roadwork is most important in our programme of 
penetration and later consolidation* It certainly does demand constant contact between the officers and the people, and has the added advantage of 
requiring the people of different groups to mix in 
a common work and reach an understanding and 
appreciation of one another which was denied them previously.56
The administrative advantages of road and airstrip construc­
tion have, therefore, been explicitly recognized; though this recognition has become much clearer as the roads have reached the more segmented peoples.
In June 1958 the D.C* remarked, after a visit to the Tari station in April, that, following his order that road­work be intensified, *the Huri warriors have had their 
surplus energies diverted from group bickering, to the con­
struction of motor roads, designed Initially to enable Native Affairs officers to maintain regular and constant contact with the people. '57 The Director of Native Affaire concurred in this policy*58
The major administrative advantage of road construction is, undoubtedly, that It enforces the slow progress of a 
Government party through the countryside, in place of the
56 D.C.*s covering memo., Duna P.R. 7/1956-7*
57 D.C. Mendi to D.N.A., 13.6.1958; also covering memo. Tari 
P.R. U/1957-8.
58 D.N.A. to D.C., 2i+*6.1958. Mendi D.O. Similarly a road 
was put into the Mogorofugwa area from Tari after September 
1959» principally as a consolidating medium, after the experience of the enormous impact of the Tari-Koroba road:
*Roads and good government have become almost synonymous to 
the native people*. The Humberu V.C. asked for a road to his area 'so that we will not have such trouble involving my 
people and disturbing you* - Koroba P.R. 5/1959-60.
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breakneck patrolling which has become traditional in New Guinea, Officers stay for weeks or even months in the same area: the Huria River bridge, which was under construction 
in November 1959 was not finished until April 1960, and 
during most of this time a European officer was resident at the base camp. The camp became a centre for social life and for the settlement of long-standing disputes. That a 
Government party has a demonstrable purpose in remaining in 
an area is immensely re-assuring, by contrast with the 
essentially penetrative or the purely administrative patrol.
This was again brought out in mld-1958, when the Toma, Hadi, and Nene groups had been fighting in the Huria River 
area. The building of the road re-assured them; the headmen got the men of the groups in to work, they co-operated willingly, and the women provided food. Having worked 
together, they arrived at settlements of their disputes and exchanged mopca payments.All in all, the building of the 
road has achieved multiple objects. The most important 
result in the long view is probably the stabilising of 
native-Administration relations: limits have been set on both sides. Ylhen in November 1959 the Patrol Officer was dissatisfied with the progress of the road and attempted to 
force the pace by using the police to conscript labour, the 
natives reacted violently and compelled the temporary 
abandonment of the base camp. Patience and forbearance are being enforced on both sides,60 D,C, commented:’Officers must spend time with the people ... before they 
can hope to be of much influence over them, ’^ 1 The 
effectiveness of roadwork patrols has driven home the fact, 
difficult to appreciate or apply in the more sparsely popu­lated coastal areas from which the patrolling tradition derives, that consolidation of Government influence depends 
on mutual knowledge and understanding. As the number of Patrol Posts increases, a new concept of patrolling is emerging in the Hi^ ilands.
If more thou^ it had been given to the techniques of 
leisurely patrolling, this development could have come earlier, independently of the pressures of roadwork. In 
March, 1955 a Patrol Officer (J.P, Sinclair) in the Yagen- 
Yaria areas of the lower Mendi Valley was using the
59 Tari P.R. 5/1957-8, June 1958, P.O. Hiatt.
60 Tari P.O. 3/1959-60, November 1959, P.O. <J. Smith.
D.C. to D.N.A., 7.12.1959. Mendi D.O.
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technique of building base camps rather than just the usual resthouses, contiguous to native hamlets. This Involved a 
more permanent type of house for the officer, together with 
adequate housing for the police and carriers; altogether, the natives were to be impressed with the idea of Adminis­tration p e r m a n e n c e . 6 2  This was a technique which he had 
previously used successfully in Kukukuku country.63 The idea, however, aroused little attention or enthusiasm, like 
several other examples of individually intelligent responses 
to local conditions*
(vil) Village Officials - the Direct or Indirect Approach?
Progressing from the stage of pacification to the stage of consolidation at which some authority or responsibility is delegated to the native peoples themselves, there has been, in the Southern Highlands, the same vacillation as has 
applied in many other parts of the Territory during the past 
fifty years. Because of the historical sequence, It has generally been considered right that Village Constables should be appointed first and, some time afterwards, the 
Councillors. The Village Constables have often been 
appointed at the stage when minimal control has been achieved, and the Councillors at a further stage when it is 
felt that the natives might have wishes of their own to 
express to the Administration. As the history of the system 
amply shows, however, because of the accumulation of attitudes on both sides it is extremely difficult to change from administration by direction to administration by advice.
The first D.C. in the Southern Highlands, J.S* McLeod, 
had strong views on the village official system. In McLeod’s view the first step should be to pick out the few most important men and to give them official recogiition*
The next step would be to select less Important for the Armed Constabulary, posting them in sophisticated areas; the object of this would be to give them an adequate conception 
of discipline and of law and order, so that when they 
returned to their areas they had the necessary training to 
be Village policemen*^ McLeod was scathing about the unwarranted arrogation of authority by Individual natives 
under the V.C* and luluai systems; but he was heartily in
62 Mendi P.R. 9/1954-5.
63 Mumeng P.R. 1/1951-2.6ii J.S. McLeod, Village Policemen and Village Councillors, 
South Pacific, August 1^ 52, pp*U11-3.
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favour of the early delegation of authority to natives collectively, or in such a way that social responsibility balanced authority. 65 He realized the dangers in the 
traditional sequence of appointment, and he wanted to make 
the Councillor into an official who really represented his community and was not subordinate to or at rivalry with the 
policeman. In practice, the impossibility of persuading 
both administrative officers and the natives to separate the 
theoretical functions of the policeman and the councillor had bedevilled the Papuan Administration for thirty years.
Promising experiments were carried out, especially in 
the period 1952-5U, in the Lake Kutubu sub-district. There had, of course, been relatively long and intensive contact in this area; numbers of V.C.s and Councillors had been appointed. The social and settlement pattern lent Itself to 
the setting up of unofficial councils, revolving around the traditional eresabu. McLeod’s influence was apparent throughout this period in the delay in appointing further 
V.C.s elsewhere, and in the serious attempts to work through 
the natives by delegating responsibility rather than by 
passing on instructions. In the Kutubu area he had the full support of the A.D.O., E.D. Wren.
In December 1952 the A.D.O. employed a Councillor to 
undertake an official patrol. He wished to make contact with villages on the western bank of the Kikori River; Councillor Sosoro had relatives living there, and the A.D.O. 
felt that he would be particularly effective in getting information. He was sent in the company of two Constabulary, who went unarmed; a Native Medical Orderly, literate in police Motu, was also sent, to keep a diary and to record 
observations, as well as to give medical care. They made a 
report on their return which was translated by the A.D.O. and submitted to headquarters. The A.D.O. justified the patrol, not only on the ground that a native Councillor was 
able to get information unavailable to a European, but also 
because of the scattered nature of the Fasu villages.’These people are so scattered that I am only in favour of their villages being visited by a full European patrol when 
it is passing through Fasu country to other areas; in the 
future contact can be made by native-led patrols such as this.'66
5 McLeod is one of the few members of general field staff 
actually to have asked for a native local government council 
to be instituted: Misima in 1958.
66 A.D.O. Wren; Kutubu P.R. 6/1952-3. December 1952 - 
January 1953*
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The patrol was frankly experimental, particularly in testing the reaction of Port Moresby. As the A.D.O. 
expressed it, *i have felt for some time that District 
Services has been very slow in employing and training natives as compared with other departments; or even having regard to what is being done by our own Co-operatives or 
Natives Authorities Sections in this line. This is not my 
concern, but I do feel, unless you rule otherwise« that I am now in a position to commence patroiling using native staff.*6/
Councillor Sosoro was able to report bad feeling between certain Pasu villages, and also - a fact which may have been denied a European officer - that the villagers 
were preoccupied with sorcery, and that this was connected 
with fears over neglected compensation payments and deaths 
resulting from a recent pneumonia epidemic. This infor­mation allowed the A.D.O. to assess the situation, and to 
decide that a full European-led patrol to the area was 
necessary. Prom the immediate administrative viewpoint, 
therefore, the patrol was by no means a failure, even though the Councillor was asked to perform functions beyond 
his normal line of duty; but the Department of Native 
Affairs is said to have been adamantly opposed to the idea, 
which was not repeated. The general emphasis on indirect administration, at this time, was however endorsed by the 
Department.
Later, in 1953, the A.D.O. intensified his efforts to spread some element of indirect administration throughout 
the sub-district. A patrol to the Bosavi area in March - 
May 1953 was instructed to make the distinction between councillor and constable clear at the beginning, by appointing a particular man a 'Kasua County Councillor1 and his younger brother a Village Constable. This had the object ultimately and specifically of leading on to local 
government: 'There is hope of avoiding a regime of direct rule which, after all, will retard the development of local government.*68 That the Councillor was to be appointed on 
a tribal, rather than on a clan or village, basis, indicates that some appreciation was being shown of preparing for local government through confederations of traditional units, the practicability of which had been suggested by Read.69
Ibid.
68 Kutubu P.R. 9/1952-3» P.O. Terrell, March - May 1953; covering instruction by A.D.O. Wren. D.N.A. comments 
endorsing the principle, attached.
69 South Pacific. Ill, 12, October 1949, pp.229-34.
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In his instructions to another patrol setting out for Fore, the A.D.O. told the officer that he should 'conduct 
your native administration within the structure of the existing native social order ... Attempt to establish meetings of elders from the various groups, with the 
ultimate aim of welding them into officially constituted 
councils.* He also instructed the officer to see that the functions of the Village Constables were kept strictly within their statutory bounds*»0
This policy was continued throughout the sub-district: 
in 1953* on the lower Tagari River, men from seven clans were recommended for appointment as V.C.s, but 'care was 
taken to explain that if and when these appointments are 
made they will in no way supersede indigenous leaders, and 
that young men were being chosen so that local chiefs will be able to take their places in Village Councils when they are set up.*71
By December ^^5k it was claimed that unofficial 
councils had been set up from Kutubu, in the Nembi and Wage valleys, the upper and lower Mubi, Erave, and Samberigi.
The response to this had been unexpectedly good, in the view 
of the Patrol Officer. Contracts were entered into with the villagers, through these unofficial councils, for the completion of the Kutubu airstrip, as a result of which 1U0 
men immediately set to work. 'The policing of these con­
tracts is left to the natives themselves, and they have demonstrated that unsophisticated natives can and will accept responsibilities If given the necessary l e a d e r s h i p *'72 
In making the appointments he had taken great care to try to 
demarcate the functions and spheres of action of the Councillors and V.C.s.
This was the same officer who had advocated a similar 
approach in the Tari area to the appointment of village officials, the less important men initially being made V.C.s.
With a change of D.C.s at Mendi, however, changes began 
to appear in the administrative emphases in 1955: the customary doubts and hesitations in delegating responsi­
bility began to reappear. The D.C. commented that the
70 Kutubu P.R. 10/1952-3, Feb. 1953. A.D.O. Wren to P.O. Brand.
71 Kutubu P.R. 3/1953-U, October 1953.
72 Kutubu P.R.s, P.O. Terrell, December 195U (unnumbered, 
Mendi copy).
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appointment of so many councillors and the setting up of 
unofficial councils posed difficult problems in future 
supervision: an indication of the return to a paternalistic frame of thought.73 During the preceding few years the 
developments outlined above had held out promise of a 
revolutionary approach to native administration in the 
Southern Highlands, oriented towards the future delegation of responsibility to the native peoples instead of simply towards the immediate problems of law and order.
Councillors were not forgotten entirely in following years, but their role ceased to be regarded as significant. In 1956 it was stated that there were, altogether, eighty- 
two councillors in the District; eight of these in the Mendi 
area were women. The object of this was to raise the status 
of the women so that better control could be exercised: 'These ladies bring any complaintsthey hear before a court 
as quickly as they can. Our control over the ladies has 
extended considerably and their co-operation is heart­warming. *7U
The concept of a steady and logical progression to 
local government has largely been lost. Kutubu itself has 
declined as an administrative centre, and the promising 
council experiments appear to have lapsed: in 1958 it was simply stated that occasional meetings were held to discuss 
infant health, cleanliness, and other village matters.75 
Similarly it was stated that in the Mendi area 'the indigenous society has a council system controlled by the 
parish elders who decide on the important feasts, construc­
tion of long houses and the various ceremonies which are part of the native social structure.*76 But it was not suggested that this should be given administrative recog­nition; instead, the D.C. suggested that before the ground­
work commenced for the institution of native local govern­
ment, selected groups of natives be taken on tours to Rabaul. *This practical suggestion would obviate the 
initial explanation being vague to these people, and 
abstract, as from their historical background (sic) they 
have not the ability to mentally grasp such a function.*77
73 ibid., covering letter D.C. to D.N.A., 23»1*1955»
^  Southern Highlands draft Report, 1955-6.
7*5 Southern Highlands draft Report, 1957-8.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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That existing; administration in fact represents the founda­
tion on which the next stage has to be built has again been 
overlooked* Moreover, only the concept of uniform develop­
ment can explain the stagnation, or indeed retrogression, 
in some areas, such as Kutubu, where control is already satisfactory#
The new tone was set in late 195J+ after a patrol to the Upper Mendi Valley, when the officers came to the conclusion that Village Constables were needed. The headmen, they felt, had served their purpose in getting food and firewood 
for patrols, lining their people and getting them to work*
But when it came to maintaining law and order in the way demanded by the Administration, they were attempting to use 
rather than serve the Administration. They were not 
bringing in the troubles of their people to the patrols for 
settlement. The appointment of Village Constables would benefit administration greatly, it was felt*78
McLeod had delayed the appointment of Village Constables 
in order to Inculcate an attitude of relying on persuasion 
and advice rather than direction; but from 195^  the tendency has been to try to appoint Village Constables at as early a stage as possible after the establishment of new Patrol 
Posts - they now form the native core of the consolidating process*
Intensive administration on the *011-3tain* principle 
carries the implication, hitherto apparently not explicitly 
realized in the Papuan service, that it encourages direct 
action at the expense of relying on traditional authorities. By having a high staff to native ratio (much higher than in 
British dependencies, for example), as well as by Incessant 
patrolling from an increasing number of patrol posts, it is possible to maintain law and order and even to carry out executive functions entirely through police rule. The 
Patrol Officer is able to compel native concurrence; the educational value of this is frequently stressed, but it 
involves a loss of flexibility in native relations, mutual understanding is difficult to build up, and the natives 
eventually cease to exercise any initiative or to accept any 
responsibility beyond what is imposed on them. In brief, as 
a foundation for the future the method is not constructive.
The theme of constant training and supervision of the 
village police becomes monotonously repetitive* As the D*C. 
yg"... 1 — ....
1 Mendi P.R. 1/195h-5, P.O. Ford.
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commented in July 1957 after fighting had broken out not far 
from Tari station: 'The answer to avoiding unrest ... is in more active patrolling and more village officials.’79 Here, as for many years, the Administration*s approach to the 
problem is essentially quantitative, instead of analytical: 
the only thing that is wrong is that there are not enough officers and Village Constables.
(viil) The Transition to a Police System
Since the concept of indirect administration has practically been abandoned, it has become increasingly 
Important that the most suitable men (that is, those most 
able or most willing to wield government authority) should 
be chosen as Village Constables. The ideas of pre-1955 that the most influential men should become Councillors and those 
less prominent Constables lapsed. The principal criterion 
for selecting Village Constables became, first, their 
presumed traditional authority or influence. In patrolling from Ialibu in December 195^  the Patrol Officer stated that he would try to compile a 'social structure table* for each 
group, on the basis of which Village Constables should be 
appointed as soon as possible. Intensive patrolling would be necessary first, he believed, so that he would be able to 
estimate the *ability, honesty, and hereditary social 
position’ of each appointee. Without such knowledge, he 
stated, the appointing of V.C.s, thou$i desirable, would be 
a rather ’hit or miss Procedure*.®0
Misconceptions about the functions of village officials, 
which have dogged native administration in Papua during its 
history, have been repeated in the Southern Highlands over 
the last five or six years. To continue with Ialibu, in this area some Constables and Councillors were appointed 
concurrently; this, stated one Patrol Officer in 1955# had 
’more than reinstated the leaders, many of whom saw their power waning when fighting in the area ceased. ’81 Since 
1955» however, administrative attitudes have changed, in the light of ’getting things done’: the native officials are 
constantly being judged by the Administration on their practical usefulness. The present village officials are therefore continually in the position of being judged from
7Q
lJ D.C. to D.O., 10.7*1957» covering Tari patrol to Kangua- 
Piango tribal areas, February 1957» P.O. Claridge.
80 Ialibu P.R. 2/195U-5, December 195^ .81 Ialibu 1/1955-6, discussing natives in the Imi area.
651
two levels, above and below them, while there is at the same time considerable conflict between their traditional 
and official roles. Confusion is bound to result, and has. In the Ialibu area the first appointees have not 
Infrequently served terras of imprisonment, subsequently, 
for 'mistreating other natives
Inevitably, too, the familiar pattern has recurred, of 
Councillors either neglected altogether or treated by 
administering officers as village policemen, or, worse, as subordinates of the village policemen. Moreover, with the emphasis on the practical usefulness of village officials, 
(mere theoretical distinctions in their functions having 
become blurred), criteria for the selection even of 
Councillors gradually throw less wei^ it on their Indigenous 
authority and more on their supposed, or proven, ability to get the Government’s work done. That these criteria may not coincide seems generally to have been discounted.33
Under what in effect is a police system the adminis­trative initiative passes completely to the Government. A 
patrol from Ialibu in July 1958 shows that the councillors 
were not being used as they were meant to be used - a 
complaint that could be made about the system ever since its introduction by Murray in 1925: ’Village Constables and 
Councillors were co-operative in trying to carry out my 
requests, but it was clear to see that the people for the most part did not have much respect for them. However, if the constables of the R.P. and N.G.C. spoke to the people through an interpreter, a much quicker result was 
obtained. ’81* when the approach was simply to demand
82 Ialibu P.R. 1/1956-7:’At best, most of them have a very hazy idea of their duties 
and obligations. *’V.C. Waronya of Mondauda appears to be carrying out his duties in a fairly capable manner. He is not a forceful 
character but he does, at least, appear to recognize his 
responsibilities.’It is believed by the Administration that V.C.s and headmen, to appear efficient, use youths as scapegoats for offences - 
personal information, D.C. Mendi.
^  e.g. the lists of qualifications and reports on abilities 
in Ialibu P.R. 3/1955-6.
8i+ Ialibu P.R. 1/1958-9, July 1958, Imbonggu area.
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compliance with orders, not unnaturally the Patrol Officers began to get the impression that the recognized leaders were losing their grip, or to find that the influential men were 
declining appointment as Village Constables. On the latter 
score, it was believed within the Administration that the influential men were declining to accept appointments 
because the V.C.'s uniform did not accord with their 
traditional dress; that a powerful leader might be involved 
in serious role conflict, or at least be placed in an 
invidious situation, by accepting appointment as a Village Constable, does not seem to have been discussed.85
The more the Administration tried to clarify the functions of village officials, the worse the confusion 
became. An increasing number of officials was being 
appointed, and most officers in practice made little dis­
tinction between them. A patrol to the Imbong'gu division of Ialibu in December 1958 was instructed to select a potential V.C. for each group which seemed - to the 
officer - to constitute a political entity; he was told to 
emphasise that statutory powers were conferred on the V.C. only, but that this did not make the V.C. a minor autocrat. 
On important matters affecting the group as a whole the 
V.C. was to be instructed not to act alone, but to discuss 
them with the Councillor. The task of implementing such joint decisions was then to devolve on the V.C., assisted as need be by *his councillors,.®6 jt was precisely this 
attitude, that the Councillors were subordinate to the V.C. ('his councillors'), which McLeod had condemned when dis­cussing village officials, and which he had tried to guard 
against by insisting on the priority of indirect adminis­tration.^ ?
Eventually the confusion became so bad, with the 
functions of the Councillors utterly misunderstood (so that 
they were being used, it was darkly hinted, by outsiders in 
their own interests), that in 1959 the Patrol Officer, 
Ialibu, seriously suggested that 'not until the people are 
able to understand the full Import of the position of 
Councillor should, I feel, further appointments be made.
* Ibid. Also headmen said to be losing authority in Ialibu 
P.R. 13/195U-5.
86 Ialibu P.R. 3/1958-9. My italics - the old adminis­
trative concept of pre-education.
87 McLeod, South Pacific, loc.cit.; notes 35» 60-1 above.
88 Ialibu P.R. 5/1958-9.
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Using Ialibu as a microcosm, developments after 195U afford a perfect example of the erosion and eventual des­truction of the indirect element In administration, once 
police control becomes practicable. There is a certain 
beguiling simplicity about a system of native administration 
in which energetic Patrol Officers, rarely still, move from village to village hearing courts and issuing instructions 
to village policemen - ’pure and simple administration’. 
Whether it lays the basis for more progressive adminis­
tration; whether, in fact, it leads anywhere, does not seem 
to be an important consideration. A progression to local government is not regarded as a progression at all, but as 
an abrupt leap which the natives must be spurred on by the 
Administration to take. That the steady recognition and 
devolution of authority is the key to this problem does not, even now, seem to have been recognized.
Current policies of uniform development and the 
preservation of these methods raise the question of the application of Turner’s frontier thesis to Papua*
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
APPENDIX B
I. Departmental Coordination: The Milne Bay Example*
(i) General Organization and Deficiencies
Various aspects of this question have been touched on 
under the main headings of economic development, health and 
education. The main underlying problem, as it affects local 
government, has been the unco-ordinated departmentalisation of the Administration in Port Moresby, inevitably reflected 
at the district level. All Departments are acutely 
conscious of the frustrations which this causes. An 
adequate secretariat organization has been urged on Canberra 
more than once, but there is resistance to the setting up of a body dissimilar from the metropolitan Public Service.
This attitude ignores the required degree of district co­
ordination which is peculiar to colonial administration.^
In 1955 some modifications were made in New Guinea: in particular the District Commissioner was made the direct 
district deputy of the Administrator, while the D.O. became 
the senior local representative of the Native Affairs Department. Partly because D.C.s were not prepared for this new role, and partly because policy divisions and adminis­
trative overlap still occurred, this arrangement did not 
achieve its objects. Pienberg wrote in 1957:
The departmental separation of District Com­missioners from Native Affairs does not seem to 
me to have cured anything. Native administration cannot be kept divorced from 'general* adminis­tration: introduction of the local government 
system actually increases the degree of overlap.
It seems to me a fair observation that where the 
existing arrangements appear to work best, they have been, in practice largely ignored. In
Information from officers of the Administrator’s and 
Native Affairs Departments. A good example of these rami­
fications lies in the functions which councils must perform, 
particularly in relation to agricultural extension. This is 
the basic problem, evidenced again in Fienberg's continued 
insistence that N.L.G. councils are not analogous to 
Australian municipal councils - though essentially this is 
the type of council with which central Administration is 
equipped to deal.
6 5 4
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districts carrying both a D.O. and a D.C., the 
former still acts as a virtual second-in-command, 
and the latter still continues to function 
principally as a sort of town manager-cum-civic 
receptionist. At the Headquarters end, the 
division of functions between the Department of 
the Administrator and Native Affairs is pretty 
confused, and in my opinion will remain so until 
the two are merged.2
In brief, the functions of different departments have 
proliferated since the war, without the development of any 
comparable co-ordinating mechanism in Port Moresby, The 
community development outlook which has become so marked in 
British territories since the war has been largely lacking 
in New Guinea, On certain specific and continuing issues, 
for example, the Tolai Cocoa Project and the proposed 
judicial functions for natives, a degree of co-ordination, 
slow and cumbersome, has been achieved through ad hoc 
committees. Where the functions of departments clearly 
overlap, however, the confusion at the district level cannot 
be blamed on the administrative organization alone; it 
results from the perpetuation of separatist attitudes of 
mind, particularly in the technical departments, and also 
from the failure to make basic policy decisions in the 
Department of the Administrator,
This applies particularly to the relationship between 
the Native Affairs and Agriculture Departments, The Tolai 
Cocoa Project surmounted this obstacle partly because of 
good personal relations in the district, and partly because 
of enforced district co-ordination through the Management 
Board,3 At the same time, as late as 1957 the Native Affairs 
and Agricultural officers in the Gazelle Peninsula were 
still hotly debating policy on their controlling precedence;
2 Notes re Paper on Local Government by C.R. Lambert,
5.11.57* In 1956 and again in 1959 the U.N. criticised this administrative arrangement. In 1956 the Trusteeship Council expressed opposition to a Separate Department of Native 
Affairs, which •conveyed the impression that the adminis­
tration of native affairs was something different from normal administrative responsibilities' (G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 
June-July 1956, Supp.U» A/3170, pp.301-2). The 1959 Visiting Mission described the arrangement as 'a very 
strange one' (U.N. T/1260, pp.72-U)* For changes, see 
Charts.
 ^ Memo., 'Organization of Extended Tolai Cocoa Scheme', 
11.11.55* NA U5-1-1.
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while the Assistant Administrator seemed far from clear on the issues involved,U
Agricultural officers, supported by their Department, have regarded agricultural extension, particularly in the 
early stages, as a technical activity for which they alone 
are responsible; while Native Affairs officers, particularly those concerned with local government, view it as part of a 
pattern of development for which they and the councils under their supervision are primarily responsible*
Flenberg had sounded a warning on the necessity for co­ordination as early as 1952:
In areas under local government units it (economic development) involves District Commissioners working through councils in conjunction with the 
Agriculture Department, with the Co-operative _ 
Section taking over once production has commenced.^
In practice, however, in the period to 1960, neither 
the District Commissioners nor the Co-operative Section had 
assumed these roles* This left Native Affairs officers (representing councils) and Agriculture officers to fight out the matter themselves in the districts*®
(ii) Milne Bay: Integration from Below
Milne Bay is the outstanding example of an area where an attempt has been made to integrate the work of the 
council with a wider programme of community development.
This was, to a large extent, an accident of personalities;
 ^a/D.O. New Britain to D.N.A., 15*7*57; W.L. Conroy (Agric.) to Asst. Admin*, 18*7.57; Asst. Admin, to D.C.,
29.7*57* NA U5-1-1. Dr* Gunther in general supported Conroy's view; but the D.C. pointed out that the arrangement of 11*11*1955 appeared to put the responsibility squarely on 
Native Affairs officers (5.8.57)*
5 Fienberg to D.C. Manus, 3*11*52. NA U2-3-5*
 ^One of the baneful results was the confusion in the Higaturu area - see Ch. on 'Economic Development'* On 
occasions the remarkable step has been taken of referring the 
problems of coordination, without a central policy (e*g* cooperatives with councils) from Port Moresby to the local field staff - a/Registrar Cooperatives to A.D.O. Mislma, 
27.2*59* The A.D.O. never replied. The Cooperatives 
Section is nominally part of the Native Affairs Department.
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but it has set a precedent which in 1960 was being con­
sidered as a pattern for extension in council areas. It derives from the work of the Regional Agricultural Officer, Mr. W. Cottrell-Dormer.
In 1953 there was no Agricultural Officer in Milne Bay, and the Ealeba council itself pointed out the need for new crops*7 At this time Cottrell-Dormer was concerned with the disastrous rice-growing programme in the Mekeo, working 
through Rural Progress Societies.® The Rural Progress 
Societies are relevant to this discussion, because they were the personal creation of Cottrell-Dormer, who began 
them in the Mekeo area in 19U8 as, si^ iificantly, 'an 
experiment in social and economic development*. Cottrell- Dormer in contrast to his colleagues has never regarded agricultural extension in primitive communities as simply a 
technical matter; the Rural Progress Societies had *a strong 
social development bias - finance control, management and 
economic potential took a place of lesser import'. This emphasis may have been one of the faults of extension in the Mekeo area; the business aspect was pushed into the back­
ground, and not until 1957-8 was any effective liaison, for the purpose of business management, arranged between the Department of Agriculture and the Co-operatives Section.9
ItuAs precisely because of this social development bias however that Cottrell-Dormer, and Local Government staff,
7------------N.A.O. Plant to D.C. Samarai, 3.1.53; C.S. Belshaw
(Economic Development in South Eastern Papua. 1951) looked 
forward to a coordinated programme of economic development for the whole Bay, linked with the extension of local govern­ment. Pienberg asked in 1952 that the work of the Co­operatives Section in the Bay be coordinated with that of 
local government - S.N.A.O. to D.C. Samarai, 22.12.52.
Rabaul 11+/11/6/26.Q Spate said of Cottrell-Dormer: 'It is a measure of his 
quality that he resigned the post of Director of Agriculture 
to devote himself to this one project...1 South Pacific. VII, 6, p.732, note 2. The pre-war promotion of rice growing by compulsion undoubtedly raised Mekeo opposition - probably the worst area in the Territory, socially, to have experimented - 
see J. Miles, Native Commercial Agriculture in Papua, South 
Pacific, IX, 2, September-October 195&» p*325.
° M.J. White, Rural Progress Societies as an Extension Tool, 
Agric. Dept., pp.1-2. The decision to liaise was taken in 
1955. Also W. Cottrell-Dormer:The Native Rural Progress 
Society (Agric. Conference 17.9.19U9): he put the emphasis on organization, self-reliance, better use of leisure, as aids 
to self-government.
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had a common area of interest. Prom the native viewpoint, 
in Cottrell-Dormer*s approach an individual should strive 
for agricultural improvement, not simply for economic 
advantage but as a moral duty to his community. This had 
met with social obstacles in the Mekeo;10 but when Cottrell- 
Dormer moved to Milne Bay in 195U he found an ideal seeding 
ground for these ideas, for the Oxford Group influence of 
Kwato had striven for a similar emphasis. Indeed, the 
spiritual aspect of Cottrell-Dormer 's work meant that it was 
welcomed by the missions generally.^ '
In the Milne Bay District Cottrell-Dormer set up 
organizations known as Village Agricultural Committees, with 
associated Village Women's Committees, to serve as promo­
tional units at the village level. When these became 
established, all the committees in *a given linguistic or 
geographical area* were combined into an Agricultural 
Association. Committeemen and elders were taken to the 
Training Centre at Kuiaro (established late 1953) for short 
courses of training, and in addition, selected young men 
were given longer courses, up to a year in length, to give 
them a sound practical knowledge of extension work.
Cottrell-Dormer made no secret of the fact that the 
agricultural work of these Committees and Associations, 
although basic, was only a beginning to their more important 
and more difficult duties:
... units of the organization are encouraged to 
interest themselves not only in agriculture, but 
also in their religion, in public health, 
education, co-operative enterprise, civics and 
in all matters which may help the community 
towards a fuller and more satisfying life. Their
0 Information from D.A.O. P. Kleckham, Port Moresby. 
Cottrell-Dormer saw community opposition to individual 
material progress as an obstacle everywhere - see his The 
Village Committee Organization. Wewak, September 1959» p.3»
Ibid., pp.6—7.
12 Fienberg had (memo., 5»11*57» loc.cit.) branded the 
attitude of other D.A.S.F. officers to low level agricul­
tural training as 'unrealistic*. But Fienberg wanted the 
trainees to be employed by the councils, supervised only by 
D.A.S.F.
J
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motto is: 'Our work is for our people and our 
villages and our country*.13
*.« it has always been ray view that economic 
development must go hand in hand with social and 
political development* Every effort should be 
made to ensure that the three are intrinsic units of 
a single overall plan. This thought will be found 
to take shape in the Village Committee Book.
Economic and social advancement join hands in the 
functions and duties of the Agricultural and 
Women's Committees. Political advancement finds 
expression in the election of the Committee 
Members and in the grouping of both types of 
Committees in the Agricultural Associations.14
This promised administrative overlap with other depart­
ments. Members of the Committees were elected on the same 
basis as members of the councils, in the period 1954-7; that 
is, by totemic clans or hamlets. Cottrell-Dormer recognized 
only in passing that they might form a new focus of authority 
in the village, perhaps in opposition to the established 
village constables or councillors. The committeemen and 
committeewomen were enjoined in the Village Coomittee Book 
with which they were issued to assist the constables and 
councillors;15 nonetheless, Cottrell-Dormer admitted that 
there was often antagonism, if only temporary, and that on 
occasions the Committeemen usurped the itmctions of the 
village officials - in two cases the Women*s Committee 
arrested the constable or councillor because he would not 
let his wife join in the w o r k .  16 He claimed that 'corrective 
measures 1 could be taken by Agriculture or Native Affairs 
officers to overcome this. At the same time it is clear 
that in areas of direct administration he regarded the 
Committees as a means of circumventing the 'old and 
suspicious' officials, representing a 'static' institution.1?
^  W. Cottrell-Dormer: Rural Organization in South-East 
Papua. T.P.N.G. Agric. Journal. XII, 1, June 1959t PP.37-8*
W. Cottrell-Dormer, The Village Committee Organization, p.6.
15 The Village Committee Book. p.4.-    -
W. Cottrell-Dormer, The Village Committee Organization.
p p . 13, 17. .......17 Ibid., p . 7* The D.C. recognized that the influence of 
the appointed officials was declining - District Report 
1958-9, p.20. Samarai 29-4-1.
And again:
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Cottrell-Dormer acknowledged that the Native Affairs 
Department had received the organisation ’with mixed 
feelings• because of its implications for native adminis­
tration; but he urged acceptance of it*
It may well be ... that the organisation should 
be developed not only as a medium of communica­
tion and organised action to implement D.A.S.F. 
policy but as a medium for all Departments for 
the purpose of economic, political and social 
development.1®
The Committees and Associations were plainly under­
taking functions which it had been the intention councils 
should undertake; but the councils had been slow in doing 
so. Moreover, the Committees and Associations spread at a 
much faster rate than councils, so that many were 
established in areas which had long needed local government, 
and for which they provided a substitute. This tended to 
alarm the Native Affairs Department and to worry Cottrell- 
Dormer. It is related elsewhere that the natives of the 
north-east coast had asked for a number of years to be 
admitted to the Milne Bay council, without success* In 
April 1957 these people formed their Committees into an 
Association, entirely on their own initiative. This was, 
from its inception, collecting money - mainly to provide 
copra driers, elsewhere a council function.19
Cottrell-Dormer was most anxious that the north-east 
coast natives should also have a local government council; 
this he expressed to the Executive Officer, Local Government:
Personally, as you know, it is my experience 
that Agr. Ext. work runs most smoothly where 
Councils are in operation. So I am naturally 
keen to see your work develop as rapidly as possible.20
He also urged the natives themselves to press for a 
council; meanwhile, the Agricultural Association would give 
them *an organisation through which they can tell the 
Government their wishes1.21 The difficulties of organiza-
18 Ibid., p.8.
^  Letter, Reuben Mark to Cottrell-Dormer 22.4.57; Cottrell- 
Dormer to Reuben Mark, 1.5.57* SR 5-1-21.
20 Cottrell-Dormer to H.T. Plant, private, 28.5«57*
21 Cottrell-Dormer to Reuben Mark, 23*5»57«
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tion, supervision, and extension prevented the Native 
Affairs Department during the next three years from setting 
up a council in this area, so that the Association remained 
the natives' sole joint organization. This caused resent­
ment and anxiety amongst Native Affairs staff;22 and 
established, from their point of view, an undesirable 
pattern of uncontrolled bodies which were being urged by 
Cottre11-Dormer to exercise wide functions.23
Cottre11-Dormer was just as eager however to promote 
co-operation with existing councils, as he was to see 
councils extended to areas possessing Associations. In the 
early years he addressed the Ealeba council on agricultural 
extension work, and kept in close touch with the Chairman, 
Mahuru Mark, whom he urged to advise the councillors to 
assist with the work of the Committees# The council 
appointed an agricultural inspector, trained at Kuiaro, on 
Cottre11-Dormer*s advice; and he had a project for a council 
farm, essentially for the experimental introduction of 
crops, which would be developed by his Department for the 
council.24 Also, by 1959 six field workers of the Depart­
ment of Agriculture were attached to the Milne Bay council 
as full time advisers.25
This indirect liaison covered only one facet of the 
activities of the Committees and Associations, however.
Cottrel1-Dormer exercised a fbrceful influence in impressing 
a community development approach on the district adminis­
tration. As the Committees, and particularly those of the 
Women, were concerned with agriculture only as an aid to
o p A.D.O• Martin (Baniara) complained of this Association 
that 'unsavoury individuals 1 were running it and that all 
its meetings should be supervised by both D.N.A. and D.A.S.F. 
personnel (to D.C., 13«H«57* Samarai 17—i—1 ); the D.A.O. 
replied that the Association was unofficial, that Associa­
tions did not collect money (quite inaccurate) and that the 
traditional leaders were rarely elected to Committees (no 
explanation). (3.12.57» ibid.).
In the d'Sntrecasteaux they were said to be exercising 
political functions, making and enforcing rules*
P k^ Address, Ealeba, 7.10.54, SR 3-3-11» Samarai; Cottrell- 
Dormer to Mahuru Mark, 18.4.56, 10.5*56, 6.6.56, SR 3-1-16.
District Report, 1958-9, p.11« Samarai 29-4-1; Also 
Report, 1959-60, p.13 (Samarai 29-4-2) whereby the Associa­
tions brought to the notice of the Council matters necessary 
for agricultural extension.
j
District Organization according to Cottre11-Dormer. 1959
(Addendum: The place of other Departments in the diagram is 
being attended to in Samarai at present. W.C.D. 
30.9.59.)
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welfare, it was important that Administration training, facilities, and leadership be provided in hygiene, handi­
crafts, housecraft, and all the other aspects of village life which promoted and reflected a rising standard of 
living. The high status of women, partly traditional and partly a result of Kwato teaching, had prepared the ground, he felt, for a concentrated programme of welfare. He 
urged the appointment of a permanent Administration Welfare 
Officer to liaise with the Women’s Committees; he regarded 
as urgent the training of boys to become village leaders and to assist with the marketing and consumer societies; and in general he urged close liaison with the Department 
of Native Affairs in a co-ordinated programme.26
(iii) The Expanding Influence of Milne Bay
By 1959 Cottrell-Dormer had won over many officers in both his own and the Native Affairs department to the concept of integrated planning and executive co-ordination, Cottrell-Dormer had been greeted with some scepticism at 
the Goroka Agricultural Extension Conference of 1956; but 
the atmosphere was quite different at Wewak in 1959, for by then the problems, particularly of co-ordination with local government councils, had become patent. The Executive Officer (Local Government) said of the Wewak conference:
Anyone attending the Conference, who was not conversant with the organisation of this Administration, might well have been forgiven 
if he presumed that Agricultural Extension was 
portion of Native Affairs activity or that the Social Development Section belonged to the Division of Agricultural Extension,27
2 'r ------------------------  ---------------He also wanted better malaria control; and he listed villages in the District which needed Village High Schools; also D.A.S.F. and P.H.D. should jointly work out a plan for 
diet improvement in the villages - Cottrell-Dormer to D.C, Samarai, 5.2.60, DASF 1-1-8. It was Cottrell-Dormer who initiated moves for a women’s training centre at Ratre; he 
sought the cooperation of the Council, and himself planned 
in detail the itinerary of a welfare officer from D.N.A. - 
D.N.A. to D.O., 4.1.60; Cottrell-Dormer to D.O., 13*1*60, 
Samarai 14-18-1, ’The matter of establishing this centre .., would appear to have become unilateral based on a structure 
organised by Mr, Cottrell-Dormer.’ D,0, to D.N,A., 21.4*60, 
Ibid,
^  H.T. Plant to Chief of Div. (Development and Welfare), 
29,9*59* NA 39-5-0. Plant had himself read a paper on local 
government to the 1956 Conference, with apparently little effect.
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There were actually complaints by Agricultural officers 
that they were not getting the co-operation of councils and supervising officers. At the same time, however, the Executive Officer stated that many agricultural officers had 
no idea of the meaning of local government.
The Conference passed a number of resolutions which 
expressed the intrusion of the Department of Agriculture 
into areas which the Native Affairs Department regarded as 
its own. These included the statement that rural organi­sations were not objects in themselves, but aimed at ffamily welfare*; that these organisations promote social advance­
ment; that the Department limit its activities to those 
organisations which had amon& their activities the improve­ment of agriculture; and that the local government councils be encouraged *by co-ordinated action between D.N.A. and 
D.A.S.F. officers* to participate in agricultural develop­ment 'by forming committees to liaise with agricultural officers. *28
The Executive Officer summed up the basic issues (which 
had, in fact, been evident ever since the inception of local 
government): that, because of the sheer lack of a statement defining the relationship between councils and the Depart­ment of Agriculture, inter-departmental co-ordination as it 
affected councils was dominated by the personalities of the 
officers concerned* He wanted a joint policy statement by the two Departments*29
By 1960 this had not been done; but in the Milne Bay 
District, because of the pace set by Cottrell-Dormer, there 
had been significant moves towards co-ordination, the pattern for which followed that suggested at Wewak*30 The 
Administrator himself devoted his attention to the problem during an inspection of the district, and directed that the 
Chief of Division, Agricultural Extension (Mr* Conroy), the Executive Officer, Local Government (Mr* Plant), and the Executive Officer, Social Development (Mr* Thompson), *make 
an appreciation of the extension work carried out by the 
Regional Agricultural Officer, Mr. Cottrell-Dormer.*31
oO Ibid., App.A: Resolutions of Conference. This last 
(Res.6) was put to the Conference by the E.O. (L.G. ) and by 
D.O. Doolan from Milne Bay.
29 Ibid. •
3 D.N.A. to D.O., 16.10.59, NA 39-5-1*
31 Asst. Admin, to D.C. Samarai, 10.11.59* Admin. 80-2-4.
As a result of this visit, the Administrator directed 
that the D.C. was to give full support to the pattern of rural extension in the area, and that to integrate this with the work of other departments a monthly meeting of 
senior officers in the district be held, with progress to 
be reported monthly to the Administrator. The D.C. was told to accelerate the extension of local government, so that it could be co-ordinated with the rural organization.It was emphasised that every departmental representative in 
the district was to be made responsible for integrating his plans with the overall programme.
His Honour has made it quite clear that the 
rural organisation in your area is not to be 
regarded as a passing phase or an activity dependent on the energies and vision of Mr,Cot tre11-Dorme r,3 2
In point of fact, although this programme of co­ordination became active only in the first months of 1960, it represented the first attempt at a formal local mechanism 
of the inter-departmental committee (or district team) type, to try to do this,33 Prom the point of view both of general 
administration and of local government, this was the most notable result of Cottrell-Dormer*s efforts.
Cottre11-Dormer welcomed the proposals. He suggested 
that the Milne Bay District be used as a pilot project area in rural organization - that is, in his connotation, community development. He further suggested that the inter­
departmental committee under the D.C. should not only 
harmonise district policy but also deal with the specific problems of individual sub-district and local government areas. He looked forward to the establishment of council 
agricultural committees at Milne Bay and Misima, as resolved 
at Wewak, to co-ordinate the work of the councils and of the Agricultural Associations.34
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32 Ibid.
33 obviously comparable (though more advanced) is the 
machinery for securing district and provincial coordination in East Africa - see Sir A, Cohen, British Policy in Changing 
Africa, pp.71-2, 79 (Uganda); E, Huxley. A New Earth - An 
Experiment in Colonialism, p,267 (Kenya), Every British Summer Conference on African Administration after 1947 empha­sised the team approach at the district and provincial level,
W, Cottre11-Dormer, Rural Organisation - Eastern Papua, 
21.12,59, Samarai SR 3-5-29-
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This type of co-operation was approved by the Agricultural Associations in Milne Bay and was presented 
to the May 1960 meeting of the Milne Bay council. One 
young councillor believed that association with the 
council would strengthen the Committees, because the weight and authority of the council would be thrown behind their work.35 Eventually it was decided that the council 
committee consist of two councillors, one man and one 
woman from each of the two Agricultural Associations, and four agricultural supervisors employed by the council.This arrangement is said to have worked very well.36
The A.D.O. (Local Government) at this meeting com­plained that in the past the council had been ignorant of the work of the Committees; as the D.A.O. pointed out, this 
was inaccurate, for a further function which the Department 
of Agriculture had assumed for the Committees was the 
regular publication of a newsletter. This has elsewhere been undertaken by councils. The newsletter produced for 
Milne Bay, however, has consistently surpassed the local 
government publications, again because of its all-embracing 
coverage. It has reported the activities of all depart­ments, as well as giving detailed reports on tile Committees 
and of the work of the council. During 1960-1 each monthly 
issue averaged about 13,000 words. The breadth of themes treated may be cited from the issue of October 1960, where discussions were reported of the Associations1 promoting democratic government and the advancement of women; of the 
need to break down inter-tribal feuds and promote Christian unity in the Boianai area (N.S. coast); and of the financial 
preconditions for local government (related to the same area).37
Cottre11-Dormer has forged an administrative outlook 
and administrative institutions in the Milne Bay District 
which are unique in the Territory, but which hold great promise of overcoming many of the more serious deficiencies
35 Personal notes of meeting, Rabe, 25«5«60. It should be 
pointed out that some personal liaison with the council had 
existed continuously through V.A.C. men and women councillors - e.g. Tilaka of Kilakilana, President of the Ealeba Agricultural Association, who had attended agricul­
tural conferences in several parts of the Territory.
36 Personal information 1961, from H.T. Plant (E.O.L.G.).
^  It is called V.A.C. Because of the detail in which 
events are reported it probably exercises considerable local 
influence.
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resulting from non-coordination in Port Moresby. For this 
reason his methods are of great importance for native localgovernment.38
In view of the potentialities of his methods, and their 
inevitable spread, it is perhaps churlish to refer to the 
lack of co-ordination elsewhere; but the Wewak Conference of
1959 revealed several rifts, particularly in the Kukipi 
area of the Gulf where the council and the D.A.O. accused one another of a lack of interest and support*39 The serious division at Higaturu is described elsewhere.40
Postscript: Cottrel1-Dormer read a paper to the ANZAAS Conference, May 1961, on his methods, stressing greater participation by natives in the planning of programmes, 
providing more opportunities and heavier responsibilities 
for native leaders, and a still greater insistence on team 
spirit amongst Administration departments (Rural Extension in Eastern Papua)« These are precisely the areas of weak- ness of existing local government.
Moreover, in August lU-18th, 1961 a District Development 
Conference was held, primarily to carry out the above objects. Representatives of all departments and natives 
from the Associations, Co-operatives, and Local Government 
considered all aspects of district development and passed 22 
resolutions on matters as diverse as the powers of council constables and the posting of infant welfare nurses
- 7  Q  1 1
J An example was the agreement on pig-penning at the 
meeting of 25*5.60, an issue which, because of the intransigence of D.A.S.F., had defied a solution for five 
years in the council - see Ch.IX, 1.
Memo. Wewak Agric. Extension Conference, 29*9«59,NA 39-5-0.
See Ch.VIII.
D.C. to A.D.O.s 5.4*61. Samarai A 1-1-9* Resolutions in V.A.C. No.35, August 1961, pp.1-6.
APPENDIX B
CENTAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
II. Supervision of Councils«
It had been realized during the drafting of the N.L.G. 
Ordinance that native local government in New Guinea would 
be, initially, a specialist occupation* The reason for this 
is clear, in that all the Senior Officers of the Adminis­tration had been raised in a tradition of direct adminis­
tration, and there was considerable scepticism about the 
necessity for and potential value of native local government. 
It was not realized at the time, how deep the opposition lay nor how persistent it was to be* Indeed, the Executive 
Officer (Local Government) has summed up that the major 
problem in implementing native local government has been to 
induce the Native Affairs staff rather than the natives to accept it*
(i) The Native Authorities Section
For this reason it was essential to entrust the policy to a specialist group convinced of the worth of native local 
government; it was equally important that the first councils 
should be sound and vigorous, otherwise those in favour of direct administration would be given an excellent argument against the extension of local government.
The importance of a specialist section was stressed in 
1949 by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Native Develop­ment and Welfare. 1 The functions of the section were to 
supervise the establishment and initial stages of councils; 
to carry out regular tours of inspection; to maintain records at Headquarters and sift information from overseas; to organize training programmes for natives in local government; and to advise the Director on the progressive enlarging of the powers of individual councils.2
The Director explained the reasons for general field staff*s exclusion from these activities in his proposals:
It is desired to stress that this supervision,especially in the preliminary stages, will be ofa specialist nature and it would be unfair to
 ^ DDS to Administrator, 5.4.49: DS 14-3-15«
2 Ibid.
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expect District Officers and members of District 
staffs, who are already more than fully occupied with their normal duties, to be the responsible 
officers.
Again:
By establishing the group, it would not be the 
intention to exclude District Officers from participation in this sphere of native adminis­
tration. They will naturally have to be fully in 
the picture and complete liaison would at all times be maintained with them.3
The Government Secretary remained unconvinced. He 
suspected that this would derogate from the prestige and work of the District Officer who, he feared, would be pushed into the background.** He was clearly opposed to the 
specialist section, and doubtful of the approach to 
’indirect administration* altogether. He hinted that the desire for self-government should 'firstly stem from the 
desire of the people themselves,f thereby indicating his 
belief that something was being imposed on the natives 
which they had not asked for. The Director of District 
Services, in his reply, failed to point out what was often pointed out afterward, that local government was not self- 
government. He mollified him by pointing out that the 
establishment of councils, the direct supervision of which would gradually pass to District Services staff under the District Officer, would enhance the District Officer's 
prestige; and that a member of the Section, whilst in the District, would be attached to the D.O.*s s t a f f . 5
The view of the Director of District Services prevailed, for a specialist section was established, and the head of 
the section, known as the Senior Native Authorities Officer, was appointed in December, 1949? shortly before the Village Councils Ordinance was p r o c l a i m e d . ®
 ^Government Secretary to DDS and NA, 2.5*49: A/5/2/9*
** Ibid.
•' At the time of the Raluana disturbance in 1953» it came 
out that it wns doubtful whether the S.N.A.O. was under the 
control of the D.C.
Personal information from Mr. D.M. Pienberg, former 
S.N.A.O.
*- %  ,. g ; ^
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As the situation in the Gazelle Peninsula developed it 
became clear that the creation of a specialist section had been wise, for certain District Services officers were prepared to carry their opposition to the point of 
obstruction,' Many others were sceptical and uninterested 
in promoting the policy.
Once he had fully realized the extent of indifference 
and opposition the S.N.A.O. realized also the way in which 
the role of the Native Authorities Section was being 
misinterpreted. In September 1951 he wrote to the DNA:
It is somewhat disquieting to reflect that nearly 
two years after the proclamation of the Ordinance, and twelve months after the policy has been put into operation, there are very few field staff 
officers outside of Headquarters and the Native 
Authorities Section with any but the haziest notions of the most significant step we have yet 
taken in administering the native population of 
this country. This despite the fact that native 
local government affairs must ultimately be handled by District Service officials as an 
integral part of normal district administration, 
and the N.V.C. Regulations were formed with 
exactly that object in view.®
This was perfectly true, for the Regulations specifi­cally invest the District Officer with supervisory powers 
over almost all aspects of local government activity.
The S.N.A.O. went on to complain that:
The original conception of the Native Authorities Officer's role has not materialised, for there 
has been no gradual assumption of supervisory 
responsibility for any council's affairs by the 
ordinary field staff of any of the three districts in which the policy has been applied ... the situation it seemed most necessary to avoid is 
rapidly developing: the local government policy is 
coming to be regarded by field staff generally as 
a fanciful superstructure that is being super­imposed on a tried and true system of native
7 Ch.V.
8 S.N.A.O. to D.N.A., 9.9.515 Rabaul 14/11/6.
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administration by a handful of specialists with little else to do.9
That specialists had been placed in this invidious and 
contradictory situation was due to the fact that field staff officers were unwilling and incompetent to take on supervisory functions.
Clarification was therefore needed of
(1) future role of the District Service field staff in
relation to local government;
(2) the future role of the Native Authorities Section.
Experience gained amongst the Tolais has clearly 
demonstrated that it is impossible to keep the 
responsibility for different aspects of the administration of any council area divided 
between field staff doing local government and 
field staff quite ignorant of local government work.10
It therefore became a primary task of the Native 
Authorities Section to educate field staff officers in the objects and principles of Native Local Government. This was begun in 1952 with the issue of District Services Local Government Memorandum No.1, the main object of which was to 
point out to officers their duties and responsibilities towards councils.11 It was felt necessary to warn officers that any attitudes of hostility or impeding of the policy would not be tolerated; and it was noted that there had 
been ’one or two instances * where this had happened. The memorandum also foresaw the principal dangers of unskilled 
or unsympathetic supervisions
Incorrectly handled, administration through local government bodies can still be direct rule in the narrowest sense. There is a golden mean between a unit whose executive work is technically efficient 
because it is all being done by an impatient 
officer without reference to the Councillors, and a unit whose members, through lack of official
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
NA.39-1-0. In preparation January, 1952.
guidance, are accomplishing nothing - and learning J 
nothing.12 j
In theory, then, the emphasis has throughout been thrown on guidance and education rather than on direction,'3 
A number of factors militated against the former in favour 
of the latter:
(1) the direct administration tradition;
(2) the fact that the Local Government Section has no
control over the appointment of supervising staff;
(3) efficiency is the responsibility of the supervisingofficer through the D.O.;
( 4 )  the lack of basic education of both Councillorsand council staff;
(5) the propaganda role of existing councils;
(6) the fact that councils are regarded primarily as
Administration instrumentalities rather than as 
consultative bodies. This originally had to be 
emphasised to enlist the support of District Service officers for the policy; this emphasis has been continued both for this reason and in 
order to persuade Technical Departments to work through local government.14
In the Gazelle Peninsula by 1954 liaison between the 
Native Authorities Office and the Native Affairs staff was good; but as the S.N.A.o. pointed out. this was due primarily to good personal relations,*5 it did not solve 
the general problems of integrating native local government 
with general administration. Many Native Affairs officers still regarded local government as the plaything of 
specialists. To overcome these difficulties, in 1955 the Native Authorities Section (which had been based in Rabaul) 
was abolished, and the present arrangement substituted,1®
12 Ibid.
13 see later Circular Instruction No.306: Local Government 
Memo. No,2, NA,39-11-2.
1^  Circular Memorandum 5/59.
15 S.N.A.O. to D.N.A., 22,4.54; on NA.39-1-0.16 Information from B.0.(L.G.), H.T. Plant; see diagrams.
(ii) The Local Government Section
Under the new arrangement one permanent officer - at present with a non-gazetted assistant - constitutes the Headquarters staff in charge of local government, with the 
title Executive Officer (Local Government), The field staff 
concerned with local government are titled A.D.O.(L.G.) but, 
although their duties are intended to be primarily concerned 
with local government establishment and extension, they 
form part of the District Officer's staff.
Regular educational courses have also been held for both junior and senior officers, at the Vunadadir Local 
Government Training Centre, in order to break down 
opposition or indifference to local government by explaining 
its functions and objects. By the end of 1959 five senior officers' courses and six field staff courses had been held. 
The senior officers' courses are attended by staff also of departments other than Native A f f a i r s ,17 The senior 
officers' course at A.S,O.P.A. in 1957 was devoted to problems of local government, and produced a lengthy report 
containing suggestions for the improvement of the Ordinance, 
all of which were endorsed by the E.O.(L.G. ) as a member of 
the course.
Yet the E,0.(L.G.) maintains that indifference or 
opposition remain major obstacles. It is rare for staff 
other than local government staff to press for the establish­ment of councils, 18
It has been mentioned that since the present arrange­
ment began early in 1956 the S.O.(L.G.) has had no control over the selection of A.D.O.s (L.G.). They are appointed generally at random to local government positions. Results 
can be measured only where indifference amounts to complete 
neglect of duties and responsibilities.
The affairs of the two councils in Milne Bay were 
entirely neglected by the supervising officer and by the 
D.O. during 1955.^  This came to light only when theD.N.A. pressed for results of elections and estimates. Elections due to be held in June had not even been mooted 
in December - so that legally there had not been a properly
^  D.N.A, Local Government Bulletin No,5, July 1959, pp.1-2,
18 E.O.(L.G.) to D.N.A., 27.it.58, NA 23-U-2.
19 a/DC to D.N.A., 2.12.55: Samarai 1i+. 1.3/2290.
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constituted council for six months* The first estimates due in September had been ignored.20
The A.D.O. in the Wewak area took two years on a 
preliminary survey of a few small offshore islands which 
should have taken two months. The A.D.O. at Lae for two years was so opposed to local government that the system 
almost lapsed before the E.O.fL.G.) was able to prevail on 
his superiors to replace him.21
(iii) The Dual Roles of the Local Government Officer
These are blatant examples of neglect* Elsewhere - and 
this is common - the incorporation of local government staff into general field staff has had the effect of making them 
available for non-local government duties* In some 
instances shortage of staff has forced them to divert their 
attention to normal patrolling and direct administration; 
in others the D.0* has directed them to what he considers ’more important duties*. The Higaturu area is a good 
example*
The Higaturu Council was established in March 1956* Until November 1956 it had an energetic supervising officer who launched the coffee scheme*22 He went on leave and did 
not return until March 1957* On his return he was immediately sent on a patrol to the non-council Managalase area, and did not return to local government supervision 
until September 1957* During this entire period the coffee scheme was placed in the charge of a cadet, and partly as a 
consequence was halted. The District Officer made an audit of the Council’s accounts - as laid down in the Regula­tions - and in May 1958 reported many mistakes and 
omissions.23 £11*00 was carried forward unspent from 1957 to 
1958 because, through lack of supervision, the Council’s works programme had been allowed to fail.^ U The A.D.O. 
complained that, although he was supposed to give his full 
attention to council work, only U0$ of his time during 1957 
was so spent.25 By council work, however, the A.D.O. meant
20 A.D.O. to D.C., 20.12.55*. Slnaeada 14.17.1/2364.
2  ^Information from 3.0.(L.G.), period 1958-60.
22 A.D.O. to D.O., 29.5.58, on NA.41-3-7.
23 D.0. to D.N.A., 22.5.58: NA.41-3-7.
2i* A.D.O. to D.0., 28.10.57: Pop. 14-8-22/2.
25 A.D.O. to D.0., 29.5.58: Pop.14-8-22/12.
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local government extension, theoretically his primary responsibility; whereas routine supervision of the Higaturu 
Council's affairs should have devolved on the sub-Dlstrict 
A.D.O. The D.O. replied, however, that although the A.D.O. was right in principle he would have to continue to devote himself to the Higaturu Council because of a shortage of other staff.2«
At this period the Higaturu Council had the services of a particularly intelligent clerk, who in July 1958 resigned to become Native Local Government Assistant at Popondetta. 
Despite his services the affairs of the Council lagged, a 
point which further highlights the difficulties of the supervising officer. All clerks are given nine months training at the Local Government Training Centre, Vunadadir; 
though because of the lack of trained recruits some councils 
have had to make do with untrained staff. The result has 
been that recruits have been taken when barely semi-literate; the instructing officer accordingly spends the bulk of his time teaching the elements of English and Arithmetic in addition to council procedure and accounts.27
The Higaturu Council has been dogged by native staff 
troubles which have further involved the supervising 
officer in direct administration of the Council's affairs.In July 1958 a young Orokaiva was appointed clerk: he had been trained at Vunadadir, but he suffered by comparison 
with his predecessor, and in his official capacity found it 
difficult to assert himself amongst his own people, who maintain strong cultural cohesion, to the detriment of the personal ambitions of the young educated men. After only a 
few months he requested a transfer, and the Council was 
without trained staff.2° The clerk who was working there 
in February 1960 had only recently completed Vunadadir training, but required constant advice and supervision even for the elements of council business. The onus therefore 
fell on the supervising officer constantly to oversee all 
aspects of the Council's business, and in particular the 
education of the Vtorks Committee.
26 A.D.O. to D.O.t 9.5.58: Pop.14-8-22/12.
27 Information from A.D.O. C. Liddle, Vunadadir: the officer 
in charge of the training centre for clerks. The entrance standard is Grade IX, roughly equivalent to a reasonable 
primary education.
2® Clerk J.L. Agose, transferred to Ilimo Council, 
v. NA.41-3-10, for correspondence August-September 1958.
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Since 1958 the supervising officer had been continually involved in Council affairs through the disputes between the 
Council and the Administration, especially the Agriculture 
Department, over the coffee scheme. In March, 1960 the
A.D.O* was due to renew the registration of coffee blocks, a task which could well occupy six to twelve months. He 
was able to spare little time for occasional visits of 
inspection to the 111mo Council based on Kokoda, where the clerk was in 1959 guilty of misappropriation of Council funds.
This problem of close supervision can be duplicated from 
a number of other Council areas. In Milne Bay the A.D.O. (L.G.) had not promoted the establishment of a single new 
council* It was necessary to place him in charge of the 
Patrol Post in Milne Bay, where the bulk of his time was taken up with agency functions, selling stamps, acting as Bank agent, dealing with native labour affairs, and so on* 
Treasury restrictions make it impossible to delegate these 
functions to a clerk* Although the wastefulness of this in 
terms of trained staff has been pointed out for some years - indeed the former S.N.A.O* has pressed for a hlgh-calibre 
office cadre to staff outstations and relieve field 
officers of routine duties2  ^- the lack of positive direc­tion and of inter-departmental liaison have so far frustrated all attempts at improvement*
The emphasis on council efficiency with concomitant 
close supervision appears to have set up a vicious circle: 
the council leans progressively more heavily on the super­vising officer who as a consequence finds it progressively 
more difficult to make the council assume its responsi­
bilities* The Hanuabada Council has from the beginning been considered weak by the Administration.
The Executive Officer (L.G.) however, interprets this 
as at least partially due to slackness or idleness by the Councils supervising officer* In June 1958 after an inspection he wrote that some of the blame must be ascribed to the fact that in the past Native Affairs staff had acted 
in a purely advisory capacity*
If strong and effective leadership is lacking 
then I consider it up to the District Officer 
and his staff to provide the necessary leader-
9'a.......... -7 Fienberg memo, of 5**57 - comments on re-shaping the
Ordinance.
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ship and direction while bringing to the fore what latent leadership does exist. There is a 
need for stronger supervision as well as advice.30
Following this criticism the Council’s activities 
improved. The 1959 Report showed that the works programme was 'well on the way to completion*» and that had the 
Council been able to acquire land more readily, especially 
for its projected new Council House, the whole programme would have been completed. It is questionable, however, whether this was the result of a renewed spirit in the 
Council rather than of direction by the supervising officer 
determined to salvage his reputation - in view of the 
continuing difficulty to get a quorum for meetings, probably 
the latter.
A similar criticism applies to the Tolal Councils. Originally it was planned that after a period of intensive 
advice and supervision the councils would steadily assume control of their own affairs. In general this has not 
happened, even in routine matters. In October, 1958 the
A.D.O.(L.G.) at Rabaul wrote urgently requesting a replace­ment full-time supervising officer for the Reimber-Livuan Councils. These Councils had for some months, May-November, 
been supervised by a Cadet; though until that time con­
tinuous supervision had been maintained. The Reimber / 
Council had done nothing to carry out its 1958 works / programme - in the opinion of the A.D.O. deliberately - I
r and when chided for its failure to take action,\ replied that it was the officers* responsibilityI to initiate action and supervise the various\ projects until their completion.3 »
The Executive Committee of the Livuan Council was also inactive. *The two councils require close and continuing supervision, such as only can be given by an officer 
residing there. *32 The A.D.O. claimed that because of 
native local government and the more complex pattern of administration the Gazelle Peninsula should have priority 
in staffing. This would be arguable if extra staff were 
involved in an expanding field of administration; but in
E.O.(L.G.) to D.N.A., Report on Hanuabada Council,
6.6.58: NA.41-1-4.
31 D.N.A. Report for 1959: NA.41-1-4; Comment 6.1.60.
32 A.D.O.(L.G.) to D.O., 22.10.58: Rabaul 14/11/6/29A.
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fact they do much the same sort of work they were doing 
when the Councils began. (The writer found at the Rabaul 
Council House, which has an unusually efficient clerk, 
that the Births Register had not been kept up as is 
required - one of the simplest of routine tasks.) Between 
March and September 1959 an officer spent his full-time supervising the affairs of the Reimber-Livuan Councils, 
with the result that the works programmes were completed, 
though the Executive Committees were described as ’useless *¿33) when supervision fell below this level,, it 
was stated, the people complained of being neglectediJU)
The Director of Native Affairs commented that the 1959 report demonstrated *the necessity for adequate guidance 
by capable officers even in those Councils which have been 
established many years, *&5) an opinion which perhaps 
exposes a neglect to analyse the type and degree of guidance which long established Councils are getting and 
should be getting. The whole reflects the influence on 
both Administration and natives of a longstanding 
paternalism.
(iv) The Inhibiting of Council Extension
One of the most important effects of this continuing supervisory strain on staff, particularly local government staff, has been its inhibiting of local government extension, 
both the establishment of new councils and the extension of existing councils.36
Yet aside from the attitudes towards supervision, 
attitudes towards local government generally still present 
a problem. To take one example: the Baluan Council, Manus, 
has been extended with painful slowness since its establish­ment in 1951 to control the Paliau cult movement. The Baluan Council has from the beginning been an economically 
marginal unit; for this reason alone extension of the 
existing Council has been an urgent task. Reports from local field staff however, continually emphasised the social 
divisions obstructing extension, in view of the voluntary 
participation approach. The D.O. in February 1957 claimed
3^ Report July-September 1959 by P.O. Allwood, NA.40-3-10.
Ibid. A.D.0.(L.G.) to D.N.A., 1.10.59» NA.40-3-10.3*5^ Comment on July-September Report on Reimber-Livuan Councils, NA.40-3-10.
36 See Ch.VI.
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to be organizing an intensive campaign of instruction and propaganda to smooth out differences and induce a mood of 
co-operation*37 The Department later pressed for the 
inclusion of outstanding villages, especially on the 
northern side of Manus* A.D.O. Collins of the L.O.Section found, however, on a visit of inspection in May,
1960 that native local government had never been explained 
to these people, and that their reluctance to accept it could be attributed to their lack of understanding* He visited one village where the people had been said to be 100^  against local government, but found them totally 
ignorant of its meaning* After a period of explanation they were 10Cffc in favour of joining the Buluan Council*™ 
This indicates indifference on the part of the local field staff.
(v) The Attitudes of Senior Staff
The S.O.(L.G*) has remained convinced that the root 
cause of the unsatisfactory progress lies in the failure of Senior Field Staff to recognize Native Local Government 
as an essential tool in progressive administration* An additional factor of Which councillors themselves complain, 
is the frequent transfer of officers: this was raised at 
the Madang Conference, where the representatives asked not only for greater continuity of supervising staff, but also 'that only suitable officers are posted to replace officers 
who have been working in council areas* *39
As local government has extended, a lack of under­
standing and sympathy within the Administration ha3 become 
correspondingly more obvious. In January 1959 the Administrator's Department issued its largest and most emphatic Memorandum on Native Local Government, the sole 
object of which was to ensure (a) that officers of all 
departments understood the elements of the policy; and(b) that they should realize the ins>ortance attached to the policy by the Administration.40 it reiterated that councils
Y W .....* ......... : m r r - i - i n
Ji D.O. to D.N.A., 5.2*57: 14/4/1-298. This dealt specifically with outstanding groups on Pak Island, east of 
Manus. The E.0.(L.G.) commented that this was the first 
direct approach to these people after six years - 
v. NA.i*2-3-5.
33 May, 1960 Report by A.D.O* Collins: NA*42-3-4« Also 
personal information A.D*0* and E.0(L.G.)•
39 item 21, Report of Madang Conference, June 1959*
L.G. II4-7-32.
i|0 Circ* Memo. No.5/5 9: 22*6*59*
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were Administration instrumentalities and not municipal 
bodies on the Australian pattern; that the primary functions 
of councils is to raise native living standards; and that through councils all departments should try to integrate development programmes at local area level - something 
which they have generally failed to do*
Towards the end of 1959» however, a situation arose in the Marshall Lagoon area which emphasised that it was still 
imperative for Native Affairs to overcome Indifference and 
improve the quality - as distinct from quantity - of 
supervision amongst its own officers*
The inaugural elections for the Marshall Lagoon Council 
had been improperly conducted by the Patrol Officer in 
charge* This was disclosed several months after the elections took place when the Department requested details* 
Subsequent investigations showed that no records of voting 
had been kept, that the elections had largely been con­ducted, unsupervised, by Station Police, and that at least two villages, Debana and Mariagolo, had not been visited at 
all - the V.C. had simply been appointed Councillor by the 
Patrol Officer* Moreover, the appointment of councillors had never been confirmed by the D.O., as required by Regulations.42
The E.0.(L.G.) commented: 'Every rule seems to have 
been broken In conducting these elections and I doubt whether I have seen such a case of neglect of duty by any officer concerned with local government* '43
As a direct result of this case he summarised the short­
comings of the present pattern of supervision and suggested 
improvements, in a memorandum running to 3#500 words - an indication of the concern he felt and of the difficulties even then of making his voice h e a r d .44
He was led to the conclusion that 'District Officers generally, fail to fill their proper role.* He attributed 
this to ignorance; a failure to adjust to area adminis­
tration; inability to plan development programmes; a simple 
lack of interest; sheer inefficiency on the part of some;
^  See Appendix B, I.
P.O. Marshall Lagoon to A.D.O. Abau, 4.5*60: NA.41-5-2.h*^ Ibid*, marginal comments*
^  E.0.(L.G.) to D.N.A., 14.6.60: NA.39-1-2.
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and a lack of strong direction from the Department of Native
Affairs:
Headquarters inspections show that the majority 
of District Officers are unfamiliar with such basic aspects of local government,as estimates, 
layout and the function annual estimates have in 
achieving balanced developmental programmes •#.45
This neglect reacted disastrously on junior officers 
supervising councils, whose work was either badly evaluated or totally ignored by their seniors; and this in turn made 
it impossible for Headquarters to assess the situation.
In view of the shortcomings of the D.O.s the E,0,(L.G.) considered that the only solution was to ensure that the best available officers were posted to local government - 
an allusion to his lack of choice - so .that supervision at 
the Council level itself would be good.^b
At the same time he maintained that the inefficiency of District Officers extended further than local government; 
the only solution laould be a conference of District Officers 
at which they could be authoritatively informed of their duties as the delegates of the Director of Native A f f a i r e .47 
Instruction in local government could be simultaneously 
introduced. He further suggested that a properly staffed 
training section be set up to give adequate in-service training particularly to senior and non-specialist officers; and that specialist officers lose their specialist 
designation - A.D.O.(L.G.)• These two last measures are 
clearly designed to break down the persisting notion 'that local government is a kind of secret society whose secrets 
are known only to officers who have local government 
supervision as their special responsibility,'48
Ibid., p.2.
kl Ibid., p.7.
48 ,  r Ibid,, p,6.
APPENDIX C
COMPARATIVE STUDIES
I. Native Officials» Courts» and Councils in German NewGuinea and the Mandated Territory - an Outline, 1¿65-1942«
(i) German Policy* Generally and Locally
Germany annexed north-eastern New Guinea in 1884 and 
its administration was entrusted under an Imperial Charter 
(Schutzbrief) of May 17th, 1885 to the Neu-Guinea Kompagnie* The Imperial Government took over the administration in 
1899* In 1897 Dr. Albert Hahl, the Imperial Judge at Herbertshohe, had Introduced a system of administration 
through native luluais or headmen. Originally they were supposed to be chosen from the more influential elders; they kept 10$> of all head taxes they collected in lieu of salary, 
and carried out minor executive and judicial functions#
The judicial functions were important: they could adjudicate in matters of native custom involving values up to 25 marks or 10 fathoms of tambu shell.1
After the Imperial Government assumed control, the 
luluai system was extended generally. Broadly, the Germans 
throughout their Empire paid sympathetic attention to native policy only after Demberg became the first Colonial 
Minister in 1907.2 up to that time indigenous institutions 
had been roughly subordinated to the achievement of economic development throu^ i company plantations, Townsend remarks 
that in the German colonial empire administrative control 
was not thoroughly established until 1906; and Vincent 
Harlow sums up the German colonial record as ’twenty years of thoroughly bad administration, followed by seven years of great improvement’*3 But in New Guinea this division does 
not appear to apply, for Hahl, who had already originated 
'k*16 luluai system, was the Governor from 1902 to 1914*
S.W. Reed, The Making of Modem New Guinea, p. 140; c.D. 
Rowley, NatlveHbfflclals and Magistrates of German New 
Guinea» 1¿97-1921, South Paciflc, Vi1, 6, PP.773-4; Rowley, (ffae Australians in German New fcuinea, 1914-21, p.215 (for 
.•judicial!, functions of luluais, pp»2^ 5-^ y«
2 H. Brunschwig, L’Expansion Allemande Outre-Mer» pp.166-72*
3 M.E. Townsend, Origins of Modem German Colonialism 
(1921), pp.194-6: v* Harlow in Germany's Colonial beraands 
(ed. A.L.C. Bullock), 1939, p.205.
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The German effort was concentrated in the areas of greatest soil fertility, dense native populations, and accessibility, for it was in these areas that plantation 
activity had been intense* These conditions applied in 
particular in the Gazelle Peninsula, which in addition had had extensive and varied contact with Europeans: it is 
estimated, for example, that in 1883 about 900 Tolai 
natives were, taken to work on the Fiji and Queensland plantations.** The English Methodist and German Catholic Missions were also established in the Peninsula in the 
1880?a.
(ii) Traditional Units and Political 'Unions'
Traditionally amongst the Tolai native leaders were 
only the heads of matrllineage sections; but the 
availability of guns helped native leaders to strengthen their authority and assisted the extension of political units*5 This may have had some bearing on German policy, 
for the luluals had more extensive jurisdiction than was 
ever officially given natives in Papua* In 1901 some 
dissatisfaction was expressed with the luluals' adminis­tration of justice; but it was stated that they were 
indispensable in the settled parts of the colony and that 
their appointment would be continued* Supervision was 
vested not only in government officials but in company administrators, lay brothers of the Catholic mission, 
settlers and senior native police*6 By 1904 the co­operation of the luluals was said to be commendable*
It would appear from later German remarks that the luluals were not, from the beginning, intended to be restricted to their traditional or pre-colonial units* In 
1913 the Administrator said that the purpose of appointing them 'was in the nature of an experiment to co-ordinate the low statused natives within a specified district to under­take obligations and to (»-operate for the benefit of their racial kindred'*7 Thus there was at an early stage a
^ T.S. Epstein, A Model of Economic Growth* p*4*
5 Ibid*, p*6; also T.S. Epstein, Private Capital Formation 
amongst the Tolai* p*4*
® Report on German New Guinea (tr. Thomson) 1900-1, pp.74-8*
 ^German Report 1912-3 (tr. Thomson) p.170; cf. Rowley's 
comments (Aust. in German New Guinea, p.213) relating this 
policy to Ttiny European officialdoms'*
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conception of the luluais as consolidators of traditional 
uni ts *
From this developed the concept of political ’unions * under the luluais» as a conscious attempt to bring villages 
over a relatively wide area together* This was extended 
from New Britain to the coastal areas of the mainland in 1905, though not without some misgivings, for it was felt 
that cultural differences might make the system unsuitable*° 
In 1906-7 the system of unions was extended further, to New Ireland and to Bougainville* From Kieta the whole east 
coast of Bougainville, comprising 178 villages ’with abundant population*, was organized into 10 unions* In 
some areas, such as the vicinity of Madang , difficulty was experienced in forming even small unions, and luluais were appointed to Individual villages*9 Elsewhere, some of the 
unions tended to fragment; additional luluais were then appointed for the smaller units*10
(ill) The Status of Native Officials
The Germans were under no illusions about the respect 
accorded the luluais and they made every effort to support 
them with the threat of force and other sanctions*11 The traditional leaders were in fact often regarded as being 
’the greatest enemies of the Chiefs and of the Europeans **12 
The luluais were given as assistants officials known as 
tultuls* who were originally interpreters and messengers, and were generally more Europeanised than the luluais*Both the luluais and tultuls would appear to have been non- 
statutory appointments; though in the Madang area in 1908, 
for example, two policemen were appointed as tultuls to each lulual, *to strengthen his influence in the village1; the object of this was to facilitate road-making.13 Generally, 
the only government employee in each village was the medical tultul who, after a brief tralning in first aid, received
® German Report 190U-5* P*70*
9 German Report 1906-7, p.i+*
10 Rowley, loc*cit*, p*775; German Report 1907-8, p*7*
11 German Report 1907-8 (Bougainville), p*7» Reed, op*cit*, p.140; H. 3chnee German Colonization* Past and Future, p*127: 
*The Germans set in"o?^ ice chiefs of their own selection. ’
(My italics).
12 German Report 1907-8, p.7; Rowley, loc.cit*, p*781.
13 ibid*
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a salary of 20 marks a year; this usually gave him a special 
status in the village. Therefore, in every village in the controlled areas there were three natives recognized by the Administration as having particular administrative and 
judicial functions and responsibilities. This Impressed a 
Papuan R.M., G.H. Nicholls, who visited German territory on the Waria river in 1911; he compared it with Papuan adminis­tration through a single official, and implicitly favoured 
the German system (as he put it) of administration through 
'a council of three* in every village, who took it in turns to report at the government station monthly. He thought that the triumvirate consisted of a chief constable (luluai) 
with two sub-constables, one selected by the people (tultul). the other by the government (medical tultul).*5
(iv) Australian Use of Native Officials
According to Rowley, when the Australian Military 
Administration took over in 1914 it Ignored, or did not grasp, the concept of political 'unions1, and regarded h^e luluai purely as a village official, perhaps by analogy 
with the Papuan V.C. Inevitably, the Military 'did not 
give a great deal of attention to long-term intentions in 
native administration*.16 After the Territory had become an Australian Mandate, the civil Administration gave statutory recognition to luluals. and to paramount chiefs (luluals) 
with jurisdiction over larger areas; but the latter were 
given no powers beyond those of the luluals. M o r e  importantly, statutory recognition gave them functions, 
primarily policing the Native Regulations, similar to those of the Papuan V.C., and in particular by default abrogated 
the judicial functions which had been recognized by the Germans, an omission criticised by Col. Ainsworth in 1924*18 Inevitably, the luluals continued to adjudicate, surrep­
titiously. '9 Under the Australian Administration the central constabulary retained their functions in the administration,
Reed, cit.sup.
Report by R.M. Nicholls (Mambare) of meeting with Hans 
Klink, 26.3.1911. CPI.V, 30, No.1068.
Rowley, loc.cit., p.7755 op.cit., pp.219-21.
^  Laws of New Guinea (ed. T.P. Fry, 1949), IV, p.3791.
Ainsworth Report (1924), p.17* Ainsworth of course favoured precedents he had known in Kenya; see Rowley's 
comment, op.cit., p.227.
Rowley, loc.cit., p.779.
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and in some respects determined the attitudes of local officials, for they tended to stay for protracted periods at the one station; their local knowledge often induced officials to rely on them inordinately.20
(v) Acculturation and Political Stirring
It must he emphasised that the Mandate administration 
was quite inexperienced. What it did resulted from pre­
conceptions, prejudices, and pressures, rather than from any carefully thought out plan or philosophy of native adminis­
tration. Amongst the Tolai of the Gazelle Peninsula 
acculturation had begun to quicken. Numbers of them had 
served on ships out of Rabaul, and the Catholic mission In particular had given some of them sufficient education to 
compare their condition with that of visiting negro seamen, for example*
In January 1929 the entire work force of Rabaul, numbering over 2,000 natives, went on strike without warning. 
This had been well organized in complete secrecy. The first 
intimation of it to Europeans was the arrival of large numbers of natives at Catholic and Methodist mission 
stations.21 The immediate reaction amongst the European 
population was alarm and incredulity followed by anger; but 
alarm was uppermost. The Rabaul Times screamed ,mutiny,•A prime element in European alarm wasthe discovery that natives from different districts could forget their 
traditional antipathies and unite in what was interpreted 
as primarily an anti-European movement. The Rabaul Times 
wrote that
the white population is in a precarious situa­tion, for we find ourselves mistaken in our 
belief that the individual native Is incapable, either by reason of lack of mental development, 
or mental indolence, to concentrate sufficiently in any matter vdiich needs careful thought*22 
.. . ■ ■ ■Private information, A.D.O. J.S* McLeod, who became a Cadet in New Guinea in 1936; while he was at Gasmata in 1946 
there were more than 80 constabulary attached to the station. 
Bumbu in Hogbin*s study, Ch.V, 1 supra, maintained his tyranny over Busama with the connivance of the constabulary. 
Police were in sole charge of patrol camps - N.G. Report 
1939-40, p. 129.
21 J.K. McCarthy, The Rabaul Strike, Quadrant. 1959, X,
PP.55-65.
22 Rabaul Times. 4.1*1929.
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The Europeans were so certain that the natives were 
incapable of such combination that they suspected a master­mind behind the movement. The Administrator, General 
Wisdom, hinted darkly of 'Bolshevists, Communists, or other 
firebrandsf.23 Native demands were in fact entirely 
economic: they claimed that Europeans had taken their land 
and were taking gold out of the country, and that in view of this they wanted higher wages.
The Commission of Enquiry found that there had been no outside aid, and that the strike had been organized by Suma Suma, the master of a Melanesian Company schooner who was described as having 'extraordinary intelligence and 
ability', and by Sergeant-Major Rami of the Rabaul Police (the entire force had participated in the strike).24 
Thirty-three natives who were all described as ringleaders were given gaol sentences of 2-3 years.25
(vi) Native Councils
The European population sought repression of native 
aspirations; but the Administration and the missions had 
already considered the possibility of consultation with the natives - indeed councils and courts functioned in the Morobe area under the influence of the Lutheran mission - 
and they now sought an institution which would serve as an 
observable safety valve.26 This was found In the tene Kivungs or informal councils, which were formalized and 
officially recognized in 1935-6, Like the Hanuabada council in Papua these klvungs had no statutory authority
23 Meeting of Citizens' Association 4.1.29; statement by 
Wisdom 5.1*29 - Rabaul Times. 11.1.29.-
^ Report of Commission, Rabaul Times. 15.3.1929.
25 Report New Guinea 1928-9, Appendix B; also Report 1929-30, 
p.143.
2^  The Rabaul Times hinted that all the Europeans were 
thrashing their deserters (11.1.1929); and the Citizens* Association persuaded the Administrator not to send natives 
to Australia for technical education because of the ideas 
they would pick up from 'the artisan class * (Rabaul Times> 25.1.29, 15*2.29). There had already been an Administrailon- 
Mlsslon Conference in 1927 which considered the question of 
consultation with the natives.In the Morobe area councils and courts had been operating 
continuously since German times, though strongly under the 
influence of the Lutheran mission. (CP 141, AQ.840/1/3).
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and no revenue* Prom the Administration’s viewpoint, 
however, the prime function of the kivungs was judicial*
The experiment was first tried on Matupi island:
• •• a council of six influential men of the 
village, selected by the people, with the luluais and tultuls, adjust matters of a purely domestic nature, such as damage to gardens by pigs, payment of debts of shell-money or money, 
matrimonial disputes and other minor incidents disturbing to the peace of the community*2 '
The system extended to Nodup at the natives’ request*
The Administration was anxious to ’hasten slowly*, but the 
natives* desire for councils outran caution*28 By 1937 councils were functioning in 14 *groups of villages’ in the Rabaul sub-distrlct;29 and by 1938 the scope of the councils’ 
discussions had expanded. Originally their work was con­fined almost entirely to the settlement of disputes; the Administration felt it impossible to extend their judicial functions, because they showed personal bias*3° By the 
time the war b roke out the work of the kivungs was beginning to create interest even in Australia;31 but the 
Administration was adamant in its determination not to be 
rushed into decisions which might shatter the harmony of 
native society:
On the whole the natives are singularly 
fortunate, for in a world rent by the 
calamaties of war, they enjoy that tran­quillity of ignorance and backwardness which is denied to the more civilized peoples of 
the world. It is the aim of the Adminis­
tration while the war lasts to preserve this condition as far as p o s s i b l e . 32
27 Report New Guinea 1935-6, pp.24-4*
28 Police Commandant W.B. Ball revealed this in 1940: ’After mature consideration ... he gave permission for the election 
of the councillors** Rabaul Times» 13»^ 2.1940*
2  ^Report New Guinea 1936-7, P*3i*
Report New Guinea 1937-6, P*2*
^  Report of Rabaul Klvung meeting, Sydney Daily Telegraph, 
12.8.1941*
Report New Guinea 1939-40, p*25*
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Daring the 1930s, however, rapid social change had already overtaken the Tolai. The young men had traditionally been bound to their lualua (matrilineage section leader) 
largely through economic ties. But as money became 
available they conceived the idea of pooling contributions 
to buy and operate trucks; only the young men understood mechanics, so that *for the first time in Tolai history 
young men became important and deciding factors in native enterprisef.33
At roughly the same time - about 1934 - the Methodist 
mission established youth clubs which quickly became foci for economic and social aspirations, and were known as Young Men’s Kivungs. The young men wanted to reform their culture 
in some respects to bring it more into line with the 
desirable values of European society; they wanted their 
neighbours to build better houses and to send their children to school.34 Because of their vigour and their emphasis on 
Western activities and values the Y.M.K. were generally 
frowned on by the official kivungs and especially by the 
paramount luluals. such as Ephraim Tami at Matupi. Without any clear objects the Y.M.K. raised money by digging wild 
fowls* eggs, putting up houses, and so on. They generally 
met once or twice a month and discussed a variety of 
matters, usually concerned with the raising of living levels. By the war most of them had bank accounts - the Matupi Y.M.K. is said to have had about £300 at the 
beginning of the war.
After the war the young men were no longer quite so young, and the official kivungs and the Y.M.K. appear to 
have been merged under their influence. They were still 
functioning at the time native local government was intro­duced; indeed, the two institutions overlapped, for the Matupi and Nodup kivungs. for example, continued to operate 
a cafe until 1954* As informal organizations they were 
largely unshackled by the Administration; the attitude of some of them towards the Administration became very indepen­
dent, even truculent - in 1949 their judicial functions were suspended.35 Difficulties were envisaged when local govern­
ment, implying closer control, was introduced.
-^3 T.S. Epstein, A Model of Economic Development, p.8.
3^  Ibid., p. 13. Also personal information John Vuia,
M.L.C., one of the founders of the Matupi Y.M.K.
35 Oral information, John Vuia and Matupi councillors. Also 
D.D.S. and N.A. to Administrator, 23*5«1949* DS 14/3/15*
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APPENDIX C 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
II. Native Administration In the British Solomon Islands.
(i) The Social Situation: Traditional Leadership
Problems for administration posed by physical factors and by highly segmented societies were very similar to 
those in Papua. The dominant social unit was the exogamous 
raatrilineal clan.1 In the Western Solomons (e.g. the 
Shortlands, Choiseul) there appear to have been forms of chieftainship; chiefs built up and maintained extensive alliances through marriage.2 More study has been devoted 
to the eastern islands, where the pattern of leadership 
approximated closely to that of coastal Papua. Here personal qualities were most important: by displays of energy in the gardens (and traditionally, through bravery 
in war) a man could build up a following; but this rarely extended beyond an administrative sub-district.3 There was often a division of functions amongst ceremonial, war, and religious leaders.4
In a few places a strong principle of hereditary leadership attached to one clan amongst a number of others - e.g. San Cristoval (Araha clan) and Sa*a (Malaita). On San 
Cristoval the chief of Arosi village imposed fines, and was
1------------C.S. Belshaw, Native Politics in the Solomon Islands.
Pacific Affairs. XX. 19U7. P.1&8.
C.S. Knibbs, The Savage Solomons as They Were and Are, 
p . 53; A. Capell. Notes on theIslands of Choiseul and New 
Georgia» Oceania. XIV 491(3» pp.2U» ¿7. 29*
3 The best example is the ngwane *lnoto (secular leader) of 
Malufu, described by H.I. Hogbln. Experiments in Civiliza­
tion; see Knibbs, op.clt., p.53*
W.G. Ivens, Melanesians of the South-East Solomon Islands: the Lau chiefs, If.li. kalaita. in a^taleka Russell described 
as ’unique * the balance between hereditary authority and individual ability (generally only within a clan) - T. 
Russell, The Fataleka of Malaita, Oceania. XXI, 1950» pp.1-13. C.H. Allan claims that this division of authority was not recognized by the Administration - h^e Marching 
Rule Movement in the B.S.I.P., (Dip. Anthrop., Cantab.;,
p.25.
689
6S0
the war leader and often also the priest;5 on the other hand, the Sa’a chief was primarily ceremonial (although he could impose tabus and exact fines for their contravention)9 and 
behaviour was regulated in the main by ’group sentiment* rather than by a native authority.6
These areas of limited hereditary authority later assumed administrative importance; for it was believed that 
they represented survivals of a system which had existed 
more generally, and which had been destroyed by culture 
contact and by indiscriminate government appointments• 7
The Solomons suffered earlier, more intensive, and more 
prolonged labour recruiting than did Papua: it began about 1860 and did not end (to Fiji) until 1910. This was long believed to have been the major factor in breaking down 
traditional leadership.“
(il) Initial Administration through Headmen
A British Protectorate was proclaimed over the southern 
islands in 1893 - under the Western Pacific High Commission - and this was expanded to its current boundaries by 1900.
The first Resident Commissioner, C,M. Woodford, took up 
residence in 1897 (at Tulagi), and district stations were 
set up on Gizo (1899), the Shortlands (1906), Malaita (1909), Guadalcanal (1914), San Cristoval and Ysabel (1918).9
Woodford’s administration was extremely rudimentary.
He had some station police, sometimes supplemented by local
5 C.E. Fox, The Threshold of the Pacific» pp.296-300; Fox 
believed the chiefly clan io be immigrants (Elliott Smith*s 
red-haired Sun worshippers).
 ^Ivens, op.cit., pp.114-5; R.H. Codrington, The Melanesians» pp.50-2, earlier described the Sa*a system, as an atypical 
example.
7 Moorhouse Report, January 1929, Cmd. 3248, p.19.
8 Brit. Colonial Reports, 1938, No.1908 (B.S.I.P.), p.3; all kanakas were not repatriated from Queensland until 1907 -
C.H.B.E., (1933), VII Pt.1, pp.287, 501. It was amongst Queensland labourers that the South Seas Evangelical Mission 
began; this functioned largely on the self-contained 
’presbytery’ principle.
 ^B.S.I.P. Report, 1931, No.1586, p.3; B.S.I.P. Handbook 
(Tulagi, 1911), p.21; (1923 ed.), p.19.
691
Europeans, together with a small boat in which to visit areas in which murders or feuding were r e p o r t e d .  *10 
Forceful and rather indiscriminate punitive measures con­tinued in the Solomons long after they had ceased in Papua.''
Until about 1920 regular administration at the village level hardly existed. The D.O.s in the districts were 
largely left to their own devices, with a small force of 
police. They adopted much the same device as in Papua, 
appointing apparently prominent men as village policemen. 
The similarity of the problem has been emphasised by Ivens:
There were no paramount chiefs with whom to 
confer, no council of elders in the various places, who could be entrusted with the establishment of law and order.12
Inevitably, the tendency was to appoint men as village police (in native eyes, generally giving them government support) with whom it was easiest to liaise - that is, 
those with some outside experience and a knowledge of English.Such men often had no traditional authority. This tendency was accentuated after 1922, when the first 
Native Administration Regulation, providing for village and district headmen, was introduced. Codrington had noted in 
1891 that the process began with traders, who naturally looked for a chief with whom to deal - ’his consideration among his own people is of course enormously enhanced by what white people make of him’ - and this had been con­
tinued by the naval commanders, who sought particular men 
who could be made responsible for the conduct of their 
p e o p l e s . '4 He believed that there was nothing regrettable
A.I. Hopkins, In the Isles of King Solomon. pp.23U-7*
lloorhouse (1929, cit.sup., p. 11) reported that such expeditions were ’regretfully common’ - even in 1927 naval vessels were called in by the Administration.
12 W.G. Ivens, The Island Builders of the Pacific, p.86.
The Native Tax Regulation, applying to males between 16 and 60, was introduced in 1920; measures to collect it prompted 
a statutory structure of native administration (1922).
3^ Allan, op.cit., p.19; Ivens, Island Builders.... p.86.
Codrington, op.cit., p.46. Of course this can be 
repeated from other segmentary societies coming under colonial rule in the same period - see L.S.B. Leakey, Mau 
Mau and the Kikuyu, p.36; L. Gray Cowan, Local Government 
in West Africa, pp.18-9.
about this; but Ivens complained that as control shifted to the government, respect for the true chiefs, and thereby internal sanctions, broke down, with consequent disorder - the very thing which the appointment of headmen was designed to prevent.15
(iii) The Trend to Native Authorities
Malaita is by far the most populous island in the Solomons (probably 40-50,000 people during its colonial 
history)* Not until D.O. W.R. Bell arrived in 1915 did effective administration really begin there* Bell was 
murdered while collecting tax in 1927; the official enquiry (the Moorhouse Report) indicated that the native leaders probably resented any government intrusion; but it also 
pointed to the maladministration (as it believed) of the 
1922 Regulation. Headmen had been appointed precipitately, 
and in most instances they were not acceptable to the 
people.1°
The basic problem with which Moorhouse grappled was 
that of introducing an indirect, traditionally-founded element into administration. He acknowledged that social conditions almost drove him to the conclusion that ’the 
directest of direct rule* was the only solution;1? but as 
Cameron had shown, and as the contemporaneous Hilton Young Report re-affirmed, this could and should be avoided.16 
The presumption of a pre-contact system of hereditary 
chieftainship provided the rationale for indirect adminis­
tration. Moorhouse recommended that much greater care be 
exercised in selecting headmen, and that D.O.8 consult with them more regularly and refrain from punitive police action*20
15 Ivens, Island Builders..., pp.86-7*
1^  Moorhouse Report, cit.sup., pp.13-20*
17 Ibid., p.21.
Cf. Report of Hilton Young Commission, Cmd. 323U, Jan.
1929, p.271: ’restore authority of the tribal chiefs’.
1  ^Moorhouse Report, p*19*
20 ibid., p.21. Moorhouse recognized the strong village 
Influence of the mission teachers, especially those of the 
S.S.S.M.; he regarded it as inevitable that the teachers 
should try to arrogate temporal authority, but justified this on the ground that co-operation between Administration 
and missions was essential.
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During the 1930s strenuous efforts were made to appoint 
men who had some following in their communities;21 but non- traditional criteria (constabulary experience and familiarity with judicial procedure) were still applied in their 
selection*22 Though it was still a system of very direct 
administration, in important respects it was a great advance on that in Papua: the headmen had relatively extensive jurisdiction (on Malaita traditional leaders 
rarely extended real sway over more than 150 people), and 
this in effect meant some confederation of parishes;^ 3 
moreover, the headmen were the official executive as well as police agents of government, and had important judicial functions.24 Although the headmen relied heavily on 
Administration support, they were men of considerable authority compared with the Papuan V.C.; their pay averaged £12 p.a. Some, like Hogbin rs Maekali, had considerable 
local influence, and in their official capacity tried to work with the traditional elders.25 Nevertheless, they were 
Administration appointees, so that a reserve of resentment was bound to huild up ('Maekalism* was loathed on Malaita after the war);2® and abuses of police powers seem to have continued to some extent*27
Thus, during the 1930s native passivity changed; there were demands for higher wages and for a voice in the 
Advisory Council.28 The Administration had regarded simple
21 Allan, op.cit., pp.20-2.
22 H.I. Hogbin, Experiments in Civilization, p.142; C.H. 
Allan, Customary Land Tenure in the B.S.I.P.* p.74#
Hogbin, ibid.; also his Native Councils and Courts in the British Solomon Islands, Oceania, I^ 43» pp. 26)0, ¿kj).Tie claimed that traditional leadership had virtually
disappeared in the coastal areas*
Oh
* Hogbin, op.cit., pp.143-6*
25 Ibid.
26 D.O. Malu’u to D.C. Malaita, 28.6.1952, Malu'u 68/52. 
Maekali nevertheless still had a loyal local following*
27 Belshaw, loc.cit*, p*189; W.J. Marquand, Community Development in the B.S.I.P.. (Confidential, 2nd Devonshire 
Course, i 94*9-50), Pt.1, pp.4^-5•p Q Belshaw, loc.cit., pp.189-90: especially Gela, Ysabel, 
Savo.
j
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administration through headmen as only temporary;2 9 and in 
1940 moves began to introduce institutions on Native Authority lines.3° The principal object was to unite customary said Administration law, through statutory native bodies having some traditional representative base and 
gradually working under Administration procedures and 
surveillance. The anthropologist, Hogbin, had in 1939 come out strongly in favour of native councils and courts as ’a return to the solid foundations of the past*.31 This 
carried on the twin ideas that to govern themselves primitive 
peoples must have opportunities for practice, and that the institutions through which they are governed should not bealien.32
The question of alien laws was clearly most important; 
therefore most attention was paid the embryonic native courts. 1940—2 wos a period of experiment. The various 
D.O.s set up court systems on a trial basis, adapted to 
their own areas and largely to their own conceptions; reports and suggestions were then called for. All the officers were agreed that an urgent need existed for such 
courts. In the Short lands the D*0. stated that the chiefs 
had always had judicial powers under native custom; he envisaged the official courts as developments from this, revolving around the sub-district chiefs. Close supervision would be necessary, primarily to avoid excessive adminis­
trative review and thereby native discouragement. Head­
quarters rejected any suggestion that D.O.s should be court members.33 in the New Georgia area ten sub-district 
courts were functleaning, ’composed of elders chosen by the 
people * and convened by the district headmen. The D.O.
Gizo believed it essential that the courts should have 
jurisdiction over minor statutory offences as well as native
29 b.S.I.P. Report, 1931» cit.sup., p.Us ’There is no form 
of Municipal or Local Government.«.at present. ’ My italics.
3° Belshawj loc.cit., p.190: ’Local legal and legislative organisations of extraordinary educative value’. Cf. Hilton Young Report, cit.sup. p.78: ’respondibility itself is the 
most valuable educator’; and Ch.II, supra.
31 Hogbin, op.cit., pp.235-9; see his Local Government for 
New Guinea. Oceania. XVII, 1946, p.38.*“
Hogbin, Native Councils and Courts.... loc.cit., p.261; 
cf. Ch.V, 1, supra.
33 a/D.O. Shortlands to Sec. Gov., 10.3*1941# Honiara 
49/19 - marginal comments.
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custom - ’it is desirable to bind the two together’*34 in 
Ysabel the members of each court numbered five, being the 
district headman, and the heads of the major clans* The 
D.O. here stressed the basic principle, warmly approved by Headquarters s
It is particularly important that offences against the communal services section of the Native Administration Reg. should be 
cognizable by the native courts, for it would 
mean that a dirty village would be punishable 
as an offence against their own people and not merely as part of the general prejudices of an alien administration.35
This frank recognition of the native viewpoint marked the approach off from the ultimately assimilatory one in Papua* The Resident Commissioner applied for a statutory 
system of native courts, because the natives had reached 
the stage where an outlet was needed for their ’political aspirationsand the establishment of native courts was ’fundamental to any system of native administration founded 
on principles generally accepted within the Empire ’.3°
The result was the Native Courts Regulation (Cap.30/ 
19*42)* Until 1960 the constitution of these courts was 
little altered, with the sub-district headmen and elders - 
later councillors - represented (section 3 provides for customary constitution)* Courts are individually established by warrant* In 1944 native courts could deal 
with criminal cases punishable by a fine of up to £5 or 
imprisonment for one month* and with civil cases involving property worth up to £10.37 By the 1950s these limits had 
generally been extended to six months or £20 (criminal) and 
£50 in civil cases (£100 in land cases)*38
From about 1940 non-statutory councils also functioned, 
on a sub-district basis. Like the courts, these were 
originally built around the district headmen as the agents
D.O. Gizo to Sec. Gov., 10.5.1941, Hon. 49/19*
D.O. Ysabel to Sec. Gov., 7»2.1941, Hon. 49/19*
Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner Western 
Pacific, 30.4*41, Hon. 49/19.
Hogbin, Oceania* XIV, loc.cit., p.262*
^8 Pro forma Court Warrant, Sect* 4*
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of government representing confederations of traditional units. These councils were permitted, unofficially, to 
levy funds, and to some extent to administer their own medical and other services; the Gela council managed a branch of the Government Trade Store.39 in the Western 
Solomons the courts and council system went ahead con­
tinuously and smoothly; real leadership there was relatively easy to locate.40 The Native Administration 
Regulation, 1947» made provision for statutory sub-district councils; this was regarded as a transitional stage to 
larger councils, until social change should break down ’excessive parochialism’.41
(lv) Cultist Disruption and Administrative Adaptation
Over the central and southern Solomons, however, the smooth transition to forms of local government was disrupted 
by the war and by the cultist Marching Rule (Masinga) 
movement. This appears to have derived, not only from the 
usual social and political frustration and imbalance leading to cargo cult, but also from the struggle for allegiance 
between the traditional or quasi-traditional leaders (often 
linked with the missions, especially the S.S.E.M.) and those recognized by government. Hogbin had recognized that in 
the Christian areas the council members were often not accepted as l e a d e r s . 42 Allan saw this as the basic reason 
for the failure of the early councils; he found that in 
To’obaeta (north Malu'u) only 31»25?o of} council members had any claim to leadership by descent.43 on Malaita the 
councils appear to have been set up hurriedly, as control mechanisms during wartime s t r e s s *44
Before the war unrealistic ideas about self-government had been spread in the Guadalcanal-Florida-Malaita area by disciples of a Melanesian Mission pastor.45 The seed
59 Belshaw, loc.cit., p.190; see Notes and Instructions to Native Administrations in the British Solomon islands, 
Oceania, XVI, 1945. p p . ¿1-9.
1 C.S. Belshaw, Island Administration in the S.W. Pacific, 
p p .118-9 ; B .C .I.P. Report, 1948, p .287
B .S .I .P .  Report, 1949-50, p .47*
2^ Hogbin, Oceania, XIV, loc.cit., p .262.
^  Allan, The Marching Rule Movement, pp.40-1.
^  Ibid., p . 87; Marquand, op.cit., I, p.12.
Allan, ibid., pp.29, 76.
< DIVISIONS ON MALAITA 
REVEALED BY MARCHING RULE 
1- 9 ; Areas under Head Chiefs 
1<010 : Language areas. 
0 10 
I 
ApproJl . 
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therefore probably existed. Bat the movement really began 
in the Labour Corps on Guadalcanal; the influence of 
American troops was marked there. Rumours spread, on usual 
cargo cult lines, that the Americans were to take over government and to provide vast quantities of free ’cargo*.
On the other hand, the leadership aspect was important: a Guadalcanal headman named Vouza, much decorated and 
favoured by the Administration, sought the paramount chieftainship of the island.46 This idea seems to have 
been taken up by the non-government leadership, beginning 
in the backward and little patrolled area of Ariari in 
south Malaita. As it emerged, the striking feature of the 
movement was the revelation on Malaita of a new leadership and of unrealized political alignments. The movement rejected white over-rule and tried to set up its own pan­
island government. Its most remarkable feature was the 
organizational accomplishment of this within twelve months; for the first time the ten fundamental linguistic- ethnological divisions were revealed to the Administration.47
The movement set up its own councils and collected 
funds. The Administration tried to co-operate (meeting of *Head Chiefs* with Resident Commissioner, 26.12.1946) in order to canalise the positive economic energies into useful 
directions; but when independent courts were set up and the 
coercive police and military aspects became obvious, the Administration realized that some suppression was necessary. 
In September, 1947 the principal Head Chiefs were arrested; 
but rifts had already appeared between the extremists in the north, and the other Chiefs.48
The ultimate success of the Administration in dealing 
with Marching Rule lay in its refusal to abandon positive measures, and m  its willingness to act on a realization of past mistakes and native grievances. The political impulse 
to the movement, in other words, was regarded as 
legitimate.49 in accordance with native leanings, the 
numbers of appointed village headmen were rapidly reduced
^  Belshaw, loc.cit., pp.190-1.
^  B.S.I.P. Report, 1949-50, p.47; Malaita Annual Report, 
1947* Auki, typescript, pp.3-5.
^  Malaita report, ibid., p.8; Marquand, op.cit., I, p. 14 
(Marquand was Malu*u D.O. at this time).
Belshaw, loc.cit., pp.192-3: ’welcome ambitions for a higher economic and political status’; also Marquand, ibid.,
II, p.19; IV, p.28.
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after the war; moreover, the criteria for the selection of 
district headmen were changed - instead of being ex­
policemen, they were chosen after the war for ’intrinsic merit, education, powers of leadership, and their status in the social system’*50 After most councils were re­
constituted (post-1952), the numbers of district headmen 
were also quite rapidly reduced, with the ultimate object of their ceasing to be central government agents and becoming employees of the councils.5*1
Particularly on Malaita, the Administration went to great lengths to compromise with the dissidents. Between 
1947 and 1950 attempts were made to re-establish the sub­
district councils; but the arrest of the nine Head Chiefs 
had not broken the movement, which had formed a hard core 
known as the Federal Council. The result was that official local government was boycotted.52
This Federal Council consisted of a number of influential men who met occasionally in Kwara’ae. The 
Council wanted one ’big man’ recognized, a fixed high 
monthly wage, and its own fl&gi 'the latent aim was complete independence for the island*.53
The Administration had already recognized this 
centralizing tendency, which had been conspicuously revealed 
on Malaita, more generally. In 1950 the Resident Com­missioner had promised the Advisory Council that native councils for each district would be introduced.54
5° Allan. Customary Land Tenure*... p.74« Making headmen employees of the councils was the theme of memos, by D.C. 
Central, 12.6.1949; D.C. Western, 19.12.1946; D.O. San 
Cristoval, 12.3*1947* Hon. 14/3.
Headmenfs conference, 1952; address by a/Res. Comm. P. Hughes, item 3. Numbers were reduced from 166 in 1950 to 
106 in 1957 - Allan, ibid. Headmen’s conferences were held 
annually at this time, concurrently with D.C.s’ conferences. 
They constituted a kind of informal native advisory 
council - South Pacific, IV, 11, 1950, p.209.
52 D.C. Malaita (Russell) recap, to Chief Sec., W.P.H.C., 
22.10.1954, Confidential F.101/9/5« Also councils partly took over from headmen on San Cristoval - district report, 
1947# typescript p.4.
53 D.C. Ilalaita, mem., ibid.
5l* High Comm, to Sec. State, No.589/52, 21+.10.1952.
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The intention to set up such a district council in 
Malaita was announced in September, 1951; hut there was a good deal of uneasiness about it. The acting High 
Commissioner felt that the application of this Kenya 
precedent might be difficult because of Melanesian 
parochialism, and he thought that they should concentrate on improving the efficiency of the sub-district councils.55 
But eventually political considerations were seen to be 
overriding; in 1952 the High Commissioner acknowledged that setting up the district councils first (most smaller councils were still barely functioning) was ’putting the 
cart before the horse*; but political pressures made it essential.56
On Malaita the establishment of an island council had 
to anticipate the statute. The M.R. Head Chiefs were 
released from prison in 1950, but when they showed moderate inclinations were remorselessly abandoned by their former supporters. It did not pay to be pro-Administ ration. 57 
The Malaita district council was eventually convened on 
29th July 1952; but preparations for it roused the extremists to the point where violence was threatened to Malu*u government station. Clearly the district council 
and the Federal Council could not co-exist. The High Commissioner then proposed to both organisations that they 
merge: the Administration went to extraordinary lengths to reach a compromise with the Federal Council. It was agreed 
that a new council of 41 members would include only ten 
official members, that the new council be known as the Malaita Council and be permitted to have its own flag, and that any *big man1 they nominated would be recognized as 
President if he took an oath of allegiance, with the 
possibility of his nomination to the Protectorate Advisory
Ffc—.........a/High Comm, to Res. Comm., No. 16 (Confidential), 
13.9.1951.
5 6 High Comm, to Res. Comm., 28.11.1952, P.10/25/6. The Kenya African District Councils Ordinance, 12/1950, was circulated to all D.C.s for comment, and discussed at a 
staff conference, April, 1951. The natives were also 
consulted. Res. Comm, to D.C.s, 15.8.1950, Hon.14/27/1. Circular District Councils (1950), paras.1-3.
57 D.O. Malu'u to D.C. Auki, 28.6.1952, Malu’u 68/52. The one exception was a North Lau chief, who retained con­
siderable authority: probably traditional reasons for this.
D.C. to D.O. Malu’u, 13.9.1955, Auki M.50/3*
(v) District Councils
700
Council.-* This was approved by the Secretary for State*^ 9 
The High Commissioner looked forward to ’an increasing 
measure of autonomy* in native local government; but he insisted that initially it be made quite clear to the 
Malaita Council that it must accept its law and order, tax, and executive responsibilities*60 The opening of the first 
meeting on 29th January 1953 marked the giving of official form to a unity which the Malaitans had achieved for 
themselves* Within 20 months the council had submitted 66 
resolutions and recommendations to the High Commissioner* 61
The Administration felt that, by retaining some element 
of nominated members (generally district headmen) it was 
both enabling liaison between central and local government 
without the direct intervention of European officers, and 
also cramping fissiparous tendencies in extremist areas 
(e*g* Ariari, which tried to form its separate council in 
1954)*62 A major difficulty was that of working down to the sub-districts. It was hoped that the steady development of 
the re-constituted native courts would reduce the tendency
* Russell memo* of 22.10.1954, cit.sup.
59 Sec. State to High Comm., 10.12.1952, No.527 Western 
Pacific.
60 Res. Coram. to High Comm., 28.11.1952, P.10/25/6. Notes on discussion between D.C. Malaita, High Comm., Res. Comm., 
27*12.1952, Govt. House, Honiara - Confidential. Here it was 
agreed that the new council should have the full powers conferred by the N.A.R., and that the Govt. Headmen be the 
executive arms of the council. A recrudescence of M.R., e.g. illegal drilling, was to be discouraged, but prosecution 
was to be avoided.
Native delegates met on 6-7.11*1952 (Minutes, Auki M.50/2) and agreed to new council, but rejected offer of an Advisory 
Council seat for their *big man*: continuing separatism.
The pseudo-customary bias, basic to the Federal Council, continued: the *big man* was to be presented with tafuli*ae (shell money, see Hogbin) by all ’lines* on Malaita. fhe prime ogject of the council was *to make good laws about 
custom* for the people.
Russell memo, of 22.10.1954, cit.sup.
District Report, Dec.1952, Auki M.5O/3. D.C.s* discussion, 
1953, on Hon. 10/92. Problem recap, by a/Prot. Sec.,11.2.1960, Hon. F.202/10/5. One native (F. Talasasa) was 
already, in 1959, a univ. graduate and an Administration D.O.
j
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to unsupervised judicial activities by c o u n c i l l o r s , ^  in 
addition, efforts were made to link the headmen and councillors in sub-district committees*64
The district councils generally were given statutory 
form by Native Administration Regulation 10/1953# which 
consolidated provisions for the appointment of headmen and the constitution of councils, together with their several powers and duties. The most striking aspect of its implementation, compared with the Papuan system, has 
continued to be the socio-political emphasis on island 
integration. This has brought the coast and hill peoples 
together. Councils may meet only twice a year (Sect. 16) so that the Papuan restrictions do not exist. Councillors 
often come together for a week at meeting times; councils 
provide centres with dormitories. This allows informal 
discussion which is probably more valuable than the formal sittings. The approach has been quite different from that in P^ pua: forms of integration are not a prerequisite for 
a council, but result from a joint assumption of responsi­
bilities. Correspondingly, executive expectations are not set so high for individual councils as in Papua; this has 
allowed, for example, for the setting up of a council and 
court on Sikaiana, which has a resident population of only
250.65
(vl) Administrative Recopnition of Local Government and
Political Incentives
Because field staff take it for granted that councils 
and courts are a normal part of progressive administration, 
councils are not executively on trial. This means that
®  D.C. to Res. Comm., 6.2.1953# Auki M.50/3; D.C. to Prot. 
Sec., 22.10.5U# Hon.F.101/9/5# Confidential.
^  Malaita Minutes, Jan. 1954; D.C.*s comments, Auki M.50/3. The operation of the committees has been uneven. In north Lau, where relatively strong traditional leadership survives, 
the divisions which appeared elsewhere between headmen and 
councillors were mitigated through the committee. In 1960 
this consisted of the headman (also Court President), with
3 councillors, plus 8 men selected by these four (informa­
tion, Salana Ga'a, Mariano Kelesi). The committees are 
expected to submit proposals to the council.
5^ warrant, Aug. 1955, Hon.F.101/20/9« The court had previously functioned at Administration discretion, imposing 
maximum penalty of £3 fine. 5*1 cases were heard, 1953-5# 
fines averaging 5/- to 10/-.
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executive responsibility can be gradually built up as socio­
political integration develops, in a way which has been 
impossible in Papua. Guadalcanal posed rather similar problems to Malaita, with severe traditional and M.R. rifts. The Marau-Haumba maintained its own small system, a legacy 
of M.R. influence, until in 1958 former M.R. leaders from 
Malaita persuaded it to join the Guadalcanal counci1.66 A nativistic politico-economic movement continued in the 
area, led by a visionary named Moro; but by sympathy and 
assistance, particularly in the economic sphere, the D.C. was hopeful that all its aspirations and activities could 
ultimately be guided into the council. He was frankly in 
agreement with its incentives:
I cannot avoid a sense of wonder at the placidity 
of the Solomon Islander under conditions that in any other country I have worked in would be cause 
for grave security concern - racial differentiation 
in living standards, poor wages and working con­ditions, lack of welfare services, agricultural 
and economic frustration, insecurity of land 
tenure, breakdown of custom, quasi-urbanization in Honiara, the emergence of the educated ’new ones', etc.67
This recognition of the relative backwardness of the Solomons - which also applies to Papua but goes largely unrecognized - creates an atmosphere of understanding and 
compromise which tends to be lacking in Papua. This does 
not mean that the councils are allowed to become mere 
political 'talking shops'. This same D.C. told the Guadalcanal council frankly that the government only helped those who helped themselves (with particular reference to a 
road in the north-west): 'if Guadalcanal people worked hard 
to help the island to go ahead...they could be the wealthiest in the Solomons; but they did not work, they 
only complained'.68 within nine months the road had been 
fig"— .. —.— .Guadalcanal Report, SP 173 (Secret), April-June 1958*This is the eastern segment of the island, with the S.E. 
•weather coast'.
67 Ibid., report March-June 1959» D.C. M.A. Andrew.
Minutes, Guadalcanal council, March 1960 (attended by 
writer), item 9*
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completed. 9^ Because of the lack of central pressures and 
supervision relative to Papua, it is probable that more 
responsibility is thrown on the councils themselves to produce results; there appears to be a greater awareness amongst natives (probably linked with the political 
emphasis) that their own initiative means the difference 
between progress and stagnation.
(vii) Problems in Councils and Courts
In 1959-60, as the councils became more strongly established, central government's surveillance began to increase. This was particularly so with resolutions and 
recommendations! the councils have more broadly defined 
powers than in Papua. Sect.18 allows them to legislate 'in 
respect of any matters affecting purely native administra­tion * within their district. The policy provision for 
'recommendations * permits latitude; but in 1959 central 
government began to examine by-laws for infringements of 
existing legislation. The Protectorate Secretary said that with increasing sophistication 'bush lawyers' could take advantage of overlap;70 the Attorney-General suggested that 
council committees submit drafts of rules in advance.71
The native courts, as in Africa, had also reached a 
stage where they had begun to arouse thoughts of reform. Pines and fees are paid to council funds (N.A.R. Sect.29), and a tendency had appeared for courts to adjudicate often rather than wisely, and to impose maximum penalties 
regularly. This posed serious problems for D.O.s of
B.S.I.P. News Bulletin, January 1961s opening by High 
Comm. There have been dramatic increases in revenues as 
councillors become conscious of a lack of services and of councils* financial self-sufficiency. Estimated Malaita 
revenue rose from £2,210 (1955) to £27#100 (1960) - there was also a prospect of a C.D.<fcW. grant of £3,900 for 
buildings (1960). Crops alternative to coconuts (e.g. cocoa, promotion financed by C.D.&W.) were only just 
beginning in 1960. Hon. P. 101/9/3*
70 Prot. Sec. to Chief Sec., 27.11.1959, Hon.F.101/5/1. 
Native Courts have blanket rights of jurisdiction over 
custom; only re-definition would be affected.
71 Attorney-General to Chief Sec., 23»11»59# ibid.
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apparent interference instead of legitimate review*72 The Attorney-General wanted the native courts subject in 
appellate jurisdiction to the High Commissioner’s courts*73 
There was a growing feeling amongst field staff that methods, 
procedure, and review should be tightened; this derived, however, not from native dereliction but from a conviction that many courts had reached a stage of sufficient 
competence to warrant reform. 74
It will be seen that the system of native administra­
tion adopted in the Solomons has largely followed the 
Native Authority concept. Customary and political bases 
have been assumed, and have influenced the direction the 
system has taken. Even in constituting councils, only in very recent years have attempts been made to introduce the 
ballot in a few areas.75 At the same time, virtually the 
whole population of the islands by 1960 were running their own councils and courts, and the Administration headmen 
were increasingly being subjected to the local authorities. 
It was hoped that this breadth and degree of devolution, giving institutional scope for Western and customary concepts together, would lay the basis for the development 
of democratic institutions: the lack of hereditary 
authorities facilitated this, and it appeared that the real leaders, even on Malaita, had been brought within the system.76
Discussion with a/Prot. Sec., a/Chief Judicial Officer. Analysis of West Kwara'ae court books showed adultery regularly treated as customary case, maximum penalty. By 
Oct. 1954» 45 native courts were functioning (generally 
sub-district), throughout the Protectorate.
73 Attorney-General to Prot. Sec., 31»5«1958, 29*7»1958,
Hon.F.101/2/3.
71» D.C. Central to Chief See., 8.5.1958, Quad. P.3/12. A particular difficulty concerned imprisonment while awaiting
D.O.*s review.
75 B.S.I.P. Press release, 6/57, 7.6.1957.
See C.H. Allan, Local Government and Political Conscious- 
ness in the B.S.I.P.. J.A.A.. XII, 1960, pp.158-63.The V960 elections marked a critical phase on Malaita, as younger men replaced the Federal Council leaders. A revival of factionalism was feared, but the Administration and the 
younger men favoured nomination of the older leaders, to 
obviate this possibility - Minutes, Walaita council, Feb.
1960, item 3; a/Prot. Sec. to Chief Sec., 11.2.1960,
Hon.F.202/10/5.
PRELIMINARY SURVEYS FOR NATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
APPENDIX D
CIRCULAR INSTRUCTION No.5QU: 18th September, 1959.
1. Some officers have, in the past, approached communities 
concerning the establishment of native local government 
councils and virtually committed the Administration to the 
establishment of a council without giving full consideration to the factors involved. The preliminary survey can be made 
without making a direct approach to the people or making promises. When it is clear that the possible population 
grouping, potential or capacity of the people to pay council 
tax, communications and the staffing position are such as to enable a unit to be set up, the time is ripe to discuss the 
matter with the people themselves. All officers must ensure 
that this procedure is followed so that no hopes of having a council are raised where the conditions are not immediately 
suitable.
2 . It is evident from reports being processed at this Headquarters that some uniform method of reporting on Native Local Government surveys is required. It is with this in 
view that the following information has been compiled and 
future surveys will be submitted in the form shown hereunder
A. Introductions-
(a) Brief geographical description listing terrain, climate, rainfall details.
(b) Location in relation to District Headquarters and other important District Centres.
(c) Brief background information listing administration 
activity; cargo cults and/or nativistic movements.
(d) Leading men of area with brief details.
B. Total population and population Distributions-
(a) List Census statistics.
(b) Population trends.
(c) Nos. of villages, size of village groups, population distribution.
(d) Standard of living. Degree of literacy.
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C* Social Grouping
(a) No, social groups*
(b) Language pattern*
(c) Relations with adjacent groups*
(d) Degree of cohesion between groups being surveyed*
D# Social* Economic and Political Organisations:-
(a) List purely native type social groups#
(b) Mission influence and organisation.
(c) Co-operative activity.
(d) Other movements not included above*
* *
E. Communications :-
(a) Land: Type of roads, future improvements,bridges, etc*
(b) Sea: Anchorage, shipping, service maintained.
(c) Air: Airfields, services maintained.
(d) Summary of communications in relation to attendance 
at meetings, supplies for council works, etc.
P. Present Avenues of Economic Production:-
(a) List each cash crop, amount being produced, numbers of bearing trees, numbers of new plantings.
(b) Existing marketing arrangements*
(c) Degree of wage labour*
(d) Co-operative and private activity in consumer field. 
Potential for Increased or New Forms of Production:-
(a) Potential for increased plantings of existing cash 
crops.
(b) Land availability and suitability.
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(c) Investigation introduction of new cash crop or 
activities, e.g. fishing ventures, (after consultation with Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries representatives),
(d) Increased activity in wage labour field.
H. Ability to Pay tax:-
This particular section must be covered fully with a 
thorough examination of the present economic position of people.
(a) Statistics in the form of balance sheets, annual 
rebate details from existing co-operative societies.
(b) Trading information from private traders if 
available.
(c) Figures on copra production if available from Copra 
Marketing Board.
(d) Turnover of goods at native markets.
(e) Collections made to various charities, etc.
(f) Cash crop tree counts.
(g) Spot checks on various individual incomes, include 
entrepreneurs and ordinary village persons.
(h) Wages casual labour, etc.
The above information will give the surveying officer 
an appreciation of the average annual income per head and enable some estimate of the tax to be paid and the amount of 
revenue to be expected.
I. Availability of Technical Skills:-
it
List artisans available.
J. Availability of Clerical Skills:-
Bearing in mind that standard IX is generally regarded 
as the most desirable qualifications, although lesser qualified students or persons may be accepted.
7 O 8
(a) Outline of methods used by surveying officer in 
determining attitudes.
(b) Voting statistics and mode of voting, where voting 
has been necessary to ascertain the peoples* wishes*
(c) Attitude of various factions within the community*
L* Recommendations
(a) Proposed constitution, including size of 
electorates and representation*
(b) Ability of existing staff to implement the 
recommendations•
(c) Map: Listing all villages, missions, plantations, 
roads, etc* and clearly indicating the boundaries of the proposed council area*
3* The District Officer must make firm recommendations 
on proposals submitted by the surveying officer, adding any 
comments he may wish to make*
K. Attitude of the Population to Local Government:-
(A.A* Roberts) Director.
APPENDIX E
NATIVE REGULATIONS, 1939 — VfLZA(yi66kW^Q
155*-(1*) The Village Constables shall be appointed by the Government Secretary and may be dismissed by him for any offence or misconduct*
(2*) The Village Constable shall deal justly and kindly with the people and shall always obey the lawful orders of 
the Government Secretary and the Magistrates* He shall not oppress the people* Any person or persons having reason to 
complain of any misconduct or wrongdoing on the part of a 
Village Constable may report him to the Magistrate, stating the subject-matter of the complaint and it shall not be 
lawful for the Village Constable to prevent or hinder in any way whatever any person from going to the Magistrate to 
make a lawful complaint against such Village Constable*
(3*) No Village Constable shall arrest any person 
unless he truly believes that such person has committed an 
offence against the law*
(U.) If he arrests a person he must take him without 
delay to the nearest Magistrate for trial*
(5*) If a Village Constable accepts a present or bribe to release a person he has arrested he shall on conviction 
be liable to a fine not exceeding Three pounds or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding Six months, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding Six months*
(6*) The Lieutenant-Governor will decide from time to time the amount of pay each Village Constable shall receive; 
each Village Constable will also be supplied with such 
uniforms and equipment as are necessary*
(7.) If a Village Constable gives away or otherwise disposes of any part of his uniform or other Government 
property entrusted to his care he shall on conviction be liable to a p e n a lty  not exceeding Two pounds or in default 
of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding Pour months, or to imprisonment in the first instance for 
any period not exceeding Pour months*
(8*) If any person is found in possession of any part of a Village Constable's uniform or any clothing closely
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resembling a Village Constable’s uniform or representing himself to be a Village Constable he shall on conviction be 
liable to a penalty not exceeding Two pounds or in default 
of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding 
Four months, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding Pour months.
(9.) If a Village Constable arrests any person for any offence he may call upon any other Village Constable or any native to assist him in taking such person before a Magistrate and if necessary for that purpose to supply 
canoes and act as crew thereof# Remuneration for such 
assistance shall be subsequently made by the Magistrate at the rate for the time being fixed in the case of carriers 
under Regulation 127 (6.) (7*)* £*or the use of a canoe payment shall be similarly made at a rate not exceeding a 
rate fixed by the Lieutenant-Governor. If any Village 
Constable or any native refuses or neglects without justifiable excuse to comply with the requirements of the arresting Village Constable when so called upon he shall 
on conviction be liable to a penalty not exceeding Thirty shillings and in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding Three months, or to imprisonment in 
the first instance for any period not exceeding Three months.
(10.) Village Constables are empowered to arrest 
offenders inside or outside the limits of their own districts.
(11.) Any Village Constable wilfully disobeying a lawful order of the Government Secretary or a Magistrate or his superior officer, or wilfully neglecting to carry 
out any of the duties imposed upon him under these regula­tions, or under any other regulations hereafter made under the Native Regulation Ordinance. 1908-1930, shall on conviction be liable to a penalty not exceeding One pound 
or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not 
exceeding Two months, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding Two months.
(12.) The powers and authorities conferred upon Village 
Constables by these or any further regulations made under 
the Native Regulation Ordinance. 1908-1930, are also conferred upon native members of the Royal Papuan 
Constabulary.
FEDERAL MINISTERS IN CHARGE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
— --PAPUA7Tl^TM5'r^ : i 90^  TaFTER MILE^ ' AlliTpnT----
5. 7.1905 - 1U*11*1916 : Minister for External Affairs.
1U.11.1916 - 17. 2.1917 : Minister for Home Affairs.
17. 2.1917 - 9*12.1928 : Minister for Horae and Territories,
10.12.1928 - 26. 6.19U1 : Prime Minister (during thisperiod the P.M. delegated control 
of territories to a succession of 
13 other Ministers).
26. 6.19U1 - 19.12.19U9 : Minister for External Territories(for last six years portfolio held by Minister for Transport).
19.12.19U9 - 11. 5.1951 : Minister for External Affairs andfor External Territories.
11* 5*1951 - : Minister for Territories.
Departmental arrangements sometimes differed slightly from
what might be indicated by ministerial responsibility.
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Ch. 1(c)
Ch.I(d)
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
The term ’Native Administration’s is used 
in the rather restricted sense in which it has 
been defined by Lord Hailey, having particular 
reference here to the ways in which natives 
have participated in ’procedures of local 
administration'
The jurisdiction of the Western Pacific High 
Commission was found inadequate everywhere; 
this inadequacy was particularly marked in New 
Guinea before and under the protectorate, 
because of the lack of chiefs.
Under Sir William MacGregor’s administ­
ration of the colony the search for chiefs who 
could be made responsible for co-operation 
with government continued for a time; initially , 
MacGregor sought to adapt methods and in- '
stitutions from Fiji. The delegation of res­
ponsibility to Government Chiefs proved tedious 
and unsuccessful. Local control through 
appointed village constables was accepted as 
a substitute. MacGregor was so involved with 
pacification - to some extent involuntarily - 
that a simple police system was found expedient. 
With a small European staff of poor quality, 
it seemed to offer relatively easy and un­
complicated control.
In the period 1898-1908 central control of 
pacification techniques deteriorated, and the 
trend to direct police rule accelerated; a co­
rollary was the total eclipse of the Govern­
ment Chiefs.
1) Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Terri-
tories, IV, pp.i, 1,
Sir Hubert Murray had as his first task the 
close regulation of pacification. In addition, 
pressures for settler development forced the 
rapid extension of the frontier. These 
factors, in relation to insufficient funds 
and staff, inhibited the evolution of new 
methods of native administration. Indeed, the 
hurried appointment of village constables came 
to be looked on in hope (or desperation) as
the talisman of law and order*
After 1918, when systems of native tax and
of native plantations were introduced, the 
deficiencies of the simple village constable 
system became progressively more patent. This 
led to experiments with non-statutory village 
councillors and assessors. A few enlightened 
officers, and the missions, conscious of social 
stresses for which native administration did 
not provide, even initiated approaches to 
native councils and courts. Murray's adminis­
trative preconceptions, essentially assimil- 
ationist, precluded any real or substantial 
delegation to natives.
Murray's death and the war brought a period 
of re-thinking. Increasing centralisation of 
control in Australia opened the way for a new 
group not steeped in 'the Murray tradition' to 
exert influences methods similar to the British 
Native Authority system were mooted. En­
trenched opposition and the traditional con­
ceptions eventually proved too strong, however, 
Native local government, as implemented, thus 
constituted only a segment of the more com­
prehensive system of native administration
▼originally projected; in particular, the element 
of devolution was rejected. In part this derived, 
conceptually, from the paradoxical reserve shown 
the few traditional authorities by MacGregor and 
Murray* Moreover, actual delegation of powers 
and functions to councils was slight; they became 
Administration instrumentalities, while a policy 
of centralizing without a centralizing of policy 
strangled local initiative.
Until 1956, when local government extension 
became accepted policy, councils were established 
in response to local pressures. Opposition within 
and outside the Administration, together with the 
primary emphasis on executive training (the two 
being inter-related) implied that councils were 
established only in carefully surveyed areas. The 
Ch. VI legacy of the long-standing village official
system meant that initially many tiny 'parishes' I 
(traditional political units) within a projected 
area had to be persuaded to confederate, and that 
there were almost no natives capable of assuming 
executive responsibility. Ideally councils were 
set up only where adequate cohesion and economic 
potential existed; but this principle often gave 
way in the fact of political and other factors.
Centralization and the non-traditional approach 
of the Administration to native local government 
tended to emasculate local authority which 
Chs. VII-IX councils or councillors sought to assume. This 
was particularly noticeable in the legislative 
sphere. Political tension developed in certain 
areas.
vi
Even in the executive sphere, the lack of an 
Ch. VIII integrated approach by central government frus­
trated co-operation by councils in developmental 
responsibilities, although they had notable 
achievements in the erecting of buildings, the 
sinking of wells, etc. Forms of co-operation 
were slowly and painfully worked out with the 
central Education and Health Departments.
Broadly, however, the disorganization and delay 
to which many councils were subjected, together 
with the discouragement by central government of 
Chs. IX—X political expression through local government, 
often eroded interest, inhibited the assumption 
of local responsibility and thereby perpetuated 
reliance on central government. Paternal welfare 
was accepted by government as a substitute for
►(rationale: as a preparation for) administrative
devolution. (The analogy with former Belgian
policy is striking). This emphasis, inter alia.
also frustrated approaches to other forms of2Ch. XI local government.
2) For a more complete outline of various aspects of my argu­
ment, see mv articles listed in the Bibliography, III, b,
(i) and (ii), especially Hative Local Government in New Guineas Its Functions and^roblems, J.A.A.. XÏÏI. 5. 1961. pp.ié5-74. (This was written in 1Ô60-- a Ÿew of the views expressed there are slightly modified in the thesis).
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9 0 
5 
0 JO 
2 0 
8 45 
9 0 
9 '° 9 25 
9 5 
0 45 
6 45 
8 0 
6 40 
5 5 
5 40 
9 5 
4 0 
B 55 
9 20 
6 ,o 
9 0 
8 0 
5 5 
5 25 
50 
9 40 
9 05 
7 5 
7 0 
7 0 
7 0 
5 0 
6 00 
B 40 
4 35 
4 35 
2 10 
4 40 
5 40 
6 25 
0 30 
9 00 
6 30 
5 05 
0 0 
4 00 
5 50 
4 25 
7 25 
6 40 
6 30 
6 30 
3 25 
5 55 
9 05 
0 40 
0 05 
6 55 
6 55 
2 40 
0 
8 55 
5 00 
6 45 
9 5 
9 40 
5 00 
2 00 
6 20 
30 
5 55 
7 55 
6 25 
3 45 
9 20 
• 
Cecilia R 
Central Ila 
Central Ra 
Coriey Peak 
Chalmers Port 
Chamberlain M 
Chamb L 
Chnpma.n Mt 
Chet o a 
Cheehunt B 
Cheater.rield C 
Ch nibU 
Ch na 8 
hina.pel 
Ch iao l B 
Cho eeul I 
Chuave 
Ci cular R.r 
Clarence Mt 
Clay R 
Clayton Pt 
Cliff Pt 
Cloudy B 
Cockburn Ia 
Cockburn Rf' 
Cooon ut Ia 
Collingwood B 
Coomodore B 
Concordia C 
Condor Pt 
Condor Pt 
Conflict Orou:p 
Coo.it Rf 
C Ok Sh 
Coral Ha en 
Coral Sea 
Co ghl.an Hr 
Cowa C~oek Miaa n 
Crab I 
Crate L 
CaterMn 
Crater Ft 
Cretin c 
Croiai lea C 
Cromwell Mtna 
Crown I 
Crown Prince Ra 
Crwnne Pks 
Cullen Ft 
Cumberlam:i Paa.a 
Cunninghrui:i C 
Cupola C 
Co:clopa ldtna 
Dabi 
Dugi R 
Dagis R 
Dagoi 
Dague 
Dahun1 
Daketaua L 
D Albe tis Dome 
D A bert Fni fax 
Group 
Os lma Hr 
Dalua 
D' = 
Dn ipicr C 
Dronpi Str 
Dsnf'u 
Darai 1 la 
Dark Hil Pt 
Darnley T 
Daru 
o=u 
Darubi11 
Dauan I 
Daul:!. 
DaU.'ll li!t 
'Dav umbu L 
Daware 
Dn son C 
Dawson I 
Dawson Str 
Dnyman Mt 
Deba 
Deboyne Ia 
Deboyne Lgn 
De e:ption B 
Dedele Pt 
Deedee a 
Deeds I 
Daijei radi Pass 
Oa o 
Delena 
Deliverance C 
Deliverance I 
Denrta 
D Entrecaateawi; Ia 
Deaauma 
Deunia 
Dewade 
Dibiri I 
Dibou 
Dickson Mt 
Didana Ra 
Digaragara I 
Dig1lnu R 
Digoel 01'!b 
Digoel R 
Digoel R Oos 
Dim1ri 
Dimiaiai 
Dinga C 
D o' 
Direction Pt 
Dirilm 
Djeruen c 
Dobodura 
Dore.au 
Dogura 
Dogwa 
Do omakae B 
D mo 
Do= 
Do= 
Dama Pka 
Dama.rs 
Domong 
Doppel Rf 
Dorf Ft 
Dorf'er B 
Doro I 
Double Mtn 
Dovo 
Dove Pt 
Dowar I 
Dreikikir 
Dremsel Mt 
Duau Mt 
Ducha.teau Ent 
Duchateau I 
Due e -C 
DFaue~t 
Dgoig! 
Dugume u I 
Dui ken Pt 
Duke o York Group 
Duke of' York I 
Du Cie R 
Dumaga B 
ow"'"'"~ Dumo lin Is 
"-Duncan Is 
Dunge eaa I 
Dungenesa Rr 
Duperre Its 
Dyaul 
Dyke Ackland B 
Eagle P 
East c 
East C 
East Cay 
East I 
East Pt 
Eb ala 
""'~ E:bora C 
Edwarda Banke 
Ee o June R 
Eel Rf 
Efafan 
Efogi 
Egwo I 
Ei R 
E andora Mtn 
Eleoa 
Eleonora. B 
Eleva.la R 
Eli abeth B 
Ellaneo an I 
Eloa R 
Elosue I 
Elobe 
Emsnanua I 
Embi M 
Enbor 
Emell ne B 
Emerald R1' 
Em-
Emira I 
Emo 
E!l1}leror Ra 
Empress Augusta B 
8m''Y' 
Endaia.dere C 
Endea Ol.U' Str 
Ensineer Group 
Entrnnce C 
Eoro 
EP• 
Epo 
Epoko I 
Era B 
Era R 
Erap 
Erap Mt 
Erep R 
Ersve R 
Erima Hr 
Erimbe 
Er1mbsri Mt 
Erkokon C 
'Eroro C 
'Errittau 
Eruk Mt 
'Eaa ala 
Es1a R 
Esperance C 
Est ell.a B 
Let ~ 
6 00 
5 00 
6 25 
5 25 
8 05 
8 5 
4 0 
8 co 
3 50 
0 0 
0 00 
6 00 
0 35 
3 5 
6 40 
7 00 
6 05 
3 25 
9 55 
4 40 
7 35 
8 20 
0 0 
50 
50 
0 05 
9 20 
s 30 
2 40 
4 05 
4 35 
0 45 
0 20 
0 0 
0 
2 05 
9 5 
0 5 
00 
7 00 
6 30 
5 20 
6 40 
4 50 
6 20 
5 05 
6 25 
6 45 
55 
0 5 
5 40 
8 05 
2 25 
9 40 
5 45 
5 55 
4 20 
3 25 
0 30 
5 OG 
5 00 
B 5 
3 35 
25 
3 5 
6 00 
5 30 
4 0 
7 05 
9 35 
9 35 
9 05 
9 05 
9 55 
9 25 
5 30 
' 25 7 35 
8 40 
9 40 
0 25 
9 4 
9 50 
0 5 
0 45 
0 45 
7 55 
0 5 
9 50 
0 30 
0 
5 30 
8 50 
25 
9 30 
2 20 
9 30 
40 
8 30 
8 05 
8 0 
9 30 
8 05 
9 30 
9 20 
6 30 
5 05 
7 05 
5 5 
9 00 
8 35 
20 
5 30 
9 05 
9 05 
3 20 
8 45 
6 25 
0 05 
8 5 
3 50 
9 20 
0 05 
6 00 
5 55 
0 0 
6 55 
3 20 
5 30 
5 55 
8 20 
4 40 
9 20 
4 35 
9 55 
3 35 
2 G 
6 55 
20 
5 
0 5 
3 
0 30 
B 50 
2 30 
4 0 
4 0 
2 05 
0 
6 0 
0 55 
5 50 
0 0 
9 50 
9 55 
0 
2 55 
9 00 
0 35 
0 5 
4 5 
0 25 
0 20 
6 50 
7 30 
5 20 
0 35 
7 45 
6 35 
' 30 6 55 
9 0 
9 25 
8 05 
6 30 
40 
5 30 
6 0 
' 50 7 50 
7 40 
40 
5 35 
40 
5 20 
4 40 
s 30 
0 40 
5 05 
40 
9 00 
5 45 
6 20 
6 0 
B 40 
0 50 
0 35 
2 20 
9 0 
8 45 
8 40 
0 55 
7 0 
20 
6 35 
6 15 
6 35 
6 40 
5 27 
5 30 
6 0 
3 50 
8 50 
6 55 
7 30 
9 45 
5 20 
9 5 
7 55 
49 50 
50 50 
53 05 
44 0 
52 05 
55 5 
45 0 
44 45 
52 30 
159 40 
5 
43 30 
46 20 
47 35 
5 55 
7 35 
46 05 
50 00 
49 45 
4 40 
52 45 
4 40 
46 35 
49 40 
50 55 
49 35 
43 40 
45 20 
49 40 
5 35 
45 00 
50 00 
48 30 
154 50 
55 0 
49 45 
48 25 
42 5 
5 5 
50 0 
48 40 
46 45 
46 30 
53 0 
44 45 
"' 50 46 40 
46 40 
l.i6 40 
43 55 
45 45 
45 55 
45 0 
52 30 
48 5 
44 5 
45 55 
150 50 
5 40 
59 45 
59 5 
E "" Etti 
Eunai ;aun Mtn 
E tao 
Expec a ion Str 
Fae au I 
Fai C 
Faiun Mt 
Fango. a a B 
Fora I 
Fathe Rt 
Fnther The 
F ro I 
Fsven Mt 
Feda 'b Ia 
Feni Ia 
Ferguson Rt' 
Ferguaaon I 
Fi integu 
Fin ater e Ra 
Finachhafen 
Finuana I 
Flinders Ent 
Florida I 
Ply R 
Fly R North Ent 
Fly Il South Ent 
Po:ro Fofo 
Forbes Ia 
Porater C 
Franaeak C 
Frere C 
Freehwo.te B 
Frieda Mtn 
Fr eda R 
F~ endahip C 
Fulnk ra Pt 
Pul bor Hr 
Fuol 
L~ B 
0 00 
4 
30 
25 
5 00 
9 00 
2 25 
5 20 
2 50 
8 05 
3 55 
5 00 
6 55 
6 55 
2 20 
4 00 
2 "' 9 30 
6 5 
5 50 
6 35 
B 05 
9 40 
9 05 
7 45 
8 30 
6 30 
8 35 
2 
"' 3 5 
0 05 
8 05 
4 25 
4 l5 
6 45 
8 20 
6 0 
3 25 
Gabba I 9 45 
Gabenais 6 4D 
Onbwina I 8 20 
Gsdnieu o 20 
Go.gan 5 5 
Gaga.ria 3 .3C 
Gagi I 7 25 
Geho 5 35 
Gai R 5 30 
Osle 940 
GGimll. 8 20 
Gali 5 4-5 
Gnllego Mt 9 20 
Gallon Rf 2 3J 
Gallows Rf o 20 
Oama R 7 50 
Gama.eke 9 00 
Oo. iongga 8 05 
Ganongga I 8 05 
OaaM 62 
Ga. aina 7 50 
Gsrer B 4 O 
Gaea 800 
Ourove I 4 40 
Gal'"Ua I 5 20 
Gasmata I 6 20 
Gate e Mt 7 50 
Gatu.k:ai l 8 45 
Gt\ut't're C 5 30 
Oauee Pt 4~ 
Oavuvu 5 30 
Gavuvu R 5 35 
Gaws I 9 00 
Gaze le C 4 20 
Gazelle Chan 2 50 
Ga elle Hr 6 30 
Gazelle Peninsula 4 35 
Geahusjei I 4 5 
Gehuu o 20 
Oeleide Geb 4 30 
Gerhards C 6 45 
GSI'"Up 6 0 
Gesoa 8 25 
GijUnabeana le 35 
Oiluwe Mt 6 05 
Gitll\'!B. B 8 55 
Ginada 9 o 
Ginetu T 9 30 
Gingala 6 O 
G s R 8 
G1rgir C 3 50 
Giua.R 850 
Giena 805 
Gia 945 
GoI 805 
Gi;:oSr 80 
Glwnia Castle o C 
Glasgow Po t o 20 
Glendako Mt 6 05 
Glibu 8 5 
G ouceater C 5 25 
Gnao 9 0 
Goari Mt 9 20 
Goaribar1 I 7 45 
Ood1 o o 
Goeia 6 45 
Gogol. R 5 0 
Goger 5 55 
Gold e Rt' 9 0 
Goldie R 9 5 
Gorn 5 35 
Gomai I 7 05 
Gona 8 35 
Goodeno gh B 9 55 
Ooodenoug)l. I 9 20 
Gora 9 0 
Goren.do 5 oo 
Goin 520 
Goroka 6 05 
Gose wn Str o O 
GodoC 425 
Oowar R 5 35 
Grsah Pt 5 50 
Granswe Pt 9 55 
Grass Pt 5 40 
Great Detached RI' 45 
Great Di iding Ra 2 20 
Great North li!aat Chan 9 30 
Great Fapuan Plateau 6 30 
Green Ia 4 25 
Green Mt 8 25 
Green Rl er 3 55 
Grenvt le C 2 oo 
Orey Mt 9 00 
Orime R 2 30 
Groaee Mt 7 05 
Guadalcanal I 9 o 
Guam R 4 35 
Ouaaopa Hr 9 5 
Guaugurina O 35 
Oua gurina B o 40 
(1Ub(\Ill 8 40 
Gubiatta 6 55 
Qugum 8 00 
Gum.int R 0 20 
Gurap 5 25 
Gurimntu 6 45 
O=u.t' 6 25 
Ouaak 6 20 
Guaap R 5 55 
Gwadarab I 8 20 
Omku 8 5 
G om 6 0 
Haddon Mt 
Hagen Mt 
Hagen_ Ra. 
Hagupa P11aa 
Hahl Mt 
Hal.r Way r 
Hall Sound 
Hamilton Chan 
Har.mend l 
Hanahan 
Hnneeauo I 
Hanieoh Hr 
Hankow R:r 
Hanpan C 
Hanaa B 
Han.a Me er Ra 
Hargy L 
Haatinge I 
Hae inga Rt' 
Hna;:ll.l'd Ia 
f atea I 
auser R 
Haws.in R 
Hawoi R 
Reath B 
Hegigio or Kikori R 
Heina Ia 
Rela Pt 
Hele Ia 
Helmholtz Pt 
Hembi 
Henienal!ei I 
Henganot'1 
Henry a 
Henelow C 
He:pa 
Herber Mt 
Herbert Hoover L 
Hercules B 
Hermit la 
Haron l 
Herzog Mt 
Heaaen B 
Higgins Pt. 
High I 
Hi na.1 B 
Hindenburg Ra 
Jl:ia u 
Hixon B 
Ho king Patch.ea 
Holland.is 
Hollman C 
Holnicote B 
Home Ia 
Hon I 
Hood B 
Hooo Pt 
Hopo1 
florden R 
Horn I 
Horno Ia 
Hoskins C 
Hughes 1l 
ttuhunati I 
Hula 
Hull I 
5 55 
5 40 
5 -5 2 
7 5 
0 0 
B 5' 
7 2 
0 " 
5 ' 8 5 
6 4' 
4 " 5 0 
4 0 
4 20 
5 20 
0 20 
9 50 
0 3 
4 35 
4 00 
3 3 
7 00 
9 0 
6 40 
05 
6 05 
B 5C 
5 3 
6 20 
0 
6 5 
0 40 
9 55 
7 " 5 40 
7 5 
7 50 
30 
6 4 
7 20 
5 45 
20 
"' 5 5 
9 " 4 55 
0 " 2 30 
5 00 
B 35 
2 00 
5 40 
0 0" 
10 05 
6 45 
3 50 
0 35 
2 0 
5 25 
9 25 
3 25 
0 0 
0 " 
Lol}!i E 
49 45 
40 20 
49 0 
49 40 
5 0 
Humboldt B 
Hunotein Mtn 
Huns e n Ra 
H.ner C 
Hunter Pt 
Hunter R 
Huon Gul 
Huon Peninsula 
iluriUa Mt 
Hyane Hr 
Iago I 
Ial bu 
Ialibu M 
lama.vs M 
Iamiga 
Iar Mt 
Iaro !! 
Iaupolo 
Tharto nbek 
IbM 
lbU'e ~t 
lilakemenai 
Idenbu.rg R 
le Hille 
Ie Inlet 
I-
I eta 
Igili 
Ihu 
Iku 
I ni I 
I lop 
Imbert I 
lmbini Mt 
!nib o 
Imi a 
In o ena 
lnaporok 
Inuuaia 
Indiapenaable St 
Indiwi R 
Ingia 
Ini I 
Inael C 
Ioke!l 
Io~ 
Iomeg 
Iongai 
Io ' Iou l 
lows R 
Iowa. R 
Ip R 
Ipiai Pt 
I in uru 
Iron Bottom Sound 
lrupt 
Isagu 
Ieitm.U'igar k Mt 
laina 
Isuieu 
Ieumrud S r 
I 1h C 
Ito I 
I o L 
vori R 
n I 
Iwaia 
Iwewe 
Jaba C 
Jacquinot B 
Jaoqu not C 
Jagol R 
Jaka Mt ,_ 
Jamal.aura I 
Japai 
'=• Jnrdi IC R 
Jari I 
J= R 
Jaroe 
Je ai B 
Jer ia r 
Jib lge 
Jlmni R 
Jitibu 
Johan A brec t Hr 
Johna o 
Joma.rd Ent 
Joru:tngge M n 
Jooeph1Jtaal 
Jouve.ney I 
Jukas Pt 
Juliana Geb 
Ju1ie H 
June or Ee R 
Ko R 
Ksbakadaa 
Kabangama Mt 
Kabineeu 
Kablungu C 
Ksbukeai I 
Ke.buli 
Kadai I 
Kaila a I 
Kae unga 
Kni 
Kaia pit 
Kaibola 
Kaigulan 
Kaileuna I 
Knim R 
Kaima i 
Kainant 
KaiJl'U 
Kairiru I 
Kai uku 
Kaiaia 
Kaiti I 
KaiVll 
Kaka L 
Kakasi;i 
llal.naa 
Kali B 
Kali Bay 
Ka11gole P 
Kalingum 
Kalo 
Ke.lo Kale 
Kambot 
Kamdara Tg 
Kamhiayer Mt 
K<•i 
··-Kanapu I Knndarisa 
Kanclrian 
Kaniet le 
Kanu Pt 
Kanuwe C 
Ka.page e 
Kapakapa 
Ke.pal 
Kapuu R 
Ka:piui a R 
Kapau Pt 
Kapu.ri 
Kapur R 
Kar aka 
Karau 
Karauw 
Knrswnri R 
Kareeba R 
"""-Ko i 
Kar ava 
Karinrui Mt 
Karinrui Plateau 
Knrtaoa 
Knriua Ra 
Karkar I 
K.aru B 
Koruk'N 
Kasal.sea 
Kase 
Kao1lamo.ka PaBs 
Ksubi 
Kaugel R 
Kau Kau B 
Ka llcs.uai 
Kaul 
Ko p 
Kaur a 
Kaut 
Knutopan c 
Kaveiniu Paea 
Kavieng 
.,,_ 
Kawa I 
Kawai Pt 
JCawal.iap 
Ke win 
Kavrulikiau I 
Kay Rf 
Kaye Mt 
Kenbunns. 
Keakoro 'B 
Kegel Mt 
Ke l Keia Rt 
KeUa I 
Keivt C 
Keka 
Kelnnoa 
Kela Kav.t.a 
Kelanoe. ID-
Kelaua (Ir 
Kele Inuna Pt 
·~· Kanibul Kem:p Welch R 
Kenaria 
Xenevi Mt 
Kenibagul 
Kenoa 
Kepler Pt 
KePJ>el Pt 
Keppel Ft 
Keram R 
Keravnt 
Xerejs llt 
·~­Kererna B 
Kereru Ra 
Kerews, Mt 
ICm"owagi 
.. ~ 
L~t S 
2 35 
4 30 
4 30 
9 50 
4 25 
9 
7 05 
6 25 
5 45 
2 00 
' 5 6 20 
6 5 
5 55 
8 5 
6 45 
6 30 
9 35 
0 
5 55 
6 35 
9 5 
3 45 
7 55 
7 55 
8 00 
5 25 
5 0 
7 55 
4 5 
0 45 
' 55 00 
30 
2 55 
0 00 
B 20 
8 5 
8 40 
8 25 
7 35 
0 
7 35 
4 40 
8 25 
8 20 
6 30 
B 35 
9 0 
7 00 
7 0 
5 30 
5 05 
8 00 
4 00 
9 5 
9 c 
8 00 
4 50 
6 25 
0 35 
4 40 
0 35 
0 35 
8 05 
5 25 
30 
8 45 
8 0 
' 05 
6 20 
5 35 
5 35 
5 20 
5 40 
3 55 
5 30 
2 50 
9 0 
05 
8 55 
B 50 
8 0 
9 0 
0 00 
6 00 
5 20 
4 55 
40 
2 25 
5 
30 
4 45 
8 45 
7 5 
4 45 
4 05 
6 '° 
6 05 
' 55 6 00 
4 05 
6 20 
00 
2 0 
8 20 
3 35 
6 20 I 5g 
8 25 
6 00 
8 30 
6 40 
7 45 
6 5 
6 25 
3 20 
8 50 
6 35 
0 40 
7 30 
7 45 
9 20 
6 0 
2 05 
2 05 
0 0 
' 30 0 00 
9 25 
4 20 
2 20 
7 30 
6 5 
3 25 
B 20 
B 35 
6 5 
0 55 
2 55 
7 00 
9 50 
9 50 
8 35 
35 
5 5 
2 40 
8 5 
8 5 
7 40 
3 4 
40 
4 45 
40 
9 0 
6 35 
7 25 
6 30 
6 30 
9 05 
5 55 
4 40 
3 30 
8 40 
4 55 
8 45 
8 50 
5 55 
6 0 
0 35 
6 50 
4 35 
3 50 
9 00 
2 45 
5 05 
5 30 
2 35 
6 30 
8 30 
9 40 
2 05 
2 45 
2 30 
2 5 
5 25 
6 35 
0 0 
5 05 
0 
5 25 
6 55 
7 20 
6 OG 
5 55 
6 00 
2 05 
0 05 
5 5 
5 55 
9 45 
8 5 
9 05 
4 50 
B 20 
5 35 
0 0 
9 20 
4 25 
4 20 
6 30 
8 00 
8 00 
7 OS 
6 00 
5 50 
8 30 
Logs E 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO GEOGRAPHIC/\L NAMES 
show ng Gwgraph1cal Nan es used and the r locations hsted by Lat tude and Long tude to the nearest f ve m1nuteR 
Keaawai 
Kesuru 
Ketakel'"Ua B 
"' Kirung1 
Kiau Pt 
Kibiriai Pt 
K bu I 
Kibu.li 
Kido 
K ep P t 
K eta 
Kieta Penina a 
Kiko i 
K kori R 
Kiko r Hegigio R 
K la. Kila 
Kilia 
Kilinailau Ia 
Killerton C 
Killerton Iii 
Kiloma I 
Kilu 
Ki~ 
Kinlbe B 
Kimbe I 
Kimutil I 
Kinegi 
""" King C Kins William c 
Kinim 
K mpo 
Kiriwina I 
Ki twins a 
KiI'iWo 
ltirk R1' 
Kies. 
Kitu a I 
Kitumal!!. Pt 
Kiunga 
Kiwai I 
Klot1: Pk 
Kon bu 
Ko~ 
Koas C 
Koembe 
Kocn!be R 
Koena 
Jroh.o.ri Hille 
Koil I 
Kora 
Kokoda 
Koko po 
Kola 
Kolo Lgn 
Kologilo Paae 
Kolombangara I 
Komalea:I. Pt 
Komalu B 
Kombuna 
Komewu C 
Komg 
Komolua 
Komp~ 
Konoga ang M 
Kono go go 
Konoe 
Ko:pagn 
Kornpu 
Korate 
K reom ( ~t 
Ko igole Hr 
Koriomoro Pt 
Kor aata 
Korogo 
K:oromtra Pt 
Koroaa.me i a 
Koehidn Mt 
Kos lanta 
Kosmann I 
Kotari 
Ko~ 
K anket I 
Kratke Ra 
Kr au 
Kre s Rf' 
Kr """ Kuano.k I 
Kubari Mt 
Kubor Mt 
Kub r Ra 
K Owni C 
Ku'buna R 
Kudawaga 
Kul 
Kukipi 
Ku1a Gulf' 
Kul R 
Kul.u.mada.u 
Kumade i Rf' 
K\l!lfbak Mt 
Kum'ba.ka e 
Kunibalup 
Kllllibi vera Mt 
Kunhoro C 
""'"" Kumusi Pt 
Kumu.s1 R 
Kundurumbangara Pt 
Kung I 
Kungga n B 
I< nil'rla pa 
Kunimaipe. R 
KU1Jal' P 
K per Rs 
Kurnt P.u 
Ku ea 
K=w 
Kutubu L 
Ku anmaa L 
Kuyau I 
Kwaiawata I 
Kwn oa 
Kwatpoma.ta Pt 
Kwarana 
Kw= 
Kwaaang 
Kwato 
Kweh 
Kwerok Mt 
Kwinia L 
Kwoi C 
Labau 
Lob 
La bu 
Labur B 
Loo 
"""" La.gage B Lnge.ip R 
Lagoon Rf' 
Luhaye C 
Lai R 
Laiaga."11 
Laiana Ghan 
Luiana I 
Lajaka 
Lakekamu R 
Lnloki 
Laloki R 
Laluai F 
L-
LMl!l.1'1 R 
Lamban B 
Lambert c 
L!llllbom 
Lambur 
Lamerika Pt 
Lametta 
Lamington Mt 
Larniaao B 
Lrunogai 
Lansemak B 
La:o:er Pt 
Lap&:u 
Laramn 
Laruma Pt 
Laaanga 
L!'l.e.ein1e 16 
LS.!!l'IU 
Lsgau B 
Lou 
Laua 
La an B 
Laugh1an Ia 
Launa 
L Averdy C 
Lawtk Rf 
Lawson Mt 
Laxton Rt' 
Leahy Mt 
Lea Lea 
Le bu 
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Salama 9 40 
Sal.at Str 4 00 
Salegoto 8 45 
Saue 710 
Barna la 25 
Samsrai 0 35 
Bamari 8 45 
Sama.ri I 8 40 
Bambi Hd 7 20 
Bamoe Hr 7 00 
Sampu.n 5 20 
Sanab ge Mt 6 20 
Banaroa I 9 35 
Sand I 4 35 
Sand R 
Sanihulinru I 
San M guel Is 
Banta Iaabe I 
Sante 
Sapau Mt 
"a ang 
Sarawakat Mt 
Ssreua.k B 
Sa 
Su i Mt 
Saribn I 
S= L 
S'll'Upai I 
Saruwaged Ra 
Baaa Pt 
Saasri Mt 
Sass. C 
Sasauia 
Snttelburg 
Sau R 
Bauli 
Sauk ea 
Sau a 
Sau.ren 
Savai R 
Ba o I 
Saw l.!tns 
Schar!'e ~ tn 
Schell ig C 
Schl.einitll. Ra 
S houten Ia 
S hrader Mt 
Sch:rader Mtn 
Schrader Ra 
S t'at hley Mt 
S re R 
Sealark Chan 
Sealarf Is 
Seb diro 
Sebut :I.a 
Sebutu:l.a B 
Sedema 
Beeadler lir 
Sege a 
Sek Hr 
Sek r 
Selapiu r 
Se epe 
Selic l 
Senibat:I. 
Sena C 
Sentani Meer 
senu R 
Bop 
Sep k R 
Sepik R 
Sepik Wahgi Di v:l.de 
Sepu 
Sermo R 
Serra Hills 
Sesepi 
Beta i 
,~, 
Se a B 
Sewai 
Sewn si ai B 
Seymour B 
Sharp I 
ShelbUPne B 
Sherburne Rf 
Short and I 
Bhungol Mt 
Sia.as Ia 
Sibium Mtna 
s dabs.du 
Sideia 
S emene C 
"'" S gul Muga.l Mt 
S .lorn. 
Bimber:I. 
Sinibe :1 I 
Bimbo I 
Siml ndon I 
3 mpson Mt 
S maim I 
S newit Mt 
3ingorka 
Bini 
S1o 
Sio I 
Si"PUl 
Sireb R 
Sireru R 
Sir1 C 
Siriken 
Si.l iua (Mt 
Sll'ot r 
Sisa Mt 
Siaa Mt 
Siaaga. Pt 
Sisaano 
Biasano Lgn 
Siaauie 
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Slade 1 
Smiths Pass 
Snake R 
Sos.ri R 
BbgerorBR 
Soeadja Tg 
Soebobbe 
Sogeram R 
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So ha no 
So anandiro Pt 
Solomon Ia 
Solomon Sea 
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Songgoto R 
Songhe 
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Sopeu 
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Southeast Pt 
Southwetlt B 
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Stett n B 
Sta ere a 
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Strachan I 
Strnthord Ia 
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Strictland R 
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'"" Bua.in 
Suaru ll 
"'"""' " 
'"'' Suau I 
Buckl ng C 
Suckling Mt 
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Sudeat C 
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8uf I 
Sugarloat' Mt 
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Sukara R 
Suki C 
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Sul R 
Sul i Ia 
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Su.loge Hr 
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Sueu 
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Su ware 
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Ta.gari R 
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Tahala I 
T'homa 
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Ta of I 
Taivo Pt 
Tul 
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Tnlaaea 
Talaaea Hr 
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Tanahmerah B 
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5 0 
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3 25 
9 5 
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5 25 
30 
7 5 
20 
7 0 
6 50 
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3 20 
6 40 
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2 50 
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4 35 
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6 5 
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30 
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9 05 
6 35 
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9 25 
6 3G 
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5 20 
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5 30 
9 30 
6 45 
2 50 
8 45 
6 40 
8 25 
6 05 
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N~o 
Tanahmersh Tg 
anahtinggi 
Tan tau Ft 
Tanga Ia 
Tang Mt 
Tantam Mt 
Tapini 
Tararu 
Tari 
Tari R 
T~ R 
Tarifuga 
Tia.rips, 
TB.l"obi 
Taroka Mt 
Tar on 
Tarua R 
Tal'"Uba. 
Taailiaki 
laaitel 
Taakul 
Tata.It I 
Ta.tel.a 
Tatau I 
Tstawa B 
T'u 
Tau.ri 
Tnuri R 
Tauu I 
Tauu Is 
Tav R 
Tswal Rf' 
Ta"'6 Ta a Mal R! 
Tawi Rf 
Tawui Ft 
Tebera L 
Tef'a I 
Tejokoh 
Telef'omin 
Temple B 
Tanch I 
Tendanye r 
To >d 
Teop Hr 
Terarrune. 
Terebu 
Terebu C 
Terema Mt 
Tetipari I 
Tewara I 
The Great Barrier Rt 
The Blot 
Thileniua C 
Thomson B 
Thousand Shipa B 
Three Sisters Tl e 
Thumb illt 
Thur wald Ra 
Thursday I 
Tia.re B 
Tidal I 
Tinibe R 
Timbri 
Timoe R 
Timono 
Ti-
Tingv;on Group 
Ti.ngwon I 
Ti:pisako 
Tirio 
Ti pit;: Mtna 
T ve Plateau 
Tiwi C 
Tosloko Pt 
Toboroi 
Toeairah 
Togo 
Togwna 
Tokona I 
Tolokiwa I 
T~ 
To= 
Tambe 
Tombu 
T-R 
Tonda 
Tong I 
O!>=' 
Toriu R 
Torkoro C 
Torleeae I 
Tur u R 
Torndn 
Tur kina 
Toro ina. Hr 
ror mbe 
Torres Str 
Torrieelli Mtna 
To tore 
Towi I 
Trefa gar Mt 
Treasury le 
Tree Pt 
Tri"" 
Triat L 
Trobriand I 
Trobriand le 
Trube Mt 
Taoi Boto I 
Tact Laununs I 
Taoma R 
Tua R 
TM~ I 
Tuboa I 
TM'1 
'l'ugiri 
Tuku:puli 
Tu ly Pke 
Tuma l 
Tungano L 
Tunguiha 
Tunnibu1i B 
Tupuaeleie 
Tura Oay-
TMr- R 
Tu.rama R 
TurBlilS R Del a of 
Turibomu I 
Turn.again l 
Turner C 
Turtle Head I Turu ., 
Twin r 
u- I 
Uapumba I 
"'" Uberi 
Ubo 
Udon Mt 
Uf'o I 
Uga Pt 
Uga R 
U amone 
Ulap 
u1, 
Ulawun Jat 
Ulirtgan 
Uluma Rt' 
Ulumam Mt 
u upu 
Ulu:pu.tu:r 
Ulu.r Mt 
U ti! Mtns 
Umboi (Rooke) I 
"""WruI UmuP-a. I 
'tlnana.i 
Unbarn Mt 
u ea r 
Un.gaJ.RbU H 
Ungerem 
Un Mt 
U:pie.rs 
Upoia 
Urndll Lgn 
U - I Ura.a I 
U swa R 
Urei R 
Urun 
Uaini 
Utu 
Utuha Hr 
o- ~ 
u 0 kt 
Uwero Rt' 
/ 
Vsilala 
Veilala R 
Vakuta 
Vskuta I 
Valit' I 
Vrun'bu I 
Vana:pa R 
Vangunu I 
Vangunu Mt 
Vanimo 
Vanirno H 
Vanuamai 
VO l 
Varoi R 
Val'"\lnga Pt 
Velaviuru 
Ve la. Gulf 
Vella Lave la I 
Ventenat C 
Venue Pt 
Verab 1 
Ve r n Ra 
V:la R 
Viai I 
Victor E ianu l Ra 
Victoria Mt 
Victory Mt 
Viken.are Pt 
VnaKkiMt 
V nall C 
Vincke Pt 
Vinegau 
Vio Inlet 
Virginia L 
Visuvieu Ft 
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Vito 
V ttora I 
V tu Ia 
Vogal I 
Vogel C 
Vokeo I 
Volupa1 
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6 20 
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2 30 
a " 6 40 
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4 40 
9 05 
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8 05 
7 35 
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7 25 
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8 35 
B 05 
9 25 
5 55 
5 
7 0 
" 35 7 55 
5 30 
6 05 
8 35 
4 40 
2 20 
9 40 
3 0 
5 s 
Loge E 
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60 25 
" 20 48 25 
49 05 
47 00 
55 25 
43 00 
42 45 
4 00 
42 55 
45 45 
50 50 
55 35 
53 o, 
43 50 
55 20 
159 35 
149 45 
50 25 
145 30 
150 05 
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52 05 
42 45 
46 0 
46 00 
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47 40 
52 20 
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53 25 
52 0 
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43 0 
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43 5 
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4 50 
43 50 
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46 45 
57 35 
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4 45 
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43 50 
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00 
4 40 
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5 55 
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155 40 
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43 50 
52 30 
47 40 
52 0 
56 05 
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43 25 
42 5 
4 35 
47 50 
50 5 
5 45 
5 20 
52 0 
5 0 
4 30 
55 05 
55 00 
55 05 
42 00 
" 20 48 55 
47 55 
49 0 
55 35 
150 05 
43 50 
47 00 
5 05 
5 05 
44 50 
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45 s 
44 40 
48 05 
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49 20 
43 20 
46 5 
46 50 
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60 25 
160 30 
59 50 
47 20 
4 25 
43 50 
43 O"i 
44 05 
43 45 
42 s 
52 00 
42 40 
43 20 
42 25 
5 00 
43 40 
50 40 
47 30 
48 45 
44 50 
56 00 
49 50 
49 40 
5 5 
47 0 
42 50 
5 20 
45 25 
00 
46 00 
43 0 
52 20 
47 25 
47 5 
47 55 
50 00 
J43.- 45 
55 25 
4 2 
49 0 
50 05 
4 0 
4 35 
42 40 
~45 30 
42 55 
44 40 
50 50 
46 45 
42 35 
47 5 
45 25 
45 35 
60 0 
48 25 
45 5 
55 55 
45 25 
45 25 
5 0 
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43 20 
49 5 
47 b 
58 00 
58 00 
4 20 
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46 0 
57 00 
4l 55 
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157 30 
56 50 
56 40 
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4£ 45 
59 35 
52 55 
49 35 
44 25 
4 35 
47 35 
49 05 
59 55 
57 30 
50 45 
47 5 
60 25 
57 0 
43 50 
57 30 
46 50 
55 25 
59 50 
9 25 
46 50 
50 05 
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50 00 
Vor Pt 
Vorua Pt 
Vrilya Pt 
Wabag 
Wabi 
Wabomst I 
Vabuda I 
Wadau 
Wadci 
Wadj 
Wege R 
Nagaau R 
Wagina I 
Ha go 
.,"' We:hgi R 
Wai R 
'liai Ketu {R) 
Va Menge (R) 
Waipal1 
Wai Pnyang (R) 
Wair ope 
Walwai 
Wakie 
Wakunai 
Wa arter Pt 
Wal.ya 
Warn L 
l'lamen I 
Womi 
W'M 
Wsnang R 
Wane. W na I 
~anderer B 
Wando 
Wangore E 
Wanigela 
Wanige a 
Wanim I 
Wnnopo 
Wan ipt 
Wantoat 
Wapa Rf 
Wapai 
'l\a:penamand.a 
Wnramung 
Warangoi B 
warapu 
Ward Hunt C 
Ward Hunt Str 
•=l Wari I 
Waria c 
Wa.ria R 
Warinsai 
Waro 
Warrior R!'a 
Waraong Pt 
Warun 
Waa1.mu I 
Waspimot B 
Wnaa Ku aa R 
Waeu 
We.awn 
Waeua Mtr. (Need.le 
Wata I 
Wat nm 
atswa 1 Rf' 
wate oa:p Mt) 
Waterfall B 
Watnela 
We.tan 1 
Wa ta C 
watut R 
Wet Wnt 
W.tl 
Waum C 
Wawiwa I 
Wawot R 
Wedge H 
Wednesday- I 
Weitin R 
Welcker Mt 
Walle I 
Weni C 
Wenlook R 
Wflat C 
West E t 
Weat Ent 
Weat Hr 
West 1 
West Pt 
West Ra 
Veatern Ent 
Vee er I 
Wewak 
Weymouth B 
Wharton Ra 
Whiteman Ra 
Wiakau I 
Wide B 
Wiel 
Wilhelm Mt 
Willaumez Peninaula 
W son Str 
W nter He ght 
Wisdom L 
··= W zard Rf 
Woe de 
Woer ng 
Wogamiah 
Woipuna 
Wokien 
Wok Lus.p (R 
Wombum 
Wombun 
Wongat 
Wongri Mtn 
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Woodlark I 
Wot' in 
Woaera 
Wose a 
Wre kB 
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""''° Wuro R 
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Yabuk 
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Yalingi R 
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Yane.ba I 
Ys.ndabome 
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Yangoru 
Ysningam 
Yankoki Mt 
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Yim"' 
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Yobu Pt 
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Yovo I 
Yowad 
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